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IMPLICATIONS OF 
CHANGES (Structural and Market) 
ON FARM MANAGEMENT 
AND MARKETING RESEARCH 
• Proceedings of a Conference held in Chicago, Ill., April 24, 26, 1967 
Sponsored by the 
Center for Agricultural and Economic Development, Iowa State University of Science 
and Technology 
In cooperation with the 
Farm Foundation- Chicago, Illinois the North Central Research Committee on Farm 
Management and the North Central Research Committee on Marketing . 
Obviously pleased at the successful turn out for the conference, the program 
planning committee included: (from left to right) John Redman, Glenn L. 
Johnson, Lowell Hill, John T. Scott Jr., Peter Helmberger, A. Gordon Ball, 
and James Hildreth. 
Notetaking was part of the conference as speakers gave the audience much 
"food for thought." Approximately 200 persons attended the 2 1/2 day meeting. 
iii 
PREFACE 
This conference was really an outgrowth of an earlier conference 
on Structural Changes in Commercial Agriculture (CAED Report 24) 
held in Chicago, April 12-14, 1965. While the earlier conference 
emphasized structural changes in the agricultural industry and their 
implications for education and extension, the 1967 conference focused 
on research. 
The conference was developed in two stages. The first stage con-
sisted of asking six people to prepare papers on market changes: three 
on the input markets and three on the product markets. These papers 
were presented on October 4, 1966 to a meeting of the North Central 
Farm Management Research Committee at the Farm Foundation in 
Chicago. The papers underwent critique and discussion after which 
they were revised. The revised papers plus the proceedings from the 
earlier Structural Conference then served as base papers or back-
ground information for all other papers prepared for this conference. 
The objective was, given these structural and market changes (out-
lined in the earlier structural conference and the six base papers on 
market changes), to focus on their implications for researchers in farm 
marketing, in marketing and in agricultural policy. In that way an op-
portunity would be provided for researchers in these three areas from 
all over United States and Canada to get together and explore the periphery 
of knowledge, assess its impact and project its meaning for the future. 
Invitations were extended, therefore, to persons involved in research 
in farm management, in marketing or in agricultural policy whether with 
academic institutions, industrial firms or departments of government. 
Interest in the conference far exceeded the planning committee's most 
optimistic estimate. Approximately 200 persons attended the conference, 
and enthusiasm was both high and sustained. 
The full texts of papers presented at the conference are included in this 
volume. The planning committee thinks that in published form the value 
of this conference can be increased for those who attended it and expanded 
to include many hundreds of other people. 
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The conference planning committee consisted of A. Gordon Ball, 
Department of Economics, Iowa State University, in the capacity of 
Chairman and three members of N.C. R. - 20 (North Central Research 
Committee on Marketing) and three members of theN. C.R. - 4 (North 
Central Research Committee on Farm Management). The N.C.R. -20 
members were: Lowell D. Hill, Department of Agricultural Economics, 
University of Illinois, Thomas T. Stout, Department of Agricultural 
Economics, Ohio State University and Peter G. Heimberger, Depart-
ment of Agricultural Economics, University of Wisconsin. The N. C.R. -
4 members (in addition to A. Gordon Ball) were Glenn L. Johnson, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University; John 
C. Redman, Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Ken-
tucky and John T. Scott, Department of Agricultural Economics, Uni-
versity of Illinois. 
Special thanks is extended to the two sponsors that covered the expenses . 
The Center of Agricultural and Economic Development provided much of 
the financial support for the conference and its publication. The remainder, 
in itself a substantial and important portion of the cost, was absorbed by 
the Farm Foundation. 
R. J. Hildreth of the Farm Foundation and his secretary, Miss Esther 
Olson helped immeasureably in making local arrangements. The unfaltering 
support and advice of Earl 0. Heady, Director, Center for Agricultural 
and Economic Development, resulted in effective planning and execution 
of the conference. The responsible, efficient editing of the papers by leo 
Mayer, moved the publication process along to completion without delay. 
To him and others of the Center staff who assisted in any way we express 
our gratitude . 
The Conference Planning and Program Committee 
A . Gordon Ball, Chairman 
Peter G. Heimberger 
Lowell D. Hill 
Glenn L. Johnson 
John C. Redman 
John T. Scott 
Thomas T. Stout 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Preface iii 
Industry Changes in Feed, Fertilizer, 
Petroleum, and other Chemical Products 
Used in Farm Production George R. Allen 1 
Changing Agriculture and its Demands 
for Capital Equipment and Management Lester S. Kellogg 10 
Structural Changes in the Farm Labor 
Market G. Edward Schuh 22 
Changes in Marketing of Livestock and 
Livestock Products Vernon W. Pherson 52 
Grain Markets, Marketing, and Farm Policy Reynold P. Dahl 66 
Agriculture: Projected Demand, Output 
and Resource Structure Rex F. Daly 82 
Agriculture's Status and Potential Dale E. Hathaway 120 
Organization and Structure of Producer 
Units of Farm Products Neil E. Harl 128 
Research Implications of Farm Firm Earl 0. Heady 
Changes Needed in Response to Wage and 
Rates and Increased Demands A . Gordon Ball 160 
Overcommitment of Resources in the 
Production of Farm Products Glenn L. Johnson 180 
Farm Firms -A Discussion Dale 0. Anderson 218 
Implications for Changes in Agricultural 
Product Markets for Farm Management 
and Marketing Research Lowe 11 D . Hill 228 
Implications for Changes in Input Markets John C. Redman 
for Credit and Finance on Farm Management and 
and Marketing Research Robert W. Rudd 244 
Input Markets for Labor and Labor 
Substitutes 
Discussion: Non-Farm Agriculture Firms, 
Agricultural Associations and Government 
Change and Community Adjustment: The 
Metamorphosis of Rural America 
On Orienting Farm Commodity Research 
to Structural and Market Change 
Implications of the Findings of Marketing 
Research to Research in Agricultural Policy 
Improving Aggregation Validty 
Effect of Changes in Market Structure on 
Ownership patterns of wealth and on the 
Distribution of Incomes , Rights and 
Privileges 
B. F. Jones 262 
A . Allan Schmid 274 
Karl A. Fox 288 
Geroge D. Irwin 320 
R. L. Kohls 332 
John E. Lee, Jr. 340 
Thomas T. Stout 360 
INDUSTRY CHANGES IN FEED, FERTILIZER, PETROLEUM, AND 
OTHER CHEMICAL PRODUCTS USED IN FARM PRODUCTION 
by George R. Allen* 
My purpose is to highlight major technological changes in manufactured 
feed and agricultural chemical industries which, in the next five years, or 
so, will have a major impact on the markets for farm inputs - affecting prices , 
farm practices, methods of marketing and financing, and the possible devel-
opment of farm planning services from the private sector. 
Petroleum products are likely to exert a completely passive influence. 
They appear even now in many areas to be yielding less than a normal return 
at retail. They may be introduced into some of the new farm service centers 
to extend product range and to help towards overheads. Even so, petroleum 
products are one of the least important influences making for change in the 
market situation for farm inputs. I shall not refer to them again. 
Turning to the other three groups - fertilizers, feeds and farm chemicals -
the market for plant nutrients will show the greatest adjustment over the next 
five years. Working from a base period of, say, 1962-1965, one can highlight 
the following: 
1. Fundamental changes in the economics of the nitrogenous materials, 
due to lower production costs both in the new ammonia plants and in associated 
conversion facilities. 
2. As compared with the period 1962-1965, major reduction in the price 
of potash, associated with new low cost mining in Canada. 
3. An equally strong but upward movement in the price of sulphur, a 
critical ingredient in the phosphate fertilizer processes commonly used in the 
U.S. This is in part the consequence of the rapid move to higher analysis 
materials since 1962. 
4. A continuation of the rapid growth in domestic consumption of fertilizers, 
8.9% annually in terms of plant nutrient from 1959/60 through 1963/64, for the 
next four or five years. In addition, a three to fourfold increase in annual 
fertilizer shipments to underdeveloped countries. 
*Director of Economic Planning, Agricultural Chemical Group, W. R. Grace 
& Co. 
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These changes, to which others could be added, represent the biggest 
shake -up of economic forces in the fertilizer economy since the agricultural 
recession following the Korean War. Looking back in 1970 we shall probably 
regard 1964 and after as one of the most rapid periods of cost reduction and 
technological advance in the North American fertilizer industry since 1945. 
Future Potential for Fertilizer 
The most publicized changes are occurring in the production of ammonia 
and potash, but they are also found in the manufacutre of nitric acid, other 
nitrogenous materials, and in phosphates. The most striking of all is deep 
mining of potash in Sasketchewan. By freezing the Blairmore Layer, shafts 
have been sunk to reach the largest deposits currently in use and, in relation 
to its markets in North America and abroad, one of the lowest cost sources 
of potash in the world. 
The optimum size fertilizer plant is becoming much larger. Whereas 
a few years ago units of 300 tons/day or 400 tons/day were considered to be 
large, the new ammonia units coming on stream range in size from 1000 
tons/day to 1500 tons/day if located close to natural gas and 600 tons/day to 
800 tons/day if located within the main mid-west markets. In potash, the 
Sasketchewan mines in 1970 will have individual annual capcities mostly rang-
ing from around 1, 150 , 000 tons. 
The locational pattern of the fertilizer industry is changing, with 
manufacturing plants being located further from the main domestic markets. 
This new geography of the fertilizer industry is a result of new mining and 
manufacturing technologies and higher nutrient content of materials, as well 
as new attractions in the export market. Ammonia plants aiming at only the 
mid-west market are best situated there, but the Mississippi Delta has dem-
onstrated its attraction for those which seek greater geographical dispersion 
of outlets. The phosphate industry has generally moved nearer to the source 
of rock, although some recent development underline the growing importance 
of the Delta. 
The new geography of the fertilizer industry is producing many changes . 
One is the logistic problems in supplying the mid-west market, especially 
·in meeting the peak spring demand. The pressures to boost fall application 
of fertilizers , including anhydrous ammonia, will increase. Another conse-
quence is the increasing importance of the river network as a competitive 
factor in the mid -west fertilizer distribution system. 
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In the last year there has been much discussion on prospective 
oversupply in N, P and K fertilizers. These appraisals underestimate 
the influence of a number of factors making for a more orderly growth 
of supply relatively to demand. The prospective demand for U. S. pro-
duced fertilizers is frequently underestimated, as well as the industrial 
markets for some of these materials. This is discussed in more detail 
later. 
In the ammonia industry , new plants are starting up behind schedule 
and are experiencing slower start-ups and approaches to full operating 
capacity than has been the earlier case with smaller plants embodying 
a more established technology. Finally, many of the announcements of 
new projects, particularly in potash, may not take place or may be 
deferred, especially in view of the tightening cash flows of 1966 and 1967. 
Since around 1956 the average price of fertilizers to the farmer has 
not increased, while other inputs have become much more expensive. 
For example, farm machinery prices have increased over the period 
by around 50% -and farm land by slightly more. These relative movements 
in the prices of farm inputs, to the advantage of fertilizer, are expected 
to continue . 
Other factors will reinforce the rising demand for plant nutrients. 
First, the fertilizer/crop price ratio for 1966-1970 is likely to be more 
favorable to fertilizers than in 1962-1965 -the base period of the review. 
By then, the opening of networks of company -owned retail outlets will 
increase selling efforts. Finally, the retirement of land in the mid-west 
under Government programs in the early 1960's has stimulated farmers 
to a greater awareness of the economic opportunities for substituting 
fertilizer for land. These opportunities are probably as great today as 
they·were in 1960, due to new crop technologies. The pace-setters of 
the Corn Belt farming community now aim for 200 bushels/acre, not 
150. 
All this means, in my opinion, that the prospective growth in fertilizer 
use in the U. S. through 1970 will be much higher than indicated by most 
published projections. I think it is likely that by 1970 U. S. agriculture 
will have increased its ability to meet the food needs of underdeveloped 
countries and, at the same time, be utilizing not much more land than in 
1964 or 1965. This will be achieved by yields and rates of fertilization 
not tho11ght possible a few years ago. My estimates through 1970-71 are 
shown in Table 1. 1. 
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Table 1.1. Annual Rate of Growth in Consumption of 
Plant Nutrients 
Period Covered 
Nutrient 1958/59- 1959/60- 1963/64-
1963/64 1963/64 1970/71 
N 10.4% 12.4% 10.0% - 13.0% 
p 5.8 7.0 6.5 - 9.0 
K 4.5 6.1 6.0 - 8.5 
Total 7.2% 8.9% 7.9% - 10.7% 
The U. S. potash industry faces conpetition from lower cost Canadian 
supplies. But otherwise, especially in nitrogenous materials, U.S. fer-
tilizer products have the cost advantage over other major exporters, mostly 
in West Europe. Further, AID fertilizer exports are expected to increase 
four-fold in the next few years. Finally, industrial uses for nitrogen and 
phosphates appear to be growing at least as rapidly as in the farm market. 
Sulphur is currently in short supply and is expected to remain tight 
through 1968. The situation thereafter is conjectural, although in my opinion 
an easing of the overall world supply position is to be expected. Looking 
through to 1970 and beyond, the most important aspect of the current sulphur 
shortage is not its effect on fertilizer prices, but the stimulus it may give 
to new fertilizer technology. Taken together with the prospective cheapening 
of ammonia and nitric acid, current sulphur prices are causing the economics 
of nitric acid as an acidulent for phosphate rock, in place of sulphuric acid, 
to be closely reviewed. 
In the U.S. virtually all phosphatic fertilizers are produced by acidulation 
processes based on sulphur. In Continental Europe , in contrast, large pro-
portions of the phosphate industry's output come from either straight nitro-
phosphates, in which the only acidulent is nitric acid, or modified nitro-phosphates 
in which nitric acid is partially substituted for sulphuric and phosphoric acids. 
Little progress is likely with straight nitro -phosphates. They are low in 
water solubility and unsuitable where quick release of nutrients is required, 
as· in pre...:plant fertilization of corn. Also, the by-product materials would 
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have much more limited value in the U. S. than they do in northwest Europe. 
Modified nitro-phosphates are a more serious contender, especially as 
they can meet required conditions on water solubility. 
It seems necessary to re-evaluate the part which nitro-phosphates can 
play in U. S. agriculture. So far, there is no sign of action. But, the 
economics of nitro-phosphates needs continual and close review. To anyone 
who would deny them any significant role, one question can be posed. Are 
there not important agricultural areas in the U. S. where the agronomy and 
economics of fertilizer use approximate conditions ruling in those parts of 
Europe where nitro-phosphates are accepted completely? 
Future Potentials for Manufactured Feeds 
Manufactured feed do not offer the same prospects for changes as the 
fertilizer industry. 
The opportunities for reducing manufacturing costs are extremely 
limited. 
Scientific advances in animal nutrition generally appear to be coming 
forward much more slowly than in the 1950's. The use of antibiotics and 
micro-nutrients seem to be clearly defined. Metabolic regulators could 
be important, and are urgently needed if the beef industry is to avoid 
decreasing returns while maintaining a 3%-4% annual average increase in 
output. But very little progress appears to have been made. 
The most important, but still partially developed, business opportunity 
is the substitution of urea for animal and vegetable protein, a move which 
is in .part connected with the use of liquid supplement feeds. 
In the last few years a number of trends have been established which 
are important to the individual feed manufacturer or farmer. However, 
even in the aggregate these developments will not have a large effect on 
meat prices. The feed industry is technologically too mature. Briefly, 
they are: 
1. A continuing decline of mobile grind-and-mix services which are 
being replaced mainly by mixing units confined to a single livestock enter-
prise and either owned or leased by it. 
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2. There will probably be some recovery in the importance of 
factory-mixed complete feeds for hogs and cattle for sale on a long-
term contract basis to large operations: say over 5, 000 head capacity 
in the case of cattle. 
3. At the same time, the growth in sales of supplement feeds in 
bulk relatively to bagged materials will continue. 
4. Regional feed companies may grow at a more rapid rate than 
the national giants of the industry. This is linked with the increasing 
importance of market-oriented mills, serving a radius of around 50-
100 miles. Some regional companies , in excpetionally close contact 
with the customer, have already demonstrated this point. 
Related Developments Affecting Manufactured Feeds 
Looking further down the road, it seems necessary to highlight 
three developments . 
1. High lysine corn; contract growing of feed grains. 
2. The use of urea, and it relation to liquid feed supplements. 
3. The development of large -scale cattle and hog operations in 
mid-west, particularly full environment-controlled cattle 
fattening and dry-lot cow-calf operations. 
High lysine corn is probably 6-7 years off commercialization. 
From the viewpoint of the economics of livestock feeding its potentiality 
has yet to be defined. There is on present evidence still some strong 
doubts whether, as against existing varieties, yield will be sufficiently 
high to justify its extensive use as a hog feed. However, if the yields 
can be obtained and taking into account possible rapid increases in the 
average size of hog operations, the structure of the feed industry will 
change dramatically. The emphasis in manufacturing will switch away 
from supplement feeds containing the full component of proteins and 
other nutrients to base mixes of vitamins, antibiotics, trace minerals , 
and such amino acid fortification as necessary to make good deficiencies 
in the corn. 
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Base mixes require even more careful mixing than supplements 
and, being of higher value in relative weight, reduce the influence of 
freight costs. In these circumstances there would be a move away 
from the regional mills which have now become typical and back to 
larger units serving, say, 200-300 miles radius. 
The quantity of urea used as an animal feed is not known, largely 
because fertilizer grade material are commonly employed. It was 
probably 250,000-300,000 tons in 1965, and rising fast. The technical 
literature frequently gives the impression that the recent growth in 
the use of urea as a feed has been the consequence of feeders finding 
that the toxic dangers were much less than had been thought originally. 
This change of attitude has been a necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition. More important, the economic incentive has changed in the 
last five years, compared with the 1950's. 
Dr. George Kromer of the U. S. D. A . has prepared an approximate 
measure of the relative profitability of using urea and soybean, by 
comparing a mixture of 1715 pounds of grain plus 285 pounds of urea 
(priced at $100 /ton) against the price of a ton of soybean meal, 44% 
protein. (This is obviously a very rough yardstick and should be used, 
as the corn/hog ratio, only as an approximate guide to profitability.) 
During the period 1954-1959 the corn-urea mixture never enjoyed 
a cost advantage of more than $6. 70/ton. Subsequently, its advantage 
has been: 
1960 $13.9/ton 
1961 16.7 
1962 22.0 
1963 20.8 
1964 (Oct. -Dec.) 18.2 
In view of expected cost reductions in the manufacture of nitrogenous 
materials --lower ammonia prices and economies of scale in the new large 
urea plants, and stronger soybean prices compared with those in 1960-1964--
the advantage should move further in favor of urea mixture. 
The role of urea has been widened by the development of liquid supple-
ment feeds with a molasses base, such as Iowa 80 and Purdue 64. It might 
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be asked how soon will the expanding use of liquid supplements be limited 
by an ultimate inelasticity in the supply of molasses. In the foreseeable 
future this is unlikely, in view of the world sugar situation. Further, 
a pulp-wood by-product is now available as a molasses substitute and is 
sold commercially. 
The most conjectural issue, looking out 10 years, is whether the size 
structure in mid -west feedlot operations will change radically. The economics 
of joint enterprises is normally advanced to justify the continued viability 
of the existing pattern of small-scale feeding. But, there are at least 
three factors favoring large units. 
First, the ability to reduce business uncertainties, especially with 
the opportunities provided for hedging in the new livestock future markets. 
Second, there are the opportunities for increasing TDN by harvesting 
the complete growth of corn, stalks and all. This, it appears, involves 
the ability to control either directly or by contracting, the output of around 
1000 acres of average corn land if equipment is to be used efficiently. 
Third, and most important of all, there is now the strong likelihood 
that· the Corn Belt can economically overcome its climatic disadvantages 
and achieve the feed conversion rates of the High Plains , as well as getting 
around the mud problem, by introducing environment-controlled indoor 
feeding. 
Iowa Beef Packers have, of course, aroused interest in environment-
controlled feeding by their announcement about a year ago that they were 
considering establishing a unit, or units, near Algona (Iowa) to turn out 
50,000-100,000 cattle annually. A number of small operations - 300-500 
head/capacity -have already been started by other feeders. The necessary 
fixed investment is less than $100 /head, and probably around $40 /head 
more than in the High Plains. At a superficial glance, this seems a small 
price to pay to offset the Corn Belt's climatic disadvantages and to max-
imize its advantages of accessibility to feed and markets and, especially 
if it develops its grass potential, to feeder cattle. 
Within the next five years environment-controlled beef production 
seems likely to be important within the Corn Belt. There is , however, 
insufficient information to develop a sound projection of its rate of growth. 
One thing seems certain, this issue deserves much more attention than 
it is currently receiving. 
-9-
It is too early to say how mid-west supplement feed manufacturers 
would react to the development of large-scale environmental feedlots 
in the mid-west, should they develop. In other areas where large feeding 
units have emerged, as in the High Plains, feed manufacturers have not 
integrated into cattle feeding. It has been advantageous to all concerned 
for feed supplement manufacturing and for feeding to retain their seperate 
indentities. This, too, seems likely in the mid-west. 
Concluding Observations 
Many important developments are occurring in farm chemicals. 
These are not discussed here. This may seem a cavalier treatment in 
view of their actual and potential effects on farming methods. However, 
although they call for added skills on the part of dealers and managers 
of company-owned farm service centers, it seems unlikely that they will 
have any direct effect on the structure of the marketing system for farm 
inputs. 
In net, the picture I wish to present is one in which technical change 
has been, and is, taking place extremely rapidly in the mining and man-
ufacture of fertilizer materials and in farm chemicals, and also to a 
lesser degree in manufactured feeds. I have described some of the more 
important changes in order to provide a base from which anyone wishing 
to analyze the structure of these industries can proceed. Any appraisal 
of structure, of course, involves many additional considerations to those 
in this paper, especially governmental policy towards vertical integration 
in agribusiness and towards recent and possible future mergers in the 
fertilizer industry. 
However, the main impression I wish to leave is that technical 
features I have highlighted, as well as some others which could have been 
explored, will have a much greater direct effect on the prices of farm 
inputs than other considerations which usually figure prominently in 
discussions of structure and performance of agribusiness. At the same 
time, any indirect effects of technical changes on the structural evolution 
of the industries under review is, in terms of their economic implications, 
a secondary issue when compared with their direct influence on prices of 
fertilizers , feed and farm chemicals. 
CHANGING AGRICULTURE AND ITS 
DEMANDS FOR CAPITAL EQUIPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 
by Lester S. Kellogg* 
This paper --originally listed as a technical paper --will not treat 
potential technical or engineering changes in farm machinery and other 
agricultural capital equipment. It will treat demands for capital and 
management, however, from economic points of view and will, in the 
process, touch pointedly some probable structural changes in agriculture. 
Background Information 
As background for discussion, I am going to spend the first few pages 
briefly describing some projections to 1980 for a few major characteristics 
of U. S. agriculture. Projections to 1985 would be much better, since 
direction signs as far ahead as possible -- and 1985 is only eighteen years 
ahead -- are helpful. 
United States Population 
The total United States population, which serves as the primary market 
for the products of United States agriculture, will total approximately 250 
million compared with 198 million now --an increase of about 26 percent. 
A 11 of North America, in fact, is growing at roughly similar rates and, as 
a result, continental demand for the product of our agricultural enterprise 
should itself be a major growth force for agricultural industries. 
World Population 
The so-called "population explosion," which will result in a doubling of 
the world's population by 2000 A.D. at current rates, has been so widely 
discussed that we won't go into detail about it here, except to assume -- in 
the light of U. S. action under the "Food for Peace" program -- that our 
country will act responsibly in helping to feed the rest of the world. Such 
assistance, of course, will show up in our exports -- and promptly. We 
can't wait five or ten years to get ready. 
*Corporate Economist, Deere & Company 
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Exports of Farm Products 
Exports of farm products, since the early fifties, have more than 
doubled, substantially as a result of government assistance. Exports with-
out government assistance, however, since the mid-fifties, have increased 
by well over 50 percent, and such exports continue to account for 50 per-
cent or more of the total -- and could account for a larger percentage. 
North American plus export demands for the products of agricultural 
enterprise in the United States will, in the next ten to twenty years , reach 
record highs and provide markets never before served by United States 
agricultural producers . 
Farm Population 
Farm population has been declining steadily in the United States since 
its peak in the mid-thirties. It will continue to decline. In fact, as a 
description of a portion of our population, it will become very small or even 
disappear by being defined out of existence. It may become indistinguishable 
because of changes in address identifications --such as urban or rural --
or vocational descriptions. It is now less than 7 percent of our total popula-
tion. By 1980 --if it is distinguishable --it will probably be 3 percent or 
less of the country's expected total population. This small segment may 
be difficult to identify, and its problems will differ greatly from those of the 
past. 
Total U. S. Land A rea 
The total U. S. land area is relatively fixed, but the total land in cities, 
highways, airports , urban and suburban utility requirements, and forest-
lands --much of which will be parks or greens --will increase. As a result, 
land available for agriculture will decrease slowly; and croplands planted 
and harvested in the next fifteen years will decline, at least temporarily, 
as soon as the current planned crop acreage increases have been digested. 
It is not necessary to point out, but I shall, that crop acres harvested in 
the United States from about 1920 until 1956 totaled 350 million acres, plus 
or minus ten to fifteen million. Since then, the total declined to 290 to 300 
million acres following the establishment of the Soil Bank in 1956. Keep in 
mind that the essentially horizontal trend, at 350 million acres, maintained 
for many years, while draft animal population was declining by some 17 
million head and the acreage used for their feed was declining by 80 million 
acres. Is it any wonder that the United States had more production than it 
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could use? It is likely, however, that we will not for many years plant 
or harvest as many acres as in the years just before the Acreage Re-
serves were established. 
Number of Farms 
The number of farms, as defined by the Census, reached a peak in 
1920 and then started to decline. The decline was arrested in the thir-
ties when, during the Great Depression, people returned to farms briefly 
as urban employment slackened, but following the recovery, the down-
ward trend continued. In 1964 only 1. 8 million farms sold products val-
ued at $2, 500 or more; less than 900,000 sent products to market with 
a value of $10,000 or more. It is safe to say that the number of farms 
will continue to decrease, and by 1980 the total of economically produc-
tive farms probably will not exceed 500 to 600 thousand. New develop-
ments could cause this total to decline to a substantially lower total by 
the target date or shortly thereafter and produce our country's total needs 
more dependably and less expensively in terms of the ratio of inputs to 
outputs. 
Agricultural Employment 
The trend of agricultural employment has been steadily downward, 
except for the Depression period. In the last twenty-five years the number 
of farm workers has been cut in half. The trend will continue downward. 
Where it will level out is impossible to predict. It is probably enough 
to say that what we now consider as agricultural employment -- even with-
in so short a period as fifteen years -- may be redefined and show up in 
nonagricultural industrial classifications. Month after month, the Farm 
Labor release of the Department of Agriculture drives home the fact of 
declining farm employment. The April 10, 1967, release -- sounding much 
like the monthly releases of the last few years --indicates that the nation's 
farm labor force in the week of March 19-25, 1967, totaled 4. 4 million 
persons, a record low for the date. For a number of years, agricultural 
employment declined relatively slowly, in the neighborhood of 3 percent 
per year. For the last several years, the year-to-year decline has been 
7 to 12 percent. 
This downward trend has been both effect and cause. Workers have 
been attracted to nonfarm jobs, and agricultural machines have been 
substituted. At the same time, the cost-saving and productivity-increasing 
-13-
capacity of machines has been eagerly sought to eliminate costly, trouble-
some , and undesirable work. There is still a long way to go. 
Recent minimum wage legislation is speeding further decreases in 
agricultural employment. 
For people in agriculture, these trends are convincing confirmations 
of the rapid declines in opportunities for individuals to work in agricultural 
enterprises. Greater proportions of the labor formerly used in agriculture 
will, in the future be used in servicing agriculture and in the processing 
and distribution of food and fiber. The sons and daughters of long-time 
workers in agriculture, however, will do well -- in view of the outlook for 
the future --to search for job opportunities in areas well beyond those 
directly or even indirectly related to agricultural operations. In the future, 
serving and supplying agriculture will be little different from serving and 
supplying other industries. If this is true, the services demanded can be 
provided as well by people without a farm heritage as by farm -raised people. 
In short, the distinctions we have credited so long to farmers or persons 
raised on farms are rapidly disappearing. 
Average Size of Farm 
The trend in the average size of U. S. farms has been continuously 
upward. In the years ahead, it will continue its upward course, and where 
it will stop nobody knows. Farms are currently being consolidated in the 
U. S. at the fastest rates in history. To project the average to 1980 is 
hazardous; more importantly, it is meaningless. It is meaningless be-
cause the trends toward industrialization and specialization of both the 
enterprise and labor will result in farms of very different sizes, depend-
ing upon the commodity produced. 
Tractors , Combines , Pickers , Balers , and Choppers on Farms 
The total number of tractors and other traditional important machines 
on farms increased in growth-curve fashion from their introduction early 
in the century into the early 1960's. Totals of most of these machines are 
now declining, but such totals for all of agriculture have little meaning. 
The important machines -- those that should be counted -- are those on 
highly productive agricultural enterprises. Such machines are less than 
ten years old and probably not more than five years old. 
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Income from Agriculture 
The trend of cash receipts from agriculture has been steadily upward 
since 1940, and I believe that the trend will continue. Such income will 
be divided among substantially fewer recipients and will be large enough 
that agricultural enterprise, as an industry, can stand on its own feet --
side by side with other industries --to a greater extent than at any time 
in our history. Many argue that some other industries don't stand on their 
own feet. I would answer that "along with agriculture, it's time that they 
did." 
So much for these types of projections. We could extend them and, 
in fact, should prepare them in much greater detail. We don't have space 
here and now to do this, however, even if all the data collection and research 
had been done -- which, in my judgement, it has not. 
Projection Methods -- Trends, Adaptation, a Philosophy 
Projections of the types I have been discussing should not be considered 
as precise forecasts. They can be best used as general guides. As extrap-
olations of previous trends, all of the kinds of forces which historically 
have affected the trends of the factors being projected are implicity assumed 
to be present in the future and, therefore, to affect the projections. Un-
fortunately, much of the research in agriculture has failed to take account 
of the changing nature of agriculture and most such projections are not borne 
out by experience. 
If the farm machinery industry and the agricultural capital suppliers of 
the future provide the inputs expected of them, they must certainly make 
their plans with reasoned consideration of many types of projections. Let 
me discuss some of the projections we have made, and then I want to discuss 
some of the changes which may take place. 
Since it takes John Deere --or any of the major farm machinery man-
ufacturers -- five to seven years to develop, test, and put into production 
a major new machine, it is important that we be as nearly right as possible 
in the projections of the various characteristics of these machines for as 
far as fifteen to twenty years ahead. As an illustration, the decision to 
develop and produce the new series of tractors which Deere put on the market 
in 1960 was made in the Fall of 1953. At that time, the new power sizes 
determined as essential were well in advance of anything then being produced 
and went only as far as the power introduced in our Model 4010, which was 
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approximately 84 horsepower. Our designs and our tooling, however, 
were such that it was possible, in a realtively short time after the 
introduction of the new series, to introduce the Model 5010 at 121 horse-
power. 
Recently, we have had to produce estimates of unit requirements 
of tractors by horsepower sizes for 1975 and 1980 as guides to engineer-
ing development. In making these projections, we have had to depend 
upon trends and the factors of change implicit in them, but we have had to 
go beyond this , however, and introduce new technical methods of projection 
as well as make some assumptions about the potential changes in the 
structure of agriculture, the capital requirements of agriculture, the 
operating characteristics of tractors and other agricultural machines and 
equipment and their servicing requirements. In short, we've had to 
develop new philosophies of the nature of change in agriculture. 
The most interesting development statistically in preparing our 
projections has been analyses of the annual shifts in power size distribu-
tions of tractors, as reflected in log-normal curves of annual sales.!/ It 
is impossible to extrapolate the trends of such distributions by usual meth-
ods. Imagination in adapting methods from other fields may pay off. Time, 
plus our use of confidential data, does not permit my describing detailed 
conclusions. 
In general, I can say that the power of tractors will continue to 
increase at the drawbar but also to provide for an increasing variety of 
hydraulic aids , for heating, cooling, and ventilating of drivers' cabs, for 
powering communication equipment, etc. The resulting machines will be 
increasingly productive and functional. They must also be considered as 
being as attractive to the manpower which runs them as the newer types 
of machinery being installed in factories in other industries. This is a 
most important consideration for agriculturists in attracting the skilled 
labor to whom they will entrust operation of high-valued capital items. 
The projections of requirements of farm machines carry with them 
some corollaries. The machines must be of a high degree of reliability. 
This re·quirement has led to the institution in most of the large farm 
machinery companies of rigorous programs of inspection, quality control, 
and reliability standards. It has also led to the reassessment of servicing 
!/such methods are described by the Belgian, Karl Daeves, in "Voraus-
bestimmungen im Wirtschaftsleben," Essen. Girardet. 1951. 
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requirements and the provision of spare parts. The cost of high-unit-value 
machines of these types requires -- just as t'lte high -cost capital equipment 
of other industries --maximum use on 'round-the-clock schedule when 
feasible. Our projections, then, go beyond the simple statistical extrapolation 
of trends to the reasoned consideration of many of the aspects of production 
and distribution to which they may be related. 
Since this is not a research paper or a paper reporting the results of 
research --but is rather one aimed at eliciting ideas and stimulating 
imagination as a basis for developing new research directions and programs --
1 'd like now to shift gears for a few minutes to raise one of the most important 
questions related to changes in machinery, buildings, equipment, etc. I 
want here to talk about two major problems. One of them is the objectives 
or goals of agricultural enterprise in the United States, and the other has 
to do with meeting these goals. 
Goals of Agriculture -- Objectivity vs. Tradition 
In my experience , research in agriculture traditionally has been done 
with many implicity or. unstated -- usually unrecognized -- assumptions. 
One effect of the presence of such assumptions in research may be to min-
imize its objectivity. 
To illustrate this point, suppose we were to say that in the future the 
objective of agricultural policy in the United States should be to minimize 
resource inputs relative to product outputs, that is, to minimize unit costs 
of production, yet remain economically viable and competitive in domestic 
as well as world markets. 
Suppose then, we were to start from scratch and to say, ''What steps 
shall we take to organize an agricultural enterprise to accomplish these 
goals?" If the group here today, for instance, were to decide to engage 
together in such an enterprise with the goals suggested, we would be wise 
to start by making -- or contracting with a professional group to make --
a feasibility study similar to those produced for groups in other industries 
(or companies) when they plan to initiate new, potentially profitable enter-
prises. 
Starting with this point of view, we must determine what product to 
produce. We will have to take into account the location and size of the 
market for the product and what specifications and qualities of the product 
the markets want. We will have to determine from. scratch-- without an 
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inventory of capital in any form -- the specifications of soils (if soils are 
required), weather or water conditions, buildings and equipment, etc., 
that we must acquire. We will have to take into account current competi-
tive costs and terms of capital, taxes, wage rates of able people, and --
most important of all --management. 
Since all of us cannot be the managers, we will have to choose one 
person who is the best manager. He may not necessarily be the best 
agronomist, but he probably will turnout to be the best businessman we 
can find and afford --however we define ''businessman." To find him, we 
certainly will have to compete with a great variety of other agricultural 
and nonagricultural enterprises . Whether or not we flnd him on what has 
been a farm and 'whether his training will have been in a college of agri-
culture, a school or business, or a college of arts and· sciences will be i;m-
material. What we will need will be the skills of management -- however 
or wherever developed. 
We will then proceed --if we are to get capital at minimum costs 
to go to the public to whom we will sell shares in order to get necessary 
funds, and our loans will have to come from institutions for long terms and 
at rates which will be competitive with those charged to other industries . 
In the future, if we treat agriculture as an industry with the same 
kinds of basic objectives as are established for other industries, these are 
the kinds of steps we will have to take. I neither have seen in writing nor 
heard in oral presentations by agricultural economists more than tradition-
al discussions of such steps. Research related to these organizational proc-
esses is the responsibility of you educators. Your research programs and 
curricula should be changed to move in the directions that will provide an-
swers and training along the line~ of requirements which will be essential 
for the future, or we ought to stddy the rapidly advancing work of others in 
I financial organizations and corporation finance and advise our students to 
be bold in crossing disciplinary lines for exposures to such fields. 
Illustrative of the need for such steps is the experience of the Midwest 
Farm Corporation. A group of eastern Iowa farmers, lawyers, doctors, 
engineers, and businessmen obtained an intra-state corporate charter in 
March 1965 to operate a large, straight corn production enterprise. Tra-
ditional opposition to both the corporate form of organization and to the 
agricultural methods proposed combined to delay the sale of shares by the 
local group, as well as the additional financing necessary for the start 
of the operation. 
-18-
After long months of restudying every phase of the plans and search-
ing for professional financial assistance, a contract was made in the 
Summer of 1966 for a feasibility study with Arthur D. Little, Inc. No 
agricultural group with experience along such lines and known to investors 
could be located. 
The feasibility study, on explicit conservative assumptions, estimated 
that the potential return, after taxes, on original stockholders' equity in 
this enterprise was 12.1 percent for the first year, 13.8 percent for the 
second year, 17. 5 percent for the third year, and 18 percent for the sixth 
and later years. Time doesn't permit reporting more details of the report. 
Suffice it to say these are figures of truly growth proportions. The study 
was presented to a group of prospective investors by a midwest financing 
firm early this year. The stock was completely subscribed, and the actual 
operation on nearly 2, 000 acres is under way. This example alone suggests 
many questions needing research. 
If I were to describe the contrast with what we have been doing in 
traditional agricultural economics, I would sound negative. Let me take 
that risk in order to make some of my points clear. 
1. The word "farm" no longer can be adequately defined. To use it 
may be increasingly misleading. 
2. Agriculture is not monolithic. It involves a great variety of 
activities. Many of the enterprises within agriculture are competitive. 
There is no common interest among all agricultural sectors or varieties 
which can possibly lead to a solid voting block, as at one time there was. 
Many activities formerly classified as farming now make up specialized 
industries. Hatcheries long since have moved to urban areas. The broiler 
industry, save for some restraining ordinances, could probably better be 
in the urban areas than where it originated. In the future, with 'the appro-
priate use of chemicals and knowledge of sanitation, the dairies --and 
even some of the animal-feeding operations --can be located within urban 
areas. Their location will depend, aside from existing restraints, largely 
upon the economics of the movement of milk or carcass versus the movement 
of feed and waste . 
3. Agricultural management is not an inherited characteristic. 
Agricultural enterprises must seek and compete for management against 
other industries. Is this really possible? I was told by a most successful 
farmer the other day that farmers are afraid of competition. But, manage-
ment is being taught with increasing effectiveness, and a great deal of re-
search is under way in the field. 
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4. The continuity of good management is essential to long-term 
credit and low or prime interest rates. How should agriculturists organize 
their enterprises in the future to provide multiple -generation good manage-
ment and the opportunities other industries have enjoyed for assured and 
economical capital costs? To accomplish such goals, freedom from re-
straining controls will be essential. 
5. Access to agriculture is still possible but under more difficult 
conditions than in the past. Much has been made over the years of the 
importance of the sons of farmers being able to become farmers . Is 
there any reason why access guarantee should be provided for agriculture? 
It is not provided or guaranteed for any other industry. 
6. Agricultural labor will receive wage, .fringe benefits, and security 
guarantees similar to those provided by other industries. 
The points I have just been making are some, but not nearly all, of 
those which implicitly appear to lie in the basic thought and hence to 
underly practically all research by agricultural economists. If United 
States agriculture in the period ahead is to attain the position in world 
agriculture and world trade which it deserves, the objectives must be 
changed and clearly recognized as promptly as possible. 
Statistics --Measurements Related to Objectives 
Now, let me turn for a moment to another aspect of research relative 
to inputs of capital goods in agriculture. 
Statistics on these subjects are of varied reliability. For many years, 
the Bureau of the Census has produced regularly figures on production and 
shipments, in units and values, of a great variety of farm machinery and 
equipment, including tractors. By certain statistical assumptions with 
respect to prices paid by farmers for such machinery , it has been possible 
to estimate farmers 1 annual investments in this type of equipment. 
Data on farmers 1 investments in other types of capital equipment how-
ever, such as buildings --including barns, silos, service shed, storage 
sheds, etc. --and the equipment necessary for irrigation or conservation 
practices have not been easily or reliably available. In neither of these 
cases, however, has investment by producers responsible for major portions 
of production been available. In 1955 the Bureau of the Census, for the 
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Department of Agriculture, conducted a Farmers' Expenditure Survey, 
which provided some information --but only some --on this general 
subject. 
Annually, the Department of Agriculture produces a Balance Sheet 
of Agriculture in which estimates of a variety of assets are provided. 
These estimates are made by a number of procedures which long since 
have been in need of review and, in my be lief, renovation. As in the 
case of the production and shipments figures, the Balance Sheet figures 
likewise are not classified by size of enterprise so that the whole of 
agriculture, within which I am sure there is great waste in use of capital, 
is not reflected in the figures. 
If it is important to know -- and I think it is -- more about changes 
in the future in investment in the various agricultural capital items, then 
it is important that new statistical programs be developed and that some 
of the older programs be modified. I mention this now because plans are 
being laid now for the Census of Agriculture of 1969. 
The Census of Agriculture is a traditional instrument. It, too, ought 
to be brought up to date to treat agriculture as an industry. The Directors 
of the Census are continuously willing to listen to proposals for changes and 
will, in this instance, welcome suggestions about information needed to 
aid in measuring the degree of attainment of the objectives of a modern 
United States agriculture o 
I listened at the recent meetings of the American Farm Economic 
Association to Professor Cochrane talk about gaps in agricultural data. 
I remember hearing no single word along the lines I have been discussing 0 
His whole interest appeared to be having more information that will help 
in government programs of production control rather than in providing the 
information which will free agriculture -- to make it what, in my judgment, 
it sould be 0 What can this group do to further the program of an improved 
Census of Agriculture? It is getting late, for decisions will be made within 
the next six to twelve months which will set the course for a new type of 
Census or continue it in the context of tradition o 
If information relative to the capital inputs of agriculture is going to 
be important in the future and if its main source will be production and 
shipments figures, as has been the case in the past, it will be necessary 
for those of you who use these figures to be aware that the "Farm Machin-
ery and Equipment" industry is probably producing a continuously declin-
ing portion of the total capital equipment used by agriculture. 
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The changing nature of agriculture is the reason for this, the in-
creasing size of operations and the changing nature of methods of handling 
and distributing agricultural products are largely accountable. Field agri-
culture is becoming increasingly a materials-handling operation. This is 
true whether we are talking about moving soil in preparation for planting, 
or the harvesting, handling, and shipping of product. Increasingly, anum-
ber of these functions are being performed by equipment made by a wide 
variety of industries whose production and shipments figures are listed 
under different classification numbers and names and are not included in 
farm machinery and equipment. To sort out these various pieces makes 
the possibility of obtaining accurate, overall figures increasingly hazard-
ous. Attention to the appropriate collection and collation of information is 
extremely important now if appropriate data on this subject are to be ob-
tained in the future. 
If agriculture in the future is to be treated like other businesses or 
industries, changes in government itself may be helpful. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture may be partitioned and re-combined by some future 
Administration much as has been proposed for the Department of Labor 
and Commerce by the present Administration. 
Conclusions 
I have told you that I believe that the future of agriculture is bright 
in terms of the demands upon it for its product. Agriculture is in the midst 
of great change and bears increasing responsibility as an industry or col-
lection of industries in helping to supply world needs. To meet these re-
sponsibilities, the most important input factors will be management and 
acce~s to capital as efficiently and economically as other industries. To 
obtain management and capital at economical costs, agriculture, the indus-
try, will become increasingly industrialized and specialized and will com-
pete in the general markets for managing manpower. 
The measurement of the capital requirements of agriculture will 
require new statistical approaches and techniques, and it is time now to do 
the research required. In this paper, I have not mentioned the research 
on the steps necessary to move from traditional agriculture to the new ag-
riculture . To make the new agriculture most productive , broad and new 
approaches to production research, as well as different kinds of research 
on the personal problems that accompany shifts of people from agriculture, 
will be required. 
STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE FARM LABOR MARKET* 
by G. Edward Schuh** 
Rapid urbanization of the U. S. economy has produced major changes 
in the labor market that American agriculture faces. Further changes are 
being imposed by legislation that is attempting, albeit somewhat belatedly, 
to deal directly with the poverty problems of rural America. 
This paper is organized in three parts . The first part attempts to 
sketch out the general characteristics of and the major changes in the 
demographic and structural characteristics of the U. S. agricultural 
labor force. The second part analyzes the effect of some recent legis-
lation that impinges directly on the agricultural labor force, and discusses 
other economic forces that are affecting the structure of the labor market. 
The third part dicusses very briefly the changing nature of skills required 
in agriculture. And the paper ends with a brief concluding comment. 
General Characteristics of and Major 
Changes in the Agricultural Labor Force 
The change over time in the labor force in agriculture has been one 
of the major resource adjustments in the industry. Having reached a peak 
at around 1917-18, farm employment declined from 13.4 million in 1920 to 
5. 6 million in 1965 .. !/ (Table 3.1). In addition, the rise in the price of 
agricultural labor has been one of the major secular changes in the relative 
price of an input (Table 3. 2). It has risen both with respect to the prices 
received by farmers and in relation to the prices of other farm inputs. 
If one divides the agricultural labor force into family labor (operator 
plus unpaid family labor) and hired labor, it appears that downward adjust-
ments in the two components are quite similar. (Table 3. 3). Measured 
either on a 1910-14 base or on a 1957-59 base, the employment in 1965 
*Purdue Agricultural Experiment Station, Journal Paper 2944, Project 
1107. Helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper were received 
from J. Carroll Bottum and Paul Farris . 
**Professor of Economics , Purdue University 
.!/usDA concept, based on average monthly employment during the year. 
These estimates amount to year equivalents of labor, without any account 
being taken of the various "qualities of the labor". 
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Table 3.1. Agricultural Labor Force Composition for Selected Years, Number 
and Indices (1920 = 100). 
Unpaid Family Operator Total agricul-
Hired Labor labor a/ labor b/ tural labor 
Year (000) (index) (000) (index) (000) (index) (000) (index) 
1920 3' 391 100 3' 523 100 6' 513 100 13' 432 100 
1930 3,190 94 2,761 78 6,546 100 12,497 93 
1940 2,679 79 1,950 55 6,350 97 10,979 82 
1950 2,329 69 1,940 55 5,648 87 9,922 74 
1959 1,952 58 1,293 37 2,097 63 7,342 55 
1964 1,604 47 1,034 29 3,472 53 6,110 46 
1965 1' 484 44 751 21 3 374 52 5' 609 42 
Sources: Farm Employment, USDA, Statistical Bullettin No. 334; Farm Labor, AMS, 
USDA: and Farm Income Situation, USDA. 
~/ Unpaid family labor = family labor - operator labor. ~/ Operator labor = number 
of farms. 
Table 3. 2. Index of Prices Received and Prices Paid for Selected Inputs, 1935-59. 
(1953-39 = 100). 
Period 
Index of 1935-39 1940-44 1945-49 1950-54 1955-59 
Prices received by 
farmers 100 144 231 252 221 
Price of fertilizer 100 106 132 150 151 
Price of machinery 100 102 130 173 191 
Price of Labor 100 178 333 395 455 
Price of land (alone) 100 112 188 254 325 
Price paid all costs 100 122 184 220 229 
Source: Heady, E.O., Agricultural Policy Under Economic Development, Iowa State 
University Press, Ames, Iowa, 1962, p. 61. 
Table 3. 3. Indexes of Farm Employment, 1965, Expressed as Percentage of 1910-14 
and 1957-59 
Total 
Family labor 
Hired labor 
Source: Farm Labor, February 1966 
1910-14 = 100 
41 
41 
44 
1957-59 = 100 
75 
75 
76 
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expressed as a percentage of the base periods is quite similar, although 
it appears that hired employment is declining somewhat more slowly than 
family labor. 
However, if one assumes that there is one farm operator per farm, the 
labor force can be further disaggregated. This permits the estimation of 
three separate components of the labor force: hired, unpaid family, and 
operator labor. (Table 3.1). Such a breakdown shows that there has been 
an important shift taking place within the family labor component. As Table 
3.1 shows , there has been a larger reduction in the unpaid family labor 
component, compared to both hired labor and operator labor. Moreover, 
the operator has declined less than any one of the three components, so that 
it is providing an increasing percentage of the total year-equivalents of 
labor employed in agriculture. 
Nikolitch_g_l examined the relative proportion between family and hired 
labor by estimating the hours worked by each component for the period 1910 
to 1959. His data show that from 1910 to 1930 the number of manhours of 
both family and hired work on farms did not change greatly. Since 19 30, 
however, the amount of family work has continually decreased. And since 
1940, hired work has also decreased. Starting about 1948-49 hired labor 
decreased rapidly and during the decade of the 1950's, decreased faster, on 
the average, than family labor. 
Nikolitch shows that the number of family workers is declining almost 
solely on small farms with little production, while the number of hired 
workers is declining on the larger farms which provide steady work. As 
a result the amount of work done by hired workers is decreasing faster 
than the amount done by family workers . And consequently , he argues , 
technological change is not substituting hired labor for family labor in 
agriculture as it did in other industries, and there is no tendency toward 
the elimination of the family farm. 
Before probing more deeply into the shifts that are taking place in the 
hired labor force , we turn first to general des.cripti ve data of the agricultural 
labor force. Table 3. 4 presents data on the median age of the employed 
U. S. farm labor force by color and sex in 1960. (Based on the Census 
concept of labor) . 
_g_/ Radaje Nikolitch, "Family Labor and Technological Advance in Farming", 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLIV, No. 4 (November 1962), pp. 1061-
1068. 
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Table 3. 4. Median age of employed U. S. farm labor force by color and 
sex, 1950 and 1960. 
Farmers and farm managers 
Total 
Nonwhite 
Farm laborers and foreman 
Total 
Nonwhite 
Unpaid family laborers!!:/ 
Total 
Nonwhite 
Hired workers!!/ 
Total 
Nonwhite 
1950 
Male Female 
45.9 
44.2 
26.4 
26.1 
19.1 
18.5 
31.9 
34.2 
50.4 
46.1 
36.2 
31.3 
37.0 
29.2 
34.1 
33.5 
Male 
49.2 
49.5 
31.2 
36.J 
18.3 
N.A. 
34.2 
N.A. 
1960 
Female 
51.4 
47.7 
40.0 
. 36.6 
42.9 
N.A. 
38.4 
N.A. 
Source: U. S. Census of Population 1960 , "Detailed Characteristics , U. S. Sum-
ary", Series PC (1) D, U. S. Bureau of the Census 1963, Table 204: U. S. Census 
of Population, 1950, Special Report P -E, No. lB, "Occupational Characteristics". 
!!!unpaid family labor and farm foreman. 
!?/Farm laborers except unpaid family labor and farm foreman. 
N. A. =not available. 
T~e data indicate important differences in age among the various components. 
Farm operators are the oldest group with little difference on the basis of race 
or sex. Farm laborers in total are somewhat younger than farm operators, 
with the females in the category tending to be somewhat older than the males. 
The unpaid family labor category presents the most important departure. The 
median age of males is 18 . 3 years while that of females is 42. 9 years. This 
would suggest that the males are most likely students who work after school 
while the females are probably the wives of the farm operators. This is impor-
tant in that females are most important in this component of the labor force, 
comprising almost 45% of the total. 
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The general aging of the labor force can also be seen in table 3. 4. All 
categories with exception of male unpaid family laborers were older 
on average in 1960 than in 1950. The increase in average age is around 
3-5 years , with the exception of the nonwhite laborers , which increased 
in age an ayerage of 10 years. 
The breakdown of the U. S. experienced farm labor force by. color and 
sex is given for 1960 intable 3.5. There it can be seen that females make 
up an important part of the unpaid labor force. They are comparatively 
unimportant as farm operators, but make up as much as 20% of the hired 
labor force. 
Table 3. 5. Breakdown of the U. S. experienced farm labor force (14 years 
and older) by color and sex, 1960 (thousands). 
Total Male Female %Male 
Farmers and farm manager 
Total 2,526 2,406 120 95.2 
Nonwhite 197 170 18 90.9 
%Nonwhite 7.8 7.4 15.1 
Farm laborers and foreman 
Total 1,560 1,290 270 82.7 
Nonwhite 400 309 91 77.3 
%Nonwhite 25.6 24.0 33.9 
Unpaid family labor~/ 
Total 284 159 125 56.0 
Nonwhite 38 22 16 57.9 
%Nonwhite 13.4 13.8 12.7 
Hired workers~/ 
Total 1,275 1,131 144 88.7 
Nonwhite 363 287 76 79.1 
%Nonwhite 28.5 25.4 52.3 
Source: U.S. Census of Population, 1960, "Detailed Characteristics, U.S. 
Summary", Series PC (1) D, U. S. Bureau of the Census. 1963, Table 205. 
~/Unpaid family labor and farm foreman. 
~/Farm laborers, except unpaid family labor and farm foreman. 
-27-
Although race is not an important part of our analysis, it is interesting 
to note that nonwhites are comparatively unimportant as farm operators, 
play a somewhat larger role as a source of unpaid family labor, and a 
still larger role among the hired labor force. Moreover, negroes make 
up a larger fraction of the female hired labor force than of any other category. 
Data on the median years of school completed by the experienced U. S. farm 
labor force are presented in Table 3. 6. These data show that for the totals, 
farmers and farm managers have the most schooling, with similar levels for 
Table 3. 6. Median years of school completed by experienced U. S. farm 
labor force, 25 years and older, by color and sex, 1960. 
Male Female 
Farmers and farm managers 
Total 
Nonwhite 
Farm laborers and foremen~/ 
Total 
Nonwhite 
Unpaid family labor~/ 
Total 
Nonwhite 
Hired labor~/ 
8.7 
5.2 
6.8 
4.4 
N.A. 
N.A. 
8.8 
6.3 
8.4 
6.0 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Total 6. 7~/ 7 . 1~/ 
___ N-'-onw.~i.~. ··- ... ___ ----·- ... ~. :::...:A:...:.·-------N-'-'.:...A_:_. ___ _ 
Source: U. S. Census of Population 1960, "Educational Attainment", Vol. II, 
PC (2) 5B, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1963, Table 8. 
~/For the age group 16-21, the median years of school completed by farm 
laborers and foremen was 10 for males and 9. 5 for females. 
~/unpaid family labor and farm foremen. 
~/Farm laborers except unpaid family labor and farm foremen. 
~/Farm wage workers 20 years and older, estimated from The Hired Farm 
Working Force of 1960, ERS, USDA, A g. Information Bulletin 226, July 
1962, Table 46. 
N.A. =not available. 
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males and females. Farm laborers and hired labor have l-2 years less 
schooling, although the female component of the farm laborers and foremen 
is almost as high as that for the farmers and farm managers. It is also 
clear that nonwhites in general have completed less years of schooling than 
the whites. 
Three other aspects of the educational situation are important, although 
supporting data are not provided. First, it is well known that educational 
attainment is considerably less among the rural population than among the 
urban population. Second, the "quality" of education in rural areas is 
thought to be lower than that in urban areas . And finally , educational 
attainment is rising for both the urban and rural components of the population. 
Changes in the Hired Farm Work Force 
We now turn to a more detailed analysis of the changes taking place in 
the hired labor force and in hired employment. These data are taken from 
the series of reports on the hired farm working force, which in turn are 
based on sample data. Since the data in these reports relate to all persons 
who did some farm wage work during the year, they are not directly com-
parable with previous data on employment and demographic characteristics 
which are based on different measurement concepts . 
Although the year equivalents of hired labor have been declining, it is 
important to recognize that this masks some important underlying shifts. 
For example, the number of persons who did any farm wage work during 
the year actually increased 3% from 1945-59 to 1960-64 (Table 3. 7). 
Involved in this shift was an increase in the number of people working for 
short periods of time ( +27% for those working less than 25 days a year) 
and a sizeable decrease in those working for longer periods of time ( -31% 
for those working 250 days and over) . 
The 1964 estimate of 3. 4 million persons who did farm work for cash 
wages at some time during the year is at about the level that has prevailed 
since the mid-1950's. Hence, despite the steady decline in the number of 
farm operators, in unpaid family workers, and in year-equivalents of 
hired workers, the number of people doing farm work for wages has stayed 
about the same . 
Table 3. 7 also shows that 44 percent of the people doing hired work in 
the period 1960-64 worked less than 25 days during the year. Only 11% 
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Table 3. 7. Number of persons who did any farm wage work during the 
year, by duration of farm wage work, average 1945-59 and 
1960-64. 
Duration of farm wage work 
Total Less than 25-149 150-249 250 days 
Year workers 25 days days days and over 
Thou. Thou. Thou. Thou. Thou. 
-- --
Average: 
1945-59 3,454 1,225 1,296 354 579 
1960-64 3,554 1,558 1,275 318 402 
Percentage change +3 +27 -2 -10 -31 
Percentage distribution 
Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. 
Average: 
1945-59 100 35 38 10 17 
1960-64 100 44 36 9 11 
Source: The Hired Farm Working Force of 1964, A Statistical Report, AER 
No. 32, USDA, ERS, Page 9. 
~/Figures for workers are rounded to the nearest thousand without being 
adjusted to group totals . 
worked 250 days or more. The biggest relative shifts from the immediate 
post war period have been the increase in percentage of people working for 
short periods of time , and the decrease in the percentage of those that are 
year -round labor. 
Men have always made up the major part of the hired farm working force. 
However, over the years there has been a gradual shift so that women now 
make up a larger proportion of the total than formerly. (Table 3. 8). The 
proportion of women has risen from 25% to 29% in the postwar period. 
Another change in the hired labor force has been a decline in the propor-
tion of the hired farm work force that spends most of the year doing farm 
wage work. The proportion of time spent doing fa.rm wage work has declined 
from roughly 55% in 1947-49 to around 40% in 1962-63. This has been offset 
by an increase in the fraction of time unemployed and an increase in the time 
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Table 3.8. Number of persons who did any farm wage work during the 
year, by duration7of farm wage work and sex, average 1945-
49 and 1960-64.~ 
Duration of farm wage work 
Total workers 25 da;ys or more Less than 25 da;ys 
Year Total Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female 
Thou. Thou. Thou. Thou. Thcu. Thou. Thou. Thou. Thou. 
-- --Average: 
1945-49 3,454 2,585 869 2,229 1,812 417 1,225 772 452 
1960-64 3,554 2,535 1,020 1,996 1,542 455 1,558 993 565 
Percentage · 
change +3 -2 +17 -10 -15 +9 +27 +29 +25 
Percentage distribution 
Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. Pet. 
Average: 
1945-49 100 75 25 100 81 19 100 63 37 
1960-64 100 71 29 100 77 23 100 64 36 
Source: The Hired Farm Working Force of 1964, A Statistical Report, AER No.32, 
USDA , ERS, Page 9. 
~/Figures for workers are rounded to the nearest thousand without being adjusted 
to group totals . 
not in the work force. Among casual workers,..;!/ two-thirds are not in the 
labor force most of the year. Housewives and students make up the majority 
of this group. 
But even among noncasual workers , many are out of the labor force most 
of the year. The proportion of students among noncasual workers more than 
doubled since 1951. Together housewives and students now comprise almost 
one -third of the non casual workers . 
The place of residence of hired farm workers has also changed significantly 
in the last 15 years. From 1945-49 approximately two-thirds of the hired farm 
workers lived on farms at the time the hired farm working force surveys were 
..;!/"casual" workers are those who did less than 25 days of farm wage work, 
and "noncasual" workers are those who did 25 days or more of farm wage 
work during the year. Where the distinction is appropriate , noncasual 
workers are further classifed as "seasonal" (those doing at least 25 but 
less than 150 days), "regular" (those doing 150-249 days), or "year-round" 
(250 days or more). 
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made, and the remainder lived in rural-nonfarm ar{JS or in urban places. 
By 1963 this situation had almost exactly reversed.-
Migrant workers have been an important factor in meeting seasonal labor 
demands. In recent years, domestic migratory workers have comprised about 
one-tenth of the hired farm work force, with foreign workers making up a much 
smaller fraction of the total. However, the significance and importance of 
this labor goes much beyond its numerical size because of its relative impor-
tance in certain crops and its contribution in handling seasonal peak work loads. 
Additional perspective on the seasonal work force can be found in Table 
3. 9, which shows the composition of the seasonal farm labor force during the 
peak month annually from 1953-65. The rather stable level of the total hired 
seasonal employment over the 12 year period can be clearly seen. In addition, 
the major fraction of this seasonal labor force has come from domestic sources, 
with this fraction also remaining relatively stable. 
Within the domestic labor force it appears that those coming from interstate 
movement have remained relatively constant, while those coming from intra-
state sources have declined. On the other hand, local sources have provided 
somewhat more in recent years , while the Puerto Rican supply has dropped off. 
Of the foreign workers , the major fraction has come from Mexico. The 
peak use of foreign workers was attained in 1956, which was also the peak year 
in employment of Mexicans. In recent years the use of foreign labor dropped 
off in anticipation of the termination of the bracero program. And in 1965 
Mexicans were brought in only in response to critical situations. 
An Aging Population of Farm Operators 
The changing age structure of our agricultural labor force is perhaps the 
major structural change in terms of demographic characteristics. This 
problem is becoming of increasing concern to both policy makers and re-
searchers. The implications in terms of farm management research are 
important. 
!/Part of this is due to the changes in farm residence definition which were 
made in 1960. However, even allowing for this, significant differences 
have occurred. 
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The aging of ~e labor force has been studied through the use of cohort 
analysis. Kanel~ pioneered in this analysis, although his published work 
was restricted to the North Central States. Marion Clawson~/ has made 
perhaps the most comprehensive analysis for the total labor force, and it 
is to this study that we turn for the analysis which follows. 
Cohort analysis essentially involves following a given age group. through 
successive censuses and examining what is happening to it. Briefly, the 
number of farmers in any age group at any census date is the number in the 
age group 10 years younger at the census 10 years earlier, plus an entries 
into the group, minus any withdrawals. Entries into the "farmers" category 
normally exceed withdrawals up to the age group 35 to 44 years; after that 
age, withdrawals normally exceed entries and the number of farmers in the 
older age groups declines. 
This type of analysis necessarily measures only net changes; the 
available census data do not show total entries into farming or total with-
drawals therefrom. Moreover, it shows net changes in numbers of farm 
operators, not changes in total farm population. 
A given cohort is characterized by the census year in which the farmers 
are less than 25 years of age - that is , when each age group is first caught 
by a census as farm operators. And each cohort will show up in six sue-
·cessi ve census, as it ages. 
It turns out that the only complete cohorts in 70 years of census are 
those for 1890, 1900 and 1910. But as Clawson points out, these are more 
modern than they appear at first glance, since they terminated in 1940, 
1950 and 1960, respectively. Moreover, in a very real sense, the censuses 
of 1910 and 1920 were the only ones in our total national history when cohorts 
were at a normal maximum; in earlier censuses, several cohorts still 
reflected the smaller farm numbers during the earlier growth periods of the 
U. S. ; and in later censuses, the decline in farm numbers, and particularly 
the reduction in new entries , had begun to change the relationships among 
age groups. 
~/Don Kanel, "Age Components of Decrease in Number of Farmers, North 
Central States, 1890 -54", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. XLIIT, No. 2 
(May 1961) , pp. 24 7-26 3; and nFarm Adjustments by Age Groups , North 
Central States, 1950-59", Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 45, No.1 
(February 1963), pp. 47-60. 
~/Marion Clawson, "Aging Farmers and Agricultural Policy", Journal of 
Farm Economics, Vol. 45, No.1 (February 1963), pp. 13-30. 
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In analyzing the decline in farm numbers since 1920, Clawson finds that 
changes in farm numbers have been due primarily to changes in the numbers of 
younger farmers --to reduced entry into the newer cohorts. Actual with-
drawals , above a normal rate , of those already in farming is a minor factor. 
This has led to a considerable aging of our farm operators -- and what is 
important here, will lead to still further aging in the future. The pattern 
found is a very stable one, and projections of existing cohorts into the future 
take us well past the year 2000. 
Clawson follows the existing cohorts through and makes projections of 
the numbers of farm operators to the year 2000. The implications of this 
in terms of an age distribution of farm operators is summarized in Table 
3.10. The average of the 1890-1910 cohorts provides the approximate pro-
portions in a farm operator population when farm numbers remain about . 
constant, and deviations from them measure the degree to which a given 
population is abnormal in age. Note that in the cohorts for these three 
decades roughly one fourth of the farmers are "young" (under 35) , roughly 
one half are in the middle years ( 35 to 54) , and roughly one fourth are "old" 
(55 and older). 
In turning to the current situation and the projections into the future, 
we note first that the age distribution in 1960 was laready abnormal by these 
standards. And it appears that the situation will both get worse in the future, 
and last for. a considerable period of time o The percentage of older farm 
operators rises to over 50 percent by 1980 and then declines somewhat, but 
Table 3.10. Percentage age distribution of farm operators in 1960, 1970, 
1980, 1990 and 2000 under different assumptions 0 
Average of 
1890-1910 
Age group cohorts 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Young (under 35 years) 25 13 10 15 14 17 
Middle ( 35 -54 years) 47 48 44 33 37 43 
Older (55 years and older) 28 39 46 51 49 40 
Source: Clawson, op. cit. page 26. 
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even in 2000 it is nearly a half higher than in the base period. The percentage 
of young operators, under the same assumptions, declines to 1970 and then 
rises slightly, but still remains only about half its level in the base period. 
In summary, then, relatively large numbers of aging farmers will be with 
us for this generation and longer. The prospects of moving them at any-
thing approaching an accelerated rate will be difficult because they are not, 
in general, good prospects for retraining for other jobs. Research programs 
should focus both on facilitating the adjustment process, and in helping older 
people to be effective farm managers. 
The magnitude of the adjustment-out-of -agriculture problem can be seen 
when we turn the coin around and ask what the labor needs will be, given our 
rapidly changing level of technology. Ruttan1/ points out that if total agricul-
tural production were concentrated on farms such as those with sales of 
$20, 000 or more , the total U. S, farm output could be produced on 750 , 000 
farms. He further argues that the technological capacity already exists that 
would permit production of 80-90 percent of the value of total u. s. farm out-
puts on between 50 , 000 -100, 000 production units. 
When we compare this to Clawson's projection of 985,000 farm operators 
by the year 2000, it is clear that the gap is quite large if we want to efficiently 
utilize our existing level of knowledge. Even a more rapid rate of outmigration 
predicted by Clawson still leaves us with 610,000 farm operators in the year 
2000. 
The Effect of Recent Legislation and Other Economic 
Forces that Affect the Labor Market 
Minimum Wages 
The effect of minimum wages depends on the nature of the situation in 
which they are imposed, and on the nature of the minimum wages themselves. 
In theory, if the minimum wage is set above the equilibrium wage rate , and 
effectively enforced, it leads to an increase in the wage rate paid by the farmer, 
but at the same time creates some unemployment. Presumably more workers 
.:Uvernon W. Ruttan, "Agricultural Policy in an Affluent Society", Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol. 45, No. 5 (December, 1966) pp. ll00-1120. 
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will be willing to offer their labor to the industry than can be employed, 
and the institutional wage thus imposed introduces a rigidity into the 
labor market. Under these circumstances both the farmers and certain 
members of the labor force bear the costs of the legislation in the short 
run, although in the longer run the costs tend to be passed on to the 
consumer. The farmer may benefit somewhat, since the higher wage 
may attract a higher quality labor force to the industry, and the firm will 
in general be able to select from the pool of labor made available. 
On the other hand, the minimum wage may be rather innocuous. It 
may be set at such a level that it is below the going wage and thus have . 
no employment or wage effects. Some have argued that much of our 
minimum wage legislation in the past has been of this kind. As wages 
have continuously moved upward, the legal wage has come along behind, 
more in the nature of consolidating the previous gains than of actually 
pushing wages higher. 
A third possibility is the classical case where the employer is a 
monopsony purchaser of labor. In this case the minimum wage can 
actually raise the wage rate that is paid while at the same time increasing 
the level of employment. This comes about through reducing the marginal 
supply price of labor.~/ Hence, the firm has incentive to use more labor. 
A final possibility is that frequently cited by proponents of minimum 
wage legislation. The argument is that the imposition of the minimum wage 
will force the firm to adopt a higher level of technology , which in turn 
raises the productivity of the labor, and in the end enables the firm to 
pay the higher wage while at the same time not being forced to reduce the 
level of employment. 
Opponenets of this argument have pointed out that it basically assumes that 
the firms were irrational in the first place, since they were not on their 
highest possible production function. If they were not rational there is no 
reason to expect this kind of response. And if they were rational, and 
currently using the highest level of technology available, then there will 
be no possibility of such a response. 
~/More specifically, the positively sloped supply curve of labor to the firm 
is replaced by a perfectly elastic supply curve, and the divergence between 
the marginal supply price and the average supply price is eliminated. 
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It would appear, however, that there is a possibility of an economically 
induced adoption of technology, but the consequences of this may be quite 
different in the case of agriculture than that suggested by the proponents of 
the minimum wage . Let's suppose that new technology tends to be imbedded 
in capital goods of capital inputs . If this is the case , and the minimum wage 
is effective , then it will lead to the substitution of capital for labor. But this 
substitution actually leads to the use of higher level of technology since 
the technology is imbedded in the new capital items purchased. So far the 
argument is consistent and holds up. 
What tends to be ignored, however, is the ultimate market effect of the 
adoption of the new technology. If the adoption of the new technology leads 
to a shift in the supply curve of agricultural products to the right more 
rapidly than the demand curve is shifting, the relative price of agricultural 
products will decline. In this case the product market effect may be greater 
than the increase in physical productivity that comes with the new technolgoy, 
and the net effect will be a decline in the demand for labor. 
We have argued elsewhere!V' that this is the way in which technology in 
agriculture has contributed to the downward adjustment in the labor force 
experienced in U. S. agriculture. Wallace and Hoover10 I show how this 
could come about in their recent work. In a cross sectional analysis of 
the demand for labor they show that the effect of the adoption of higher 
levels of technology is to increase the demand for labor, so long as product 
market effects are ignored. However , once the product market effec~ are 
allowed to work themselves out, the effect of the higher level of technology 
is to reduce the demand elasticity is inelastic. 
The problem of empirically assessing the magnitude of minimum wage 
legislation in each of these four cases is rather complex, largely because 
of our lack of knowledge concerning the econometric structure of the labor 
markets. However, the following comments seem pertinent: 
V Schuh, G. E. and J. R. Leeds , "A Regional Analysis of the Demand for 
Hired Agricultural Labor," Papers and Proceeding of the Regional Science 
Association, Vol. 11, pp. 295-308. 
10 !wallace , D. W. and Dale Hoover, "Income Effects of Innovation: The Case 
of Labor in Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 48: No. 2 
(May 1966) pp. 325-335. 
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1. It seems clear that labor scarcity and higher wage rates can force 
or induce the adoption of a higher level of technology. Two factors are 
important: (a) the substitution of capital for labor does tend to bring with 
it a higher level of technology - especially that which is embodied in 
capital goods, and (b) Land Grant Colleges and private companies are 
responsive to the needs of farmers, such that rising wages and labor 
scarcity provides the incentive to extend both the mechanical and the 
biological research necessary to speed the process of mechanization. 
Both points (a) and (b) work toward reducing the demand for labor, and 
can reduce the costs to the farmer associated with effective minimum wage 
legislation. 
2. It would be my judgment that the monopsony purchase of labor in 
American agriculture is not a widespread phenomenon. Hence, we would 
not expect a situation in which both wages and employment would rise as a 
response to the minimum wage legislation. 
3. The direct effect of the legislation, especially in the short run, can 
be seen;n broad lines from a more comprehensive analysis made by Robert 
Rudd.- In capsule form, his conclusions are as follows:12/ 
a. The main impact of a minimum wage extension to agriculture will 
fall on Class I (over $40 , 000 sales) and Class II ( $20 , 000-
$40 , 000 sales) farms which employ more than 70 percent of the 
hired farm work force. Class I farms pay more than half the 
annual commercial farm hired wage bill. 
b. The South will be the area most affected by higher wage rates. 
This is because farm wage rates in this area are lowest and 
because the South uses nearly 50% of the nation's hired farm 
work force. 
c. Cotton and tobacco will be the most affected crops since they 
are the most labor-intensive crops in areas of low hired farm 
wage rates. Both of these are high seasonal users of hired 
farm labor. 
!!./Robert Rudd, ''Minimum Wages and Farming," Presented at the Regional 
Farm Policy Conference on Labor and Agriculture, Co-sponsored by 
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and the Agriculture Policy Institute of 
North Carolina State University at Roanoke, Virginia, March 15, 1966. 
12/ Rudd's analysis assumed that the legislation would apply to farmers 
using 300 mandays of labor in a given quarter, when in fact the law 
passed applies only to those using 500 mendays of labor in the peak 
. quarter. Hence the effect of the law will be somewhat less than indicated 
here. 
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d. Based on a 1965 enumerative survey, a minimum wage of 
$1. 00 per hour for hired farm workers applied to all farms 
in the United States would raise the hourly wages of half 
the hired farm workers in the nation and would increase the 
wage bill 19 percent. If a minimum wages of $1.00 were 
applied only to workers on large farms ( 300 mandays of labor 
in the peak quarter of the year) , 44% of the hired farm workers 
on such farms would receive increases and the wage bill 
would rise 15% on affected farms. 
e. A minimum wage of $1 applied to farms using more than 300 
mandays of labor in the peak quarter would affect 69% of the 
hired farm workers , and raise the wage bill by a third. 
So clearly the minimum wage legislation that has been extended to agricul-
ture is not innocuous. It is likely to have sizeable effects on the pattern of 
production in the South as farmers shift away from labor intensive crops, 
and these shifts will have spillover effects in other parts of the country as 
the competitive forces play themselves out. In other words, the minimum 
wage legislation may make the South a much stronger competitor of mid-
western agriculture. 
A secondary effect may be to shift somewhat the proportions between 
family labor .and hired labor. Since the major impact of the legislation would 
be on farms in which family labor is relatively important, we would not expect 
this effect to be very large. 
On the other hand, it does appear that the legislation will create some 
unemployment. Although it appears that the demand for labor is relatively 
inelastic, it is greater than zero, and appears to range between - . 2 and -
. 4.13/ Our estimates of the supply elasticity of labor to agriculture, holding 
constant the size of the labor force, are also in the vicinity of . 25 to . 50. 14/ 
Hence, there would be more workers willing to supply their labor to agriculture 
at the higher wage rate. This problem would be further compounded by 
13/schuh, G. E., "An Econometric Investigation of the Market for Hired 
Labor in Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 44: No. 2 
(May 1962) pp. 307-321; and Johnson, Stanley S., and E. 0. Heady, 
Demand for Labor in Agriculture, CAEA Report 13 T, Iowa State University, 
1962. 
14/ Ibid, Schuh. 
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the entrance of new workers into the labor force in response to the higher 
wage rates. Hence, the minimum wage legislation may introduce a 
considerable imperfection or discontinuity into the agricultural labor 
market. 
In the longer run, however, minimum wages, plus more intensive re-
traifling p.lrograms , may speed up the migration rate from agriculture. The 
person who becomes unemployed may be more prone to utilize available 
retraining programs than if he were employed, but at a low salary. 
Housing Legislation 
The Housing Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-117) provides a subsidy for 
housing by assisting in the construction of low-rent housing for American 
farmworkers .15/ Under this Act, the Farmer's Home Administration 
is authorized to make grants up to two-thirds of the costs of providing 
low-rent housing. The funds may be used to pay part of the costs of 
building, buying, or repairing housing and related facilities. 
The grants are made to states or other political sub-divisions and 
essentially provide a means of creating public housing for farm workers. 
Although the appropriations for this Act are not large, in general the 
effect of the law is to reduce the cost of labor to the individual farmer. 
The provision of low cost housing, at the expense of the state and federal 
governments, provides a means whereby the farmer can attract a given 
amount of labor at a lower direct wage cost, other things being equal. 
In essence the government and the farmers are sharing in the cost of the 
labor. The longer run effect of such programs is of course to slow down 
the rate of change into a more capital intensive agriculture, and also to 
shift the product mix to more labor intensive products. (Shift it from 
what it would be in the absence of such programs . ) 
15/see'The Migratory Farm Labor Problem in the United States, 1966 
Report of the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, U. S. Senate, 
pp. 25-27. 
-41-
Other Federal Grant in Aid Programs 
Two other laws have been passed in recent years which make funds 
available for the improvement of working, living, and health conditions of 
domestic agricultural workers. These are the Migrant Health Act of 1962 
(Public Law 87 -692) and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Public Law 
88 -452) • The latter authorizes migrato~ labor programs in education, 
child daycare, sanitation and housing .16 Both laws are implemented 
through grants -in -aid to political entities , and provide social services to 
the agricultural labor force. 
As with the Housing Act of 1965, these programs should enable the farm 
sector to obtain a given supply of labor at a lower direct cost (increased 
supply at the same price) to themselves than would be possible in the absence 
of the programs. To this extent they would have similar resource allocation 
effects. 
It should be recognized that these programs provide an extension of 
public services to the rural areas that are already available in urban areas. 
To this extent they do not represent a discrimination in favor of rural areas, 
but rather .a catching-up with services available in other areas. · It would 
appear that such programs increase the supply of labor to agriculture, other 
things being equal, with exception of the educational aspects of the Economic 
Opportunity Act, which may have a longer run affect of speeding up the rate 
of out-migration.l7 I It is also our guess that we will see an expansion of 
such public service programs for agriculture in the future. 
Social Security 
The Social Security Act was extended to farmers on January 1, 1955. 
Presumably this extension would help alleviate the problem of an aging 
farm operator population by facilitating the retirement of a larger fraction 
of farm operators when they reached 65 years of age. 
16/lbid,pp. 27-29. 
17 /see below. 
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However, KaneJlY found that up to 1959 the availability of Social 
Security had not affected the withdrawal rates of farmers in the North 
Central states. Using cohort analysis he studied farm adjustments by 
age groups. More widespread retirement would have been shown by a 
larger rate of withdrawal in the 1950's of those who were 55-64 years 
of age at the begining of the decade. But these age-specific withdrawal 
rates were practically identical in the 1950's (38.3 percent) and the 1940's 
( 37. 3 percent) . Thus the proportion of farmers who completed their 
retirement upon reaching 65 years of age has apparently not increased. 
Admittedly this is rather limited evidence. The program may not have 
been available long enough for this to be a true test, or it may be a 
measurement problem since many farmers who retire continue to earn 
some income. Moreover, step-ups in the benefits from the program 
may ·make this a more important factor in the future. 
The Effect of Educational Programs 
It is very likely that educational expenditures will not only increase in 
the aggregate, but increase on a per capita basis. The returns from 
investment in the human agent are being increasingly recognized, as is 
the disparity in educational opportunities among various groups in society. 
As a consequence we are very likely to see increasing amounts of federal 
aid to education, particularly at the elementary and secondary levels, 
with a relative upgrading of those groups that have been by-passed at the 
present time. 
It would also seem that the changes that are taking place in the South, 
where major fractions of the agricultural labor force are found, will lead 
to increased educational expenditures. The industrialization that is taking 
place not only is effective in changing value positions, but also provides a 
stronger tax base for the support of educational institutions. 
A recent study by Micha Gisserl9/ provides a basis for analyzing the 
effect of increased educational expenditures on the agricultural labor force. 
He argues that education affects both the demand for and the supply of 
labor. Its effect on the demand for labor is to increase it, other things 
18/ . 
- Op.cit., 1963. 
19 I Gisser, Micha, "Schooling and the Farm Problem", Econometrica, 
Vol. 33: No. 3, (July 1965), pp. 582-592. 
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being equal, since it leads to an increase in the productivity of that input. 
It is expected to have a negative effect on the supply of labor offered to 
agriculture, however, since it provides the individual with a wider range 
of marketable skills , and makes him more aware of his employment 
opportunities . 
What is of more interest, however, is the way in which these counteracting 
influences resolve themselves in the market place. That is, the net effect 
in terms of wage rates and employment. Gisser examines this through 
the reduced forms of the structural equations, and shows that the net effect 
of education is to reduce the employment in agriculture and to raise the 
agricultural wage or the price of labor. More specifically he found that an 
increase in the level of schooling in rural farm areas of 10 percent will 
induce a 6 to 7 percent additional migration out of agriculture and raise the 
farm wage rate 5 percent, other things being equal. 
In summary, the , educational programs act to reduce the employment 
of labor in agriculture and to raise the agricultural wage rate . And although 
we have not similar research available on the effects of less formal educational 
programs such as the training programs of the Job Corps , etc. , it would be 
our judgment that they would have similar effects. Further expansion of these 
will act to further reduce the supply of labor available to agriculture. 
· Unionization 
The unionization of agricultural labor has been and will continue to be 
difficult, largely because of the geographic distribution of the industry and 
the attendant difficulties in policing. Despite this, I think that most students 
of the problem would agree that eventually it will come. Unionization will 
become increasingly feasible as total production becomes increasingly 
concentrated in fewer firms , and if operators and family labor should make 
up a smaller fraction of the labor force on the individual farm unit. 
The effect of unionization will depend in large part on the form it takes, 
and on the individual situations of the employers. Lewis20 I makes a 
distinction between competitive unions and monopoly unions. Competitive 
unions tend to organize the labor of an individual firm, and provide a system-
atic basis for establishing the rules of employment. Such unions provide a 
20/Lewis, H. G. 
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service to the firms in that they make for economy in hiring personnel, 
in establishing rates of pay, and in establishing the other conditions of 
employment. Moreover, they do not in general restrict the supply of 
labor as a means of exploiting a monopoly position. 
Monopoly unions, on the other hand, in addition to establishing work 
rules, are also in the position of restricting the supply of labor offered, 
and thus gain a monopoly return. Such unions are typically organized on 
an industry wide basis, and generally ration the supply of labor offered 
through some licensing procedure, generally with the explicit or implicit 
support of the government - the latter obtained through some guise of 
protecting the public, such as housing codes, safety codes, or health. 
Clearly, the relative wage or employment effects of unionization in 
agriculture will depend on which of these forms it takes. The creation 
of an industry -wide union with power to ration job opportunities would 
have a larger wage effect than a competitive union established to facilitate 
the establishment of work rules and conditions of employment.· 
However, the individual situations of the employers are also important 
in evaluating the impact of unionization. If the employer is a monopsony 
purchaser of labor, and is thereby purchasing less labor and at a lower 
wage than if he were hiring in a competitive market, the creation of 
either a competitive or a monopoly union could have sizeable wage and 
employment effects, either one tending to move toward the position of 
a competitive solution. 
If the firm is hiring labor in a competitive market, the formation of 
competitive unions will have little or no effect on relative wages and 
employment, but will lead to standardization of hiring and firing pro-
cedures and other rules of employment. The formation of a monopoly 
union will destroy the competitive market in which the firms hire labor, 
and by definition would lead to higher wages and the availability of less 
labor. 
The third possibility for the firms is that they be monopoly sellers of 
their product. This situation lends itself especially well to the establishment 
of a monopoly union, and the fruits of the product monopoly are shared, 
then, between the frim (or firms if it is a cartel) and the labor union. 
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By way of summary, it would appear that there is very little monopsony 
purchase of labor among agricultural firms (abstracting fran discrimination 
against Negroes -which is beyond this paper). Hence there is very little 
potential for raising wage rates from this source. On the other hand, we 
may see some tendency toward the formation of cartels .• particularly among 
specialty crops. This could lead to somewhat more of a tendency for the 
creation of monopoly unions. 
Independently of these effects the unionization of the agricultural labor 
force will have an additional effect. Agricultural wages have traditionally 
been one of the more flexible in the total economy. This flexibility has been 
both upward and downward and probably has been responsible for the appear-
ance of very little measured unemployment among agricultural employees, 
although underemployment has probably been rather widespread. 
The establishment of labor unions will probably lead to a great deal 
more rigidity in agricultural wages, especially on the downward side, and 
may lead to the appearance of somewhat more unemployment among farm 
employees as weather and product demand fluctuations shift the demand for 
labor. This effect will be in addition to the upward pressure on wage rates 
which the union will exert. 
The Level of Aggregate Economic Activity 
Although not specifically assigned as a topic to be covered by this paper, 
this is perhaps one of the most important factors determining the stock of 
labor in agriculture. A number of studies21/ have shown the role of unemploy-
ment in the nonfarm sector in determining the migration rate from agriculture. 
A high level of aggregate demand, with unemployment down to around 4% makes 
for a rapid outflow of labor from the agricultural sector, whereas a higher 
level of unemployment keeps the labor dammed up in agriculture. 
We can see the effects of this most especially in 1965 when average farm 
employment declined 3 percent from 1964, the largest decline of record for 
21/ Sjaastad, Larry, "Occuational Structure and Migration Patterns", Labor 
Mobility and Population in Agriculture, Iowa State University Press , Ames , 
Iowa, 1961; and Dale E. Hathaway, ttMigration from Agriculture: The 
Historical Record and Its Meaning, American Economic Review, L (1960) , 
pp. 379-391. 
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any one year. 221 Farm wage rates, on the other hand, increased 5% from 
1964. 24/ A year to year advance of this size has been recorded in only 
one year since 1951-52, when pressures of the Korean war contributed to 
considerable increases. 
Adjustments of this magnitude continued into 1966.24/ The number of 
workel."s on farms during the survey wee~ of Aprill7-23 was 7% below what 
it had been in the same period of the previous year. And farm wage rates 
were 10% above those of the same period in the previous year. The reduction 
in the labor force for the first 3 months of 1966 was also 7%. 
If we have in fact learned to manage the economy in such a way as to 
maintain a high level of aggregate demand, and are able and willing to do 
so despite political exigencies and balance of payments problems, we may 
soon find ourselves in a rather unique situation. Through much of the period 
since 1930 the agricultural labor force has had a considerable amount of 
slack in it. Rapid expansion of production to meet wartime needs was always 
possible because of the sizeable amounts of under-employed labor in the 
sector, and because of the availability of potential new entrants into the 
labor force from the farm population. However, we may soon find ourselves 
in a situation where this slack no longer exists. Expansion of agricultural . 
employmel}.t will then come about in large part by bidding the labor away 
from other employments. This has important implications both from the 
standpoint of shortrun adjustments and in terms of the manpower policies 
necessary in case of a war time emergency, for example. 
On the other hand if balance of payment problems and/or other consider-
ations should force us to return to a 5-7% level of unemployment, or higher, 
,the ~ffect of this will outweigh many of the other developments in the labor 
market previously discussed. Continued mechanization and the increased 
use of purchased inputs will require a continued downward adjustment in 
the farm labor force. If the level of unemployment rises, labor will once 
again be dammed up in the rural areas , and wage rates will rise more 
slowly. 
22/ Farm Labor, USDA , Selected Issues. 
23/lbid. 
24/lbid. 
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In this respect it is also important to recognize another major shift in 
the structure of the agricultural labor market. The agricultural labor force 
is now reaching a point where it makes up only a relatively small fraction of 
the total labor force. In itself this would tend to make relative adjustments 
in the labor force somewhat easier, since on tl:;te outmigration side it involves 
a relatively small flow feeding into a larger base, and vice versa. On the 
other hand, however, this is counter -balanced by the fact that the drain out of 
agriculture has involved a shift of the population base from rural areas to 
urban areas. If in the future we should have to expand agricultural employment 
because of a national emergency or the increasing demand for food and fiber 
products , we may encounter the same serious difficulties that we had in 
reducing the agricultural labor force. Employment in agriculture will involve 
moving perhaps long distances, the development of skills that the labor force 
does not have, plus the provision of a product mix that was learned in urban 
areas, but which is not widely available in rural areas. 
The Changing Nature of Skills Required in Agriculture 
We have very little research to draw on in this very important area, so 
we will have to depend primarily on conjecture. But it appears that we may 
be reaching a significant turning point concerning farm skills. This can 
perhaps be best seen by considering some background. 
Brewster~/ argued in 1950 that mechanization in agriculture has been 
quite different than mechanization in the industrial sector. In the industrial 
sector it led to a higher degree of functional specialization in the use of labor, 
and the laborer became essentially an extension of the machine, performing 
highly routinized tasks, with little or no skills other than manual skills required. 
On the contrary, many of the skills previously required were replaced by the 
machines themselves. In agriculture, however, mechanization has not led 
to such functional specialization. There has been little or no use made of 
assembly line techniques in agriculture, and the laborer has essentially the 
same range of functions to perform as he did prior to mechanization. And a 
major contribution of mechanization has been to lighten work loads and improve 
the timeliness of farming operations, rather than to perform previous skills 
involving manual dexerity more efficiently. 
25/Brewster, J. M., "The Machine Process in Agriculture and Industry", 
Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 32: No. 1 (February 1950) pp. 69-81. 
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In a recent paper I have argued that the nature of the technical change 
(or change in technique) in agriculture is such that an increase in skills is 
necessary for farming. 26/ Given the rather limited degree to which func-
tional specialization has developed within agriculture, so that assembly 
line techniques can be used, it would appear that the change in technology, 
which involves either changes in the quality of other inputs or the intro-
duction of new inputs into the production process, requires increasing skill 
levels. The substitutuion of commercial fertilizers for organic fertilizers, 
for example, increased the range of alternatives available to the farm 
decision maker, and made his decision making process much more complex. 
The same applies as a general rule to the other chemical and biological 
developments. In general they tend to be more specific in their application, 
and require a much greater skill level on the part of their user. Hence, 
there would appear to be a highly complementary relationship between the 
quality of labor and the quality of other inputs, thereby leading to increas-
ing demands for skills in the labor force as the quality dimensions of 
other inputs changes. The impact of this will be felt most strongly among 
the farm operators or the decision makers. 
On the other hand, we have seen a considerable amount of specialization 
in the production of farm products . This trend is likely to continue , 
especially if we maintain public policies designed to transfer a fraction of 
the risk and uncertainty associated with farming to the nonfarm sector. The 
trend toward specialization does reduce the range of production knowledge 
and skills which the farm operators must have, although it may well increase 
the necessity of his being more highly skilled with respect to market oppor-
tunities and market conditions. It is difficult to evaluate the relative magni-
tude of these forces. 
However, if and when total U. S. farm output is produced on between 
50,000 - 100,000 production units, as Ruttan27 I suggest, it would appear 
tha:t farm firms will become much more like similar sized nonfarm firms. 
In the past, farm firms have not had serious problems of labor management 
and labor coordination, with the exception of the limited number of excep-
tionally large farms. However, if we produce our food and fiber needs on 
26/schuh, G. E. , "The Influence of Technological Advance Upon Farm Factor 
Demands, Supplies, and Income Shares", presented at Workshop on Income 
Distribution Analysis, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, North 
Carolina, June 6-8 , 1966. 
27/ap. cit. 
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50,000 - 100,000 farms, a substantial fraction of them will have sizeable 
staffs of employees, both to handle routine functions and to provide tech-
nical assistance of various forms. 
The need for personnel relations will be greatly expanded, the need to 
carefully select prospective employees will be much larger, and the need 
for coordination will be great. ·In addition individual farms may well have 
their own staff of highly trained technical people, either as full time employ-
ees or on a retainer basis. It is conceivable that a large feeding operation, 
for example, would have need for a nutritionist, a veterinarian, and an 
economist to do the market analysis. 28/ Such developments are already 
taking place in some cases. 
The implications of this to the future fUiiction and role of schools of 
agriculture is great. It is conceivable that farm firms will be doing their 
own applied research, much as the larger firms in the nonfarm sector do, 
and the public universities will be given a greater opportunity to do the 
basic research in the biological and physical sciences and the overall func-
tioning of the economy , plus the training of the technicians to do the applied 
research for the firms . 
In Conclusion 
The quality of social services provided by local, state, or federal 
government is a major factor over the long run in determining the capacity 
and quality of the human factor in the community. In recent years we have 
seen an increasing concern with these problems , and with the extension of 
the programs to people in rural areas. For the first time we have a set 
of policy instruments which potentially can make a significant attack on the 
poverty problem in agriculture. 
The Poverty Program attempts to improve the quality and employability 
of the human factor. The Economic Development Administration, Appalachia, 
and other physical investment programs attempt to create economic activity 
and jobs. Programs such as these probably will reduce the supply of labor 
28/Nielson, James, ''Managerial Requirements of Farm Firms, 1980", 
Structural Changes in Commerical Agriculture , CAED Report 24, 
Iowa State University, 1965. 
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offered to agriculture. The basic premise behind this statement is that 
a good fraction of the labor in agriculture is trapped there - trapped by 
a lack of opportunity or alternative. To the extent that these programs 
do improve the quality and employability of the human factor, they will 
probably speed up the migration rate from agriculture. It is true that 
a few of these will remain in agriculture , and tliat as a result of the 
program, they will be more productive in agricultural pursuits. However, 
given the relative wage structure, the major fraction of them will prob-
ably seek nonfarm employment. And to the extent that the new Federal 
programs reduce the amount of poverty in the rural areas , they by defi-
nition raise the price of labor - either indirectly by speeding up the 
migration rate, or directly by increasing the reservation price of much 
of the labor in rural areas • 

CHANGES IN MARKETING OF LIVESTOCK AND LIVESTOCK 
PRODUCTS 
by Vernon W. Pherson* 
The objectives of this paper are: 
1. To look briefly at historical trends of key factors related to live-
stock and livestock products marketing; 
2. To reflect on the unique characteristics of meat; 
3. To propose a long-term objective of the Livestock and Meat 
Economy; and 
4. To suggest some implications for future activities. 
I will not attempt to make specific forecasts based upon historical data. 
Others are much better equipped to do this. In fact, I hope to challenge 
the usefulness of this over-exploited activity. 
Review of Major Industry Trends 
To review most trends in the livestock and meat industry, it is necessary 
only to read Technical Study No~ 1 of the National Commission on Food Market-
ing, June 1966. Since each of you has ready access to that report, I will 
duplicate only a few of the data series. 
1 .. Total red meat production has had an upward trend during the recent 
years with beef increasing and hogs decreasing slightly. (See Table 4.1) 
2. These livestock passed through a variety of marketing channels and 
institutions. You are aware of the increasing relative importance of direct 
and general country buying activities at the expense of terminal markets. 
(See Table 4. 2) 
3. Cooperatives have been a decreasing factor in cattle marketing and 
a slightly increasing factor in hog marketings since 1950 (See Table 4. 3). 
This can probably be explained by the co-ops' reluctance to change. 
*Product Group Supervisor, Meat Products Div. , Armour Food Products Co. 
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activities from terminal markets in the case of cattle, and their willingness 
to operate country buying stations plus their backward integration into feeder 
pig marketing in the case of hogs. 
4. Concentration in meat packing ~clined markedly after World War II. 
The decline was greatest for cattle slaughtering. The largest four firms 
produced 35% of commercial beef and veal in 1947 and 24% in 1964 (See Table 
4. 4) . The next group of four held their relatively small 4% share. For hog 
slaughter, the largest four declined from 41 to 34% but the next four rose 
from 10 to 14%. 
5. Surplus slaughter capacity exists in abundance -particularly for 
hogs . It was estimated that F. I. S. was only 6 3 pe]\~ent of a 39 hour week 
capacity for hogs and 90% for cattle in 1965. Most plants can economically 
slaughter much more than 39 hrs. /wk. -even up to a double shift of 78 
hrs./wk. 
6. Imported meat has accounted for a relatively small share of total 
consumption. Beef imports hit a peak of 9.0% of the U. S. commercial 
supply in 1963, but dropped to 4. 7% in 1965. Pork imports were at -a 
high of 3.0% of the U. S. commercial supply in 1965 in response to high 
pork prices (See Table 4. 5). 
Other industry trends include the following: 
7. Livestock production concentrated in fewer -but larger units. 
8. Increased specialization in production units. 
9.. More specification in livestock purchasing. 
10. Greater emphasis on "quality" in livestock production. 
ll. An apparent increased demand for all meats during past several 
months. 
12. Larger proportion of meats sold under brand names - big increase 
in retailers ' brands . 
13. An increasing share of beef is being semi-processed before reaching 
the retail store . 
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14. Meat packers' expenditures for research and development have 
been increasing, but are still much below competitive industries. 
This listing is neither exhaustive nor definitive in a cause-effect 
relationship. It is intended only as a brief review. 
Should we be encouraged by these trends or should we be alarmed? 
You say, "Some of each, some are good and some are bad." And I'm 
sure that we could argue through gallons of coffee about which of the trends 
should go into each category. 
But that would be a waste of time. The only reason for identifying trends 
at all is to help isolate the causes. Then to project the impact of its 
continuation, but most important, to initiate action to control both the 
direction and rate of change of the key factors. 
For example, let's take a look at the Industry segment that feeds my 
family. Concentration_i!!_!_he ~~:g_p..!l9!ting ind~_!;~~ong the large packers 
has declined sign~f!cantly du!:!_ng the_2-as~2 dec~del!· There could be many 
arguments regarding whether this has been good or bad such as "It has 
benefitted the farmers because it has increased competition for the livestock." 
But, the important point is '"Why has this trend occurred?" Certainly one 
reason was that the large packers did not keep up with technological changes 
in either production or marketing so that new firms were encouraged to enter 
the business and could grow. This has resulted in over-capacity which 
in the sign of a high -cost, inefficient industry. Now, we can all agree that 
this is bad and over a period of time will have a negative effect on all seg-
ments of the livestock and meat industry. 
But you say, ''You're stretching a point, people have to eat and as long 
as they have money they're going to eat meat." Let's reflect a few minutes 
on the uniqueness of meat. 
What is different about meat that makes it so valuable? It must have 
some special characteristics since it is a relatively inefficient source of 
food. 
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Meat has been one of the chief foods of man for thousands of years. 
The caveman ate meat because he liked the taste and because it satisfied 
his hunger better than fruits and plants. Today most of us eat meats for 
these reasons , but also because we know it is one of the most complete 
foods available. Meat is an energy food, rich in proteins, minerals and 
vitamins in addition to fats and carbohydrates. 
These characteristics in combination with affluence have brought us 
to the present developed state of our Livestock and Meat Economy. Will 
it continue? 
Until recent years, there has been relatively little success in duplicating 
these characteristics in other products , but that appears to be changing. 
There are many products currently marketed I'd like to show you that are 
\ 
considered to be "meat substitutesrr in every sense - including consumer 
taste and appearance. They can be purchased at a store here in the area. 
They are both canned and frozen and have names such as Prime, Wham 
and Prosage. 
Additional meat competitors on a world-wide basis are discussed in an 
article by Ray Goldberg in the September - October "Harvard Business 
Review." He mentions three vegetable products that may be an answer 
to protein malnutrition in developing countries. 
I have no doubt that we in the United States will continue to consume 
large quantities of meats. However, these developments indicate to me 
that members of the Livestock and Meat Industry need to seriously re-
evaluate some basic assumptions on which future plans are laid. 
I believe it is necessary to begin with a statement of Objective for the 
entire Livestock and Meat Industry complex - then to write objectives for 
each segment or group within the industry. If we had time today, I'd like 
to see if this group could agree upon a set of objectives. But since we 
don't, I'd like to suggest the following long-term objective: 
The objective of the Livestock and Meat Industry is to sell 
an increasing quantity of food manufactured from red meat raw 
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materials in an efficient manner that will yield a reasonable 
return on invested capital in all segments of the industry. 
The long-term sub-objectives for industry segments must concentrate 
on efficiency: 
The objective of livestock producers is to provide raw 
materials for ma..rmfacturing food from meats - efficiently. 
The objective of the livestock marketing system is to 
concentrate and allocate raw materials (livestock) --efficiently. 
The objective of meat processors is to manufacture food 
from meat raw materials and to distribute to retail outlets 
efficiently. 
These objectives for specific segments could be expanded to include 
profits and they certainly should be for individual firms. However, 
survival and growth will not be possible without increased efficiency in 
all industry segments. Over the long pull we will rise and fall together. 
Competition will not be among segments 0f the livestock industry. 
It will be with meat substitutes. How well meat products compete will 
depend on the accumulative efficiency of all segments of the industry. 
In order to drive for efficiency, several already existing trends must 
continue. 
l. Livestock production units must become larger and more specialized. 
2. Increasing numbers of livestock must go directly from farm to 
slaughter. 
3. Increasing numbers of livestock, particularly hogs, must be sold 
on the basis of carcass grade and weight. 
4. There must be more long-term arrangements between livestock 
producers and packers that will help eliminate supply fluctuations and 
uncertainty. 
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5. Larger share of meats must be processed to some degree before 
reaching consumer - mostly sold under brand names. 
6. There must be an accelerated drive to develop new products to 
efficiently utilize meat raw materials. 
7. Cost reducing activities must receive increased attention from 
meat processors . 
It is my opinion, that as an industry, we are making only a feeble 
effort toward accomplishing the proposed objectives. It's a tough job 
and there are many roadblocks. 
I'll list only a few specific roadblocks as examples, many more could 
be added: 
1. Pre -occupation on "quality'r by livestock production and marketing 
specialists . 
This problem is most easily seen for hogs, but it also exists for beef. 
How many times have we heard the statement (or made it ourselves) that 
the pork industry needs to produce higher quality pork and to keep it 
identified so that it can be merchandised as "quality" pork to consumers? 
The implication is that this action would solve the Hog and Pork Industry's 
problems. 
The fact is that less than one -fifth of a hog is sold in a form recognized 
by consumers as pork. The remainder is processed to some degree. The 
problem is compounded by the confusion of meat yield with quality character-
istics. 
Fortunately, there is a positive correlation of high quality with meat 
yield so that many of the conclusions regarding production and marketing 
practices are right for the wrong reasons. This confusion, however, results 
in an inflexible production system because influential people continue to treat 
the symptoms rather than to attack the basic problems. 
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The result will be that if, (no not if), WHEN consumers dictate 
through the marketing system the meat change in the best type of hog 
to provide raw materials in the most efficient manner, the hog pro-
duction system will take years to adjust - years that may cost the 
life of the hog and pork industry. 
2. Great concern for Income Equity among Industry Segments. 
This probably has its most sophisticated approach among students of 
"market structure.'' In other forms, we see the organization of new 
farm organizations and emphasis on bargaining cooperatives. I believe 
the principle danger of this great concern is the tendency to assume that 
the only competition is within the industry rather than to recognize the 
real competition coming from other industries . 
3. Reluctance by Meat Processors to Invest in Research and Devel-
opment. 
Because of the profit squeeze, only small investments have been made 
in Research and Development. As a result, relatively few cost reducing 
innovations and new product concepts have been produced. The processors 
also have ignored the threat of substitute products. 
Other roadblocks include: 
4. A generally negative attitude of Farm Management Specialists in 
the Midwest toward Specialized Large-scale Livestock Production Units. 
5. Fear of Private Firms to Cooperate in any manner with Government 
agencies. 
This may be justified because of a feeling by Government Personnel 
that Private Industry (particularly the large firms) attempts in every way 
possible to cheat all other segments of the industry, including consumers. 
Can the industry insure a profitable future by moving rapidly and in the 
proper direction? I believe the answer is yes -if -we get started immediately. 
First: The first step to a profitable future is to reach agreement 
on the primary objective of the industry among key segments of the 
industry -namely Government, University and Industry Spokesmen. 
This task should be to reach agreement on "what" should be done 
rather than "how" to do it. No attempt should be made to recommend 
or set Public policy. 
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At this point I should suggest another Roadblock, and that is the 
tendency to call large conference meetings for the purpose of problem 
solving. Seriously, such a group as suggested here must be kept small. 
The individuals should be selected because of their broad insight into 
the total livestock and meat economy. 
Second: After objectives are determined, how to accomplish 
them becomes the problem. 
It is my opinion that the study of past trends is useful but only for 
isolating and understanding their causes. They should not be blindly 
projected to the future. It is time to change the emphasis from bakcward 
looking research and policy research per se to creative research. Respon-
sible researchers must use a normative approach. Many of the factors 
that will influence the future can be changed with creative leadership. 
Dr. Thomas Stout in his discussion of basically this same paper says 
that "we may expect an industrial revolution in agriculture of unprecedented 
proportions. We may expect it to be engineered as much by non-traditional 
thinkers with backgrounds and training unrelated to agriculture as by 
less -inspired products of the existing agricultural establishments." 
I'm afraid that Dr. Stout may be correct, but I hope for the good of all 
here today, that he is wrong. We have the talent among our existing 
agricultural establishments. If we can get the inspiration, we will provide 
the creative leadership that can change the future of the Livestock and 
Meat Industry. 
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Table 4.1. Commerical Meat Production, 1946 - 1965 
------
Lamb and Total 
Year Beef Veal Pori&! Mutton Meat 
Million pounds 
1946 9,010 1,329 9,220 946 20,505 
1947 10,096 1,493 8,811 779 21,179 
1948 8,766 1,323 8,486 728 19,303 
1949 9',142 1,240 8,875 587 19,844 
1950 9,248 1,137 9,397 581 20,363 
1951 8,,549 972 10,190 508 20,219 
1952 9,337 1,080 10 '321 635 21,373 
1953 12,055 1,451 8,971 715 23,192 
1954 12,601 1,551 8,932 721 23,805 
1955 13,213 1,487 10,027 744 25,471 
1956 . 14,090 1,541 10,284 728 26,643 
1957 13,852 1,442 9,579 694 25,567 
1958 .12,983 1,103 9,618 674 24,378 
1959 13,233 929 11,131 724 26,017 
1960 14,374 1,025 10,863 754 27,016 
1961 14,930 960 10 '730 818 27,438 
1962 14,931 936 11,229 795 27,891 
1963 16,049 847 11,863 757 29,516 
1964. 18,037 928 12,019 703 31,687 
1965 18' 325 936 10 '736 639 30,636 
Source: Livestock and Meat Statistics, USDA. 
!/Excludes Lard and Rendered Pork Fat. 
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Table 4. 2. Percent of packer livestock purchases through different market 
outlets, selected years. 
Year Cattle Calves Sheep Hogs 
--------
Terminal markets 
----
1930~/ 88.3 81.8 84.7 59.9 
1940~/ 75.1 50.9 63.8 46.7 
1950~/ 74.9 56.7 57.4 39.9 
1960 45.8 25.4 35.4 30.3 
1961 42.3 23.1 36.8 29.2 
1962 42.6 23.3 35.4 29.3 
1963 39.1 18.2 30.1 26.5 
1964 36.5 18.8 28.6 23.8 
----------
Direct, country dealers, etc. 
---
1960 38.6 42.5 54.0 61.0 
1961 38.0 37.5 52.3 59.6 
1962 38.6 31.0 49:4 59.6 
1963 43.1 35.4 56.0 60.7 
1964 44.6 31.7 57.7 63.1 
-------------
Auction Markets 
---- ----- -------
1960 15.6 32.1 10.6 8.7 
1961 19.7 39.4 10.9 11.2 
1962 18.8 45.7 15.2 11.1 
1963 17.8 46.4 14.0 12.7 
1964 18.9 49.5 13.7 13.1 
---Source: U. S. Department of Agriculture, Consumer and Marketing Service, 
Packers and Stockyards Division. 
~/Percentages for these years based on federally inspected slaughter purchased 
at terminal public markets. Percentages for 1960-64 from annual reports of 
packers filed with Packers and Stockyards Division, C&MS-USDA. 
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Table 4. 3. Percent of farm livestock marketings handled by cooperatives, 
United States, by species, selected years. 
Year 
1949 
1954 
1959 
1964 
1965 
Cattle Calves 
15.0 11.6 
15.0 10.3 
14.8 8.5 
12.6 10.0 
12.6 11.0 
Hogs 
10.7 
11.7 
11.3 
12.1 
13.0 
Sheep and 
Lambs 
24.6 
22.6 
20.5 
17.3 
16.8 
------------~------·---------------------------------Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Farmer Cooperative Service; 
and Livestock and Meat Statistics, 1962, Statistical Bulletin No. 333, July 
1963, and Supp. for 1964 to Statistical Bull. No. 333, September 1965. 
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Table 4. 4. Percent of U. S. commercial meat production accounted for 
by largest companies in 1963,!!:./ 1947-64. · 
YEAR 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
l952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Beef 
and 
Veal 
Pork 
including 
lard 
Lamb 
and 
mutton 
Total 
red 
meat 
Percent of U. S. commercial production 
_____ ....__ __ b=..Yt-.companies ranking 
1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 1-4 5-8 
--'---'-----
35.0 3.9 
32.4 4.0 
35.1 3.9 
33.5 3.5 
30.8 3.5 
32.1 3. 7 
32".8 4.5 
32.9 4. 7 
31.4 4. 7 
30.7 4.7 
29.9 4.6 
27~9 4.2 
25.1 4. 2 
24.2 4.2 
24.4 4.0 
24.2 4.2 
23.1 4.0 
23.7 4.2 
41.0 10.1 
39.4 10.2 
40.6 10.4 
40.6 10.6 
39.1 10.6 
40.2 ll.3 
40.6 14.8 
37.8 14.9 
38.2 15.0 
38.8 lS-.4 
38.7 15.7 
35.3 15.2 
32.2 14.4 
33.7 15.8 
33.4 14.5 
33.7 14.1 
33.2 13.9 
34.1 14.2 
63.3 7.2 
60.9 5.9 
64.6 7.2 
64.9 6.9 
62.2 6.7 
61.7 6. 3 
84.9 6.7 
63.5 6.2 
61.4 6.6 
62.5 7.1 
60.1 7.1 
56.5 6.5 
53.9 6.6 
54.1 7.0 
53.9 6.1 
54.0 4.4 
53.1 4.4 
55.8 4.3 
38.7 6.9 
36.8 7.1 
38.7 7.2 
37.9 7.2 
36.2 7.5 
37.3 7. 9 
37.7 9.1 
35.8 9.1 
35.2 9.3 
35.1 9.5 
34.4 9.4 
31..9 9. 2 
29.3 9.2 
29.3 9.2 
29.2 8.7 
29J 8.6 
28 .a 8.4 
28.7 8.4 
-----------------Source: Data for companies from survey by National Commission on Food 
Marketing; commercial meat production from Livestock and Meat Statistics, 
Statistical Reporting Service Bull. No. 333, July 1963 and Supp. for 1964, 
September 1965, U. S. Department of Agriculture. 
!!:./Ranked according to red meat sales in 1963. Largest 4 companies include 
Armour, Morrell, Swift, and Wilson. Companies in second group of 4 
include Hormel, Hygrade Oscar Mayer, and Rath. 
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Table 4. 5. U. S. imports of red meat in relation to commercial supply, 
by type of meat, 1958-65. 
Percent of 
In Million Pounds, Carcass Weight US Commercial 
u. s. supply 
bnports Commercial represented 
supply!./ imports 
Beef and Veal 
1958 9Q9.0 14,962.4 6.1 
1959 1,063.2 15,190.8 7.0 
1960 775.5 16,138.7 4.8 
1961 1,037.1 16,891.1 6.1 
1962 1, 440.0 17,274.9 8.3 
1963 1,677.5 18,540.9 9.0 
1964 1,085.2 19,985.4 5.4 
1965 941.8 20,148.9 4.7 
----
Pork, excluding Lard 
1958 193.1 9 '749. 3 2.0 
1959 186.0 11,237.9 1.7 
1960 185.6 10,972.7 1.7 
1961 187.2 10,844.9 1.7 
1962 215.9 11,378.0 1.9 
1963 225.0 11,946.3 1.9 
1964 267.4 12,148.1 2.2 
1965 _333~-- 11,013.7 3.0 
Lamb and Mutton 
1958 41.2 712.8 5.8 
1959 104.2 826.0 12.6 
1960 87.0 839.0 10.4 
1961 100.7 916.7 11.0 
1962 143.2 935.6 15.3 
1963 144.7 900.2 16.1 
1964 79.0 780.1 10.1 
1965 72.6 709.6 10.2 
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Table 4. 5. (Continued) 
In Million Pounds~arc_!l.ss Weight 
u.s. 
Imports Commercial 
supply~/ 
Total red meat 
--------------------
Percent of 
US Commercial 
supply 
represented 
imports 
1958 1,143.3 25,424.5 4.5 
1959 1,353.3 27,254.6 5.0 
1960 1,048.1 27,129.7 3.9 
1961 1,325.1 28,652.9 4.6 
1962 1,798.8 29",588.3 6.1 
1963 2,047.2 31,387.2 6.5 
1964 1,431.6 32,913.6 . 4.3 
1965- 1,347.3 31,872.1 - 4.2 
Source: USDA, Economic Research Service, Livestock & Meat Situation, 
LMS-149, May 1966, p. 31; Livestock & Meat Statistics, Supp. for 1964 
to Stat. Bull. No. 333, Statistical Reporting Service, 9/65 p. 81. 
~/ U. S. Commercial production minus exports plus imports. 
GRAIN MARKETS, MARKETING, AND FARM POLICY 
by Reynold P. Dahl* 
More than a half century ago Dr. L. D. H. Weld, head of a young 
Department of Agricultural Economics at the University of Minnesota 
made a study of grain marketing in the upper midwest. A principal 
conclusion of that study was the following: "Taken all in all, and 
considering the number and variety of services that are necessary 
between producer and consumer, grain is probably marketed more 
efficiently and more economically than any other farm product." 
Available evidence supports a similar conclusion today regarding 
the relative efficiency of grain marketiD.g. The grain market probably 
comes as close to the economists: concept ofa "perfect" market as any 
other agricultural market. There are special reasons for this, of course, 
such as the relative non-perishability of grain and the early establishment 
of uniform grades and standards. However, the organization of the 
marketing system plays a most important part. Organized commodity 
markets fostering open, competitive trading in both the cash commodity 
and futures developed early in the grain trade and they continue to play 
an important role in price discovery. Futures trading originally emerged 
in the grain trade where it has achieved its highest degree of development. 
Roger Gray has recently argued that it is fruitful to look at futures trading 
with the primary focus on its "market" and prices discovery aspects 
rather than the risk transfer aspects. According to Gray, futures markets 
deserve to be cast in a competitive equilibrium model and it is doubtful if 
any other market organization can approach a futures market in competitiveness, 
owing to the impossibility of achieving certain of the requirements in such 
a high. degree.!/ These requirements are usually given as (1) large numbers 
of buyers and sellers, (2) a homogeneous product, ( 3) free entry; and ( 4) 
full information for all participants . 
If Gray's analysis is correct, it is surprising that these markets have 
not been more studied as models of competitive behavior by economists. 
*Professor of Agricultural Economics, University of Minnesota. 
!/Futures Trading Seminar, Roger N. Gray, "Fundamental Price Behavior 
Characteristics in Commodity Futures , " Mimir Publishers Inc, Madison, 
Wisconsin, 1966, pp. 71-87. 
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Further, we can regard the recent development of futures trading in 
commodities other than grain as welcome additions to out market price 
making machinery. 
Many changes have occurred in grain markets and marketing since 
Dr. Weld's research 50 years ago. Some of the most significant develop-
ments in recent years are the following: ( 1) shifts in federal programs 
to support farm income and associated changes in the stock of grain 
owned by the government, (2) the increasing importance of the export 
market as an outlet for United States grain, ( 3) changes in transportation 
technology and the railroad rate structure , and ( 4) grain in marketing changes 
associated with changes in farm production technology. 
We have witnessed other changes in grain markets and marketing, 
but, in my opinion they are of minor importance relative to the four 
developments listed above. 
Farm Income Support Programs , Surplus Stocks , and Markets 
The grain marketing industry has been affected to a greater degree 
by government programs to support farm income than any other part of 
our agricultural marketing system. Since the 1930's grain production 
has often exceeded market needs at prices deemed equitable to farmers. 
As a result public policy has been directed toward supporting farm income. 
Farm income was supported untill963 principally through the support 
of market prices . 'Dhe programs were implemented through nonrecourse 
loans which resulted in the government taking over and subsequently 
marketing substanti8.1 quantities of grain. Consequently, the government 
has often been the dominant firm in grain markets , influencing both prices 
and marketing. 
Since 1963, however, we have witnessed a significant shift in the 
basis of supporting farm income to a greater reliance on direct income 
payments together with lower price support loans . This change has been 
accompanied by a rapid decline in government-owned grain stocks, due 
in part to the new program, and to increased grain exports . The shift 
to direct income payments in supporting farm income has important 
implications to markets and the performance of their traditional role in 
a capitalistic society as well as to marketing firms and farmers. Before 
attempting an analysis of these implications, they can perhaps be better 
-68-
appreciated if we review the situation with respect to government grain 
stocks and their influence on grain markets and marketing. 
During the 1950's government-owned stocks of grain were accumulated 
very rapidly under price-support operations reaching an all-time high 
in 1961. Total carryover stocks of wheat reached the record level of 1. 4 
billion bushels on July 1, 1961, while the carryover of feed grains also 
reached a record high of 85 million tons in the fall of the same year. 
The Commodity Credit Corporation, the price -supporting agency of 
the U. S. Department of Agriculture and the principal owner of these stocks 
was directed by Congress to use commercial storage facilities wherever 
possible. Consequently, it provided incentives for commercial firms to 
expand their storage facilities by increasing storage rates paid. As a 
result, CCC approved commercial grain storage capacity in the twelve 
state north central region more than tripled from 805 million bushels 
in 1953 to 2.9 billion bushels in 1962. Increases in approved commercial 
storage exceeded 300 percent in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, and 
Kansas while increases were 100 percent or less in Wisconsin, Minnesota, 
and North Dakota. Some of the storage expansion was in permanent vertical 
facilities, but a large part was in flat storage with relatively low efficiency. 
Farm storage facilities were also expanded during this period due 
in large part to government incentive programs. From 1949 to 1962, low 
interest rate loans covering the construction of more than 700 million 
bushels of farm storage space were made or guaranteed by the CCC. 
Finally, the CCC found it necessary to increase its own storage 
facilities. CCC-owned storage capacity rose from 45 million bushels 
in 194~ to 980 million bushels in 1962. These facilities were concentrated 
largely in the Corn Belt. Most of this was relatively inexpensive flat type 
storage some of which has since been sold by the CCC. 
The above discussion indicates that we have a considerably larger 
farm and commercial grain storage capacity relative to yearly crop 
production today than a decade ago, so lower market returns to grain 
storage activities may prevail in the future. 
Obviously, the federal government could not continue accumulating 
surplus grain stocks at the rate it did up to 1961, so a major change was 
subsequently made in farm income support programs. Acreage diversion 
programs were initiated under which farmers are required to divert acreage 
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to soil conserving uses as a requirement for income payments and 
price support loans. Farmers are also paid for diverting acreage 
above the minimum required for program particiaption. 
These acreage diversion programs, together with increases in grain 
exports, have achieved the desired goal of reducing the level of government-
owned grain stocks. By the end of the 1966-67 marketing year wheat and 
feed grain stocks are estimated to be 400 million bushels and 25 million 
tons, respectively. These carryovers are close to levels considered 
necessary for national emergencies. It is generally agreed that some 
level of grain reserves is desirable, but how much grain should we stock-
pile? Where should it be stored? Who should own it, the commercial 
trade , or the government? Under what terms and conditions should it 
be released? These questions merit more research attention by agricultural 
economists. 
The decline of government-owned grain stocks will probably affect the 
structure and organization of the grain marketing industry. During the past 
decade, many grain marketing firms have grown accustomed to earning a 
sizeable share of their income through storage and handling grain for CCC. 
Opportunities to earn such income have now substantially declined or evaporated. 
Grain firms have entered a new era in which they can no longer rely on the 
CCC as a captive customer and must now compete for grain storage and 
merchandising income. Such elevator operators who may have forgotten 
how to merchandise and store grain on their own account may not be able to 
adjust to the change. There is good reason to believe that government 
grain storage and handling income may have kept some firms in business 
that otherwise could not have survived. It is interesting to note that in 
Minnesota, for example, the reduction in the number of country elevators 
in recent years has not been as great as the reduction in the number of 
creameries. 
I would hypothesize that we will witness considerable adjustment in 
the country elevator industry in the next decade. A trend toward fewer 
and larger firms will be accelerated. While the initial impetus may come 
from the decline in government stocks, it will be reinforced by changes in 
transportation technology and the railroad rate structure which will be 
discussed later. 
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The grain marketing industry, as well as farmers, must also be 
prepared for adjustment to changes in the role of markets and market 
prices associated with the new farm program. The current trend in 
farm policy is to shift the basis of farm income support toward direct 
payments with lower price support loans under voluntary programs. 
Wheat marketing certificates that were initiated in 1964 and continued 
under the Food and Agriculture Act of 1965 for another four years, 1966 
through 1969, represent a form of direct payment to participating wheat 
farmers. The wheat price support loan has been reduced from $2. 24 in 
1954 to $1.25 in 1966 and the Secretary of Agriculture has the authority 
to reduce it further under the new farm bill. The loan rate on corn was 
reduced·from $1.62 to $1.00 during the same period with participating 
farmers also receiving income payments in 1966. Price support loan 
rates have been lowered to levels where they are much closer to com-
petitive market prices. Consequently, the market is in a better position 
to determine price. This means that the price support loan has been 
relegated to an emergency role. While it still may be important to 
farmers, it is not the crucial factor in farm income that it was a few 
years ago. 
The role of pricing, consequently, is being shifted from the govern-
ment to markets which are experiencing a resurgence in activity. Sharp 
increases in trading volume have occurred in futures trading on the 
nation's principal commodity exchanges which is a reflection of greater 
price uncertainty and increased stock carrying by the private grain 
trade. The Commodity Credit Corporation is also assuming a smaller 
role as a marketing agency for the nation's grain. From 1953 to 1960, 
CCC acquired 8 to 16 percent of the corn crop each year while in 1963 
through 1965 it acquired an average of 1 percent of the corn crop. From 
1953 to.l960, CCC acquired an average of 27 percent of the wheat crop. 
In the years 1963-65, this figure fell to 4 percent. Grain marketing 
firms are now handling more grain on their own account and less for the 
CCC. 
What are the implications of these changes to farmers? First, farm 
production decision making must now be made under conditions of greater 
price uncertainty. No longer will farmers be able to plan on the basis of 
market prices fluctuating within a narrow range around the price support 
loan rate. Second, market prices will likely be at levels lower than in 
previous years when farm income was supported solely through the support 
of market prices. Income payments under the current program are tied 
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to projected yields based on county averages not actual yields and, 
consequently , do not become a part of the price for decision making. 
To be sure, it is important in deciding whether or not to participate 
in the program. However, the return to marginal production is the 
expected market price with the lower support rates as a floor. So 
maximum profit is achieved at a lower output than under previous 
programs when loan rates were higher with no income payments. 
For example, the principal way in which a farmer can increase corn 
production on a given amount of land is to use more fertilizer, chemicals, 
etc. Due to diminishing returns to these inputs the marginal cost of 
producing corn rises as production is increased. Consequently, the 
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maximum profit output at a price of $1. 62 per bushe 1 is OQ1, while at 
a price of $1. 00 it is lower at a level of OQ2 (Figure 5 .1). 
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Economists have been slow to recognize the welfare implications of 
the shift to income payments. A welfare or social cost was involved 
under the old program when production resources were used to produce 
grains whoe market value was less than the value of the resources used 
to produce them.~/ 
Professor D. Gale Johnson criticizes the current farm program on 
the grounds that income transfers do directly influence output decisions. 
He points out that since the allocation of marketing certificates to wheat 
farmers is based on projected farm yields defined by the program as 
"the yield per harvested acre of such commodity on the farm during each 
of the th·ree calendar years immediately preceeding the year in which the 
projected farm yield is determined," a farmer's yields this year will 
affect the value of income payments in subsequent years . This would induce 
farmers to produce more wheat than if there were a single price of $1. 25. ~/ 
While Johnson's point is well taken he does overlook an important 
factor in program administration which makes it less relevant. Projected 
yields are not exactly calculated for individual farms but are actually 
determined by township committees. They are subject to considerable 
error and therefore, the linkage between actual and projected yields is 
a good deal less direct than implfed by Johnson's paper. 
Marketing decisions by farmers also become more complex under a 
market-oriented farm policy. Decisions regarding when to sell and 
when to store grain were relatively simple under price support programs 
of previous years. Often the principal decision to be made was whether 
or not to take a price support loan. After a loan was obtained, the 
market price often did not rise above the loan rate so the grain was 
automatically delivered to the CCC. Farmers who did not take out loans 
found that prices fluctuated over a narrow seasonal range because the 
CCC usually was a seller when prices reached 105 percent of the price 
support loan rate or at lower rates when necessary to maintain the quality 
of its stocks. Greater price variability can be anticipated under the new 
farm programs . 
----·----------~/For a more complete analysis of social costs see T. D. Wallace, 
rrMeasures of Social Costs of Agricultural Programs," Journal of 
Farm Economics, Vol. XLIV, May 1962, pp. 580-594. 
~/D. Gale Johnson, rrTrade Policies and U. S. Agriculture," Journal of 
Farm Economics, Vol. 48, No.2, Mayl966, pp. 346-49. 
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These changes have important implications for research in farm 
management and production economics. Since the end of World War II, 
research workers have usually considered grain prices as a constant 
at the price support loan. Consequently, marketing decisions were 
not important and had relatively little effect on farm earnings. With 
greater price variability, however, marketing decisions become more 
important relative to production decisions as a variable in farm earnings. 
Grain is a seasonally produced commodity while consumption is 
spread more evenly over the year. Consequently, someone must own and 
store it from the time of production to consumption. The private grain 
trade has traditionally performed this role in a free market because 
farmers are typically heavy sellers at harvest time. However, with 
the expansion of farm storage facilities in recent years more farmers 
may want to store grain when it is profitable to do so. Farmers, like 
grain merchandising firms, can use cash-futures price relationships 
as a guide to storage operations. When cash grain is at a discount to 
the future, often at harvest time, the market indicates that it is profitable 
to store. At such times farmers can store their grain and sell a future 
contract as a temporary substitute for the sale of cash grain later in the 
cash market. This is hedging -- a device through which a return on 
storage can be earned. On the other hand, when cash grain is at a 
premium to the future, usually in periods of short supply relative to 
demand, it is probably unprofitable to store. 
In order to take advantage of profitable storage opportunities when 
they arise, the farmer must thoroughly study the relationship between 
his selling price for cash grain and the futures price over time. This 
is his local cash -basis. He must be a careful student of the cash -basis 
if he is to utilize the futures market to earn a return on storage through 
hedging. 
Farmers might also consider using the futures market to sell their 
crops in advance of the completion of production when futures prices 
are regarded as favorable. This procedure has been described by 
Working as anticipatory hedging .i/ The anticipatory hedge, as the 
storage hedge described above, also serves as a temporary substitute 
for a later sale of his grain in the cash market. 
i/ Holbrook Working, "New Concepts Concerning Futures Markets and Prices," 
The American Economic Review, Vol. LII, June 1962, p. 441. 
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In a discussion of an earlier draft of this paper, Professor Havlicek 
raised a question as to whether the above described uses of futures 
markets were really hedging. Is not hedging simply an "insurance 
policy" which protects the holder of stocks against a price decline? 
Several excellent research studies have presented convincing evidence 
that most hedging is not undertaken with risk aversion being the primary 
motive .. !~/ Hedging is usually done in the expectation of a change in 
the cash -future price relationship -- a change that can reasonably be 
predicted at the time the hedge is placed. 
The·over-emphasis of risk aversion in discussions of hedging has 
diverted attention from the more important economic contributions of 
futures markets. Since farmers are beginning to raise more questions 
about the use of futures markets in their marketing decision making, 
production economists may find it worthwhile to analyze the potential 
use of these markets in greater depth; 
The Expanding Export Market 
A second significant change in grain marketing is the increasing 
importance of the export market as an outlet for United States grain. 
The total value of U. S. agricultural exports increased 29 percent from 
1960 through 1965 reaching $6.2 billion in the later years. Almost all 
of the increase has been in commercial sales which were 77 percent of 
total exports in 1965. Exports under Government-financed programs made 
up 23 percent of total exports --the smallest proportion since the 
beginning of the P. L. 480 program in 1954. 
Exports of grains and oilseeds have increased more rapidly than 
other agricultural exports in recent years and, as a result, now make 
up a larger percentage of the total. Combined exports of wheat, feed 
grains, oilseeds and their products totaled $3. 5 billion in 1965 or 
56 percent of our total agricultural exports. 
~/Holbrook Working, "Hedging Reconsidered," Journal of Farm Economics, 
Vol. 35, No. 4, November 1953; and Holbrook Working, "The Theory 
of Price of Storage," American Economic Review, Vol. 39, No. 6, 
December 1949. 
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The importance of exports to United States grain farmers is 
dramatically illustrated by comparing exports with domestic production. 
In fiscall965-66, wheat exports were 65 percent of our domestic 
production. Over two-fifths of our soybeans, one-third of our grain 
sorghums, and 16 percent of our corn were marketed overseas. 
What has been responsible fo:- our significant increase in agricul-
tural exports? Most of the increase can be attributed to the increased 
world demand for U. S. farm products . Commercial exports of feed 
grains and soybeans to industrial, developed countries have increased 
as they have intensified animal agriculture. Livestock and poultry 
production in Western Europe and Japan have gained sharply in recent 
years as higher income has strengthened the demand for meat. While the 
commercial demand for our wheat has remained relatively constant in 
recent years, we have increased our exports of wheat under P. L. 480. 
Over two-thirds of our wheat exports last year were government financed 
under the Food for Peace Program. 
What is the outlook for our agricultural exports? First, industrial 
countries, especially in Western Europe and Japan, will probably 
continue to increase their purchases of United States feed grains and 
soybeans as economic growth continues. It is significant to note that 
income elasticities of demand for meat are higher and per capita meat 
consumption is lower in the rest of the developed world than in the 
United States. In the six countries of the European Economic Community, 
for example , per capita consumption of beef and veal was 51 pounds in 
1963-64 while the United States it was 106 pounds. Per capita consumption 
of poultry was 15 pounds in the EE C compared to 37 pounds in the United 
States. 
Second, the need for food in the less developed regions of the world 
is increasing faster than food outputs. Population in many parts of 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa is rising more rapidly than the food 
supply. To help meet these increased food needs, a modified and expanded 
Food for Peace bill has been passed Congress . One of the changes is 
that U. S. food aid will now be contingent upon efforts in the recipient 
countries to increase their own food output. This is recognition of the 
fact that expanded food aid is not a permanent solution to food shortages 
in the developing countries because the day is not far off when the United 
States will not be able to fill the food gap. The long-run solution lies in 
helping these countries improve their own agricultural productivity. 
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Expanded United States food aid will have a larger impact on our 
wheat production than other grains. Indications are that our wheat 
exports will continue to be heavily dependent upon food aid. 
In the past we have had a tendency to look upon foreign markets 
as a residual claimant to our dome~tic agricultural production. In 
other words, crops and food products have been produced mainly for 
our domestic market with foreign markets considered only when 
production exceeded our domestic needs. But the day has past when 
we could gear our agricultural production and marketing practices to 
the domestic market only. We cannot overlook the fact that the needs 
and demands of foreign consumers may be different than our own. 
Recognizing special tastes and preferences of foreign buyers and 
gearing our farm production and marketing practices to these demands 
is essential. 
TransQortation Technology and the Railroad Rate Structure 
Changes in transportation technology and the railroad rate struc-
ture have also had a significant impact on grain marketing in recent 
years. Changing transportation patterns and rates have altered commod-
ity price relationships among markets within a region as well as between 
producing and consuming regions. The competitive position of both 
producers and processors of farm products among regions has also 
changed. 
Advances in transportation technology have been particularly rapid 
since the end of World War II. The construction of interstate highways 
has enabled trucks to become more competitive. Improvements to inland 
waterways have made it possible for barges to capture an increasing 
share of the long-haul grain movements. Railroads, while still important, 
have experienced stiff competition for agricultural traffic. Their rate 
structure that was developed during the early thirties when railroads had 
monopoly power has been under pressure in the new era of competition. 
This rail. rate structure was originally designed to enable processors and 
merchandisers at different market to compete equally with respect to 
transportation charges for raw materials and products, even though they 
did not have equal geographical advantages. In other words, it was not 
based on costs of providing the service. 
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Railroads have responded to increased competition by selectively 
reducing rates on grain. The trend has been for them to offer new 
"mileagert and rtmultiple-car" rates for grain based on costs of pro-
viding service . The new grain rates provide fewer transportation 
services such as transit and routing privileges than the old rates. 
In general, the effect has been to reduce the rates on grain relative 
to grain products. This has worked to the disadvantage of many 
midwest grain processors that are heavily dependent upon the old 
rail rate structure . 
Agricultural economists probably have not devoted enough research 
effort to analyzing the impact of changes in transportation rate structures 
that alter rate differentials between grain and grain products or between 
grain and livestock products. Changes in transportation that reduce 
rates on grain relative to grain products and livestock products affect 
the competitive position of midwest livestock producers as well as agricul-
tural processors. The reduction of rates on feed grains into the South-
eastern United States through low cost barge traffic on inland waterways 
certainly was one factor in the rapid growth of the broiler industry in 
that area. More recently there has been discussion of a possible decline 
in the competitive position of cattle feeding in the corn belt relative to the 
plains states and the far west. Population on the west coast is increasing 
relative to other areas in the U. S. so we can anticipate greater movements 
of farm products from the midwest to the west coast. Consequently, chang-
ing transportation rates between feed grain, livestock and livestock products 
take on added significance . 
Spatial equilibrium models are useful tools to analyze the consequences 
of changes in transportation costs on the spatial distribution of prices and 
movements of commodities. The usefulness of the results of these models, 
however, is often no better than the quality of the data going into them. 
The latter deserves more attention. 
We will probably see a trend toward the increased use of special 
mileage, multiple car railroad rates on grain at the country level. This 
will give an advantage to country elevators that can accumulate grain in 
sufficient volume to qualify for these rates. Some elevators are already 
offering price premiums to farmers who can deliver grain in large quantities. 
Here we have an interesting parallel between economies of scale in marketing 
and farm production. Increasing economies of scale in grain marketing 
may become an important contributing factor to economies to scale in 
agriculture . 
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Changes in Farm Production Technology and Marketing 
Interrelationships between changes in farm production technology 
and marketing are well illustrated in the case of feed grains. We used 
to think of our feed grains being fed mostly on the farms where they 
were produced. In the 1930's farmers fed 75 percent of the feed grains 
they produced to livestock on their farms. In recent years, however, 
only one half of our feed grains have been fed on the farms where they 
are produced while the other half has moved into marketing channels. 
This is a reflection of increased specialization and commercialization 
in agriculture. The increased movement from farms also reflects an 
increase in the use of feed grains for food, industry, and export. 
U. S. eXports of feed grains reached 29 million tons in 1965-66, more 
than double their level of 5 years ago. Exports of corn, our principal 
feed grain, were 700 million bushels in 1965-66 which was a third of 
the farm sales of corn. 
One of the more significant developments in farm production techno-
logy affecting corn marketing in recent years has been the increased 
harvesting of corn with field shellers, particularly combines with corn 
heads. This has caused substantial changes in corn marketing patterns 
which have important implications to both country grain dealers and 
farmers. 
The rapidity of the shifts to corn field shelling has been dramatic 
in the eastern part of the Corn Belt. In Indiana, for example, 52 
percent of the 1964 corn crop was field shelled --up from 18 percent 
for the 1960 crop. The proportion of Iowa corn field shelled is lower, 
18 percent of the 1964 crop, but up substantially from 10 percent of the 
1960 crop. 
Many expect that field shelling of corn will continue to increase and 
account for substantially all of the corn crops in certain states within 
a few years. 
Some of the marketing implications of the changes in corn harvesting 
methods have been disucssed by Professor L. F. Stice. First, a much 
larger proportion of field-shelled corn than ear corn moves direct from 
the field to market. In 1963, 40 percent of the field shelled corn in 
Illinois was marketed direct from the field in constrast to only 3. 5 percent 
of the corn harvested as ear corn. Second, field shelling causes the corn 
harvest to start earlier and to be completed in a shorter time. Third, 
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field shelled corn has too high moisture to permit storage without 
drying or heavy aeration. All of these factors tend to increase the 
pressure on country elevators at harvest time.~/ 
Farmers' decision making in marketing high moisture , field 
shelled, corn is more complex than when ear corn was harvested, 
The farmer can decide to sell high moisture corn directly from the 
field at harvest and accept a moisture discount. Otherwise, he can 
dry the corn and sell it immediately or store it for sale later. If 
he drys his corn he must decide whether to purchase his own drying 
equipment or have it done commercially at the elevator. Similarly, 
he can either store his corn at the elevator or on his own farm. In-. 
creased price variability and price uncertainty associated with the new 
farm program will further complicate his marketing decision making. 
If the present trend of marketing a high proportion of field shelled 
corn at harvest continues, one would expect greater price depressions 
at harvest and a greater seasonal price rise in corn. Consequently, 
farmers will have to be careful students of seasonal price movements 
to maximize profits. As argued previously, the corn futures market 
can serve as a useful guide to corn storage with returns to storage 
earned through the mechanism of hedging. 
Conclusions 
In summary, I have argued that grain market structure and organiza-
tion have been affected by government price support operations and 
surplus stocks owned by the CCC during the past two decades. The 
recent shift in farm income support to income payments and lower price. 
supports will mean that the government will play a smaller role in grain 
marketing in the future than in the past. Markets will be relied on more 
extensively in price discovery and grain firms will again carry more stocks 
under private ownership. Grain firms as well as farmers will find decision 
making more complex with greater price uncertainty. These changes 
will hasten adjustments in market structure --particularly at the country 
level. 
~/ t. F. Stice , The Outlook in Grain Marketing, Talk given at the 11th 
Annual Agricultural Marketing Clinic, East Lansing, Michigan, March 
9' 1965. 
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The export market will become increasingly important as an outlet 
for United States grain. Commercial exports of both feed grains and 
soybeans to the developed world will continue to expand as these 
countries intensify animal agriculture in response to increases in the 
demand for meat. Income elasticities of demand for meat are higher 
in most of these countries than in the U. S. Wheat exports will continue 
to be heavily dependent upon food aid. The increased importance of the 
export market calls for more marketing and demand and price studies 
beyond the continental boundaries of the U. S. 
Changes in transportation technology and the railroad rate structure 
have altered relationships between grain and grain products and between 
grain and livestock products. Such changes affect the competitive 
position of midwest producers and processors of agricultural products. 
Analyzing such problems through spatial equilibrium models with better 
data will proye fruitful. 
Finally, the increase use of com combines in harvesting is altering 
marketing patterns. Farmers' marketing decisions are more complex 
with high moisture corn. As the harvest period is advanced and shortened 
the seasonal variation in corn prices may increase. Therefore, decisions 
as to when to sell and store will become more important. Farmers may 
find it advantageous to use the futures market in making these decisions. 

AGRICULTURE: PROJECTED DEMAND, OUTPUT AND 
RESOURCE STRUCTURE 
by Rex F. Daly* 
Revolutionary changes have taken place in farming and they will 
continue in the years ahead. Demand growth and rapid advances in 
technology have combined to release workers from agriculture, greatly 
increase productivity, increase the size of farms, change cultural 
practices, and modify output and relative prices for many major farm 
products. 
This paper is in part methodological, though the major objective 
is to sketch probable changes in agriculture during the next 10 to 15 
years under alternative sets of assumed conditions. The projections 
are based on a simple analytical framework in which projected results 
were rather mechanically determined under alternatives assumed. 
The projection framework consists of demand-supply response functions 
for the crop and livestock product sectors, a feed demand function, and 
other relationships. Projected output, yields, domestic food and feed 
use , prices , and cash receipts are determined in the framework outlined 
in the Appendix. 
The general problem setting in agriculture has changed in recent 
years from one characterized by burdensome stocks to one in which 
stocks (except for cotton) approach minimum desirable levels. This 
generally improved supply-use balance, concern about world hunger, 
and related programs, may be moving U. S. agriculture into a new 
era. 
The ,.Agricultural Act of 1965, despite its similarity to previous 
legislation, embodies some important changes . The shift toward 
greater flexibility and pricing of grains and cotton around world market 
levels moves the Gover.nment toward a role of referee rather than an 
active participant in day-to-day operations in the market place. 
*Chairman of the Outlook Board, United States Department of Agricultur~. 
Views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily represent 
those of the U. S. Department of Agriculture. The author wishes to 
recognize the assistance and advice of W. J. Layng, J. D. Ahalt and A. 
C. Egbert of the Economic Research Service. 
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The new Food for Peace legislation also emphasizes some important 
changes from previous programs. It explicitly recognizes that the U. S. 
cannot feed the world and emphasizes the need for self help in the recipient 
nation. With grain surpluses gone, the new legislation requires positive 
action to gear production to domestic markets ' aid requirements ' and 
commercial export prospects rather than simply exporting available 
surpluses. Farm product exports will depend to a considerable extent 
on the administration of this legislation and how rapidly self -help provisions 
can bring about increased production in the hungry nations. Because of 
the range of possibilities, much of the appraisal in this paper is built 
around three export assumptions rather than specific projection. Under 
these and a number of other assumptions, let us examine prospective 
demand-supply balances and related prices, income implications, probable 
changes in the number and size distribution of farms, and the projected 
organization and resource structure of agriculture. 
Agriculture's Projected Profile In Perspective 
Dramatic changes have taken place in agriculture in postwar years, 
particularly in the organization and structure of agriculture. Technological 
advances and adjustment possibilities suggest that changes in the organiza-
tion and structure of agriculture may be even more rapid in coming years . 
Domestic markets for farm products will continue to expand around 11/2 
percent a year, possible a bit more rapidly than population as diets are 
upgraded to include more meats and convenience foods. Growth in consumer 
incomes and changes in relative prices will continue to modify the diet, 
but overall use of food and farm products in general is very inelastic in 
response to price and income changes. Diet changes may slightly reduce 
per capita intake of calories and pounds of product. However, an upgraded 
diet will likely result in more resources being used per person for food 
production, though most of the increase may be in nonfarm resources. 
Domestic use of farm products in 1964-66 totaled nearly 30 percent 
above the 1949-51 average. Population accounted for most of this increase 
with only· a small gain in per capita use. A I though overall per capita use 
was very stable, food use of crops declined 10 percent from the 1949-51 
average, reflecting downtrends in per capita use of wheat and in fresh uses 
of most fruits and vegetables. Per capita use of livestock products increased 
about a tenth over the period as big gains in consumption of beef and poultry 
more than offset declines in per capita use of milk, pork, eggs and animal 
fats. 
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Although the domestic market grew only slightly more than population 
in the past 15 years , the volume of exports more than doubled, rising about 
5 percent per year. In 1949-51 crop exports were equivalent in volume at 
the farm level to less than 14 percent of crop output. By 1964-66 this ratio 
had risen to 22 percent. Exports take more than half of the wheat and rice 
crops and a very substantial share of other grains , fats , oils , oilseeds , 
tobacco and cotton. (Table 6 .1) . 
Growth in overall demand, as in the past, will depend heavily on exports 
of farm products . The general uptrend in crop exports is expected to 
continue. How rapidly they rise will depend on U. S. availabilities and 
relative prices, the operation of food aid programs, and a host of economic 
and institutional forces. Because of uncertainties about possible effects 
of self-help programs, population control, and world-wide participation in 
food aid, this analysis explores the impacts of three assumed alternatives 
for crop exports--export I assumes crop exports increase 41/2 percnet per 
year; export II, 6 percent per year; and export III, 3 percent. They are 
also modified to reflect projected prices (See the Appendix). 
Farm output increases over the past 15 years met the expansion in 
domestic use and exports without strain. Increases in productivity in 
agriculture -.-output per unit of input--were sufficiently rapid that total 
resource inputs in 1964-66 were about the same as in 1949-51. But this 
stability overlooks some big changes in the types of resources used. Use 
of labor was down nearly 50 percent, and cropland used for crops declined 
about 13 percent from the 1949-51 average. The volume of production assets 
increased about a tenth. Inputs of mechanical power and machinery were 
up 17 percent, miscellaneous inputs increased 41 percent, and use of 
fertili.zer materials more than doubled. These changes were due largely 
to the rapid advance of technology in agriculture and to shifts in the relative 
cost of major inputs. Output per man-hour increased about 2 1/2 times 
over the period, rising nearly 6 1/2 percent per year. Crop output per 
acre averaged in 1964-66 some 41 percent above 1949-51. Accompanying 
these changes, the number of farms declined by about 2 1/4 million from 
1950 to about 3.4 million in 1965. The larger-size classes were the only 
farms that increased in number. In 1965 there were an estimated million 
farms--30 percent of the total--with sales above $10,000 per farm. Th~se 
farms apparently accounted for more than 80 percent of total cash receipts 
(Table6.2). 
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Farm output increases projected to 1980 range from an increase of 
about 40 percent from the 1964-66 average, for the low export assumption, 
to an increase of 50 percent, for the high export assumption. These 
increases and productivity trends imply small increases in re.source inputs. 
Labor use in agriculture continues to decline. Employment may decline to 
around 3 to 3 1/2 million workers by 1980, from 5. 7 million in 1964-66 
(SRS concept). Rising output and resource shifts would suggest a continued 
moderate rise in capital inputs. 
Rapid consolidation of small farms into larger units is expected to lead 
to fewer and more efficient commerical family farms. They likely will be 
better managed and more responsive to changing economic conditions. By 
1980, if recent trends continue, farm numbers could be down to around 
2 million compared with 3. 4 million estimated for 1965. About half these 
farms may account for perhaps 95 percent of total cash receipts, 90 percent 
of total production assets, and 75 to 80 percent of total labor inputs. For 
the larger commercial farms , with larger bundles of efficiently used 
resources, returns will likely move rapidly toward those earned on resources 
used in nonfarm industries. The remaining farms would consist of small 
farms, including part-time and part-retirement farms , many of which 
would be largely rural residences. 
This appraisal domonstrates the importance of exports to the growth 
and prosperity of U. S. agriculture. The rate of export growth can 
materially influence prices and incomes as well as the problems of 
adjusting the output potential of agriculture to growth in markets. The 
appraisal also illustrates the relatively inelastic response of resource 
use and production to price change. These characteristics complicate the 
problems of gearing output to market expansion. 
Methodology, Data, and Assumptions 
Analytical techniques used in this study appraise simultaneously 
projected increases in aggregate output and demand for crops and livest~ck. 
The domestic demand functions reflect the relatively inelastic response of 
consumption to changes in prices and consumer income (See the Appendix). 
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The output functions illustrate the tendency for output to increase 
as prices rise with very little response in the short-run and a larger 
response in the long-run. Technological advance, which is to some 
extent a proxy variable for the uptrend in inputs, is a major determi-
nant of output growth. Accordingly, the crop output function as well 
as projections into the future assume a continuation of past trends in 
technology in agriculture. The output function for livestock products 
reflects prices and feed costs as well as the advance in technology, 
which has been comparatively slow for major livestock, other than 
poultry. A technological breakthrough affecting production costs and 
feeding efficiency for cattle and hogs could accelerate output and affect 
relative prices for livestock and products. 
Economic Environment 
Developments in the general economy are importantly interrelated 
with agriculture since they influence markets for farm products; the 
availability and cost of capital, labor, land and other inputs; and off -farm 
employment opportunities for farm people. 
Population growth will continue to be the major factor affecting the 
domestic market for farm products as long as buying power continues 
to expand. In the 1950's population grew at about 1. 8 percent per year 
and from 1960 to 1965 annual growth was around 1 1/2 percent. Popula-
tion growth has slowed. It is expected to grow around 1. 3 percent per 
year in the next decade. Although overall population growth is slowing, 
increases in age groups 20 to 34 years will be rapid. The labor force is 
expected to increase about 1. 9 percent a year into the 1970's (Table 6. 3) . 
The current population bulge is in those age groups which put more 
pressure on demand for higher education facilities, housing, and many 
other goods and services. 
Rapid growth in the labor force presents an opportunity and a challenge 
to the economy. Can jobs be created rapidly enough and schools and 
housing increased fast enough to meet the challenge? If investment is 
forthcoming, labor force growth and trends in productivity suggest an 
increase in the output potential of the economy of possibly 4 to 4 1/2 
percent a year extending well into the 1970 decade. The real gross 
national product projected for 1980 is up about 85 percent from the 1964-66 
average --a growth in real output for the period of over 4 percent per year. 
A similar increase in real disposable income results in an annual gain 
in per capita income of 2 1/2 percent for an overall increase of 45 to 50 
percent in real consumer buying power per person from 1965 to 1980. 
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Output and Capacity 
The technology variable--output per unit of resource input--is projected 
to rise almost 2 percent per year. This is largely an extension of past 
trends and thus could be conservative. Technological advance often exceeds 
the expectations of the most imaginative. In like manner, output per man-
hour is largely an extension of past trends in productivity. Since the level 
of cropland used for crops is assumed, projected yields are determined in 
the framework. 
Both crop and livestock exports are assumed as a basis for the appraisal. 
In order to examine differential impacts, crop export volume was assumed 
to increase at 3 percent, 4 1/2 percent, and 6 percent per year. Although 
these are not projections, they fall in the plausible range relative to past 
expansion and some projections into the 1970's. Demand impacts, of course, 
are very different under a 3 percent growth in exports than under 6 percent 
growth. 
No attempt is made to specify some fixed capacity of U. S. agriculture. 
Output potential is not a fixed quantity, except under very specific condi-
tions. It varies with changes in technology and the relative cost of inputs; 
and it varies with demand pressures and returns to producers. The land 
input does not rigidly limit crop output. Increases in crop output in recent 
decades have resulted from technological advances and increased use of 
fertilizer and other inputs. In addition to these inputs, there is a substan-
tial acreage of land considered suitable for regular cultivation and other 
uses which might be brought into cultivation if demand pressures and returns 
to farmers warrant. A recent inventory of land capability and use reported 
more than 250 million acres of land in capability classes I, II and III--
suitable for regular cultivation--in addition to around 450 million acres 
now used as cropland.!/ 
Small changes in land use , both into and out of production, are continu-
ously underway. If demand pressures and prices built up under rapid demand 
expansion, some of the additional land resources as well as nonfarm inputs 
would expand the output potential of agriculture. Although no attempt was 
made to analyze the conditions under which new lands would come into 
production, indicated prices and incomes, under the highest demand projec-
tion in this study, would be moderated if additional land came into production 
Ysoil and Water Conservation Needs, Statistical Bulleting 317, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture, August 1962. 
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and stepped up the output potential of agriculture. Likewise, the low 
demand projection implies relatively low prices and incomes at the 
acreage level specified. 
The Next Few Years 
Farm output will likely increase more rapidly in the last half of 
the 1960 decade than in the first half, when accumulated grain stocks 
were being worked off. Advancing technology, together with larger crop-
land use and price supports around those scheduled for 1967 crops, steps 
up the projected rise in farm output. If depleted grain stocks are re-
built gradually over the next few years and exports continue to rise, 
prospective output increases are not expected to be so large as to seriously 
depress prices. 
Projections for the next few years are based on the short-run adapta-
tion of the model framework. In it output, domestic use, and prices are 
built up recursively year-by-year from 1966 to 1971. The demand-output-
price balances projected for the next few years assume, on the demand 
side, the population and income growth projected above and an increase 
of about 4 1/2 percent per year in the volume of crop exports (adjusted to 
reflect the effect of projected price change). The supply response depends 
importantly on the projected advance in technology, a continuation of grain 
and cotton programs about as scheduled for 1967, and cropland use at 360 
million acres, some 25 million above the 1964-66 average. 
Crops 
Crop output projected for 1968 --roughly the 1967-68 and 1968-69 
marketing years--totals 12 to 14 percent above the 1964-66 average, a 
much more rapid gain than during the past 5 to 6 years. By 1970, projected 
crop output is around a sixth larger than the 1964-66 average. These 
increases reflect assumed advances in technology, larger acreage used 
for crops, and the relatively favorable price and income levels projected 
for the next few years (Table 6. 4) . 
There is no good basis for appraising probable export demand. The 
alternative used for this exercise assumes that the volume of crop exports 
-95-
Table 6.4. Farm output, domestic use, exports , prices , productivity and 
resource use, 1959-611964-66 and projections to 1971. 
PROJE CTEI>!!} 
Item Average Average 
1959-61 1964-66 1968 1963-71 
Supply: 
Farm output (Bil. 1957-59 dol.) 29.6 32.3 35.3 36.7 
Farm output (1957 -59 -100) 104.0 113.6 124.,4 128.8 
Livestock products (1957-59-100) 103.3 113.3 119.1 123.0 
Crops (1957 -59 -100) 105.4 112.7 127.3 132.8 
Imports (Bil. 1957-59 dol.) 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.4 
Total (Bil. 1957-59 dol.) 33.6 36.3 39.5 41.1 
Utilization: 
Domestic use, excluding feed and 
seed (Bil. 1957-59 dol.) 28.9 31.5 33.1 34.1 
Per capita (Dol.) 160.4 162.2 164.2 164.8 
Livestock (Dol.) 100.0 101.9 103.6 104.1 
Crops (Dol.) 60.4 60.3 60.6 60.7 
Feed and seed (Bil. 1957-59 dol.) 8.98 9.3 10.2 10.6 
Exports (Bil. 19 57 -59 dol.)~/ 4.3 5.5 6.2 6.9 
Total net use (Bil. 1957-59 dol.)Q/ 33.2 37.0 39.3 41.0 
Net stock change (Bil. 1957-59 dol.) 0.4 -0.7 0.2 0 
Livestock production units (Mil.) 175.4 212 224 231 
Concentrates fed (Mil. ton) 122.9 157 168 175 
Feeding rate (Ton) .70 .74 .75 .76 
Prices received (1910-14-100) 239 250 256 261 
Livestock (Pa) 253 263 282 291 
Crops (Pc) 224 235 224 225 
Feed grains and hay (Pf) 153 173 165 168 
Ratio Pa/Pf 1.65 1.52 1.71 1. 73 
Price support level~/ 265 248 249 
Parity index 300 323 339 344 
Cash re~eipts (Bil. dol.) 34.1 39.7 43.5 46.2 
Livestock (Bil. dol.) 19 .o 22.1 24.9 26.5 
Crops (Bil. dol.)~/ 15.1 17.6 18.6 19.6 
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Table 6 . 4. (Continued) 
Item 
Productivity: 
Crop output per acre (1957-59-100) 
Output per man-hour 
Output per unit of inpUt (1957-59-100) 
Resource inputs: 
Cropland used for crops (Mil. acres) 
Labor (SRS concept) (Mil.) 
Total inputs (1957-59-100) 
PROJECTEna/ 
Average Average 
1959-61 1964-66 1968 1969-71 
108 
114 
104 
351 
7.1 
101 
120 126 
152 182 
1U 119 
334 360 
5. 7 5.1 
102 104 
132 
201 
125 
360 
4.9 
103 
Y Assumes current programs for grains and cotton with direct payment in 
1968 and 1969-71 of about $2 billion compared with $3 billion in 1966. 
Q./ Crop exports assumed to increase 4 1/2 percnet per year to 1971. 
£/Feed and seed are deducted out of gross production to avoid double counting 
in total output. 
fVMarket prices for crops adjusted upward by percent direct payments are of 
cash receipts for crops. 
~/noes not include direct payments on grains and cotton of about $2 1/4 billion 
in 1964-66 and an estimated $2 billion in 1967 and 1969-71. 
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will increase about 4 l/2 percent a year. This compares with the relatively 
rapid increase of more than 5 percent per year in the 5 -year period 1959-61 
to 1964-66. In addition to the above assumption, the commercial export 
function for crops attempts to take into account changes in relative prices as 
well. Total exports assumed for the 1969-71 period average a fourth larger 
than in 1964-66. 
With a very inelastic domestic demand for crops, other than for feed, 
per capita use is projected to change little in response to price and income 
variations. This overall stability reflects prospects for further declines in 
per capita use of cereals and fresh use of fruits, vegetables, and potatoes, 
but further increases in per capita use of processed foods from crops. Thus, 
domestic food use of crops increases about 7 percent, only slightly more 
than population. But feed use, which depends largely on livestock production 
and product-feed price relationships, is projected to rise twice as rapidly 
as food use. 
Livestock 
Production of livestock products is projected to increase possibly 10 
percent by 1970, about the same as the gain in the first half of the 1960 decade. 
The projected supply-demand balance, based primarily on growth in the 
domestic market, points to a continued relatively strong price and income 
situation for livestock products as a whole. 
Domestic use increases a bit more rapidly than population. Per capita 
use projected for 1969-71 averages around 2 percent above 1964-66. The 
impact of a continued rise in consumer income is partly offset by higher 
average prices projected for livestock products. Further increases are 
likely in per capita consumption of beef and poultry and some pickup in 
per capita use of pork is likely during the next few years from reduced 
levels in 1965 and 1966. Downtrends may continue in per capita use of 
dairy products, eggs, and some animal fats; but these declines will likely 
slow in the next several years. 
Product-feed price relationships and the rate of feeding continue high 
un:ler the relatively favorable conditions projected for livestock products. 
However, projected concentrate feeding increases about the same as 
livestock production from the relatively high 1965-66 utilization. 
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Demand and_Q_!1_!2ut ~lternatives Projected For the Next lO to 15 Years 
Prospective demand expansion and the output potential of U. S. farms 
point to little pressure on resources during the next decade or so. The 
projected demand-output balances for the years beyond the mid-1970's, in 
the framework and assumptions of this appraisal, point to some upward 
pressure on prices assuming crop export volume increases by 6 percent or 
so per year. Big demand increases and favorable prices and incomes would 
likely attract new land and other resources into production and moderate 
accordingly prices indicated for the high demand projections. On the 
other hand, if crop exports are assumed to increase around 3 percent per 
year, projected demand and output, assuming cropland use at the 1967 
level, would imply some downward pressure on prices and incomes. The 
low demand projection suggests a continuation of programs designed to 
limit resource used in agriculture. 
While the short-run model used for the near-term projections built 
up projections recursively year -by-year, the long-run framework permits 
one-jump projections to 1970, 1975 and 1980 (See the Appendix). Projections 
in this framework represent an approximate balance between a schedule of 
demand and a supply response projected for each target date. The demand 
shifters are population growth, consumer income, and assumed export 
levels. The supply response reflects primarily technology, the level of 
land use, and for livestock products, the cost of feed as determined in the 
crop sector. 
The domestic use levels projected for 1980 range around 28 to 33 percent 
above the 1964-66 average. The range reflects primarily the influence of 
variations in projected prices under the three assumed crop export alterna-
tives. These demand increases compare with prospective population growth 
of from 20 to 25 percent. Livestock products would account for the small 
overall gain in per capita domestic use. Among the crops , increased feed 
concentrate use for an expanding livestock industry as well as exports would 
account for most growth in demand, as they have in past years (Table 6. 5). 
Crop export volume increased about 5 percent per year between 1959-61 ?"d 
1964-66 and some published projections extend this rate of gain to 1970 ._g_ 
_g_lwest, Q. M., "Foreign Supply and Demand Projections: Outlook for U. S. 
Exports," Journal of Farm Econ~mics, Vol. 48, No. 5, December 1966, 
p. 1359. 
T
ab
le
 6
.5
. 
T
ot
al
 f
ar
m
 o
u
tp
ut
, 
u
ti
li
za
ti
on
, 
pr
ic
es
 a
n
d 
in
co
m
e,
 a
v
e
ra
ge
s 
19
49
-5
1 
a
n
d 
19
64
-6
6 
a
n
d 
pr
oj
ec
tio
ns
 
to
 1
98
0.
 
-
-
·
 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
~
-
-
-
·
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
·
·
·
-
-
-
~
-
-
PR
O
JE
C
T
E
na
7 
19
75
 
19
80
 
It
em
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
19
49
-5
1 
19
64
-6
6 
E
xp
. 
I 
E
xp
. 
II
 
E
xp
. 
II
I 
E
xp
. 
I 
E
xp
. 
II
 
Ex
p 
.
 
II
I 
SU
J2
J2
lie
s: 
F
ar
m
 o
u
tp
ut
 (B
il 
19
57
-5
9 
do
l.)
 
-
-
-
32
.5
 
41
.2
 
41
.8
 
40
.3
 
46
.3
 
47
.7
 
44
.9
 
F
ar
m
 o
u
tp
ut
 (1
95
7-
59
=1
00
 
88
 
11
3 
14
5.
0 
14
7.
2 
14
1.
9 
16
3.
0 
16
8.
0 
15
8.
1 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 (1
95
7-
59
=1
00
) 
86
 
11
3 
13
6.
2 
13
4.
5 
13
8.
3 
15
0.
6 
14
8.
3 
15
3.
1 
C
ro
ps
 ( 1
95
 7 -
59
=1
00
) 
90
 
11
3 
15
0.
6 
15
4.
2 
14
5.
0 
17
2.
3 
17
9.
8 
16
3.
5 
I ~
 
Im
po
rt
s 
(B
il.
 1
95
7-
59
 d
ol
.) 
3.
3 
4.
0 
4.
6 
4.
7 
4.
8 
5.
1 
5.
1 
5.
1 
~
 
I 
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
D
om
es
ti
c 
e
x
c
lu
di
ng
 fe
ed
 a
n
d 
s
e
e
d 
(B
il.
 1
95
7-
59
 d
ol
.) 
24
.4
 
31
.5
 
37
.3
 
36
.8
 
37
.8
 
41
.0
 
40
.3
 
41
.7
 
P
er
 c
a
pi
ta
 (1
95
7-
59
 d
ol
.) 
16
0.
8 
16
2 
16
7 
16
5 
17
0 
16
9 
16
7 
17
2 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 (1
95
7-
59
 d
ol
.) 
93
.6
 
10
2 
10
7 
10
6 
10
9 
10
9 
10
8 
11
1 
C
ro
ps
 (1
95
7-
59
 d
ol
.) 
67
.2
 
60
 
60
 
59
 
61
 
60
 
59
 
61
 
Fe
ed
 a
n
d 
s
e
e
d 
(B
il.
 1
95
7-
59
 d
ol
.) 
8.
8 
9.
3 
11
.9
 
11
.6
 
12
.1
 
13
.4
 
13
.1
 
13
.7
 
E
xp
or
ts
 (B
il.
 1
95
7-
59
 d
ol
.) 
2.
7 
5.
6 
8.
6 
9.
7 
7.
3 
10
.5
 
12
.5
 
8.
3 
T
ot
al
 n
e
t 
u
se
!Y
 
27
.1
 
37
.1
 
45
.8
 
46
.5
 
45
.1
 
51
.4
 
52
.8
 
50
.0
 
In
ve
nt
or
y 
c
ha
ng
e 
0 
-
0.
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
P
ri
ce
s 
re
c
e
iv
ed
 (1
910
-14
=10
0)~
/ 
27
0 
25
0 
26
4 
28
4 
24
6 
27
6 
30
7 
25
2 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 (P
a)
 
29
6 
26
3 
28
7 
30
5 
26
6 
29
7 
31
9 
27
6 
C
ro
ps
 (P
c)
 
24
1 
23
5 
23
8 
25
9 
22
6 
25
2 
29
7 
22
6 
T
ab
le
 6
. 5
 . 
(C
on
tin
ue
d)
 
It
em
 
C
as
h 
re
c
e
ip
ts
 (B
il.
 d
ol
.) 
L
iv
es
to
ck
 
C
ro
ps
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
19
49
-5
1 
29
.7
 
17
.0
 
12
.7
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 
19
64
-6
6 
39
.7
 
22
.1
 
17
.6
 
PR
OJ
EC
TE
D~
/ 
-
19
75
 
19
80
 
-
-
E
xp
. 
I 
E
xp
. 
II
 
E
xp
. 
II
I 
E
xp
. 
I 
E
xp
. 
II
 
E
xp
. 
II
I 
-
-
-
52
.6
 
56
.7
 
48
.3
 
61
.7
 
69
.4
 
55
.1
 
29
.1
 
30
.5
 
27
.3
 
27
.3
 
35
.2
 
31
.5
 
23
.5
 
26
.2
 
21
.0
 
21
.0
 
34
.2
 
23
.6
 
~/E
xpo
rt 
I 
a
s
s
u
m
e
s
 c
ro
p 
e
x
po
rt
s 
in
cr
ea
se
 .a
t 
4 
1/
2 
pe
rc
en
t p
er
 y
ea
r;
 E
xp
or
t I
I 
a
ss
w
n
e
s 
c
ro
p 
e
x
po
rt
s 
in
cr
ea
se
 a
t 
6 
pe
rc
en
t p
er
 y
ea
r 
a
n
d 
E
xp
or
t I
II
 a
ss
u
m
e
d 
c
ro
p 
e
x
po
rt
s 
in
cr
ea
se
 a
t 
3 
pe
rc
en
t p
er
 y
ea
r.
 
~/
Fe
ed
 an
d 
s
e
e
d 
a
re
 s
u
bt
ra
ct
ed
 fr
om
 to
ta
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 a
v
o
id
 d
ou
bl
e 
c
o
u
n
tin
g 
in
 th
e 
to
ta
l. 
£/
Pr
oj
ec
te
d p
ri
ce
s 
re
fl
ec
t r
e
a
l 
in
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
 a
n
d 
a 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
st
ab
le
 g
en
er
al
 p
ri
ce
 le
ve
l. 
5 0 I 
-100a-
The range in crop export increases assumed for this appraisal--3 percent, 
4 1/2 percent, and 6 percent--were chosen to illustrate possible impacts on 
agriculture. 
Total farm output projected for 1980 ranges some 40 to 50 percent 
above 1964-66. With assumed exports increasing at 4 1/2 percent per year 
(I), domestic use (excluding feed and seed) increases around 30 percent 
and feed uses increase about 45 percent. The assumed 1980 export volume, 
under this assumption, rises almost 90 percent from the 1964-66 average. 
This would be about as large as the gain over the past 15 years. A farm 
output increase of some 45 percent would match this demand projection at 
prices averaging around 1966 levels. These comparisons, of course, make 
no allowance for big changes in the general level of prices. Under the 
slower crop export assumption (lll} --3 percent per year--a total farm 
output increase of about 40 percent from 1964-66 would meet projected 
demand with about 20 million fewer acres than for export I and little change 
in average prices received. 
Crop output projected for 1980 varies from 45 to 60 percent above the 
1964-66 average. This relatively wide range reflects the three assumed 
levels of crop exports, the major variable element in demand. Under the 
high export assumption, the increase in domestic use is the smallest and 
prices are the highest of either alternative. But domestic demand is very 
inelastic relative to price. Accordingly, use varies little under the three 
alternatives (Table 6. 6). 
Combined domestic use of crops, assuming an annual increase in exports 
of 4 1/2 percent (I), is projected to increase a third from the 1964-66 average. 
The increase in total use would include an approximate doubling in crop 
exports by 1980. With such an increase, crop exports would equal about 29 
percent of crop output compared with 22 percent in 1964-66. In order to 
match projected demand, under this alternative (I}, output needs to increase 
around 55 percent and projected prices might average around 5 percent above 
the 1964-66 average. A price change this small could hardly be considered 
significant in the simple analytical framework used for these projections. 
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Projected demand-output-price balances under the half dozen alterna-
tives explored in this appraisal are illustrated for crops in figure 6 .1. 
Demand alternatives reflect the effect of projected population and income 
on domestic demand for each target date. The domestic demand projection 
and the export assumptions provide the basis for the three demand projections 
for each target date. The supply response reflects the advance in technology 
(in part a proxy for nonfarm inputs) and alternative assumptions for land 
use. 
The figure effectively illustrates the relatively inelastic demand and 
output responses in the analytical framework. It is clear that the low 
demand level implies some downward pressure on prices with cropland use 
specified at 360 million acres, approximately the same as the use level 
estimated for 1967. Only the highest demand projection points to some 
price pressures developing around the mid-1970's. It is easy to visualize 
the possible impact of adding another 20 to 30 million acres to the cropland 
base or a step-up in the rate of technological advance--from about 1.9 per-
cent to 2 .1 percent per year --reflected in the output function S 380T. Crop 
output per acre projected for 1980 ranges 35 to 40 percent above the 1964-66 
average. These gains compare with an increase of around 40 percent over 
the past 15 years . 
Livestock 
Increases in per capita use of livestock products expand domestic use 
more rapidly than population. Per capita use projected for 1980 is 6 to 
8 percent above 1964-66, due primarily to rising consumer income. Increased 
consumption would reflect a strong consumer preference for beef and the 
likelihood of further increases in per capita use of meats and poultry. 
Further declines in per capita use of animal fats and possibly eggs, in line 
with past trends, would be partly offsetting. 
With livestock product output geared primarily to growth in the domestic 
market, projected demand increases would be matched by production increases 
ranging some 30 to 35 percent above 1964-66. Such increases compare with 
a gain of 38 percent in the previous 15 years. Unlike for crops, the higher 
production is projected under the low export assumption and the corresponding 
low crop price alternative. Under the high export and high grain price 
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assumptionsJ livestock product prices run around 15 percent higher 
than under the low export assumption. These variations projected 
for production and prices are due primarily to differences in feed 
costs and in domestic demand for livestock products under the 3 export 
assumptions (Table 6. 7). 
Feed concentrate use is projected to increase 45 to 50 percent under 
the low export assumption and 40 to 45 percent under the high export 
alternative. The increase reflects the rise in production of livestock 
products as well as some further increase in the feeding rate, particularly 
under the low crop price alternative. 
The demand -output balance for livestock in this highly aggregated 
framework points to relatively strong prices in the next 10 to 15 years. 
Gradually declining costs for feed are implied for the projection frame-
work if upward price pressures are to be avoided. With prices for corn 
(and comparable prices for other feed grains) holding around $1.10 per 
bushel by 1975 and $1.00 by 1980, the analytical framework suggests 
considerable upward pressure on prices (Figure 6. 2). The assumption 
of a gradual downtrend in feed costs implies that technological advances 
will continue to be more rapid for feed grains than for most livestock 
products. Technological breakthroughs in the production of cattle and 
hogs, such as those in poultry in the past two decades, however, could 
materially alter the supply response for livestock products. 
Prices and Incomes 
Output and demand projections for the next decade or so, assuming an 
annual increase fo 4 1/2 percent in the volume of crop exports , point to 
average prices received around the levels of recent years. Because of 
the very low price elasticity of demand for crops, there is a rather large 
price range--around 25 percent--from the high to the low export assumption. 
This variation influences feed costs, livestock production and prices of 
livestock products, though the projected range in livestock product prices 
for 1980 is only about half as large as that for crops. 
The higher price projections for crops are associated with the higher 
export assumption and the larger output projection. Since the effect of 
prices on domestic use is relatively small, projected crop receipts under 
the high export (I) assumption are 45 percent larger than those for the 
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low export (III) assumption. The level of cropland use was assumed at 
380 million acres, but returns under the high alternative may well attract 
additional land into the production of crops. This would narrow the difference 
in projected prices and cash receipts between the high and low alternatives. 
The range in market receipts projected for livestock products is much 
narrower than for crops--around a tenth from the low alternative (III) to 
the high alternative (II) --reflecting mainly the impact of variations in 
crop exports on the cost of feed. 
Under the assumption that crop exports increase about 4 1/2 percent 
per year, projected livestock receipts for 1980 are about 50 percent above 
the 1964-66 average. Combined receipts for both crops and livestock products, 
under this assumption (I), are projected to increase by 50 to 60 percent. 
With declining farm numbers, cash receipts per farm rise much more 
sharply than total receipts (Table 6. 4). 
During the 1960-65 period, one of rapid rise in farm income, realized 
net income per farm in real terms (adjusted for price level increase) rose 
more than 6 percent per year. Median income per family for the nonfarm 
population, similarly adjusted, rose around 2 1/2 percent per year in this 
period. Although the farm-nonfarm income gap was substantially narrowed, 
per capita farm incomes still average only about two-thirds nonfarm incomes. 
The output-demand balance projected under the middle export assumption 
(alternative I) would push up net income per farm by possibly 3 1/2 to 4 
percent per year in the next 10 to 15 years, well above the increase projected 
for real income per family in the nonfarm sector. If these farm and nonfarm 
rates continued, it would take about two decades to close the income gap. 
The most rapid changes in agriculture have been in resource adjustment 
and associated changes in numbers of farms, farm population, and productivity. 
Shifts in resource use associated with technological advances and changes 
in the relative cost of inputs have in general resulted in the replacement of 
labor and, to some extent, land with inputs such as machinery and equipment, 
fertilizer, and other nonfarm inputs. Resource adjustments are expected 
to continue at a rapid clip and could accelerate in coming years. These 
adjustments will bring further declines in the number of farms, extensive 
shifts in the labor-capital resource mix, and rapid advances in the productivity 
of agriculture . 
-109-
Farm consolidation and the sharp decline in farm numbers have been 
associated with rapid changes in the resource structure of agriculture. 
There were about 3. 4 million farms in 1965, about 2 l/2 million fewer 
than in 1950. Projected farm numbers, based largely on changes between 
the 19 59 -to -19 64 Census years, decline to around 2 million by 19 80. About 
half of these would be the larger commercial family farms with sales above 
$10,000 per farm. Remaining farms would include part-time and part-
retirement farms and a sizeable number of units with sales per farm below 
$10,000. Under the current definition of a farm, many people will live in 
rural areas on places considered farms. Many of these may be largely rural 
residences.· 
Technical possibilities exist for an even more rapid decline in farm 
numbers than in the past. It would not be unreasonable to visualize an 
organization of agriculture in which a half million farms would carry out 
the prduction job. This may be possible if all farms were in general 
organized like those with sales of more than $40,000 per farm. These 
farms would have average sales around $ll0, 000 per farm with average net 
incomes of about $25,000 and production assets around $400,000 per farm. 
A commercial agriculture made up of fewer and more specialized units 
probably would be more responsive to economic forces and possibly would 
be a stronger influence in the market. 
Labor Input 
Labor requirements are expected to decline further in coming years. 
The projected decline assumes that output per man-hour will rise, much 
as in the past, with further extensive shifts in resource use. An uptrend 
in output per man-hour of 5 l/2 to 6 percent per year and the projected output-
demand balance for 1980 points to labor requirements around 40 percent below 
1964-65. This decline compares with a drop of nearly 50 percent in the past 
15 years (Table 6. 2). 
Labor requirements projected for 1980 would suggest 3 to 3 l/2 million 
workers (SRS concept) compared with 5. 7 million in 1964-66. The comparable 
Census concept would imply fewer than 3 million workers by 1980. These 
declines reflect the downtrend in farm numbers as well as projected output 
and productivity trends. Labor input per farm is projected to decline little, 
through the average size of farm as well as capital inputs per farm and average 
labor productivity rise rapidly. 
-llO-
Labor requirements and projected farm numbers, assuming no big 
changes in the definition of a farm, imply a farm population by 1980 of 
around 71/2 million, down from a,bout 12.4 million in 1965. Such a 
decline would be slower than that during the past 15 years. But projected 
farm population would drop from around 6 1/2 percent of total population 
in 1965 to around 3 percent for 1980. 
Capital Requirements 
Total resource inputs have changed little in the past decade or so 
and may increase only slightly in the next 10 to 15 years. This projection 
assumes no big acceleration from the recent relatively rapid growth in 
domestic and export demand for farm products. Projected demands and 
productivity trends do not point to great pressure on available land resources. 
There are around 1,150 million acres of land in farms. Around 450 mil-
lion acres are classified as cropland and some 300 million acres have been 
harvested in recent years. The remaining acreage of cropland in farms 
was either pasture, fallow, idle or diverted under Government programs. 
An inventory of land capability and use taken in 1962 reported, in addition 
to the above cropland, more than 250 million acres of land in capability 
classes (I to Ill) considered suitable for regular cultivation. Undoubtedly, 
much of this land would come into production if demand expansion, prices, 
or public investment provided the inducement. 
Crop output per acre is projected to trend upward much as in the past. 
However, the increase may be a little slower, if additional acreage of 
cropland is brought into production. 
Production assets used in agriculture, after adjustment for price level 
change, have increased around a tenth in the past 15 years. However, capital 
of nonfarm origin and inputs of intermediate nonfarm products used in farm 
production increased around 50 percent. The latter include big increases in 
the use of fertilizer and other chemicals, fuels, services, and many other 
operating inputs. 
The uptrend in use of many nonfarm operating inputs will continue and may 
accelerate in coming years. Total capital use in agriculture, is also expected 
to rise further and possibly more rapidly than in the past. Changes in the 
general capital-land-labor mix in agriculture are not easy to anticipate even 
-lll-
under simplifying assumptions relating to technological advances, pro-
ductivity, and costs of various inputs. A continuation of past growth 
in capital inputs appears conservative and implies some acceleration 
in the advance in technology (Table 6. 8). A slower, but still plausible, 
technological advance would imply an increase of perhaps as much as 
50 percent from 1965 to 1980 in the volume of productive asset use. But 
the latter increase seems unreasonably large. In any event, capital 
likely will play an increasingly more strategic role in determining f~rm 
output and the output potential of U. S. agriculture than will land and 
labor. 
Number and Size Structure of Farms 
---
As indicated above, farm numbers are projected to decline to around 
2 million farms by 1980. The adjustment surely could be more rapid 
and it may be slower. Around a million of the 2 million farms projected 
for 1980 would fall into sales classes with more than $10,000 per farm; 
about 350-400 thousand would be in the $2,500 to $10,000 per farm sales 
groups; and about 700 thousand farms would be in sales groups under 
$2,500 per farm. Around two-thirds of the latter would be part-time 
and part-retirement farms . 
These projections rest heavily on trends of the past decade. They 
are based on a matrix of changes by economic class derived primarily 
from changes between 1959 and 1964. The size distribution of farms is 
chained forward by 5-year intervals on the basis of recent trends by 
economic class. After about two decades , projected farm numbers are 
down to around 1 1/2 million units and declining slowly. This technique 
is neater, but probably no better than a simple appraisal of trends by 
size class. 
The reasonableness of the projected size distribution of farms was 
checked by using distributions projected for 1970, 1975 and 1980 to compute 
total land in farms and cash receipts, i.e. , the product of number of farms 
and average receipts in each size class, etc. Receipts based on the projected 
demand-output balance are expressed in 1965 prices and the income-expenditure 
relationships reflect primarily ratios based on 1959 and 1965 (Table 6. 8). 
Changes in the number and size distribution of farms based on this approach 
yields some interesting implications and questions about productivity gains 
and the labor-land-capital mix. 
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But, such highly aggregated data does not provide the best framework 
in which to appraise input requirements and productivity trends. Changes 
in the distribution of farms by dollar sales classes reflects the consolidation 
of smaller farms and parts of farms into larger units. But they also reflect 
changes in prices and many technological advances affecting productivity, 
capital and labor requirements, optimum size, etc. 
As a basis for projection, it was convenient to assume no chang~ in 
prices. This means that cash receipts and the value of output (real output) 
per farm must cluster around the mid-point of the size classes. But produc-
tivity advances pose some difficult questions about the labor-land-capital 
mix which are not easy to handle conceptually or empirically. 
In order for the projected distributions to yield the labor requirement 
projected for 1980, it was necessary to assume that some 60 to 70 percent 
of the rise in labor productivity was due simply to a change in the number 
and size distribution of farms. It may be helpful, for the moment, to think 
of growth in output per man-hour as made up of technological advances and 
gains due to shifts in the number and size distribution of farms. The larger 
farms have higher output per man-hour reflecting primarily a different 
capital-labor mix. However, the combining of smaller and often less efficient 
units into fewer, larger, more efficient farms can materially increase output 
per man-hour in agriculture over time. In addition, productivity on all 
farm units is increasing over time . These projected increases in labor 
productivity for agriculture as a whole rise about twice as rapidly as gains 
projected for individual size classes (Table 6. 9). 
Rising productivity of labor implies considerably more capital per worker, 
but total capital requirements may increase little. Do these shifts with 
rising .yields also imply some decline in acreage per farm in a given size 
class, or some other change in the resource mix? Are average yields in 
agriculture rising more rapidly than those on individual farms? 
One alternative is suggested, as a basis for measuring capital require-
ments, by the apparent tendency in the past for a relatively constant capital-
output ratio for agriculture, in total and, insofar as it can be approximated, 
by economic class. From a relatively constant capital-output ratio (K/0) 
and projected output per man-hour (0/L), we can approximate the capital-
labor ratio (K/L). With projected labor requirements, capital requirements 
are determined. ·Under the high productivity alternative (Table 6.8), pro-
ductive assets are projected to increase about 15 percent by 1980 . 
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The above projections for output and for labor and capital inputs by 
size class of farms were checked for implied productivity gains in the 
framework of a simple production function: 0 = AtLaKk, in which (a) is 
assumed equal to 0. 8 and (K) 0. 2. The neutral technology shifter (At) , 
computed in the above framework for each size class and for all farms, 
rises 1 1/2 percent per year for each size class from 1965 to 1970 compared 
with an increase of 4 percent for all farms. The implied increase in the 
technology shifter (At) tends to accelerate some from 1970 to 1980. For 
all farms, the average annual increase implied for (AJ is about 4 1/2 
percent per year to 1975, about the average of the past (Table 6. 9). 
Suppose we assume, in the above framework, that the technology 
shifter (At) rises 1 1/2 percent from 1965 to 1970, 2.0 percent from 1970 
to 1975 and 2 1/2 percent from 1975 to 1980. In this case, productive assets 
projected for 1980 would total about 50 percent above 1965. The shift 
in technology (At) for all farms suggested by this slower advance in 
technology would run about 4 percent per year for the next decade and a 
half. 
Exploring the implications of productivity advances and changes in 
the resource mix by economic class are interesting, but the investigation 
does not yield solid and unequivocal conclusions. It is quite apparent that 
much of the rapid increase in average output per man-hour and possibly in 
other measures of productivity for agriculture are due directly to changes 
in the number and size distribution of farms. Although these observations 
are not new, differences in trends for individual farms and for the average 
for all farms may be greater than is generally realized. The optimum size 
firm changes constantly with technology. But if agriculture is moving 
rapidly toward some desired optimum size farms , do these shifts imply 
a slower decline in farm numbers and farm population as well as some 
slowing in productivity gains in agriculture and possibly in yields? 
APPENDIX 
The Analytical Framework 
The highly aggregated framework used as a basis for the projections 
in this appraisal consists of a supply response function for crops and 
livestock products, two corresponding demand functions and several related 
relationships, the most important of which is a demand function for .feed. 
Though greatly oversimplified, the supply relationships generally 
explain output trends of the past 10 to 15 years. Output in the current 
year is considered a function of technological advance and the output 
level and prices in the preceding year. The livestock function also 
includes feed costs. It is not complete enough to adequately explain 
cyclical swings in the cattle and hog cycle. 
Major domestic uses are functionally determined in the analysis , 
but export levels were assumed as specified. In general, domestic 
demand is a function of population, income, and prices. 
The short-run application projects output, demand, and prices year-
by-year. For example, given projected technology, conditions in year (t) 
explain output in year (t+1). This supply estimate together with demand, 
projected on the basis of population and income, establishes prices in 
year (t+1) and provides the information to move to year (t+2), etc. 
In the longer-run analysis, coefficients are adjusted to approximate 
long-run relationships by the technique indicated in the framework. The 
specific long-run projections approximate an equilibrium of supply, demand 
and price at alternative levels of demand, cropland use, and technology. 
A. Variables: 
Oc =index of crop output (1957-59=100) 
P c = index of crop prices received ( 1910-14=100) deflated by parity index 
A =index of acreage of cropland used for crops (1957-59=100=357 
million acres) 
qc =per capita food and nonfood use of crops (other than for feed, 
seed and exports) (1957-59 dollars) 
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index of prices received for feed grains and hay 1910-14= 
100 deflated by parity index. 
index of competitive prices for crops based on prices for 
polyester fiber (1957 -59=100) 
Oa = index of livestock production (1957-59=100) 
Pa index of livestock product prices (1910-14=100) deflated by 
parity index 
qa per capita food use of livestock products (1957-59 dollars) 
Lu = livestock production units (Million) 
F c = feed concentrates fed (Million ton) 
I index of per capita disposable income deflated by consumer price 
index 
T = index of total farm output per unit of input (1957 -59=100) 
B. Short-run Framework: 
1. Crop Sector 
(1. 0) Log Oct = -1.226 + 0. 2 log Pct-1 + . 333 log At + . 85 log Tt + . 25 log Oct-1 
(2. 0) Log qct = 1. 7611 - .15 log P ct + 0.1 log It + 0. 05 log Cpt 
_gommercial cro~orts: Ect = 1.045 Ect-1- 0.5 .f:? 
c 
Imports: It=~ (It-l> + 0.2 6;~ 
Seed = f (acreage) 
2. Livestock Sector 
(3.0) Log Oat= .5701 + 0.2 log Pat-l -0.2 log Pft-l + 0.2 log Tt + .5059 log Oat-1 
(4. 0) Log qat = 1. 951 - 0. 214 log Pat+ 0.2 log It 
p 
(5.0) Fe= -68 + .878 Lu + .233 ~, Lu =f (Oa) 
Pf 
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Nonfood use = f (Oa) 
C. Long-run Framework~/ 
1. Crop Sector 
* (1.1) Log Oc = -1.635 + • 267 log P c + .444 log A + 1.1333 log T 
(2 .1) Log qct = 1. 7611 -.15 log P c + 0 .1 log I + 0. 05 log Cp 
Export I assumes increase of 4 1/2 percent per year--55 percent 
from 1964-66 to 1975 and 95 percent to 1980--with price adjustment 
as in short-run framework. 
Export II assumes increase of 6 percent per year and Export III 
assumes 3 percent per year. 
Seed == f (acreage) 
2. Livestock Sector 
(3.1) Log 0~ = 1.1536 + .4048log Pa -.4048log Pf + .405 log T 
(4.1) Log qa = 1.951 -.2141og Pa + 0.2 log I 
~Short-run supplv functions (1.0) and (3.0) adjusted to approximate long-run 
elasticities assuming a distributed lag model. Observed output, reflecting 
prices and economic conditions in past years, is constantly adjusting toward 
some desired equilibrium: Ot - Ot-1 = B (Ot - Ot-l).See Marc Nerlove, The 
Dynamics of Supply: Estimation of Farmers' Response to Price, 1958. 
AGRICULTURE'S STATUS AND POTENTIAL 
by Dale E. Hathaway* 
I thought the title assigned this paper "Status and Potential" more 
descriptive of the concerns of the mother of the bride toward her new 
son-in-law than of the issues of importance to research workers. Upon 
reflection, however, I have concluded we in University research have 
more in common with mothers-in-law than we should admit. We are 
jealous and suspicious of virtually all who appear interested in "our baby", 
the agricultural industry, and are quite certain their intentions are dis-
honorable. If things work out badly we are the first to say "we told you 
so" and; if, contrary to our expectations, they work out well we tend to 
take the credit for bringing them together. This attitude, in research as 
in families, stems, I believe, from a failure to recognize that the object 
of our attention changes and matures over time and that its environment 
is also rapidly changing. It follows, therefore, that our attitudes and 
analysis also should change regarding the needs of our concern. I view 
it as my job to sketch some of these maturing changes in agriculture 
that should alter the way in which we approach farm management, marketing, 
and policy research. 
There are three areas which I will discuss. They are (1) the changing 
beliefs and values relating to agriculture (2) the political environment 
within which agriculture will operate, and (3} the level and context within 
which consumption and production decisions are made. Most of what I 
shall say is based upon scantly empirical evidence, which does not imply 
that such evidence is unobtainable but merely that it has not be obtained. 
The Value Context Relating to Agriculture 
Much of the discussion which follows relates to beliefs associated with 
our value structure rather than with the values of society. It appears that 
a majority of the society still values stability, both economic and political, 
growth, minimum levels of economic welfare, equal opportunity, and sharing 
our abundance. It appears, however, that the long-standing ideas regarding 
*Professor of Economics, Michigan State University. I have benefited by 
comments from G. L. Johnson, A. Alan Schmid, and J.D. Shaffer. 
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agriculture's speciai contributions to the achievement of these values is 
rapidly being replaced by a radically different set of beliefs. The bitter 
struggle over civil rights, especially in the rural South, is convincing most 
people that farmers have no monopoly on justice or concern for equality. 
The difficulties of assimulating the rural migrants to large cities has 
convinced many th~t the virtues of rural upbringing are hardly sufficient 
to offset poor schools. The shameful treatment of some migrant workers 
has confirmed these feelings. And, the enthusiasm of numerous rural 
areas for extreme right-wing political candidates has done little to con-
vince the general population that farmers add greatly to the stability of 
our political system. The same can be said for the actions of some of 
our farm organizations. 
With these beliefs falling away, it appears that farming is increasingly 
regarded by nonfarmers primarily as an economic enterprise. To be sure 
it is still regarded as a crucial enterprise in the economy but not as one 
which has special virtues that exempt it from social control or as one 
which sould be maintained at a given size and with a special structure 
because of its special contributions to non-economic values. 
If this assessment is correct it has important implications, some of 
which are evident already. One is that the general social legislation and 
organization which applied to hired workers in nonfarm business will be 
applied in some form to farms. This has significant implications for the 
farm manager, the way he organizes his farm, and the management task 
he faces. I suspect that farm management researchers in the years ahead 
will have to become well acquainted with the work in labor and industrial 
relations, if they are not already. 
Concurrent with this change in beliefs on the part of nonfarm people, it 
appears there has been a major shift in the values of farm people. Farm 
people still regard the family farm as a useful social institution, but in a 
recent survey 69 percent of a sample of Michigan farmers agreed that "It 
is more important that farm people earn satisfactory incomes than it is 
to maintain the family farm system".!/ Moreover, 55 percent of these 
farmers agreed that farmers who can't make satisfactory income from 
farming should plan to leave farming. 
1/Dale E. Hathaway, Richard Feltner, James D. Shaffer, and Denton Morri-
son, Michigan Farmers in the Mid -Sixties , Research Report 54, Michigan 
State University, Agricultural Experiment Station, 1966, page 6. 
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My impression is that these attitudes are significantly different from 
those one would have found among farmers a decade ago. Moreover, the 
high relative importance of income seems increasingly to push farmers 
toward new attitudes regarding ways to achieve their income goals. An 
overwhelming 90 percent of all farmers in Michigan survey agreed "Farmers 
must get together in bargaining associations to deal effectively with pro~ 
cessors and retailers".!/ . 
This rising interest in market bargaining by farmers has been obvious 
in recent weeks during the milk holding action of the National Farmers 
Organization. It would be a mistake to dismiss this interest as one represent-
ing a minority view, for while there are marked disagreements as to tactics, 
the bargaining approach to improvement of farm prices appears to have wide-
spread farmer appeal. The widespread appeal of government market inter-
vention now appears to have been replaced by an interest in bargaining, per-
haps partially because of farmers increasing suspicion that the executive 
branch of government is now completely consumer oriented. 
The curious dual values that we appear to be developing toward food and 
its producers may pose some interesting questions. On one hand farmers are 
increasingly viewed as businessmen, but at the same time many nonfarm 
people appear to view the withholding or even conscious planning of food 
supplies at levels that will produce satisfactory prices as sinful. The kind 
of public controls that are placed over agricultural bargaining as a result 
of this public value system remain to be seen. In any case, marketing 
researchers are going to be called on increasingly to work in new areas and 
on new kinds of problems . 
Finally, the decline of the view that farming is a preferred industry may 
have implications for the ability of the industry to attract new capital, manage-
ment, and labor. In my lifetime farming in the United States never has had 
the social status that commercial farmers and land-ownership have in England 
and Western Europe. Even so I think the "preferred industry" concept has 
helped to attract capital and people to farming in the U. S. for lower rates of 
return than they might have been obtained in other industries. If this ''better 
way of life" attitude disappears it implies significant changes to be considered 
by farm management and policy researchers. 
~/Op. cit. page 24. 
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The Political Environment 
A great deal has been written about the decline in the number of farms 
and the consequent decline in the political power of farmers. Much of this 
·is misleading because of the decline in the number of farms has been largely 
due to the continuing disappearance of the subsis~nce and low-production 
farms. On the basis of nearly 40 years of farm legislation these gr<;mps 
must not have had much political power or the programs would not have been 
slanted so much in favor of the larger commercial farms. 
Neither has the rea~rtionment of state legislatures apparently hurt 
commercial farmers.~ This is not surprising because most state leg-
islatures were rural dominated not farm dominated, before reapportionment 
and there is a difference. 
There have been significant shifts in political power, especially at the 
national level. The farm bloc in Congress is gone forever and with it much 
of the independant power of the general farm organizations. But, what is 
rarely mentioned is the steadily rising political power of the farm-allied 
input producing and marketing industries. Most of these industries did not 
exist in their present form when our basic farm legislation was written in the 
1930's, but they are a significant force now and will be in the future .. 
Thus, commercial farmers have potential allies in the political wars. 
There is a major difference, however, between the objectives of wars fought 
alone and those where one needs help. Under the old system the poli~ical 
power of the farm bloc could be used to maximize the well-being of the 
conuD.ercial farmers it represented. But, the new alliance must find pro-
grams. which recognize the well-being of the input industries, the commercial 
farmers , and the marketing industries. 
One can immediately see some of the implications of this change. Neither 
the input or marketing industries are likely to go along with production control 
programs that might maximize returns to farms. Indeed, they have been and 
are likely to be major supporters of programs to run our farm plant at full 
capacity,· adding to the capacity when possible. Marketing industries are un-
·likely to support farmer-bargaining attempts, and to understate a bit, might 
even oppose them . 
.w'Talbot, Ross B. and Wiggins, Charles W., Political Forces in American 
Agriculture: The Present and a Look to the Future, a chapter in the 
Agricultural Policy Basebook, to be published, Iowa State University Press, 
Ames, Iowa. 
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There are other groups, of course, with an interest in farm legislation. 
Among them are consumers who, while poorly organized as such, appear 
increasingly sensative to retail food prices. The "good old days", when 
farm organizations could flaunt price controls on one hand and minimum 
wages on the other, have gone. Congress now will not pass farm programs 
that imply higher retail prices, and moreover, they are likely to become 
more concerned about the distribution of program benefits within agriculture. 
Thus, the political forces as well as the changing beliefs about farming 
seem likely to push us toward an industry oriented toward efficiency, pro-
duction, and low margins. Both forces will find "comparable returns" an 
acceptable income goal for the industry, but the concept is likely to apply 
in practice only to efficient, well-managed farms and not to all farm enterprises. 
At another level, that of local affairs, prospects look less promising. 
The organization and financing of local services to farm people is becoming 
more their concern alone because increasingly our national attention turns 
toward the problem of the cities and suburbs. Most consumers live in these 
urban areas , and so do those engaged in producing farm inputs and marketing 
farm products. Thus, these latter groups may have little interest in how 
rural life is organized, unlike their predecessors who lived and worked in 
small rural communities. If this pessimism is justified it means we may 
have the inconguity of successful and prosperous farm operators lacking 
the amenities and social services that are common for their counterparts 
in other businesses. 
Despite the rising chorus of questions about the wisdom of our non-policy 
relating to population distribution and concentration, I see little prospect for 
political support for a policy that would disperse our population in centers 
located apart from our growing megalopolises. The political pressures are 
where the people are and they want their problems solved there, not in some 
ideal community a hundred miles away. Thus, the prospect of community 
growth policies which would benefit both rural and urban people appear to be 
dim. 
The Level and Context of Economic Decisions 
At this point I will move to topics more directly related to our typical 
economic research and build further upon the papers that have preceeded 
mine. My definitions of level and context of decision making will become 
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apparent as I go on. I want to discuss this issue in two parts, one 
international and the other domestic. 
The international market for farm products has become extremely 
important to U. S. farmers and is likely to become even more so. Since 
the end of World War I we have viewed exports largely as a place to get 
rid of the excess over domestic needs, but this view is no longer realistic. 
Export demand has become a crucial fact0r in the demand for all of our 
major field crops, even including those in the midwest. While I would not 
argue that we completely understand domestic demand, I think that on the 
whole we do rather well in both our short and intermediate range outlook. 
When it comes to foreign demand, however, we know very little. This 
is not the market researchers fault, for the funds have been meager, the 
data are awful, and much of the demand is politically determined by 
decisions both in Washington and abroad. 
Thus, in dealing with commercial export demand we know very little, 
but our farm managers will increasingly have to produce for this uncharted 
market. Moreover, we have a tendancy to view the quality of our farm 
products as unbeatable, which may be true given the tastes and preferences 
of U. S. consumers but not always for foreign consumers. The level 
of development of marketing research in foreign countries does not promise 
to give us the needed answers very soon, so either we shall have to finance 
and do significant marketing research abroad or our farm operators and 
marketing agencies will have to continue to sell rather blindly in these 
markets, depending upon the government to bail them out if they are wrong. 
I believe it is unrealistic to assume our government can and should buy 
our farm products and then peddle them abroad, for I see little reason that 
state trading works better for the export market than for the domestic market, 
and we have chosen to reject it at home. 
A point related to the international markets is our lack of effective political 
linkage with these persons making political decisions affecting international 
trade in farm products. Effective and workable international political organi-
zations are a universal problem but they are especially so in agriculture. 
This stems partially, I believe, from the complete ignorance that most top 
level diplomats have regarding their own or other agricultural industries. 
It also stems from the relatively limited experience and view of the world 
which is held by U. S. farm operators and their leaders in farm organizations. 
Many successful nonfarm businesses which depend heavily upon export sales 
have long since developed an understanding of the problems they face in their 
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marketing abroad and some political empathy with foreign political groups 
too. In U. S. agriculture we have not. In fact, the largest farm organi-
zation in the United States has refused to join the International Federation 
of Agricultural Producers. Their reasons are private and may be excellent, 
but it results in isolating many of our producers from the world's major 
forum of farm producers. 
Thus, in general, at a time when international markets have become 
steadily more important to U. S. farmers we are lacking both good economic 
analysis as to the nature of those markets and an effective international 
political mechanism whereby our farmer's interest can be explained and 
represented. This seems , to me , to add a high degree of uncertainty to 
these markets, perhaps even greater than we had in our domestic markets 
several decades ago. 
Turning to the domestic scene there has been or will be a shift in the 
level at which decisions are made about items crucial to the management 
of a farm. Perhaps the most obvious example again is in the field of 
farm labor. Historically, a farmer employer could offer a "going local 
wage" and expect to have the necessary labor supply forthcoming. Already 
the federal government, through minimum wage legislation, has stepped 
in to put a floor under the wage offer regardless of labor market conditions . 
It is almost inevitable that farm workers will be unionized and the decision 
on wage levels will not be between the farm operator and the workers, but 
will be made at regional or national union headquarters. Concurrently, if 
market bargaining by farmer groups expands, production and price decisions 
for individual farms also may be made in an entirely new context. My 
remarks are neither to approve or condemn such changes, but merely to 
point out that farm managers will need to have far different information in 
this situation than they need now, and they will be called on to perform 
management functions that are new to most of them. 
The level at which decisions are made about other input prices seems 
to be moving up or toward centralization too. The old local horse dealer 
was much closer to his customers than the management of a company 
producing farm machinery for the national and international market. Much 
of the same holds for the producers of the nationally distributed inputs--
chemicals, fertilizers, feeds, etc. Among other things these large national 
corporations are a part of and extremely sensative to changes in the nonfarm 
economy such as interest rates and nonfarm wage rates. Machinery prices, 
I suspect, are more nearly a function of steel prices and union wage rates 
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than any factor in agriculture. The credit needs of modern commercial 
farms puts them squarely into the national money market, which operates 
with little regard to the needs of the agricultural industry and is highly 
influenced by general economic policy. 
Similar trends seem apparent on the product market side. Large-scale 
specification buying by chain stores moves the pricing decision away from 
the classical market to the professional managers, who often have their 
own production facilities as an alternative for all or part of their supply. 
In essence, all of the developments I have mentioned seem to run in 
one direction, that of subjecting the individual farm operator to greater 
influence from the economy at large. This is not a new trend, of course, 
but it seems to be likely to become fully effective in the years immediately 
ahead. Here again, we find the farm manager pushed more nearly into the 
position of managers of nonfarm manufacturing firms producing undifferen-
tiated products. Success becomes highly related to an understanding of these 
outside forces as well as of the internal production processes. 
Thus, both at home and abroad, in both economic and political affairs, 
the farm people of the future will find outside decisions made far away have 
a major impact upon their business. They certainly will need new and 
improved research in farm management, marketing, and policy to effectively 
adjust to these decisions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
It ~ppears that the environment within which U. S. farms operate in the 
decades ahead is going to be radically different than that of the recent past. 
Shifts in beliefs, values, political structures, input markets and institutions, 
and market structures have occured and are likely to continue. The direction 
of change I have pointed may prove in error but the fact of change in these 
elements is not likely to be. 
Most of the items I have discussed are largely those that we omit from 
our economic models and assume as unchanged. If, however, they change 
markedly, it would appear to raise some questions about the validity and 
utility of much of our model building. Unless we can build changes in insti-
tutional parameters as well as measured economic variables into our re-
search I am pessimistic regarding its utility. Thus, I view the need for more 
and better research in the areas of our concern as very great, and the task 
of filling these needs likely to strain both our financial and intellectual resources. 
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE OF PRODUCER 
UNITS OF FARM PRODUCTS* 
by Neil E. Harl** 
Although the parameters of the modal farm firm!/ of 1980 or beyond 
remain shrouded in a modicum of uncertainty and conjecture, the clustering 
of current opinions, projections and estimates in a direction far re~oved 
from the extant situation indicates beyond a reasonable doubt that the farm 
firm of that era will function in a vastly different environment and will 
itself be significantly different from the farm firm of 1967. Notwithstanding 
the wide range of views on the precise growth and developmen~ast of 
the farm firm, it is quite clear that farm firms will be fewer_g_ and 
*Journal Paper no. J-5661 of the Iowa Agricultural and Home Economics 
Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa. Project No. 1444. Special acknowledgment 
is made to Donald R. Kaldor, R. J. Hildreth and Leo V. Mayer for critical 
review of an earlier draft. 
**Professor of Economics, Iowa State University; Member of the Iowa Bar 
!/In a private enterprise economy, the firm may be viewed as an autonomous 
administrative unit transforming inputs into outputs pursuant to some 
entrepreneurial objective function and consistent with a technical production 
function. See Harl, "Research Methods Adaptable to Legal-Economic Inquiry; 
Linear Programming and Simulation," p. 75, Methods for Legal-Economic 
Research into Rural Problems , Monograph No. 8, Agricultural Law Center , 
University of Iowa (1966). 
g_lsee Ruttan, "Agricultural P~licy in An Affluent Society," 48 J. Farm Econ. 
1100, 1113 (1966) (if production were concentrated entirely on farms such 
as thbse with sales of $40,000 or more the total U. S. farm output could 
be produced on less than 400,000 farms); Clawson, "Aging Farmers and 
Agricultural Policy," 45 J. Farm Econ. 13, 26 (1963) (a ''high" estimate 
of 730,000 farms by 2,000 and a "low" estimate of 418 ,000); Heady & Tweeten, 
Resource Demand and Structure of the Agricultural Industry 481-82 (1963) 
(number of farms to produce the 1980 food supply with scale of operations 
approaching but still short of minimum cost is around 750 ,000); Daly, 
"Agriculture: Projected Demand, Output and Resource Structure," pp. 82-
119 ~ra (if past trends continue possibly fewer than a million commercial 
farms by 1980) . 
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larger~/ with sharply higher amounts of capital managed per farm.1/ 
Moreover, it appears that the incidence of multi-member farm firms!!./ 
will increase gradually over time for a variety of reasons. Coordination 
of input acquisition and output marketing by contract will probably increase; 
some belief exists that shifts in relative bargaining power in favor of the 
farm firm are likely to occur. 
Projections of firm size are related, of course, to the configuration 
of cost curves. Available data on economies of size, although not indicating 
overwhelming economies of very large farm businesses , at the least point 
~/Whether expressed in terms of acres per farm, capital per farm or 
output per farm, size of firm is increasing rapidly . Gross sales per 
farm have grown at about 6% per year on the average over the past 25 
years. See Butcher & Whittlesey, "Trends and Problems in Growth of 
Firm Size, "48 J. Farm Econ. 1513 (1966). A comparison of 1959 and 
1964 Census of Agriculture data indicates that substantial increases in 
farm size occurred for farms 500 acres or larger, particularly in the 
north central states, while the total number of farms decreased sharply. 
United States North Central Region 
No. 1964 Chg. from 1959 No. 1964 Chg. from 1959 
500-999 acres 207,520 +5.3% 107,661 +10.8% 
1, 000 -1,999 acres 84,290 +7. 4% 38 , 049 +2 3. 4% 
2,000 or more acres 60,081 +5 .1% 14,241 +12. 9% 
.1./u is likely that the growth of capital per firm will continue to exceed 
substantially the growth of capital for the agricultural industry because 
of farm consolidation. See Heady & Ball, "Economic Growth of the Farm 
Firm and Projected Changes in Farming," p. 18, Report No. 24, Center 
for Agricultural and Economic Development, Iowa State University (1965). 
From 1940 to 1966, capital per farm increased nationally from $6, 158 to 
$64,960 while assets per farm worker during the same period rose from 
$3, 326 to $35,958. The Balance Sheet of Agriculture, p. 17, Agriculture 
Information Bull. No. 314, ERS, USDA ( 1966) . 
Q_/By multi-member farm firm is meant a firm wherein ownership and 
management are provided by more than one individual. 
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toward nearly constant costs over a wide range of firm size.~/ Some 
doubt exists whether in fact the long-run average total cost curve rises 
at all for larger farms,'!_/ It may very well be that management is the 
key variable responsible for the behavior of the cost curve at high volumes. 
And the quality of management input on farms, particularly well-organized 
and financed commercial farms, is increasing at a relatively rapid rate. 
If the cost curve continues to decline at higher volumes , a centripetal 
tendency exists for farm firms to attain such size as will permit advantages 
of scale to be obtained. If the cost curve reveals nearly constant costs 
per unit or output beyond the initial low production stage of high costs, 
larger firms may enjoy higher incomes merely because of the larger volume 
of business.~/ The need exists for research on the configuration of cost 
cu.rves at higher volumes of production. 
This paper recognizes the duality of the firm as an economic entity 
engaged in resource allocation and income distribution and also as a legal 
insitution representing, embodying and participating in interfirm and intra-
firm relationships. Legally, a relatively highly developed, finite structural 
framework is provided for the conduct of economic activity. Although 
it would undoubtedly be economically desirable if the legal framework 
provided an organizational continum with an opportunity for entrepreneurs 
to select precisely the combination of organizational attributes desired 
from among an infinite array, the development of organizational forms 
over time has produced discrete alternatives. These alternatives are 
the well known sole proprietorship and its principal variant wherein major 
blocks of inputs are obtained contractually such as under the landlord-
tenant or vertical coordination relationship, the general and limited 
~/Butcher & Whittlesey, "Trends and Problems in Growth of Farm Size," 
48 J. Farm Econ. 1513, 1516 (1966); Hunter & Madden, "Economies 
of Size for Specialized Beef Feedlots in Colorado, "Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 91, ERS, USDA (1966) (technical economies of size attained 
beyond 1,500 head in terms of feeding cost per head are very small). 
']_/See .Halter, "Models of Firm Growth," 48 J. Farm Econ. 150 3 ( 1966) • 
Cf. Williamson, "Profit, Growth and Sales Maximization, " 33 Economica 
1 (1966). 
~/see Madden, "Economies of Size in Farming," Agricultural Economic 
Report No. 107, ERS, USDA (1967). 
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partnership, the trust, and the corporation. The economic adequacy of 
these traditional forms of organization is and will be increasingly open to 
question. No sector is more likely to dynamically test the sufficiency of 
the deeply rooted organizational forms during the next quarter century 
than farming. Enough alternatives should exist to permit attainment of 
relevant objectives without institutional restraint or obstruction. 
As a research and policy matter, the legal framework, including 
that segment impinging upon the organization of the firm, should perhaps 
be viewed as legislatively and judicially malleable and amenable to change 
if properly cast in the role of a dependent variable. As elsewhere observed, 
"if the roots of law extend to knowledge and human experience examined 
by the social sciences, then legal change should ideally flow from and be 
directed in large part by the research results of the appropriate disciplines."~/ 
By this view research designed to affect and influence the law in futuro 
becomes much more than a search for legal precedent. It involves, in a 
vital way, all disciplines that are demonstrably relevant to the social issue 
under study. The social scientist bears a responsiblity in the molding of 
law to accomplish societally weighted objectives. 
If social scientists were required to take an oath, it should include a 
firm commi1ment to take nothing, least of all the law, as given. With 
this approach, a plea that institutional restraints will likely limit the 
growth of firms irrationally10/ constitutes either an indictment of the 
relevant disciplines or an implied criticism of the content or weighting of 
the societal objective function. 
The performance of the legal framework giving identity to and functional 
basis for the firm can perhaps rationally be measured by the extent to which 
---------------~./ Harl, "Modifying Institutional-Legal Relations Among Private Parties to 
Facilitate Adjustments in Agriculture," 46 J. Farm Econ. 95 3, 955 ( 1964). 
10/see, ~.g., Nielson, "Managerial Requirements of Farm Firms, 1980," 
p. 57, Report No. 24, Center for Agricultural and Economic Development, 
Iowa State University (1965). 
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the relevant objectives are met. It would seem that, in the case of the 
farm firm, the set of objectives would include certain more or less 
well-defined national objectives plus the articulated or unarticulated 
objectives of the firm and of the individuals associated with the firm 
as owners or managers . It is especially important to recognize the 
role of objectives in dealing with firm structure inasmuch as a tendency 
has existed to use limitations on organizational form in the implementation 
of specific policies. 11/ · 
National Objectives 
Although certainly not beyond the pale of argument, a substantial 
concensus exists that certain pervasive objectives may be distilled 
from contemporary economic life. These include the performance goals 
of economic growth, efficiency, distributive justice with concern over 
optimal sharing in the benefits of firm activity, and political and economic 
stability . 12/ These are not, however, the only national objectives 
relevant for farm firm activity. The literature abounds with a plenitude 
of pronouncements on the merits of the family farm, small scale land 
holdings that are individually owned, freedom to produce and market 
without restraint and the exchange s1s~m as opposed to an integrative 
or contract or coordinative system.~ Whether these rise to the status 
of national objectives or are merely deeply cherished ideals of a declining 
but eloquently chauvinistic segment of society remains to be seen. 
11/ For example , in an effort to remedy the projected consequences of 
foreclosure of mortgages on large quantities of land, an initiative 
measure was adopted in North Dakota in 19 32 prohibiting corporations 
from engaging in farming in that state. SeeN. D. Cent. Code§ 10-06-01 
(1960). That provision was repealed in 1967 by the North Dakota legis-
lature. 
12/see, ~.g_., Report of the President's Commission on National Goals, 
Goals .for Americans (1960), especially Ch. 7. 
13/ See Ogren, "Discussion: Future Organization and Control of U. S. 
Agricultural Production and Marketing," 46 J. Farm Econ. 947, 948 
(1964). 
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At what would appear to be a lesser stage of national commitment, 
distinctly undesirable connotations seem to be associated in some 
circles with the corporate form (as well as a tendency to equate cor-
porations and bigness of "factory farms"), 14/ vertical integration, 
nonfarm capital moving into agriculture, and increase in size of farms. 
It may be reasonable and appropriate to ask how viable are these ideals 
or objectives, to what extent is the country committed to them, and 
what will be the likely social costs of embarking upon courses of action 
destined ultimately to result in the demise of one or more of them. 
In the past, these often rather loosely defined goals, objectives 
or ideals allegedly attributed to farm firms were not seriously competitive 
with economic growth and efficiency. The goals were attainable at a 
relatively low marginal cost. However, trends are beginning to point 
to areas of serious divergence between national goals. Attainment of 
such goals as a family farm system (as presently defined by some writers) 15/ 
or small scale landholdings that are individually owned may be possible 
only at a cost in terms of over-all economic efficiency. Social scientists 
should be probing for such divergencies and providing knowledge and 
information well in advance to policy makers. It may well be that, given 
such a divergence, society will be willing to sacrifice a measure of 
economic efficiency for maintenance of an otherwise desirable structural 
14/ See, ~· g_. , Nikolitch, "The Expanding and the Contracting Sectors of 
American Agriculture," p. 23, Agricultural Economic Report No. 74, 
ERS, USDA (1965), "data presented does (sic) not support the notion 
that, under the advent of a revolutionary change in farm technology, 
our Jarm production is more and more falling under the dominance of 
a factory system of large corporate businesses in agriculture." See 
also Breimyer, "The Farm Firm in the Structure of the Agricultural 
'System'," p. 9, Center for Agricultural and Economic Development 
Report No. 24, Iowa State University (1965) . 
.!.~/see, ~.g_., Nikolitch, "Our 100,000 Biggest Farms- Their Relative 
Position in American Agriculture," p. 5, Agricultural Economic Report 
No. 49, ERS, USDA (1964) (farms using less than 1. 5 manyears of hired 
labor are considered to be family farms). 
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system. But the evidence is sparse that a majority of people would 
be willing to pay that price. With the influence of agriculture in the 
remainder of the economy declining and with agriculture itself oriented 
less and less toward agrarian fundamentalism and more and more toward 
identification with the classic urban model, perhaps only those harking 
back to childhood memories will evince serious doubt as to directions 
taken by this branch of farm policy. 
It appears likely that, for a great majority of farms, the ownership 
of capital and management of the firm will be provided for many years 
to come by individuals who are related by blood or marriage. With 
this view of the "family farm," there would seem to be some assurance 
that the family farm will continue to be an important institution through 
the remainder of the Twentieth Century. However, it takes no particularly 
high degree of perspicacity to deduce that such a family farm could and 
probably would be quite different from the family farm of tradition and 
sentiment. 
If nothing else, the family farm concept deserves rigorous redefinition 
in terms of the important ends ostensibly to be accomplished by adherance 
to a family farm structure. As has been suggested, expression of the 
degree of famif farm dominance in acreage terms may not be wholly 
meaningful. 16 Similarly, the number of paid employees may not completely 
specify the essential characteristics of the family farm. 
From a research standpoint, it would be highly desirable if the essential 
attributes of the family farm as a concept were identified and related to 
the emerging patterns of firm organization. Perhaps then a family farm 
could be described. Given an acceptably workable definition of the family 
farm and assuming a sufficiently broad base of support to assure its 
continued viability, it then becomes important to identify the factors that 
are in derogation of the family farm and those that are in fact promotive 
of the concept. Appropriate public policy means could then be taken to 
perpetuate the family farm ideal. 
16/see Ruttan, "Agricultural Policy in An Affluent Society," 48 J. Farm 
Econ. 1100, 1115 (1966). 
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If no more than a myth of shibboleth, t.lte family farm idea deserves 
little more than a decent interment. To the extent that the concept 
continues to have meaningful and priority content, it deserves a fair 
and impartial hearing. 
Individual and Firm Objectives 
No less important than the national objectives, the micro objective 
component of the over-all objective function governing the firm merits 
concern and becomes acutely visible as choices are made at the firm 
level from among alternative organizational forms available and as 
decisions are made and policies pursued within the framework of the 
organizational form. The policies a firm pursues depend heavily upon 
the form of its objectives. In a small, closely-held firm, of the type 
dominating agriculture today and likely to remain characteristic for 
several years, the objective function may be a question of fact, ascer-
tainable with appropriate empirical technique. 
Although traditional theory of the firm long has posited net revenue 
or profit maximization as the dominant if not singular goal of the firm, 17 I 
it has been suggested that firms are likely to pursue goals other than or 
different from profit maximization. It has been argued that a primary 
objective of the firm may be long-run security of profit or survival, 181 
maximization of sales subject to a minimum profit constraint,19l max-
imization of profit subject to a minimum sales constraint, or attainment of 
"satisfactory" profits. 20 I Entrepreneurial motives may also include diverse 
171see, ~.g_., Henderson & Quandt, Microeconomic Theory -A Mathe-
matical Approach 43 (1958). See Shur,ik, "Objective Functions and 
Models of Corporate Optimization," 75 Q. J. Econ. 345, 347 (1961). 
Shubik has observed htat, "the less the firm is able to influence its 
environment, the less needs to be known about the motivation of the 
management of the firm for most purposes of policy." Shubik, supra 
at 374. 
181Rothschild, "Price Theory and Oligopoly," 57 Econ. J. 299 (1947). 
19 I Baumol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth 49 ( 1959) . See Hall, 
"On the Goals of the Firm: Comment," 80 Q. J. Econ. 154 (1966) 
1Wisee, ~.g_., Margolis, "The Analysis of the Firm: Rationalism, 
Conventionalism and Behaviorism," 31 J. Business 187 (1958). 
-136-
personal goals (such as security, power and prestige) as well. 21/ 
Recent investigation has contributed to a "behavioral" theory of the 
firm in the way business firms make economic decisions. 22/ This 
view considers the firm to be an adaptive organism dealing with 
problems as they arise and not striving to maximize any specific 
objective function. In the short run, the emphasis is on moving 
performances to aspiration levels and, in the lo~ run, on adjusting 
aspiration levels to experienced performance ._g_~ 
Increased attention has been given in the near past to growth 
objectives of firms and the development of a growth theory as the 
dynamic counterpart to the classical static theory of the firm .24/ 
Of course, growth objectives and profit objectives are not only inter-
twined but sometimes virtually indistinguishable. Profit is the main 
source of funds for growth25/ and serves as a major inducement for 
21/see Katona, Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior (1951). 
An entrepreneur as a decision maker is also a member of a house-
hold which has maximization of utility as its assumed objective. If 
the profit maximization objectives of the firm and utility maximization 
goals of the individual are not in complete consonance, a modification 
of one or both may result. 
_g_g_/E .g_., Cyert & March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963). 
23/Berle, "The Impact of the Corporation on Classical Economic Theory," 
79Q. J. Econ. 25(1965). 
24/see ~.g., Penrose, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm (1959); 
Bailey, "Necessary Conditions for Growth of the Farm Business Firm," 
19 Agricultural Econ. Research 1 (1967); Halter, "Models of Firm 
Growth," 48 J. Farm Econ. 1503 (1966); Heidhues, "A Recursive 
Programming Model of Firm Growth in Northern Germany," 48 J. Farm 
Econ. 668 (1966); Williamson, "Profit Growth and Sales Maximization," 
33 ~conomica 1 ( 1966). 
25/ For industrial corporations, an estimated 60% to 65% of all capital is 
internally generated by retaining earnings and accumulating depreciation 
allowances. See Berle, supra note 23 at 29. New-issue financing has 
typically contributed less than 10% of the total funds employed for expan-
sion by established corporations. See Marris, "A Model of the 'Managerial' 
Enterprise," 77 Q. J. Econ. 185 (1963). 
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growth with growth as the sine qua ~ of long run profits . However, 
anaysis of the firm from a growth standpoint may be more realistic 
than a static appraisal and offers highly promising research oppor-
tunities. 
Since well before the publication of Berle and Means' well-known 
book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, in 1932, inter~st 
has been expressed in the implications of separation of ownership and 
control under the corporate form and the nature and source of objectives 
governing the firm. The emerginH theory of the "managerial" corporation 
has given new vitality to the idea!::./ and recognizes that the objective 
functions of decision makers in the firm may not always coincide with 
those of the owners of contributed equity capital. As farm firms become 
larger and involve greater separation of ownership and management, 
research attention will likely focus on similar problems in agriculture. 
If so, much can be gained from the theoretical framework now being worked 
out for sectors dominated by large corporations. 
Sub-sets of Firm and Individual Objectives 
Because of the effects of the family firm cycle and the close relation-
ship traditionally of the firm and the household in agriculture!, additional 
objectives in the nature of sub-systems or sub-sets are identifiable. At 
any point in time, farm firms may be grouped loosely in accordance with 
a clustering of objectives. This is neither a precise nor necessarily a 
complete classification, however. 
A substantial group of farmers , nearing or within the third and final 
stage of the family firm cycle ,27 I are likely to pursue objectives within 
a framework of reduced planning horizons if it is assumed that the firm 
will not continue to function beyond :their lifetimes and that the capital 
resources involved will be recombined with those of other firms at retire-
ment or death. For this group, short-run profit maximization, security of 
26/see, ~·K·, Marris, The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism 
(1964). 
27/see generally Heady, Back & Peterson, Interdependence Between the 
Farm Business and the Farm Household with Implications on Economic 
Efficiency 403, Iowa State University Agricultural Experiment Station 
Research Bull. 398 (1953). 
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income and capital, retirement planning, equitable disposition of 
family wealth among the heirs, and prevention of erosion of family 
wealth in the intergenerational transfer process because of taxes and 
estate settlement costs are likely to be paramount. From the stand-
point of over-all economic efficiency, such firms may operate in the 
final stages of the cycle at reduced efficiency levels comparable to 
the lower efficiency in the early stages of the cycle. 28/ 
A rapidly growing segment of farm firms, those wherein plans 
have been made for continuation of the firm as a functioning economic 
unit beyond the life cycle span of the senior (and, generally, majority) 
owner or owners, may pursue objectives in addition to, in lieu of or 
quite different from those of farmers who are willing for the life cycle 
of the firm to parallel the life cycle of the household. For these firms, 
strong emphasis is rationally placed upon arrangements to move in-
dividuals and their capital into and out of the firm in keeping with their 
own personal life cycle but without disrupting the firm or causing the 
firm cycle to parallel or even be influenced significantly by personal 
life cycles . 
Objectives of this latter group of firms are likely to include max-
imizing long-run efficiency within the firm in terms of resource 
allocation, income distribution and extended planning horizons. The 
objective of perpetuating the higher efficiency levels characteristic 
of the mid-phase of the family farm cycle by injecting successively 
overlapping personal life cycles may be rewarded in sustained operation 
at minimum cost levels through time. The gradual divestment of owner-
ship and control by senior members of the firm during their lives to 
younger members often serves to dampen modulation of the family firm 
cycle. The firm may be quite interested in minimizing the effects of 
death or departure of owners and enhancing capital availability. The 
senior members of the firm are frequently concerned about devolution 
of family wealth (much or all of which is often committed to the firm) 
to their heirs, including those who may be junior members of the firm 
and those who may have no association with the firm, as well as about 
preventing erosion of that wealth by costs and taxes in the intergenerational 
wealth -transfer process. Simplicity and economy in organization and 
maintenance of the organizational form may also be relevant objectives 
of the firm. 
28/ 
-- See Heady, Back & Peterson, supra note 27. 
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It is explicitly recognized that many farm firms fall into neither 
category. In general, these are the firms operating in the early and 
mid-stages of the family firm cycle and that have not made a definite 
decision as to the future of their particular time. · 
Partial Analysis of Discrete Points 
on the Institutional Spectrum 
Neither space nor time permits a detailed economic analysis and 
critique of the various organizational alternatives available for the 
accomplishment of specific firm and individual objectives. However, 
it is recognized that only through such analysis and critique will 
inadequacies of present forms be identified. 
Research on incidence of use of alternative forms of organization 
is hampered by lack of reliable data. The Census of Agriculture does 
not enumerate farms by method of organization (corporation, partnership, 
trust, sole-proprietorship) although the resulting data would be most 
helpful, particularly as time series information could be built up for 
analysis and correlation with other data. Information published by the 
Internal Revenue Service indicates that fewer than 25,000 corporations 
classified as "agriculture, forestry and fisheries" have filed income 
tax returns in recent years. 29/ Limited data are available in a few states 
on farm corporations. 30/ Even less is known about the extent of use 
of the partnership or trust. Quite clearly, a pressing need exists for 
reliable, primary data on farm-firm organization. 
In .the belief that the corporation or some derivative therefrom 
may well be the most rapidly growing form of organization for farm firms 
in the next several decades, special attention is devoted to the corporation 
in the following paragraphs . It should be recognized that the major use 
29/see U. S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics 
of Income 1963, Corporation Income Tax Returns, p. 7 (Pub. No. 159, 
1966). (23,270 returns filed by such corporations in 1963). 
30/In Iowa, data have been obtained in an annual search of records in the 
Office of the Secretary of State (where corporate articles of incorpora-
tion must be filed) with data verified by mail questionnaire. Recently, 
state income tax data have been made available. The Iowa data indicate 
_that the rate of farm incorporation has increased since 1958. 
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of the corporate form in agriculture in recent years has been by larger 
family operations. Reported studies reveal that fairly general agreement 
exists among decision makers for incorporated farm firms as to why 
the corporation was selected over alternative organizational forms. The 
corporate form has generally been selected to facilitate accomplishing 
objectives of estate planning or intergeneration transfer of property, 
business continuation over time' avoidance of full owrr liability for. 
business obligations and income tax minimization. 31 
It is deceptively easy to consider current characteristics of specific 
organizational forms to be inherent in the form itself. In the remainder 
of this paper an attempt is made to concentrate primarily on the truly 
inherent nature of the particular organizational form. Detailed charac-
teristics that may be either advantageous or disadvantageous and thus 
take on significance in the short run may have little permanence in the 
long term. 
Static Firm Efficiency 
Prior research on the firm, involving specifically the landlord-
tenant relationship, has produced a set of static conditions deemed 
necessary to encourage operation of the firm at maximum efficiency from 
the combined resources of the owners.32/ (1) Each owner's share of 
the factory of variable input must be the same as the share of product 
output obtained therefrom, (2) each resource owner should receive the 
full share of the product earned by each unit of fixed and variable re-
source contributed, and (3) the shares of all products must be the same 
for each resource owner if one party can make decisions as to level of 
output. Attainment of these conditions may be facilitated in firms with 
functional unity of ownership and management. One characteristic of 
the corporation or other single economic entity that has both theoretical 
and practical micro implications is the unity of ownership of production 
resources and unity of decision making in the sense of providing a 
mechanism for a single management voice. 
31/see Harl, "Public Policy Aspects of Farm Incorporation," 20 Business 
Lawyer 9 33, 942 ( 1965) . 
32/ See Hurlburt, Farm Rental Practices and Problems in the Midwest p. 86-
90, Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station Research Bull. No. 416 (1954). 
-141-
Frequently, in a multi-member farm firm, the informal organizational 
ties among the members do not rise to the separate entity status of a 
recognized form of multi-member firm organization. In many cases, the 
various parties own different shares in the various inputs of production. 
Some assets may be owned solely by one member and contributed to the 
firm, some assets may be owned by the other members, and others may 
be owned in co-ownership with varying undivided interests from asset to 
asset. This pattern of resource ownership and control creates problems 
of accounting, income distribution and resource allocation. 
Conventional analysis of the farm firm is based upon the implied 
assumption that one owner-operator makes decisions, bears the costs 
and receives the returns from production. If two or more individuals 
own production resources or their services, the sharing of costs and 
returns within the firm becomes a factor potentially affecting resource 
allocation and firm efficiency. Under perfect association of costs and 
returns, the resource owner receives the marginal value product of 
the contributed resource or resource service . To the extent there is 
not perfect association between input contributor and return receiver 
within the firm, motivations and pressures are generated for other than 
efficient resource allocation. The problem is basically the same whether 
the parties are associated together as landlord-tenant under a crop or 
livestock-share lease, as father and son operating under a contractual 
operating agreement, as an integrated firm or under soine other form of 
relationship encompassing multiple ownership of the resources of produc-
tion. Imperfections in the negotiating or bargaining process may seriously 
hamper attainment of this condition where the entity obtains substantial 
amount of inputs by contractual means. 
The corporation or other economic entity, to the extent that i~js 
the owner of production resources and also the decision maker, L 
occupies a position similar to that of the sole proprietorship. As 
the contributor of variable inputs and the recipient of the entire amount 
of additional product, the corporation theoretically applies the variable 
33/ Although the corporation frequently involves multiple membership 
at the three management levels - shareholders , board of directors 
and officers - the corporate control structure produces a single 
management voice . 
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input until the last unit of input equals in value the last unit of output. 
The sharing of costs and returns in a corporation owned by multiple 
shareholders is therefore automatic and attainment of the economic 
optimum for the firm is therefore encouraged. 
The second condition for maximum firm efficiency, that each resource 
owner should receive the full share of the product earned by each un~t 
of fixed and variable resource contributed, is facilitated by the 
corporation by virtue of its structural design. Taking, as the simplest 
case for illustration, the corporation issuing a single class of stock 
upon incorporation, the holders of stock have rights to corporate income 
that vary only with the number of shares held. In dividing the product 
among the production resources as compensation for inputs utilized 
in the production process, the corporation still faces the problem of 
compensating the labor hired, capital borrowed and property leased on 
the basis of market values or the marginal productivity of each resource. 
Once this is accomplished, however, the remainder of corporate net 
income from production (after taxes) is available for distribtuion to 
shareholders on the basis of a uniform amount per share of stock. 34/ 
Thus , the holder of stock, representing prior ownership of a specific 
item or items of property, receives compensation precisely equal to 
that of the holder of another share of stock representing prior ownership 
of a different item of property. The amount imputed to each share can 
be paid out as dividends or retained in the corporation for expansion or 
investment. The corporation, by being the owner of productive resources 
of various types, amounts and values and by being owned by individuals 
with identical rights to corporate income, greatly simplifies the problem 
of compensating resources on the basis of their marginal value productivities. 
Moreover, the problem of continually adjusting returns to resource owners 
as resource values and productivities change does not arise where resources 
34/rr the resource services purchased by the corporation in the form of 
labor hired, capital borrowed and property rented are compensated 
on the basis of marginal value productivities, and if the corporation's 
production function is homogeneous of degree one, then the amount of 
product imputed directly to corporate capital assets (and indirectly to 
holders of corporate stock) should equal the marginal value product of 
such property by Euler's theorem and the total product would be exactly 
exhausted. See Henderson & Quandt, Microeconomic Theory -A Math-
matical Approach 64-66 (1958). 
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are owned by the corporation. The problem of compensating resources 
rented, leased, hired or borrowed by the corporation remains however, 
and is much the same as for unincorporated firms. 
A necessary condition for fulfilling the requirement that each resource 
owner should receive the full share of the product earned by each unit 
of resource contributed is that assets transferred to the corporation.must 
be exchanged for stock and securities at fair market value or a uniform 
percentage of fair market value. Otherwise, a system of product sharing 
is established which may operate perpetually to misallocate the corporate 
product among shareholders. 
An aspect of benefit sharing other than the perfect or imperfect nature 
of the scheme should be noted. The accounting system needed to main-
tain an orderly allocation of returns among resource owners may become 
quite complex if specific assets or resources of production are individually 
owned or held in co-ownership. For example, if a widow and children 
succeed to the ownership of an unincorporated firm upon death of the owner-
operator (with the widow getting the customary one-third share pursuant 
to statute and with the remaining two-thirds interest divided among the 
children), operation of the firm under that division of ownership over time 
might result in a complicated system of benefit and cost sharing unless 
all transactions with respect to the firm are in complete consonance with 
the initial ownership pattern. 
A third condition considered necessary to encourage maximum firm 
efficiency under multiple ownership of resources is that the shares of all 
products must be the same for all resource owners if one party can make 
decisions as to level of output or specific enterprises. This condition is 
frequently not met in father-son contractual agreements or landlord-tenant 
relationships and may not be met in integrated firms. Under the corporate 
form of organization, all income from the various corporate enterprises is 
divided among the shareholders on a predetermined, fixed basis that is 
uniform for all enterprises. Each shareholder receives or is entitled to 
receive a proportionate share of corporate net income from each enterprise. 
Dynamic Efficiency Considerations 
With the injection of time as a dimension of resource allocation and 
income distribution, the structural and organizational framework of the 
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firm takes on added importance. Basically, for maximum efficiency, 
each resource owner should have an opportunity to receive return on in-
vestment in fixed and variable resources made in one production period 
and not forthcoming until a subsequent period. In theory, the form of 
organization should not increase firm uncertainty or result in a shift in 
resource use between time periods. 
In many firm relationships involving multiple-resource owners, 
the intrafirm associations are pursuant to contractual, time or other 
linkages that are frequently of indefinite or limited duration. Thus, 
in a life tenant - remainderman association, the linkage is the life of 
the life tenant (or another measuring life), either of which is the subject 
of substantial uncertainty, both when viewed from the standpoint of the 
life tenant and that of the remainderman, with respect to investments 
in the property over time. Likewise, in a landlord-tenant association, 
the contractual linkage, whether based upon a specific term or at will, 
is again the subject of some uncertainty for periods beyond the certain 
term of the lease contract. For a partnership, which technically dissolves 
upon death or expulsion of a partner, admission of a new partner, bank-
ruptcy, insanity or other legal disability, or fraud or misconduct, sub-
stantial uncertainty exists as to the term of the relationship. 
In a corporation, intrafirm relationships are pursuant to linkage 
of, arguably, a more permanent nature. Corporations in most states 
may be organized for a term of years or perpetually . 35 I From the 
standpoint of the firm, perpetual organization is advantageous inasmuch 
as renewal of the term of existence may disrupt the firm and result in 
erosion of equity capital through pay-outs to dissenters. But from the 
standpoint of minority shareholders, limiting the organizational form to 
a term provides some measure of protection in the event that withdrawal 
of capital from the firm becomes desirable. Except for expiration of 
term, a corporation can be dissolved only by operation of law or by 
necessary vote of the shareholders. Even if dissolution should occur, 
the rights of shareholders to receive their pro rata share of immature 
and unrecovered firm investments may be substantially greater than that 
provided by law for life tenants (or their heirs) or lessees. 
35/Nine states limit maximum corporate duration to terms ranging from 
25 to 100 years. See 1 Model Business Corporation Act Annotated § 
4(a), ~2.02. 
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Theoretically, corporate life does not depend upon the lives of share-
holders. Upon death of a shareholder, his stock and noncorporate property 
pass through the probate process to pay costs of estate settlement and for 
distribution in accordance with a will or state law of descent and distribution. 
The corporate assets underlying the stock are not affected by shareholder 
death, thus simplifying estate settlement. If corporate ownership and 
management succession are planned, multi-member corporation continues 
to function much the same after death of a shareholder as before. 
By removing a portion of the consequences of owner liability, a properly 
organized and adequately financed corporation may limit the liability of 
shareholders for deficiency obligations against the firm and thus lengthen 
the planning horizon of decision makers. While limited liability has been 
a major factor enabling corporations to attract investors and assemble 
substantial amounts of capital, limited liability serves to protect share-
holders from the full consequences of catastrophically large corporate 
obligations even in a small, closely-held corporation. By isolating their 
noncorporate assets from obligations of the farm business, the officer-
director-shareholder group may be more willing to allocate resources among 
enterprises involving greater uncertainty than if personal as well as business 
assets would be subjected to satisfaction of business obligations. 36/ 
In two situations, however, the corporate form may affect the uncertainty 
and planning horizons of decision makers adversely compared with non-
corporate forms. A !though neither individual farmers nor farm partners 
can be declared bankrupt involuntarily under federal law, farm corporations 
may be subject to involuntary bankruptcy. 37 I Also, the privilege accorded 
a deb~r of holding specified items of property exempt from execution to 
36/While limited tort liability (such as from employee negligence) may ob-
tain in a corporation properly organized, adequately financed with equity 
capital and properly operated with due attention to corporate formalities, 
limited contractual liability is sacrificed for specific obligations if the 
shareholders are required to affix their personal signatures to corporate 
contractual obligations. 
37 /see Harl, "Considerations in Incorporating Farm Businesses," 18 Fla. 
L. Rev. 221, 237(1965). 
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pay debts 38/ is generally available only to natural persons or heads 
of families and not to corporations. Therefore, upon conveyance of 
exempt property to a corporation, a debtor loses the privilege of 
holding the property free from creditors. Moreover, the stock received 
in exchange for the exempt property is not exempt from execution of 
creditors. 
The net effect of the corporate form of organization upon the decision 
makers' planning horizons in unknown. Undoubtedly, the effect varies 
from time to time and from firm to firm. Additional research is needed 
to ascertain the precise effects of organizational forms upon decision 
making activities. 
Capital Availability and Accumulation 
With capital serving as one of the important limiting factors for 
growth of the firm39/ and with capital needs of individual farm firms 
likely to increase still further with the expansion anticipated, the mat-
ter of capital availability will likely take on added significance for the 
years ahead. 
1. Equity capital. Traditionally, each generation of farmers has 
furnished its own equity40/ capital for use in the business, supplemented 
by debt capital obtained from external sources. Even land rented to farm 
firms by nonfarmers on a variable -rent basis with payment of rent in kind 
cannot be characterized as full risk bearing capital inasmuch as landlords 
38/Exemption statutes of the middle-western and western states generally 
favor the debtor more than those of the eastern states. Exemption 
statutes of heavily rural states reflect a generous policy of protecting 
farmers as a class from deprivation at the hands of creditors. See, 
~·&·,Iowa Code~ 627.6 (1966). 
39/rrwin, "Discussion: Firm Growth Research Opportunities and Techniques," 
48 J. Farm Econ. 1532 (1966). 
!Q/ Equity capital constitutes the risk bearing fund of the firm. Equity 
holders have less certainty of income, greater management rights 
and greater opportunity to share in positive or negative firm growth 
than creditors as holders of debt securities. 
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are generally granted leyal priority over the tenant's creditors in 
sharing in firm output . .!_/ The landlord's payment is not necessarily 
a function of the firm's net profit. 
Direct investment of equity capital in farm firms from sources 
outside the agricultural sector has not become widespread and is not 
comparable to direct equity investment in larger firms in other in-
dustries. This may be because of relative return on investment, 
relative uncertainty, size of capital-using firm or the fact that con-
venient and satisfactory means have not been generally available for 
channeling nonfarm equity capital to farm firms. It would appear 
reasonable to hypothesize that utilization of nonfarm equity capital 
would have a beneficent effect upon farm firms in that a portion of 
the risk and uncertainty of agriculture would be shifted to the nonfarm 
sector. Moreover, the absence of a fixed payment burden on this 
portion of firm capital should entail perhaps a lesser modification of 
production planning because of expectations concerning weather, price 
or other uncertainty. 42/ However, the guid pro quo would be a partial 
shifting of control and management rights our of agriculture. This 
problem has been faced most squarely by researchers in the area of 
vertical integration and coordination. 437 
With agriculture dominated by sole proprietorships , many firms 
are ''born" and also "die" within a generation. Over time, discontinu-
ities in management and ownership occur in the transition from gen-
eration to generation. If family linkage in firm ownership continues 
from one generation to the next, a portion of the capital from a termin-
ating farm business may be channeled to successors by testamentary 
succession, gift, or bargain purchase transaction. However, substantial 
amounts of equity capital are removed from farm firms (and may flow 
out of the agricultural sector) with each generation because of the rel-
atively high rates of out-migration of farm reared people. State laws 
41 /See, ~.g., Iowa Code§ 570.1 (1966) (landlord's lien on all crops and 
tenant's nonexempt personal property). 
42/ See Heady, Economics of Agricultural Production and Resource Use 
549-50 ( 1952) . 
43/ See Harris & Massey, Vertical Coordination Via Contract Farming 
(forthcoming) . 
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of intestate succession uniformly divide estates equally among the 
children after setting apart the share for the surviving spouse; and, 
with testate devolution, parents generally endeavor to distribute their 
property equitably among their children, whether on the farm or 
pursuing off-farm vocations. Upon completion of estate settlement, 
any one of more of the heirs generally may demand legal partition of 
the property into shares or judicial sale of the property and division. 
of the proceeds. Thus, the result may be distribution of accumulated 
farm firm capital among the various heirs and liquidation of the firm 
or imposition of a debt obligation on the successor in order for pay-
ments to be made to nonfarm heirs without liquidation of the firm. 
It is in the area of capital accumulation and retention over time 
that the corporation has the greatest potential advantage. With most 
farm corporations, the original shareholder group is limited to members 
of a family who were farming together as a partnership, father-son 
arrangement or a landlord-tenant relationship before incorporation. 
Assuming the non-admittance of new nonfamily equity investors, which 
is discussed below, a major concern is maintaining and expanding the 
firm's equity capital in ( 1) bridging the transitional ownership gap 
between generations, (2) lessening the impact of capital withdrawal by 
nonfarm heirs upon vesting of testamentary devolution rights, and (3) 
minimizing erosion of equity capital by estate settlement costs and 
taxes levied upon the estate or property passing therefrom. 44/ 
Although property transfers within and between generations are 
possible under any form of organization, certain attributes of the 
corporate form facilitate intergeneration and intrageneration property 
transfers. These attributes include the opportunity for making gifts 
or sales of stock with retention of working control over the firm, 45/ 
restricting retransfer of corporate stock by donees or vendees, divis-
ibility of asset ownership into easily transferred shares of stock making 
possible the concept of farm business transfer as opposed to specific 
asset transfer, and possibilities for using corporate stock as an income 
44/ At this point it is assumed arguendo that continuation as an intact 
economic entity over time is an objective of the firm. 
45 /ButseeRev. Rul. 67-54, I. R. B. 1967-8, p. 10providingthat 
retention of indirect control over transferred stock may result in 
inclusion of the value of the transferred stock in the estate of the 
transferor for federal estate tax purposes. 
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channeling device for minimizing family income tax liability. The 
choice of stock transfer alternatives (gifts and sales during life, 
dispositions by will, disposition at death under state law and stock 
redemption or purchase arrangements at death) and the time path 
of property distribution are generally functions of the transferor's 
specific objectives to be accomplished by the transfer. 
Stock transfers by gift or sale during the life of a shareholder 
result in a partial shift in farm business ownership to the recipients 
of the stock, who become holders of an equity in the business. Thus, 
continuation of the business after the death or retirement of the 
principal shareholder or shareholders is promoted. Such transfers 
also reduce the amount of stock susceptible to passage through the 
probate process at death. Stock transfers to younger members of 
the firm during life provide security and the possibility of additional 
income through dividends. These factors may contribute to attraction 
and retention of qualified management personnel whose employment 
alternatives offer similar opportunities for ownership security. If 
stock is made available by parents to children remaining on the farm, 
purchases may be made by such on-farm heirs during the years of 
high earning capacity. Such purchases (along with gifts) may amelio-
rate the burden frequently falling upon those heirs of acquiring the 
balance of the farm business assets upon death of the parents. 
To the extent that stock passes to nonfarm heirs by gift or by in-
heritance, two problems may arise: (1) whether such heirs would be 
willing to continue as shareholders for a period of time , and (2) whether, 
as a matter of policy, the stock should gradually be purchased by those 
actively associated with the firm or whether the stock should be permitted 
to pass to the heirs, devisees, donees or vendees of the nonfarm heirs 
with the stock thus likely to become publicly held after the passage of a 
few generations. These problems relate, of course, to the matter of 
feasibility and acceptability of off-farm ownership of stock in general. 
From the standpoint of maintaining the equity c_apital of the firm 
intact, the disposition of a decedent's interests therein and the rights 
of a distributee including rights to a liquidating distribution are important. 
For a firm whose objective is to remain closely-held through succeeding 
generations, it is essential for stock ultimately to be channeled to the 
successors in the "inner circle" of ownership and management, If 
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stock passes to all the heirs or legatees of shareholders at death, firm 
ownership may become widely diffused in a short time. If stock passes 
to nonfarm heirs or legatees, the equity of the firm is preserved intact 
inasmuch as the holder of stock cannot obtain partition and sale as can 
co-owners of property generally. Thus, no diminution of equity capital 
occurs since there are no pay-outs to heirs or legatees, neither is there 
imposition of a debt obligation for the same purpose. 
The involuntary nature of the equity investment by nonfarm heirs or 
legatees raises problems ·as to the stability of the investment relation-
ship, however. Problems may arise stemming from: (1) a desire by 
off-farm shareholders for larger dividend declarations while on-farm 
shareholders prefer low dividend payments, if any, and instead may 
prefer to utilize corporate funds for expansion; (2) intervention in de-
cision making by uninformed, technically unqualified off-farm share-
holders ;46/ and (3) the relatively narrow market for shares in a closely-
held corporation encountered by off-farm shareholders as they desire 
to dispose of their holdings. The latter difficulty may be compounded 
by restrictions on stock transfer that reduce the market substantially 
so that, in effect, the only permissible purchasers are the corporation 
or other shareholders. 47/ Moreover, with little or no history of 
dividend declaration, and with control vested in individuals whose 
objective functions may not include dividend declaration, a minority 
shareholder's block of stock may be additionally unattractive to investors. 
Off-farm shareholders in nearly all farm corporations having off-farm 
shareholders studied in a 1959 Iowa survey were in the first generation 
of off-farm residence. It is arguable that family ties to the firm and 
farm minority investors who are first generation heirs. It is largely 
conjectural whether the investment functions of second and succeeding 
generations off the farm will be similarly oriented. Much will likely 
depend upon a comparison with alternatives investment opportunities as 
to whether continued ownership of farm corporation stock will be 
acceptable to these individuals. 
46/However, participation in management, beyond the minimal manage-
ment rights of minority shareholder, is likely only if the off-farm 
shareholders singly or in combination can muster majority or working 
control of the firm. 
4 7 I Absolute restrictions on stock transfer are legally void, however. 
-152-
As the form of immediate and direct compensation for equity 
capital contributions to the firm dividends are an important factor 
in attracting and retaining off-farm investment interest. Dividends 
occupy a position in input compensation similar to that of salaries 
as compensation for labor inputs or interest as compensation for 
debt capital inputs. One key difference, however, is that dividend 
payments at rates less than marginal value productivities would 
specify are evidently not unusual, 48/ and amounts of earnings not 
so declared and paid out as dividends increase stock value, thus 
inuring ultimately to the benefit of the shareholders. 
The matter of immediate compensation in the form of dividends 
or mediate compensation in the form of stock value appreciation has 
important economic implications for off-farm ownership of stock. 
Shareholder compensation in the form of stock value appreciation may 
be realizable at a future time. Thus , compensation in such form is 
subject to discounting. The discount rate may be substantial inasmuch 
as the date of payment or realization of input compensation is generally 
accompanied by substantial uncertainty. In a corporation in which 
stock is publicly traded, shareholder compensation in the form of ap-
preciation in stock value due to retention of corporate earnings may 
be realized at any time by sale of the stock. However, stock in a 
closely held corporation is generally not publicly traded, restraints 
may be placed on alienation of the stock and only minority interests 
with few management rights are usually made available for purchase. 
These factors militate against sale of stock by a shareholder seeking 
to realize previous compensation amounts imputed to corporate stock. 
Sale may be possible, but often at a price less than the fair market 
value. of the stock as determined by the value of underlying assets. As 
an alternative to sale, shareholders generally must await dissolution of 
the corporation and liquidation of its assets before previously imputed 
48/ One reason for low rates of dividend declarations in many corporations 
is that while salaries and interest are tax deductible from corporate 
income, dividends are not. Therefore, an incentive exists to pay out 
corporate earnings in tax deductible form thus skewing the income 
distribution schedule in favor of higher salaries for example. Only in 
the tax-option or Subchapter S corporations are dividends, interest 
and salaries treated substantially alike tax-wise. 
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capital compensation could be realized. 49/ It would appear that the 
mediacy or immediacy of receipt or equity capital compensation would 
be of particular importance to prospective investors in a closely-held 
corporation, and to off-farm heirs who receive corporate stock as all 
or part of their testate or intestate share of a decedent shareholder's 
estate or by inter vivos gift. 
The attractiveness of farm corporation stock as an investment is 
allegedly influenced by considerations in addition to relatively low 
dividends, limited market for the stock, and little if any voice in 
management as a minority shareholder. The level of resource earnings 
in agriculture, compared with nonagricultural investment opportunities, 
is likely to affect, not only the purchase of minority interests in operat-
ing farm corporations by nonfarm investors and retention of stock by 
off-farm heirs, but also the important matter of whether off-farm invest-
ment groups are likely to form corporations for the purpose of engaging 
in farmiff with management and control clearly vested in the off-farm 
group. 50 It is somewhat ironic that higher levels of prosperity in 
agriculture are likely to be accompanied by increased investment activity 
by nonfarmers in agriculture with the result that more management and 
control rights are vested in off-farm groups. 
IT outside equity capital were solicited for farm firms, either private 
placement of securities or an organizational grouping of several firms 
for capital acquisition purposes would be a necessity because of the rel-
atively small size of farm firms now and for the forseeable future. As 
49 / Ali incentive exists to receive capital compensation in the form of 
appreciation in stock value rather than currently as dividends in that 
stock value appreciation is eligible for capital gains treatment (long 
term if stock is held more than six months) while dividends are treated 
as ordinary income . 
50/ Several instances of formation of operating farm corporations by 
nonfarm groups have been reported in recent months. The availability 
of competent management inputs is likely to be a crucial factor in 
whether such firms succeed and ultimately increase in number. Of 
course, formation of incorporated farm landlords has become relatively 
common wherein nonfarm investors form a corporation which in turn 
purchases land and rents it out to tenants under a conventional lease 
arrangement. 
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a general rule of thumb, if the growth potential of the business is not 
such that $300,000 or more of stock can be sold, the business is not 
in a position to seek capital through widespread capital solicitation or 
from the large capital markets because the cost for small public offer-
ings is prohibitive. 51/ The Securities and Exchange Commission has 
reported that more than 20 percent of public common stock issues 
running less than $1 million is used for expenses of issuance, compensa-
tion to underwriters and other fees. Costs for larger flotations are 
relatively less. If off-farm ownership of equity capital is deemed 
desirable, perhaps efforts should be expended in developing a suitable 
capital market for efficient allocation of investment capital. 
2. Debt capital. As to debt capital availability, farm corporations 
are constrained somewhat in the short-run by nonavailability of52/ or 
restrictions upon53/ loans from federal agencies. And in some cases 
credit extenders may be reluctant, without the personal commitment of 
shareholders·, to continue lending at preincorporation levels if share-
holder limited liability was unduly "manufactured" upon incorporation. 
51/see Weaver, "Equity Financing for the Small Firm," 34 Harv. Bus. 
Rev. , Mar. -Apr. 1956, p. 99. 
52/Farmers Home Administration real estate loans, operating loans and 
rural housing loans and grants may not be made to farm corporations 
6 C. F. R. ~~ 321.5(c), 331.3(c), 332.6(g) (1) (1966). 
53/Federal Land Bank loans may be made to a farm corporation if more 
than one-half of its income is derived from farming and if a substan-
tial portion of the capital stock is owned by individuals engaged in 
farming operations of the farm to be mortgaged. In addition, one or 
more individuals owning a substantial portion of the corporate stock 
must assume personal liability for the loan. 75 Stat. 750 (1961), 12 
U.S. C.§ 771 (1964); 6 C. R. R. ~ 10.3 (1966). Production Credit 
loans may be made to a farm corporation engaged in actual farming 
operations or livestock production provided 75% or more of the stock 
is owned by individuals actually engaged in its farming or livestock 
operations, or the major portion of corporate assets consists of prop-
erty actually devoted to farming or livestock production and at least 
half the gross income is derived from these operations . 6 C . F. R. § 
50. 102 ( 1966) . Holders of a majority of the shares must personally 
guarantee the indebtedness. 6 C. F. R. § 50.103 (1966). 
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On the plus side however, shareholders may be a source of debt capital 
and take a mortgage or pledge of corporate property in return. These 
are the typical manifestation of incorporation on debt capital availability. 
The quantitative change in availability of debt capital by incorporation 
alone (assuming a given amount of equity capital) has received attention 
in the literature, 54/ although no objective factual data have been published 
upon incorporation. The effect of the corporate form itself is not great. 
However, it would seem that the corporation offers convenient means 
whereby its debtor status may be affected favorably if the corporate form 
is used deliberately to take advantage of the factors that impinge upon 
exogenous capital rationing. By providing opportunity for continuity of 
operation and more certain organizational posture, the corporation may 
appear a more stable borrower to a credit extender. If ownership and 
management succession is planned, the corporation offers less change of 
bu8iness disruption on death of a shareholder. By providing an ownership 
and mangement framework for larger scale operations, the corporation 
may permit greater specialization by employees, resulting in improved 
management in the long term. However, exogenous capital rationing may 
be increased by incorporation if substantial amounts of assets previously 
subject to satisfaction of firm obligations are not transferred to the 
corporation. Thus, shareholder limited liability may operate to reduce 
credit availability unless shareholders commit personal assets to liability 
for the obligation. Research is clearly needed in this area. 
Employee Status for Farmers 
Important consequences attach to the fact that a partner in a partnership 
or the proprietor in a sole proprietorship may become an employee upon 
incorporation of the farm business. The transformation may be accompanied 
by psychological adjustments as well as by shifts in both legal and economic 
relationships with .the firm. 
54/ See Krausz & Mann, Corporations in the Farm Bus ines~ , p. 8 , Uni v. 
of lll. Ext. Serv. Circ. No. 797 (1958); Note, "Incorporating the Farm 
Business," 43 Minn. L. Rev. 305, 320-22 (1958). 
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Employee status casts the matter of compensating labor and manage-
ment inputs in bold perspective as salaries and bonuses are established, 
ostensibly without regard to the shareholder status of the employee. 
This fact may have a salutary effect upon intrafamily bargaining for shares 
of income of the firm wherein a tendency often exists to lump all inputs, 
including labor, management and capital, together in making Eleterminations 
for income sharing. 
Employee status automatically brings higher social security taxes, 55/ 
along with eligibility to participate in tax privileged fringe benefits such 
as group term life insurance, pension plans and profit sharing plans. 
With a fixed annual salary, farm employees may become eligible for 
higher social security benefits than a fluctuating income would produce. 
Retirement planning may be facilitated for employees since earnings 
received as dividends or interest do not reduce social security benefits. 
Research Models 
Considerable progress is being made in the development of techniques, 
models and methodology for research on the farm firm as a small, closely-
held economic unit. Heidhues has developed a recursive programming 
model that explicitly includes savings, investment and growth. 56/ Using 
simulation techniques, Halter and Dean have applied a model to a situation 
where an attempt was made to find some improved management policies to 
deal with the uncertain environment in which farm firm decisions are made. 57 I 
55/For 1967-68, self-employed farmers pay social security tax on the first 
$6,600 of earnings from self employment. Jnt. Rev. Code , ~~ 140 1, 
1402(b). By comparison the tax is levied at a rate of 4.4% on employees' 
compensation up to $6 , 600 per year with a like amount imposed on the 
corporation for a total of 8.8%. Int. Rev. Code, ~~ 3101, 3111. This 
differential is presently projected through 198 7 when the difference will 
be a maximum of $231.00 per employee per year. 
56/ Heidhues, "A Recursive Programming Model of Farm Growth in Northern 
Germany," 48 J. Farm Econ. 668 (1966). 
57 I Halter & Dean, "Use of Simulation in Evaluating Management Policies 
Under Uncertainty," 47 J. Farm Econ. 557 (1965). 
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Patrick has constructed a behavioral simulation model. 58/ In research 
carried on at Iowa State University, this writer has developed a functional 
linear programming-simulation model for multi-period analysis for growth 
of the firm and for testing the economic efficacy of various components 
of the legal structure within which firms operate. 59/ Recently, interesting 
work on models for investigating growth of the firm has been going on in 
other quarters . 60 I 
Simulation is a promising and exciting analytic tool and may provide 
the most workable approach for analyzing the firm, particularly under 
uncertainty. Although it has clear disadvantages, such as complexity 
of models, paucity of workable tests of significance and the need for a 
multiplicity of models because of their specificity with respect to a 
particular problematic situation, the flexibility and adaptability of sim-
ulation commend it for research on the firm. 
The ISU -USDA model developed at Iowa State University utilizes both 
linear programming and simulation in tracing firm growth through time 
and measuring the economic effects of the legal form of firm organization. 
To date, the model has been used to test the corporate form; however, the 
model is adaptable for use in testing and comparing the sole proprietorship, 
general and limited partnership, trust, landlord-tenant relationship or 
partially or totally integrated firm. The deterministic model is recursive, 
involving n years of firm activity. The linear programming segment of 
the model first generates , for a particular year, an optimum production 
plan based upon ex ante price and yield expectations. The linear programm-
ing matrix, which contains several additional resource rows and activity 
columns to adapt the model to multi-period analysis and more finite capital 
accounting, then computes an ex post solution using actual prices and yields. 
58/see Patrick, "The Impact of Managerial Ability and Capital Structure 
on Farm Firm Growth," unpublished M. S. Thesis, Purdue University, 
1966. 
59/see Harl, "Research Methods Adaptable to Legal-Economic Inquiry: 
Linear Programming and Simulation," in Monograph No. 8, Agricultural 
Law Center, University of Iowa, pp. 71, 78-99 ( 1966) ; Harl, "Identifica-
tion and Measurement of Selected Legal-Economic Effects of the Corporate 
Form of Business Organization Upon a Small, Closely-Held Firm," 
unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Iowa State University (1965). 
60/see Williamson, "Profit, Growth and Sales Maximization," 33 Economica 
1 (1966). 
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Figure 8.1 
Exooenoua L.eval and 
-----t Functional Data for the 
Firm and HouMholdl 
Relevant portions of the solution are transmitted to the simulation portion 
of the model as shown in block diagram form in Figure 8.1. Also, nec-
essary accounting and inventory information is transmitted directly to the 
next year's linear programming matrix, thus providing an interyear pro-
duction function link. The simulator, composed of almost 60 equations 
and containing more than 200 variables, reflects with reasonable fidelity 
the legal form of business organization and the legal framework for the 
households and estates of the firm's shareholders. The simulator produces 
a s·olution in several variables and provides input data for the next year's 
linear programming matrix and the next year's simulator. The process 
is repeated for the second year and for each of then years under study. 
Various "runs" can be made for different assumptions as to the technical 
production function, the decision-making model, or the legal structure of 
the firm or the household. 
Conclusion 
The farm firm may well be entering an era of dramatic and far reaching 
structural and organizational change, perhaps the most dramatic and far 
reaching in its long and colorful history. Structurally, the firm has changed 
relatively little from the birth of the family farm concept down to the present 
time. But forces are alreadv in motion to bring about significant change. 
The family farm will likely continue, at least for a time, if the term is 
redefined to encompass principally ownership and management concepts. 
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Farm firms of the future will be owned and managed in a great many 
instances by more than one individual, will be more detached from the 
household than currently, and will be less subject to the family cycle 
of its owners and managers than it traditionally has been. Substantially 
greater use will likely be made of the corporation and its va<riants and 
derivatives. It would appear that more equity capital will be provided 
to agriculture from outside the sector. 
It is hypothesized that commercial farmers are prepared to accept 
the structural and organizational changes that appear almost inevitable. 
In fact, farmers may be more willing to accept the change than some 
nonfarmers whose contact and experience with agriculture in an earlier 
day has created a Procrustean mold that rejects out of hand any structural 
or organizational change. 
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS OF FARM FIRM 
CHANGES NEEDED IN RESPONSE TO 
WAGE RATES AND INCREASED DEMANDS 
by Earl 0. Heady* and A. Gordon Ball** 
Few investors would look upon agriculture as a growth industry. 
Demand for its products over the last two decades has been restrained 
by low price and income elasticities. Resource returns hav~ been low 
in terms of certain traditional measures. The labor force has fled from 
it, in contrast to expanding industries such as office machines, tele-
vision, amusement, drugs and chemicals. It has required large-scale 
government programs to maintain its prices and incomes in a rather long 
period of rapid growth in the national economy. Other characteristics 
and facets of the industry are those ordinarily associated with retarded 
or declining growth. 
The industry has not, of course, been passive if we view its resourqe 
structure. While, in the last decade or so, output has been restrained 
by slow demand growth, with the exception of commercial exports and 
international food aid, it has had dynamic growth in the value of capital 
assets, in capital gains from investment, in adjusting its labor force 
and in transformation of its many forms of technological capital. But 
even if we were to consider the industry the antithesis of those commonly 
considered growth sectors, the agricultural firm can not be placed in 
the same category. The farm firm, particularly in some categories, has 
been even more dynamic and responsive than many growth industries, 
to resource and product price changes and to new technologies or know-
ledge. Previous papers in this series suggest that there are going to 
be even more rapid changes in the parameters that provide the decision 
variables of the farm firm. Some technologies of the agri-business 
sector are projected to provide chemicals and similar inputs at even 
lower real prices. Other technologies are expected to change the para-
meters of the farm firm's cost function; specifying both a larger and more 
specialized unit to survive under extended interfirm competition for 
resources. Increases in education and other investments of the human 
resource, plus the shifting of the age composition of farmers and 
*Earl 0. Heady, Professor of Economics and Executive Director, Center 
for Agricultural Economic Development, Iowa State University. 
**A. Gordon Ball, Professor of Economics, Iowa State University. 
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family labor as suggested by cohort analysis, promises to reduce the 
supply quantity and increase the supply price of labor to the farm firm. 
A continuing and accentuated change in the resource structure of the 
farm firm is thus projected for the future. There will be fewer of them; 
they will be larger and more specialized; their resource structure will 
turn more to capital and less to labor and land, but more acres will be 
required to allow them the scale advantage and payoff from modern 
technology. The complexity of the scientific technology implies an 
advanced managerial function for them, or a set of managerial services 
furnished to them from the agribusiness sector. 
One need not speculate about these possibilities--the trend is 
already here and is even quite well known by the man in the country-
side whose quantitative analysis is "simply that which he sees about 
him." There is little chance that the direction of the trend will change; 
uncertainty exists only with respect to the rate of change and whether 
the trend lines will have increased slopes. 
The transformation of the farm resource structure and economic 
organization is the key to many broad social and economic problems 
in agriculture. The extent and types of agricultural policies needed 
for the future will depend on the structure of farm firms, the extent that 
they continue or accentuate the substitution of capital for land and ex-
tend production capacity at rates exceeding demand growth, and their 
responsiveness to parameter changes and the corresponding supply 
elasticity in its relation to price and income stability. The size of firms, 
and hence the number, will determine how many people live in the 
countryside--and hence the population and business volume in village 
and town settlements of the non-metropolitan areas. Extended still 
further, these factors will also determine the number and sizes of towns 
needed in purely rural areas, the modifications that should take place 
in extent and form of public investments in roads, utilities, schools 
and even local governments. A sufficiently rapid transformation of the 
agricultural firm, for example, a reduction in numbers to the level of 
50,000 to 100,000 as suggested by Ruttan)/ will entirely eliminate the 
political power of agriculture; except to the extent that the managers of 
the remaining firms are of a psychological nature and political orienta-
tion to initiate effective collective bargaining and market power. These 
transformations also will cause the worker in the urban chemical, drug 
or machinery factory to be substituted for the worker on the farm and in 
the village of the rural community; thus prolonging our attempts at 
solution of poverty problems in agriculture and requiring larger and more 
1/ Vernon W. Ruttan, "Agricultural Policy in an Affluent Society," Journal 
of Farm Economics, Vol. 45, No. 5. (December, 1966) pp. 1100-1120. 
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rapid investments in vocational retraining and redirected adult education. 
Additionally, these changes will determine the extent to which rural 
institutions such as banks should organize their activities around service 
charges from a large number of small depositors; or around the payoff 
from fewer large-volume and highly commercial farm borrowers. 
In short, there are few if any aspects of economic change which 
have such broad economic and social implications as the upcoming 
structure of the agricultural firm as it res ponds to changes in price and 
production coefficient parameters that are either with us or in prospect 
for the future. If we could count on a response in the years ahead as 
rapid or as great as projected by Ruttan, we would not need. to hold 
this conference. The 50,000 to 100,000 farms would be large enough 
to invest in their own managerial research and aids, either individually 
or in small groups. Similarly, when the resource structure reduces the 
number of commercial farms down to this level, there will be little if 
any need for public investment in agricultural research and education. 
Farm firms with a half million to a million dollars in gross volume of 
sales are large enough to conduct their own applied trials and experimen-
tation. Their results would be supplemented by or supplemental to the 
research conducted by the input and processing industries to sell more . 
of their capital inputs to agriculture. Of course, public investigations 
might be needed for some of the more fundamental aspects of knowledge 
and particularly for research such as that relating to health, land use, 
pollution and other phenomena having little or no payoff to private 
industry. It also would be needed to solve the massive social and 
economic problems of the rural community stemming from the shift in 
firm resource structure necessary to allow thinning of farm numbers to 
this level. Obviously, the rate and extent to which the structure and 
organization of the farm firm brings us to any such number of farms will 
determine whether any public funds need to be invested in agricultural 
knowledge and its communication. Already, private industry invests 
more than the public in agriculture research, and makes substantial 
additional investment in the communication of this research to farmers. 
Response to Changes in Factor Prices 
and Productivities 
Projected changes in factor prices and productivities were summarized 
previously. In general, they favor the trends already under way in agri-
culture. Higher real prices for labor, brought about through greater 
investment in the human resources of rural areas and the resulting 
greater occupational mobility, minimum wage laws, an age distribu-
tion of farm operators skewed towards older persons which must give 
way to massive retirements and new entrants in the near future--all of 
these favor a continued substitution of capital for labor. The numerous 
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time-series and cross-section resource demand studies completed to 
date indicate clearly that farmers are responsive to these relative 
price changes for resources. Investment is made in labor substitutes 
as the price of capital declines relative to manpower and the quantity 
of labor demanded is smaller as its price increases. · 
Labor Substitutions 
The use of more capital gives rise, of course, to cost or scale 
economies that specify larger and more specialized units if farming is 
to be profitable. During the past two decades these phenomena are 
reflected on an aggregate basis by the large decline in manpower and 
simultaneously a large increase in capital representing operating items, 
machinery and equipment. Over the period 1945-66, farm employment 
declined by 50 percent and non-real estate capital (constant dollars) 
advanced by 350 percent. At the same time, the average farm of the 
nation increased by 154 acres or 78 percent in size and the number of 
farms declined by 2. 7 million or 45 percent. Aggregatively, this sub-
stitution is both real and obvious. But from a farm management research 
standpoint, the process is not so obvious. More needs to be known about 
it, both for purposes of guidance of individual farmers and for assessing, 
the rate at which the set of social and economic problems mentioned 
earlier will face the rural community in the magnitude indicated. 
Machinery, equipment and new building designs are direct substitutes 
for labor. Less actual labor and more substitutes for it have, there-
fore, shown up aggregatively in agriculture as technologies and relative 
prices favored the shift. Similarly, biological forms of capital such as 
fertilizer, insecticides, feed additives, improved varieties and others 
are substitutes for labor. With higher yields per acre or animal, fewer 
are needed and total labor requirements of the agricultural firm are 
lessened. Yet, in response to the changed prices of resources, the 
farmer does not always or typically select a new mix of capital and labor 
along an isoquant and change his resource structure so easily. As 
the prices of fertilizer or insecticides decline relative to labor, the 
farmer does not simply buy more of these items, put them into use and 
replace some of the labor contributed by him, family members or a 
hired man. Neither does he typically buy a machine and release some 
labor from the farm. While this process does happen on farms with a 
moderately large input of hired labor, a farm depending on family labor 
or even one hired man typically lessens employment intensity of the 
labor supply or acquires more acres and animals to allow an effective 
use of the machine and labor. Following the latter route, however, some 
labor is replaced, as acres and animals are taken over from other 
operators. We know little about these indirect processes of capital-
labor substitution on individual farms, although their occurrences in 
the aggregative time-series data are obvious. Similarly, we know little 
about the supply conditions of resources in the restricted market, in 
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contrast to a state or national market, which surrounds the individual 
farm for land and similar resources. Hence, we cannot describe or 
project the rate at which these substitutions can take place in the 
future. We know so little about the rural mechanisms of this capital-
labor substitution and local resource supplies that we are unable to 
project the rate of change implied for the future firm with its broad social 
implications for agriculture and the rural community. Likewise, we 
are able to give farmers little guidance on the expansion paths or iso-
clines they should follow in extending the resource mix to the farm 
size and volumes projected to be consistent with resource prices and 
productivities of the future. These processes and expansion on the 
individual farms do not unfold in the same manner as in a set of time 
series regression equations to provide estimates of resource demand or 
its changes. 
Scale Economies 
A great deal of importance to individual farmers, rural communities 
and agri-business firms revolves around the scale economies of the firm 
under current and prospective technology. While the term 11 scale · 
economies 11 is shop-worn and old much depends on the concept, or its 
counterpart in cost functions of the individual farm firm, in respect to 
who can or should farm, the source and volume of the credit or capital 
supply to farmers and the institutional structure of the farm. Whether 
there will be 50,000 or a million farms in the future rests not on time 
trends that can be projected from time series data but on the nature of 
cost or scale economies of the farm firm. Similarly, the number of 
merchants and the dis placed labor force of agriculture, and the retrain-
ing investment involved, hinges on these coefficients. But as of now, 
there is only scattered evidence of these relationships. We have no 
adequate inventory of research, for example, indicating the existence or 
even the nature of short-run and long-run cost functions, in technologies 
related to highly mechanized and large-volume cattle feeding or dairying 
operations. We can find no closely related data suggesting a feasible 
scale of operations under environmentally controlled livestock produc-
tion. Neither are there data available to indicate whether the important 
cost economies relating to prospective and upcoming technology rest 
in the farm firm or in the input-supply firm. If it is the former, one set 
of decision, and even political, forces will determine the direction of 
agricultural and the managerial research which should be conducted in 
its behalf. If it is the latter, control will tend to be invested in quite 
a different direction and the managerial resources available for generating . 
dec is ions will be much more numerous and sufficient. If the major cost 
economies reside at the level of farms, the machines and equipment will 
be owned and controlled by the traditional farm manager, upgraded as 
he may be. On the other hand, if the relevant scale economies are in 
the firms that supply inputs and if the direction of development is for 
these input supply firms to own and furnish the machines for farm 
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operations on a custom basis, quite a different financing and capital of 
the farm firm will result. Under these circumstances, the farm operator 
might be a sort of sophisticated landlord or animal tender who furnished 
the land or animal services while the chemical or machinery firm fur-
nished machines and operating capital. 
Whether and when either of these developments comes about depends 
on the scale or cost economies involved in typical field and farm opera-
tions. Needless to say, our research information on scale economies is 
now so scant that we can not inform the farmer whether or not he should 
prepare to become a sophisticated landlord or animal tender while the 
input firm is depended upon to furnish machines, chemicals; seeds and 
feeds. Neither can we decide whether the seat of management will 
change so drastically that we should turn our services in managerial 
research aids in the directions of the agribusiness firm. 
We have no information, at least to our knowledge, to indicate the 
extent to which cost or scale economies that favor larger farms unfold 
from price or production functions. If such scale economies are attached 
largely to the elasticities of the production function, it seems rather 
obvious that the control, management and operation of farms would 
continue to reside with the farm manager. The scale or cost economies 
could be duplicated as easily on farms as in the input supplying industry. 
On the other hand, if the greater economies are reflected in the price 
function relating to material inputs, or the cost functions of processing 
firms, and if mammoth scale were necessary to realize these through the 
capital markets, the farm operations might more nearly pass over into 
the hands of the input supply firms; again leaving the farmer simply as 
an animal tender or as a sophisticated landlord furnishing land services. 
If the main scale economies were associated with elasticities of the 
production function, farmers might band together in group farming opera-
tions as in parts of Europe. However, if economies were mainly those 
relating to material inputs or the cost functions of processing firms, 
requiring massive scale and volume, the aristocratic landlord or the 
animal tender might be more in prospect. 
It is obvious, of course, that as relative resource prices and pro-
ductivities shift to alter the marginal rates of substitution of capital 
for labor, with more capital and less labor used in farming, that the fixed 
costs of farming increase. This is true because of the large capital 
investment involved and the relatively rapid obsolesence of new capital 
forms. Hence, larger volumes are required to attain break-even points 
and profit margins. Modern farmers think in terms of break-even 
volumes and profit margins, knowing that if scale is extended far 
enough profits exist and grow in a larger proportion than output. They 
have been made aware of these concepts and operations not only because 
of the large investments and high overhead costs, but also because of 
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the large investments and high overhead costs, but also because of the 
greater cash costs even for constant-per-acre-or-animal outlays for 
operating items such as seeds, chemicals and insecticides. 
The concepts of scale and cost functions have been widely used and 
durable and continue to be important ones for employment in research 
if we are to establish sensible guides for the upcoming generation of 
farmers or even if we are to have dependable estimates of the number and 
sizes of farms that will exist in the future. It is rather obvious that as 
few as SOO, 000 farms could readily produce the nation's output. Once 
the number of farms had been reduced to that extent they would be so 
large that few would encounter difficulties in getting capita~ supplies 
or with financing. However, the process of moving from our present 
number of farms to SO, 000, involving as it does the absorption of 2 
million small units and consequent expansion of those that remain, 
poses restraints, particularly those related to difficulties and time 
lags in financing. Hence, scale studies seem relevant to better indicate 
whether we are in prospect of only SO, 000 farm units or the .rather easily 
attainable SOO, 000 commercial farms. 
Numerous projections on "prospective" and "possible" farm numbers, 
exist. If simple trends are projected, the estimated number of farms for 
1980 is around 2 million. A more realistically based projection con-
sidering the distributed lags traditionally associated with change in 
farm structure would put the number at 1. S million farms in 1980, with 
half of these represented by commercial units and half represented by 
nominal part-time and retirement units .Y Of course, 7SO, 000 commercial 
farms of a very reasonable and modest size, those with sales of 
$10,000 and over, already could quite easily produce the nation's 
food and fiber output--with only slight expansion to take over the re-
sources and output of the other farmers. But how rapidly the number falls 
and whether it approaches 50 10001 1001000 or 500,000 at a near-
equilibrium of the industry, will certainly depend on the extent and 
degree of cost or scale economies, and whether it will be 50 1000 or 
500 1000 will make a great deal of economic and social difference. It 
would seem that the state of the arts in economic research has both 
simple and complex tools which should throw some light on the possi-
bilities. Perhaps research on scale economies and cost functions 1 
as one of the older sets of concepts related to firms 1 seems too elemen-
tal to merit analysis in this dashing era of analytical techniques and 
mathematical mechanisms. Yet the extent and degree of scale economies 
in agriculture is more important, with respect to both the nature of the 
Y Earl 0. Heady and A. Gordon Ball. "Economic Growth of the Farm 
Firm and Projected Changes in Farming. " CAED Report 24. I ow a 
State University. 19 65. 
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individual firm and the structure of the rural community than any other 
phenomenon relating to the individual farm. Needed in this realm of 
established concepts but less well accepted methodology, are measures 
of cost functions for farm firms with different complements of fixed 
resources (the large-scale enterprise or farm) and measures of scale 
returns for farms that represent multi-producing units under the same 
management (forgetting momentarily given management as a fixed in-
put outside the "pure concept" of scale returns). Again whether in-
creasing returns to scale prevail or not, and whether they unfold from 
the elasticities inherent in the technical production function or price 
functions which decline for resources or increase with outputs for 
large volumes, will determine whether there will be both many fewer 
farms and managers--or many fewer managers with more farm units held 
under their control and a large input of skilled laborers and super-
visory personnel. The two possibilities, the former supposing scale 
economies through the production function and price functions and the 
latter through the price functions alone, have quite different implica-
tions in the labor force of agriculture and its management. 
The range over which scale economies may exist and their degree, 
or simply the range over which the long-run cost function declines, also' 
has optimal relationships to the institutional arrangements under which 
farm firms operate. If they are relatively restrained but still allow 
farms of sizes that give rise to problems of capital acquisition and 
accumulation to individual families, corporate forms of business may 
be best suited from the standpoint of taxes and "holding the unit to-
gether. " But if the scale or cost economies extend even further and 
give rise to greater capital accordingly, group farming activities may 
provide the means competitive to the structure sometimes posed of 
farmers as sophisticated landlords or animal tenders while the field 
operations, chemical drugs and feeds are services provided by the input 
firm. In any case, the inter-relationships of scale and business 
form should be researched in order to provide guidance in decisions to 
farm managers, selecting among the many routes they can follow under 
a growing capitalization of agriculture such as corporate organizations 
to circumvent inheritance taxes or to accrue funds through the nonfarm 
capital market, integration with the input and processing industries, 
group farming, etc. 
Capital-Land Substitution 
While capital-labor substitution brings many problems of displace-
ment of workers and families from farms and the rural community, 
capital-land substitutions bring mainly problems of producing capacity 
and the attending complexities of short-run supply elasticities and price 
and income levels. Almost every biological form of capital invented 
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for use and finding application in agriculture serves as a substitute 
for land (and indirectly as a substitute for labor in the sense that fewer 
acres need to be operated). Similarly, biological and other innovations 
that increase livestock output from given feed, or reduce feed input 
for a given livestock output, also serve as land substitutes. Less land 
is thus required to produce a given feed and animal output. 
These substitutions have been mammoth over the past. Not only 
were we producing a 45 percent greater output in 19 65 than in 1945, 
but we also were doing it with around 60,000,000 crop acres held out 
of production. The possibilities of these substitutions still exist, 
and perhaps their application in the future will be even more rapid than 
in the past. The theme in the base papers presented at this conference 
certainly point in this direction. Some of our own estimates emphasize 
these potentials. Even using the conservative assumption that trends 
in productivity gains of American agriculture will rise to 1980 at the 
1954-64 rate, in contrast to the higher 1955-64 rate as the rates more 
nearly implied in the base papers of this set, we estimate that U.S. 
agriculture can produce the output needed by a 1980 domestic popu-
lation of 243 million with per capita incomes of $3,300 (based on 
1957-60 value of the dollar) with (a) 75 million acres shifted from 
crop production if exports are only equal to the 1965 level and (b) 
50 million acres if exports grow to three times the 1965 levels .1/ 
These are still mammoth substitution possibilities which are realistic 
and too conservative against the propositions and projections offered 
in the base papers. 
Individual technologies have high rates of substitution for land 
resources. Fitting even fertilizer substitution into a framework of 
1/ Earl 0. Heady and Leo V. Mayer. Projected Structure and Capacity 
of American Agriculture. Iowa State University. Jan. 1967 (Mimeo). 
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continuous land-fertilizer production functions ,1/ we estimate that 
the potentials in this substitution are still extremely great. Consider-
ing fertilizer alone at the rate farmers currently use it, and basing 
estimates on productivities derived from experimental production 
functions we estimate that a ton of fertilizer substitutes for 15-25 
acres of land over the Corn Belt proper. 
In making these estimates, we started with experimental response 
functions of the form: 2 2 (a) Y=a+b1F1 +b2F2 -b3F1 -b4 F2 +b5 F1 F2 
where Y is yield per acre and F 1 are individual nutrients N 1 P2 0 5 and 
K2 0. Next we convert them to fertilizer response functions where 
represents quantity of the common mixes used in the regions of the 
experiment. ~in;:e ¢ represents the combination of F 1 and F 2 in 
the ratio of F 1 F 2 * implies an optimal or conventional mix. For 
determination of the coefficients in the function Y = f(¢) we let 
* 2 * * 2 * (b) R 1 = F 1/ L F 1 and (c) R2 = F 2! !. F 1 
~1 ~1 
and since 
2 * * (d) ¢ = L F 2 therefore (e) F 1 = Ri¢ 
i=1 
and 
(f) Y = a +0!/J-/3¢ 2 
Now, since the function is on a per acre basis, we divide by acreage 
to get 
(g) Ya =a +af/JA- 1 {J/lA-2 
Now by multiplying by A to get land in the production function, we have 
(h) Yt = aA +ai/J-{3¢2 A - 1 . 
The equation of marginal rate of substitution from which our calculations 
were made is 
(i) oA = ~ ~ ~f3/J2A -2 
and we set ¢ at farm level uses, the ratio ¢/A, for the calculations. 
The estimates are from an unpublished paper: Capital-Labor Sub-
stitution at Different Locations by Fahmi Bishay and Earl 0. Heady. 
Iowa State University. 1966. 
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Add other biological capital items and the rate can be equally high 
for the investment. New seed varieties, insecticides, growth hormones 
and similar items probably have even higher marginal rates of substitu-
tion relative to the investment. Herbicides may be nearly as high. 
It is, of course, these operating items of capital that are having, 
and will have, the greatest effect in increasing the productivity of 
capital. They provide much of the basis for structural change as it 
is effected through the total supply capacity of American agriculture. 
These forms of capital are, and will continue, to grow in domination 
over the total capital used on farms. In our projects, we find that 
real estate capital for agriculture in total will increase by less than 
10 percent in the next 15 years; although it will more than double per 
farm if the number of farms is halved. The growth in total real estate 
capital will be very modest due to farm size expansion and the consoli-
dation of units that does away with duplicate sets of buildings that 
are not always fully employed on separate units. Added investment in 
the total stock of machinery and equipment is projected to increase by 
less than 25 percent for the agricultural industry. This statement 
refers to the value of the inventory or stock of machinery on farms. 
Total purchases of machinery will exceed this, as obsolete equipment 
is replaced by improved models. The consolidation of farms into larger 
units causes a dampening down of the total supply of machinery because 
duplicated sets of underemployed equipment are not needed on the 
separate farms. 
For operating capital items, havever, total input is projected to 
double in the next 15 years • Hence, the quantity per farm would be 
expected to quadruple, if farm numbers were halved. A mammoth sub-
stitution of biological capital for land will thus occur, and annual 
outlays of $50,000 per farm for operating inputs can be quite common 
place for conventional hut large scale family farms over the next two 
decades, even if the number of truly commercial farms reduces only 
to 700,000. 
In terms of capital-land substitution, the process does not take 
place directly on the individual farm. The operator does not buy a ton 
of fertilizer, a drum of insecticide and a bag of 11 new variety" seed 
and apply them while he withdraws a corres pending acreage of land 
{except as this process is effected through land diversion under govern-
ment programs.) Rather, he buys this mix of capital inputs and applies 
them over the whole acreage; with the output of the entire farm in-
creased accordingly. Yet in this process, the same or more output can 
be produced with less land. Hence some farmers can realize an expan-
sion without acquiring control of additional land which would otherwise 
be the case. {The fact that the land isn •t withdrawn results in an 
overly large output and low prices in the short-run.) Yet substitution 
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of capital for land has taken place and land at the margin could now 
be shifted from particular crops to other uses and substitution has taken 
place in a national sense. On one individual farm, the process is 
simply one of using more inputs. But for the farm at the margin in a 
different location, the problem is one of shifting its entire organization 
as the substitution process takes place. We should have research 
which interprets these processes in the broad manner in which they 
take place, and pinpoint the regions of major adjustments for guidance 
of individual farms. This indirect and round-about substitution process, 
which simply adds up nationally in our ability to produce more from a 
given national agriculture, has quite different capital implications. 
The farms in the "heart of the producing regions" that apply. the new 
biological capital have to increase their investment accordingly, but 
they add little or no real estate investment at the time. However 1 
the marginal or fringe area possessing the land, for which the biolog-
ical capital applied at the heart of the producing regions substitutes, 
is faced with mammoth capital requirements as it has to acquire more 
acreage and shift from row crops to grass and grazing or trees. 
Firm Growth 
Propositions put forward in these papers 1 plus other projections, 
suggest a much larger capital investment per farm in the next 15 years. 
The typical commercial farm will easily be in the farm-products-sold 
class of $20,000 and over by then and at some point in the future, we 
can be sure that the lower boundary of growing and competitive commercial 
farms will rise to $40,000. Some of our own projections suggest that 
the investment per farm even when all commercial farms reach the 
rather modest farm product sales level of $20 1 000 will be $225,000 by 
1980, a 27 percent increase (in constant dollars) over 1960. Many 
more, of course, will approach a half million dollars. While these 
are projections, the "speculated possible" 50-100,000 farms would 
entail mammoth investments per farm. 
Hence, there is an important analytic problem of firm growth in 
agriculture. We have never had much research on this problem even 
for the traditional firm of the past; when it went through a definite life 
cycle tied in quite closely with the life cycle of the household that 
attached to it. Starting from a small equity, it grew in a manner 
related to the surplus of income generated over living expenses and 
its equity-restrained capital supplies. This growth process limited 
greatly the capital available to it. Its capital supply increased with 
time as the equity and credit restraint moved up with greater family 
income and savings. How, now will it grow to accumulate the more 
massive amount of capital needed? Or will this trend be represented 
in growth models of the individual -firm, aided by new supplies of 
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capital provided through different institutional mechanisms such as 
sale of common stock in the market, or by vertical integration with 
the integrating agribusiness firm tapping the general capital market 
in sale of stock? Or will this transition not be made by an existing 
generation of farms that will grow to the larger scale, but by a dis-
crete break between generations of farm firms. As owners of present 
farms retire, will a new group of "swinging" managers and capitalists 
acquire the resources and initiate an entirely new firm structure from 
the outset? And what will be the growth process of the latter once it 
is initiated? 
The growth process of existing and future firms will determine if, 
when and by what extent farm numbers will dwindle to economically 
strangle the traditional rural community. It will have other implications 
for which we should be readying other plans to create viable rural 
structures and communities. Yet we know little about these processes; 
partly because they are difficult to study, but partly because they 
simply have not been studied. Sufficient time series data in the farm 
accounts of many states would allow application of models resting on 
modern growth theory. Also, many interesting normative-type analyses 
could be applied through dynamic and nonlinear programming models. 
There has been continuous pressure during recent years for the 
farmer to increase his size of business. Previous papers of this con-
ference and projections from other sources suggest that much larger 
farm businesses are in prospect for the future. Many of our present 
farmers, however, are already trapped in a situation of "forced savings" 
because of the competitive pressures to increase the size of their farm 
business. Such farmers actually lower their current living standards 
in order to accumulate money to invest in their business. The element 
of "forced savings" in agriculture together with the inflation in land 
values over the past decade have resulted in a situation where many 
farmers have acquired a relatively large net worth in their business 
in ·spite of the fact that their net farm income has been relatively low. 
A recent study reported that the average per family net worth of 
farm people in 1962 was $51,600. While the average net worth for the 
non-farm family was estimated to be $11, 581, and at the same time the 
average income for _f9rmers was $1,430, as compared to $2,440 for 
non-farm families ,2/ 
y 
M. A. Jacobson and D. Paarlberg, "Parity of Net Worth". Journal of 
Farm Economics, Vol. 48. No. I (Feb. 1966) pp. 127-128. 
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Many important problems are associated with the methods by which 
capital is accumulated in the agricultural industry. The high degree of 
dependence on their own savings has forced many farmers, particularly 
young farmers, to operate units well below an optimum or even satis-
factory size. Since capital accumulation is an essential element in the 
growth of the firm, limits and obstacles to the process will have sub-
stantial effects on which farm firms survive, the firm organization and 
so on. 
The desire to have complete ownership of the farm capital by the 
time of retirement has forced an unduly high rate of savings on the 
farmer. Should farmers be encouraged to sacrifice consumption stand-
ards during most of their lifetime in order to complete ownership of 
all farm capital before retirement? These and other problems relating 
to financing the farm and to its growth will increase in number, severity 
and complexity. Entirely new methods of financing the farm may be 
required in the future. 
Research is needed to determine not only the necessary and suffi-
cient elements of firm growth in agriculture but to explore relationships 
on farms between current income, consumption, investments and net 
worth. More needs to be known on how farmers who have accumulated 
sizeable net worths can best contend with estate taxes associated with 
the transfer of the farm once every generation. What are the prospects 
for farmers in the future to get their capital as Lester Kellogg suggests, 
by selling shares to the public and through long term loans at prime 
rates from established financial institutions? Is it feasible for such 
shares to be sold directly to the public or will such financing have to 
come indirectly via input suppliers or output buyers with known reputa-
tions whose shares are already exchanged on the stock market? Re-
search is needed to determine alternative methods for avoiding the 
discontinuities of investment and competent management in farming 
associated with the life cycle. 
Handling Risks and Uncertainties 
Farmers have always had their relatively simple strategies for 
dealing with risk and uncertainties. Included are strategies that are 
conservative or of the maximum nature, such as selecting enterprises 
with low income variance, diversification to provide income stability, 
self-restraints on capital use and others. What types of strategies and 
decision mechanisms become applicable under much larger and more 
highly specialized farm firms? In contrast to labor technology, capital 
intensive technology calls much more for a high degree of specialization. 
When labor was the main input of farming, the farmer and his family 
could switch their efforts relatively easily back and forth among a 
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few hens, a flock of geese, a dozen milk cows, a few brood sows, a 
small drove of feeder cattle and a mix of corn, soybeans, small grains 
and hay. This flexibility melts away when the resource to be switched 
is capital in the form of specialized machinery and equipment. A 
picker-sheller can hardly be switched to milk cows or convey feed in a 
broiler battery. 
It is for this reason that changes in resource prices that favor capital 
inputs over labor not only bring larger farm units but also bring greater 
specialization. But greater specialization also poses the possibilities 
and actualities of wide swings in income as yields or prices fluctuate. 
These phenomena may themselves squeeze specialized farming operations 
in the direction of vertical integration and animal tenders, in order that 
more of the burden of risks and uncertainties are borne by very large 
scale agribusiness or input-furnishing firms. There are reasons in 
probability to provide a mathematical justification for this trend. The 
large firm integrated over a large number of farms and animal tenders 
may have a sample large enough to reduce income variance much lower 
than the individual farmer. With a stronger capital position, and the 
ability to withhold or lessen dividends to common stockholders in 
scattered unfavorable years, the agribusiness thus integrated also has 
the possibility of more observations and a greater sample in time. It 
may be thus better able than an individual farm manager to operate under 
wide fluctuations of income of a more highly specialized agriculture. 
Yet there are other strategies that are used by industrial firms and 
may be potentials for otherwise highly specialized farms and farm 
managers. Industrial firms do diversify, but not by producing a smatter-
ing of several products in the same plant. Instead, they simply buy 
up the assets of a specialized firm at a different location producing an 
entirely different product. Steel firms buy up grocery chains, electric 
organ manufacturers buy up firms that produce work clothes and auto-
mobile manufacturers acquire the assets of firms that produce house-
hold appliances. Are these the optimal strategies in the future for 
highly specialized farms? Should the owner and manager of a 50,000 
feed lot in the Corn Belt buy a specialized 100,000 acre wheat farm in 
the Great Plains and a specialized egg unit in Maryland? 
Research has never been adequate on the potentials and outcomes 
for farmers in meeting risks and uncertainties. The new era posed in 
the structure of farming for the future places new importance on problems 
of decisions under uncertainty and gives them renewed relevance in 
research. What are the outcomes in the application of existing game or 
decision models? What adaptations and extensions in subjective 
and probability models can and should be made for the new generation 
of farms and farm managers? 
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Functions and Qualities of Management 
Industry has always distinguished rather sharply between the types 
of human resources best suited as labor, supervisory roles and manage-
ment. In the traditional farm, they were the same person. Yet the up-
coming structure of agriculture outlined in numerous papers in this set 
suggests a scale of farm operations in which the same stratification 
of human effort now used in industry might be applicable. 
If farm numbers ever reduce to the point suggested by Lester 
Kellogg in his paper or to the number "tabbed" as possible by Ruttan, 
we will certainly have farmers who specialize in the management func-
tion leaving the actual farm operation to a highly skilled foreman or 
other supervisory personnel. Even if commercial farms only more 
modestly graduate to the present economic class of sales over $40,000 
and are represented by more two-and three-man farms, we expect more 
of this division in functions of farm manpower. Dec is ion procedures 
indicating who should become managers of farm firms and who should 
become the skilled workers to conduct technologically advanced opera-
tions may become highly relevant. It is possible that the two should 
arise from entirely different training. As has been suggested by Kellogg, 
perhaps managers should be trained in business schools, raised in a 
nonfarm environment where they are associated more with individuals 
who have their origin in families from the chemical 1 drug, computer 
and similar firms of the nonfarm sector. It may be more nearly the 
skilled worker and supervisory personnel who should go through our 
current complement of vocational agriculture and agricultural college 
training--but even the latter need further restructuring to meet the type 
of agriculture we are discus sing here. Training even at the agricultural 
level needs to break more away from departments and follow inter-
disciplinary lines; to be based more on fundamental science and 
decision models, and only "topped off" by the applied agricultural 
courses. Training at the level of vocational agriculture in high school 
needs to go somewhat in the opposite direction; namely away from one 
man departments and "general purpose instructors," to several specialists 
who can surround enough deep knowledge in some discipline to surpass 
the knowledge of operating farmers. Of course, if Ruttan •s 50,000 
farms are ever attained, we won •t have much room for education in 
specialized vocational agriculture departments and agricultural colleges. 
The training then will come from enrollment in business 1 botany 1 bio-
chemistry, computer programming and similar courses. 
The questions that revolve around the future nature of management 
resources and decision procedures are large and important. They are 
important for determining the magnitude and nature of agricultural 
education, in decisions of individuals with respect to deciding who should 
become a farm manager, in structuring capital investments to meet 
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uncertainty and for many other important issues. Research relating to 
managerial problems and procedures will be more important for the future 
than the past. But we have always had too little of it. 
Managerial Aids 
While it is less a problem of research and more nearly one of pro-
jection and enlightened guidance, some thought needs to be given to 
the managerial or planning methods and decision models to be used by 
farmers in the future. Some analysis needs to be devoted to the extent 
to which and conditions under which programming and related models 
can improve decisions and the economic performances of the firm. On 
the basis of these findings, specifications need to be made relative to 
the institutions or organizations that can best provide these aids and 
services. 
If, as some speculate, the farmer is to become the sophisticated 
and highly capitalized landlord furnishing land services, or the animal 
tender furnishing labor services while the agribusiness firm furnishes 
the other inputs and services for farm operation, no problem exists. 
Under these circumstances the agribusiness firm will furnish the 
computers and models for farm decisions. These agribusiness firms 
will be of a scale to merit investment in the most advanced computers 
for applying systems analysis as some now call it (but more nearly the 
conventional economic models and the newer programming and related 
models that are the core of firm theory and profit systems). Indeed 
some such firms are already moving in the direction of providing these 
aids to individual farmers, with the services acting to complement the 
inputs sold the farmer. 
Even if farming never reduced to the land-furnishing and animal-
tending category in integration with agribusiness, but only to the level 
of 50,000 commercial farms, numerous of these farmers might be able 
to invest in limited capacity computers for applying the more modest 
linear programming models consistent with specialized farms. And/or 
they could afford to be members of a group investing in a trained 
analyst to provide programming routines and interpretations. With 
farming reduced to these numbers, certainly the major planning would 
be done by programming and other more sophisticated procedures. We 
would expect programming models to become the basis of farm planning 
even if farm numbers reduced, at some reasonable point in time such 
as 1985 or 1990, to 500,000 truly commercial farms. In this case, 
services of programming and decision models, as well as farm account-
ing, perhaps could be best furnished by firms and organizations special-
ized to this purpose. Whoever performs this service, the agribusiness 
sector, private concerns organized for this purpose or the state agri-
cultural extension services, will find the major leadership of commercial 
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farming operations falls in its hands • 
As part of this complex, various models of operations research 
need to be researched more deeply in terms of their relevance in 
investments and management for large-scale, specialized farms. We 
can imagine that the posed Corn Belt farm that uses little field machinery 
but many chemicals and drugs, harvests the entire corn plant and 
handles feed through a specialized center with advanced storage and 
handling equipment, produces livestock under environmentally controlled 
conditions 1 is faced with problems of antipollution in dis posing of its 
wastes, etc., will need courses of action and investments prescribed 
by quequeing and inventory models, simulation techniques 1 .critical 
path programming, turnpike theorems and others. More research 
should be initiated now to better mesh and perfect models for these 
purposes. 
Labor Management 
Data presented here and elsewhere indicate prospects for important 
changes in the farm labor market. A greater proportion of the work 
force on commercial farms, as they transgress through economic classes· 
towards the structure of Class I farms with sales of over $40,000, 
will be hired and family labor will continue as a declining component. 
Investments in education and vocational training, elimination of poverty, 
improved employment services, retraining of established workers and 
other facets of the human resource will reduce the supply and increase 
the supply elasticity of labor to agriculture. Minimum wage laws will 
raise the reservation price of labor to agriculture. "Captive" migratory 
labor will be in smaller supply and more of the hired labor force will 
live away from farms--unless some rather large upgrading of living 
facilities and fringe benefits takes place for farm workers. Thus the 
farm manager must bid against competing employers for labor drawn from 
local sources and which lives in the towns and villages along with the 
labor employment in other firms and institutions of the community. 
This setting is quite different from that of the past and places the farmer 
in a different role as employer and manager of labor. The farmer is 
at a dis advantage where he must recruit labor from local services for 
seasonal tasks but cannot offer work during the rest of the year nor 
provide them with competitive fringe benefits. 
Traditionally, the less desirable farm jobs were performed by 
unskilled labor with few or no alternatives. In the future, a growing 
number of farm workers will be able to choose better wages and working 
conditions of both farm and nonfarm jobs. Two-thirds of all the hired-
work force lived in nonfarm places in 19 65. 
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Most farmers have not developed the employer skills to compete 
effectively as recruiters and managers of labor in this type of market. 
Some will respond, as rightly they should when the real price of labor 
rises sufficiently, by substituting more machines and capacity for 
workers. Yet we need to investigate the conditions under which farm 
managers can function effectively as employers in a changing market 
for labor and a changing structure of the farm work force. 
Conclusion 
We have not attempted to inventory all of the farm firm -research 
implied for the future. Much of it will be conventional in nature and 
is evident in usual decision models of old or new vintage. We have 
tried to select the realms of research that stand out as, through the 
implications of previous papers, agricultural transformation continues 
with the further rapid injection of new technology and operating capital 
into the industry. Whether the research and the corresponding communi-
cation and education is accomplished by public institutions or private 
institutions will certainly determine the leadership of agriculture. 

OVERCOMMITMENT OF RESOURCES IN THE PRODUCTION 
OF FARM PRODUCTS 
by Glenn L. Johnson* 
Currently, there is a feeling that U.S. agriculture is at the 
end of a long period of surplus farm production and that all there 
is to worry about is expansion of farm output to feed the people being 
created by the population explosion. Others also feel that such 
drastic structural changes are taking place in the organization of 
· agricultural production and marketing that overcommitted resources are 
a thing of the past. 
In the following pages, I shall speculate as to whether structural 
changes now occurring in U.S. agriculture will prevent further over-
commitment of physical and financial resources. I shall also argue 
that the international food gap will not reverse the long-standing 
tendency to overcommit resources. 
In so speculating and arguing, I propose first to look briefly at 
the historical facts. Following this, I will look at the theoretical 
structures which underlie our reasoning on such subjects. Then I will 
look at some of the relevant structural characteristics of American 
agriculture and its producing firms. Following this, I will examine 
the structural changes which are occurring to see if they are likely to 
stop the overcommitment of physical and financial resources to agri-
cultural production. Finally, I will sketch out some of the kinds of 
structural changes still needed to stop the overcommitment to and 
wastage of resources in U.S. agricultural production which will 
indicate some needed research in farm management, policy and marketing. 
A Look at Some Historical "Facts" ..!/ 
In looking at the history of resource use in United States agri-
cultural production, 1917 to date, Y I find it advantageous to break 
*Professor of Agricultural Economics, Michigan State University • 
..!/This section is based largely on Calvin Quance's, "Farm Capital: Use, 
MVPs, and Capital Gains or Losses, United States, 1917-1964," Un-
published Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1966, and an in-
complete M.S. U. thesis by Francis Van Gigch. 
YAs part of a study conducted by the author, financed by Resources for the 
Future and involving the work of Bob Jones, Edward Rossmiller, Arne 
Larson, William Lerohl, Chenareddy Venkareddy, Calvin Quance and 
Francis Van Gigch with the advice and assistance, among others, of 
Dale Hathaway, Lester Manderscheid, David Boyne, Gladys Baker and 
Marion Clawson. 
-181-
the period down into sub-periods: 1917 to 19 29 -- from War to the Great 
Depression; 1930 to 1933 --into the depths; 1933 to 1941 --from the 
bottom to World War II; 1942 to 1946 --World War II; 1947 to 1954 --
from War to Peace to War to uneasy Peace: 1955 to 1965 -- from Korea 
to the international food gap. 
Some Historical Facts -- By Periods 
The period from World War I to the Great Depression was characterized 
by the overcommitment of land, labor and of some forms of capital to agri-
cultural production. The overcommitment of land was both physical --
too much was used -- and financial -- too much had been paid. This 
excessive commitment led to high output, low farm prices, capital losses 
and hardship in the rural relative to the non-farm economy. As there 
were no governmental programs to maintain prices above market-clear-
ing levels, stocks did not accumulate; instead, the burden of adjustment 
fell on prices, incomes, wealth and hence on farmers and their families. 
In this period the culprit blamed was World War I which, it was correctly 
reasoned, had caused farmers to mistakenly "overcommit resources to 
agricultural production. " Having found a whipping boy, few, if any, 
asked whether it was inherent in the system that farmers overcommit 
resources to the extent that the resultant output would put such adverse 
pressure on prices that farmers would fail to recover their expenditures 
on resources and fail to earn returns comparable to those obtainable in 
alternative industries. 
Then came the 19 29-33 slide to the depths of the Great Depression. 
This world-wide financial collapse deflated the entire economy bringing 
with it widespread unemployment and loss of domestic demand for farm 
products. As the Great Depression was international in character, an 
added loss of foreign demand for farm products accentuated problems 
for American agriculture. Thus, a new culprit had been found on which 
to blame the overcommitment of resources; instead of pointing an accus-
ing finger only at World War II, we now blamed the monetary-fiscal 
system for the hardships experienced by American farmers as a result 
of producing so much that it could not; be sold at prices high enough to 
cover investment expenditures. The linkage between the Great Depression 
and rural hardship was obvious. Thus, there was still no compelling 
need to ask whether the agricultural economy of the United States has 
inherent characteristics which cause it to overcommit resources to agri-
cultural production. 
The 1933 to 1941 period, the period from the depths to World War II, 
was characterized by governmental programs designed more to alleviate 
symptoms than to cure the disease of overcommitted resources. As the 
causes of the disease were taken to be World War I and the Great 
Depression, it was hard to conceive of doing anything within agriculture 
·about causes. The prevention of wars was left to the diplomats and of 
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depressions to the monetary/fiscal experts while agricultural econo-
mists)../ trained in static theory, got on with the task of supporting 
prices and of preventing the use of overcommitted resources -- in 
short, agricultural economists treated symptoms leaving the disease 
as they saw it to others. 
Then came World War II. Farming did become more profitable and 
events revealed that despite governmental attempts to restrict use of 
overcommitted resources, more resources had been committed. Obviously, 
productive capacity had built up in the inter-war years despite apparently 
adverse economic conditions for investing in agriculture. Various studies 
of U.S. capacity to produce agricultural products credited technology, 
specialization, agricultural education, and land-grant research for the 
rapid expansion in agricultural production with only modest increases 
in the use of capital and witl].gut much expansion in the use of land and 
with a reduced use of labor .11 
In the years 194 7 to 1954 -- from World War II to the end of the 
Korean War -- World War II, the Steagall amendment price supports 
and the Korean War were blamed for overcommitments of resources to 
agricultural production. Production expanded rapidly and the stage 
was set for at least ten more years of over-production. In this period, 
price supports and governmental storage programs were to mean that 
the symptoms of overcommitted resources would be enormous govern-
mental stocks of agricultural products rather than reduced prices and 
incomes and capital losses on investments in agriculture capital and 
land as in the 1917-30 and 1930-33 periods. Increasingly, these 
government programs became the culprit blamed by many of the ills 
of agriculture. The availability of this whipping boy, it seems, ex-
plains in part why agricultural economists, farm leaders and USDA 
officials did not ask themselves the fundamental question of whether 
inherent characteristics of American agriculture were responsible for 
the overcommitment of resources irregardless of World w,_ar II,- the 
Great Depression, World War I or government programs.~ 
Y A few studied counterclycial measures largely under the leadership 
of T. W. Schultz. 
Y Sherman Johnson USDA document, Changes in American Farming, 
Miscellaneous Publication No. 707, Dec. 1949, andT. W. Schultz, 
The Economic Organization of Agriculture, New York, 1953. 
Y The few inadequate explanations which were advanced by laymen and 
others were rather summarily dismissed by the better-trained theorists 
among agricultural economists. See John M. Brewster & Howard L. 
Parsons, "Can Prices Allocate Resources in American Agriculture?" 
Journal of Farm Economics, November 1946. 
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The ten to twelve year period terminating around 1965 brought 
U.S. argiculture to the international food gap. In this period, sub-
stantial governmental measures were taken to dispose of governmen-
tally held stocks at home and abroad. These programs were conducted 
at great cost and expense to the American tax payer and were of 
questionable value to recipients in the developing countries .Y As 
the world demand stiffened for agricultural products, it became easier 
to export agricultural products and by sometime in 1965, the end of 
excessive governmental stocks was in sight for everything except 
cotton. By now, 1967, it appears that we no longer have culprits 
to blame. In fact some people say that a new era has come. The 
international food gap and the changing structure of the American agri-
cultural economy, according to these people, now mean that we are 
through with overcommitting resources. Yet, a very relevant question 
to ask involves whether or not there are still inherent characteristics 
in the U.S. agricultural economy which lead to overcommitting resources. 
Some Historical Facts -- By aggregated Factors of Production 
Another way to look at the historical factors is to look at them 
from the standpoint of labor, land, and various forms of capital. 
From the standpoint of labor ,11 the record 1917 to date is one of 
almost continuous overcommitment of labor to agricultural production 
Table 10. 1, by Venkareddy, shows his estimates of the present value 
of agricultural laborers in five different industries: agriculture, retail 
services, construction, manufacturing, and laundries. Over the entire 
period, the value of agricultural laborers has remained rather compar-
able with that of laborers in laundries, while the value of laborers in 
construction and in manufacturing has grown steadily relative to the 
value of agricultural laborers. A number of agricultural economists 
have analyzed the supply of agricultural operators and laborers by 
following age groups -- cohorts -- through time. These include Clawson, 
Y T. W. Schultz, "Impact and Implications of Foreign Surplus Disposal 
on Underdeveloped Economies, " Journal of Farm Economics, December 
1960. 
11 This section is based largely on Chennareddy Venkareddy, "Present 
Values of Expected Future Income Streams and Their Relevance to 
Mobility of Farm Workers to the Nonfarm Sector in the United States, 
1917-62," unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 
1965; and on Bob Jones' "Farm-Non-Farm Labor Flows, 1917-62, 
With Emphasis on Recent Manpower and Credit Programs," Unpub-
lished Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1964. 
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Bishop, Tolley, and others )V Venkarreddy extended the cohort analyses 
to estimate how entry rates for young persons and exit rates for old 
persons are related to the ratios of the values of the laborers in agri-
culture and relevant non-farm industries for different age groups. 
Venkarreddy predicted about the same number of farm operators for the 
1970's as Clawson, Bishop, Tolley, and others. However, the addi-
tional data used by Venkarreddy indicate that the rates of entry of 
younger persons and the rate of exit of older farm operators should be 
expected to be lower than these other analysts predicted (See Table 
10. 2). As a consequence, the age distribution which Venkarreddy pre-
dicts is even more skewed to the older age groups than those predicted 
by Clawson, Bishop, Tolley, et. al. Neither Venkarreddy's. nor the 
earlier estimates indicate that the overcommitment of laborers to 
agriculture is going to cease in the decade ahead. 
For the purposes of this paper, however, we must note that 
Venkarreddy, as well as Clawson, Bishop, and Tolley have not taken 
into account significant structural changes which are occurring in 
the agricultural labor market. Perhaps an extension of their empirical 
analyses to take these into account would show a different picture. 
I shall address myself to this question later. 
Turning to capital,V we find that we must distinguish between 
durable and expendable forms and between forms specialized and not 
specialized in agricultural production. Because there are associated 
differences in behavior of prices over the business cycle, it is also 
important to distinguish between farm-produced and non-farm produced 
capital. Still further, it is important to distinguish among capital 
which (1) substitutes for labor, (2) substitutes for land, and (3) 
is neutral with respect to land and labor. 
YM. Clawson, "Aging Farmers and Agricultural Policy," Journal of 
Farm Economics, 1963; and C. E. Bishop and G. S. Tolley, Man-
power in Farming and Related Occupations, Appendix II, Report of 
the Panel of Consultants on Vocational Education and Welfare, 
Washington, 19 63, both in Venkarreddy Thesis. 
Y This section is based largely on Calvin Quance, "Farm Capital: 
Use, MVPs, and Capital Gains or Losses, United States, 1917-
1964," Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis 1 Michigan State University 1 
1967. Quance's estimates of MVPs for capital are based on the 
technique employed by Tyner and Tweeten, in "A Methodology for 
Estimating Production Parameters 1 " Journal of Farm Economics 
XLVII, No. 5, (Dec. 1 19 65} 1 pp. 1462-1467 1 except that Quance's 
estimates are based on the theory discussed in this paper and hence 
are related to acquisition prices when use of a resource is expanding 
and on salvage values when its use is contracting. 
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Most of the new factors of production making up what we call 
"advanced technology" are not neutral with respect to labor and/or 
land, as a great part of our effort to improve technology has been 
devoted to the saving of labor and land. From 1917 to date there 
have been few periods in which new forms of capital which substitute 
for labor and for land have not been relatively profitable. Profit-
ability as used here, includes loss minimization of use as well as 
profit maximization adjustments. 
Farmers have been relatively quick to exploit these profit maximi-
zation and loss minimization opportunities. With resepct to neutral 
forms of capital, farmers have tended to vary capital whenever they 
could maximize profits or minimize losses. 
It is also important to remember that there are cycles of over-
commitment and liquidation with respect to such forms of capital as 
beef cows, sows and gilts, and dairy animals which are quite inde-
pendent of inflations and deflations but which, in total, impose 
capital losses on farmers. 
Over the 1917-65 period, overcommitments of specialized farm 
or non-farm produced, durable capital have not been followed by 
liquidations as the salvage value of such capital outside of agri-
culture is virtually zero. Instead, these items have remained in 
production at substantial capital losses to farms. 
With respect to the expendable inputs produced in the non-farm 
economy, rates of purchase and us age have changed as profit maximiza-
tion and loss minimization opportunities have arisen. Consequently, 
little overcommitment and few capital losses have taken place for 
these items. 
In the case of farm-produced expendables, the prices of these ex-
pendables have tended to go up and down in close correlation with the 
prices of products produced by farmers; hence, profit maximization and 
loss minimization rates of usage for these items have not changed much 
as a result of changes in farm product prices. Though, as a consequence, 
little overcommitment and fewer capital losses have occurred on these 
items, substantial overcommitment and capital losses have taken place 
for the durables overcommitted to their production. 
It should also be noted that there have been capital losses on 
storable, expendable inputs produced in the farm economy. 
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Land, lQ} despite the theoretical difficulties involved in distin-
guishing between it and capital, does behave differently than many 
forms of capital -- for one thing, it is hard to reproduce and is highly 
specialized in agricultural production. For the agricultural economy 
as a whole, land has a very high acquisition price and a very low 
salvage value which means that Ricardian rent theory does explain a 
good part of the variation in the value of land. The characteristics 
of land make it easier for farmers to pay too much for it rather than 
over-use it physically. 
The development and extensive use of fertilizer as a land sub-
stitute has had a profound influence on the land market. Undoubtedly 
this development has prevented land prices in general from advancing 
further than they have over the 1917-67 period. This influence has 
been selective, however, as some land has been rendered virtually 
worthies s while other land amenable both to fertilization and mechan-
ization has increased in value. 
There has been a strong demand for land on the part of individual 
farmers which seems to originate in a desire to minimize losses on 
previous overcommitments of first labor and then large scale machinery 
to minimize losses on labor. Once a farmer, who has overcommitted 
himself to farming, acquires a set of machinery capable of handling 
25 to 50 percent more land than he controls, he finds it advantageous 
to acquire more land often on a loss minimization basis in order to 
fully utilize his labor and capital equipment. The resultant compe-
tition of farmers for land bids up land prices until, eventually, gross 
farm incomes cannot simultaneously cover the wages of comparable 
labor in the non-farm ~99nomy and what was paid for both the capital 
and land on the farm • .!.!! 
lQ/ This section is based in part on Arne Larsen, "Changes in Land 
. Values in the United States, 1925-1962," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, 
Michigan State University, 1966; George E. Rossmiller, "Farm Real 
Estate Value Patterns in the United States, 1930-62," Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis Michigan State University, 1965; and Merle Eugene 
Quenemoen, "A Study of Costs and Returns for Dry-Land Farms in 
J1l 
the Triangle Area of Montana with Emphasis on Operator•s Labor, 
Machinery, and Land," Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan 
State University, 19 66. 
See M. E. Quenemoen Thesis. 
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Some Historical Facts with Respect to Technology, Improvements in the 
Human Agent and Institutional Change 
Throughout the 1917 to 19 67 period, important structural changes 
had been occurring with respect to technology, the human agent, and 
institutions for controlling prices, production, uncertainty and infla-
tion. Some of these structural changes have been blamed for the over-
commitment of resources to agricultural production. 
Technological advance, for instance, is viewed by some as a force 
which enters agricultural production at a predetermined rate with respect 
to time and expands productive capacity almost irregardless of decisions 
by governmental administrators or individual farmers. I regard this as 
an erroneous way of looking at the impact of advancing agricultural 
technology on production. Instead, I view technological advances as 
embodied in inputs which cost money .W Typically some of these 
inputs are labor saving while others are land saving. If so many of 
these inputs are put into use that farmers lose money on them, the 
rate of adoption of new technologies is excessive. If we want to 
understand excessive rates of adoption it seems to me that we should 
look at the forces which cause farmers to acquire excessive quantities 
of these modern inputs .JY 
The modern factors which carry the new technology are sometimes 
durable, sometimes expendable. Some are farm-produced; others are 
not. Some such as hybrid seed corn are highly specialized; others 
such as pick-up trucks are not. 
Viewing the adoption of new technology primarily as an investment 
and/or expenditure problem shifts the discussion back to the section 
on capital use and the same conclusions apply. 
Neither are improvements in the human agent mystical things. 
Instead, individuals invest in their own training and once they have 
done so possess skills which are either devoted or not devoted to 
w Glenn L. Johnson, "A Note on Nonconventional Inputs and Conven-
tional Production Functions, " in Agriculture in Economic Development 
by Carl Eicher and Lawrence Witt, New York, McGraw-Hill Company, 
1964. 
W At this point in time I regard the lack in T. W. Schultz's modification 
of Book IV of J. S. Mill's Principles of Political Economy, New York, 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1936, of an explanation as to why farmers 
overcommit themselves to the use of capital, as well as labor, as 
a major shortcoming of his otherwise excellent book, Agriculture in 
an Unstable Economy, New York, McGraw Hill Book Co., 1945. 
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agricultural production. If so many of these skills are used in agricultural 
production that returns are not comparable to what would have been used 
elsewhere, then these skills are overcommitted. The key question is 
whether or not individuals overcommit themselves. 
The institutional changes in the structure of American agriculture 
which occurred with respect to price supports and governmental produc-
tion controls from 1933 on have not been of the type which have prevented 
the overcommitment of physical and financial resources to agricultural 
production. The 1917-67 historical record is quite clear -- even when 
production controls have placed physical restrictions on the use of 
land, they have not restricted either the use of land substitutes nor the 
willingness of farmers to pay too much for land and acreage allotments. 
Excessive commitment of resources has occurred both with and without 
government controls . Though the record indicates that the overcommit-
ment has been greater since the introduction of price supports and con-
trols than before, overcommitment existed prior to their introduction. 
Speculation and Uncertainty as an Explanation of High Land Prices and 
Overcommitment of Land and other Resources 
Some people have argued that inflationary gains from land specula-
tion more than offset the low rates of return resulting from the overcommit-
ment of land and other factors to agricultural production. Over the long 
sweep of time from 1917 to date there have been about as many periods 
of time in which farmers have lost from deflation as periods of time in 
which they have gained from inflation. Even for recent years, research 
indicates that the stock market has been a better place in which to 
speculate than the land market • ..1.¥ Thus, inflation is not an adequate 
explanation for the low rates of current earnings on investments in 
agricultural productivity for returns in farming are reduced still further 
relative to those in the non-farm sector when returns to speculative 
activity are included on both sides of the farm/non-farm equation. 
Risk and uncertainty have been advanced by Il!~ny as explanations 
of the ills of agriculture. Sorenson for potatoes, 1.§.1 Hathaway for dry 
.w 
William E. Kost, 11 Investing in Farm and Non-farm Equities, .. Un-
published Ph.D. Thesis, Michigan State University, 1967. 
w -Roger W. Gray, Vernon L. Sorenson, and Willard W. Cochrane, 
An Economic Analysis of the Impact of Government Programs on 
the Potato Industry of the United States, University of Minnesota 
Agricultural Experiment Station, June, 1954. 
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edible beans ,1.§/ and the author for burley ,11./ have found that price 
uncertainty accounted for under-allocation (from the standpoint of 
average profitability) of resources. This implies above 11 standard 11 
average actual returns before discounting and as such hardly explains 
the overcommitment, substandard returns and capital losses so pre-
valent 1917 to date .W More will be said about this matter later 
after appropriate theoretical issues have been raised. 
Some Historical Conclusions 
The above historical summary: 
1. indicates that the tendency of U.S. agriculture to overcommit 
resources to agricultural production was aggravated by World Wars I 
and II, the Korean War, the Great Depression, and government programs 
but 
2. has also existed independently of these events as a fundamental 
characteristic of U.S. agriculture not explainable by 
a) advancing technology 
b) improvements in the human agent 
c} inflationary gains on rural real estate or 
d) risk and uncertainty 
A Look at Theory 
One hesitates to consider theoretical concepts among colleagues 
so well-versed in theory. Yet, it seems that we have not faced up 
to the theoretical issues which are becoming increasingly relevant as 
a result of the structural changes now taking place. In view of our 
historical study, we need to look at theory which contains the possi-
bility of explaining an inherent tendency to overcommit resources. 
w Dale E. Hathaway, The Effects of the Price Support Program on the 
Dry Bean Industry in Michigan, Michigan State College Agricultural 
Experiment Station, April, 1955. 
11.1 . Glenn L. Johnson, Burley Tobacco Control Programs, Kentucky Agn-
cultural Experiment Station, University of Kentucky, February, 195 2. 
W Glenn L. Johnson, "Sources of Expanded Agricultural Production, 11 
in Policy for Commercial Agriculture, Joint Economic Committee, 
85th Congress, 1st Session, Washington, 1957. 
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It is customary for policy and farm business analysts to use a 
theoretical economic system characterized by (1) perfect knowledge 
and foresight, (2) resources which are fixed exogenously to the firms 
and, hence industries, and (3) perfect markets for factors and products 
in which transfer costs are zero. The third assumption is often made 
almost unthinkingly by tacitly assuming acquisition costs for resources 
to be infinite and salvage prices to be zero for fixed resources while 
assuming tacitly without any more thought, that the variable resources 
used and products produced by firms are perfectly priced in the sense 
that they can be bought and sold "at the barn door" at the same price. 
The substantive content of our theories, however, is drastically 
changed if we assume, more realistically, (1) imperfect knowledge, 
(2) that acquisition prices for many resources (fixed or variable) may 
be less than infinite and salvage prices greater than zero and (3) 
that acquisition prices are typically greater than salvage values for 
most of the resources used in production. 
With perfect knowledge, the introduction of more realistic as sump-
tions with respect to acquisition prices and salvage values produces 
only minor changes in the theory. With imperfect knowledge, however 1 
the differences are great and of important consequence. 
I will not burden this conference with the theory and mathematics 
of theory by attempting to present them from this rostrum. Instead,. a 
mathematical presentation comparing this theory with the more usual 
form is attached as an appendix. Also, the main characteristics of 
this theory have been published in a number of places .W 
The theory to be used in the remainder of this paper is based on 
the assumptions, among others, of (1) imperfectly informed managers 
capable of learning and (2) acquisition prices less than or equal to 
infinity but greater than or- equal to salvage prices which are in turn 
. greater than or equal to zero. Such a modification of ordinary neo-
classical theory has many characteristics not present in neo-classical 
w . Glenn L. Johnson and Lowell Hardin, The Economics of Forage Evalua-
tion, Purdue Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin i623, 1955; 
Clark Edwards, "Resource Fixity and Farm Organization," Journal of 
Farm Economics, Nov. 1 1959; Glenn L. Johnson, "Supply Functions --
Some Facts and Notions," Agricultural Adjustment Problems in a 
Growing Economy, Iowa State University Press, 1956; Glenn L. 
Johnson, "The State of Agricultural Supply Analysis," Journal of Farm 
Economics, May, 1960 1 pp. 441-2; Glenn L. Johnson, "Implications 
of the IMS for Study of Responses to Price," A Study of Managerial 
Processes of Midwestern Farmers, edited by Johnson et. al., Iowa 
State University Press, 1961. 
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theories based upon perfect knowledge and acquisition prices equal to 
salvage prices for variable inputs and acquisition prices equal to in-
finity and salvage prices equal to zero for fixed inputs. One of the 
characteristics of the modified theory is overcommitment of resources 
through time. The introduction of errors in combination and levels of 
resource use by imperfectly informed managers under these price con-
ditions leads to some important conclusions concerning overcommit-
ment of resources: 
1. No mistake of overcommitting an input whose acquisition 
cost exceeds its salvage value is completely correctable. 
2. Some mistakes of overcommitment can be partially corrected 
by loss-minimizing further expansions in resource use and output. 
3. On the other side, some mistakes of undercommitment on 
production can be completely corrected by moving to the optimum level 
of resource use, while other mistakes of undercommitment can only be 
partially corrected by a loss minimization adjustment from a point of 
undercommitment to a level of output which would exceed the optimum 
had no mistake of undercommitment been made originally. 
Conclusions 1, 2 and 3 above result in a tendency towards over-
production leading to capital losses through time with respect to ac-
quisition prices of inputs whose acquisition prices exceed salvage 
value. The maximum capital losses is the difference between acquisi-
tion cost and salvage value. So long as knowledge remains imperfect 
through time either because farm entrepreneurs have not learned all 
there is to know about past changes or because new chan~es have 
occurred, this bias should be expected to be maintained.1.Q/ 
Some people have argued that managers would learn how much to 
discount expected earnings and that they would not over-produce in 
the· long run. This would presume considerable knowledge about the 
distribution of technical institutional and human change. However, 
even if managers have such knowledge, Kellogg has demonstrated 
lQ/ Recent examples of policy and farm business applications of this 
theory include Dale Hathaway, Government in Agriculture, the 
McMillan Co., 1963, and the Phase II Model of the NC54 study 
of feed grain and livestock production in the Midwest. Other appli-
cations are by Theordor Heidhues, "A Recursive Programming Model 
of Farm Growth in Northern Germany," in Journal of Farm Economics, 
August, 1966, and Robert Young, An Economic Study of the Eastern 
Beet Sugar Industry, Michigan State University Agricultural Experi-
ment Station, Bulletin :!f9, 19 65. 
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mathematically the theoretical consequences of discounting a marginal 
value productivity of, say, 10% to 6% in the presence of imperfect 
knowledge with reali~~ip assumptions with respect to acquisition prices 
and salvage values .ll! The theoretical consequence is that entre-
preneurs would (1) fail to make their discount rate and hence (2) 
suffer capital losses with respect to the rate of return which they 
had expected to get to cover their cost of bearing the uncertainty 
present in the system. 
Characteristics of the Agricultural Economy 
In general, firms of the agricultural economy have the characteris-
tics of atomistically organized firms in any part of the economy; how-
ever, the combinatiol]._ot characteristics found among agricultural firms 
is somewhat unique .fJ/ 
A characteristic of the agricultural firms is that larger quantities 
of labor are born into the agricultural household/firm complex than 
required to supply demand at prices which will cover acquisition costs 
simultaneously for all inputs. 
U.S. farmers operate in an economy characterized by rapidly 
rising real per capita incomes and wage rates. 
Another characteristic of agricultural firms is that they occupy 
much geographic space. Large numbers of agricultural firms simply 
cannot be established without creating substantial transportation costs 
for moving inputs from non-farm sources to the farm and for moving 
farm products from farm to non-farm consumers. Similarly there is a 
substantial cost of moving farm-produced inputs from producing farms 
to utilizing farms. The same is true of second-hand non-farm produced 
inputs. This geographic characteristic of the agricultural firm intro-
duces wide variations between acquisition and salvage prices for many 
inputs. For instance, in the case of silage, hay and pasture, which 
provide a very high proportion of the nutrients consumed by the ruminants 
of the U • S. agricultural economy, the differentials between acquisition 
and salvage prices are such that acquisition prices may exceed salvage 
prices by as much as 1000 percent. 
w Earl Kellogg has simulated the operations of an imperfectly-informed 
discounting entrepreneur producing on a Cobb-Douglas function of 
unit total elasticity with acquisition costs greater than salvage 
values subject to a net worth restriction. 
W Dale Hathaway, Government and Agriculture, the MacMillan Co., 
1963, p. 84. 
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Another characteristic of agricultural firms is that they are 
operated in a rapidly changing environment by managers who are very 
imperfectly informed about the macro consequences of their individual 
actions. 
Another characteristic of the environment in which agriculture 
operates is change -- change with respect to foreign demand, per 
capita incomes, war demand, technology, institutions and education. 
These changes, however, occur in the presence of price and income demand 
elasticities which means that the demand for agricultural products grows 
slowly relative to (l) capacity to produce (if the required investments 
are made) and (2) the growth in demand for non-agricultural goods and 
services. 
This set of characteristics combines with the theory considered in 
the preceding section to explain "the roots of the farm problem" of 
overcommitting resources to production. This combination of theory and 
fact implies that the tendency to overcommit has been inherent in the 
agricultural economy of the U.S. It indicates that World Wars I and II, 
the Great Depression, the Korean War, and government programs have 
been aggravating factors but not fundamental causes. 
It is now time to look at the likely impacts of current structural 
changes and the international food gap on this long-standing tendency 
of U.S. agriculture to overcommit, over-produce and to impose hard-
ship on its entrepreneurs. 
Structural Changes Occurring in American Agriculture 
For the past half century, important structural changes in agri-
culture have involved (1) improvements in the human agent, (2) the 
creation of new technologies, and {3) changes in the institutions which 
control resource use. 
As the educational institutions of the United States have been 
improved and have been adapted to serve agriculture they have tended 
increasingly to break the traditional bond between the farm-firm house-
hold complex and the farm child. Widespread receipt of general educa-
tion has made the farm child much more flexible and capable with respect 
to life occupations. With the passage of time, this structural change 
may reduce the importance of excess labor being continually born into 
the farm firm/household complex. The projections of numbers of farm 
operators made by Clawson, Heady, Bishop and Venkareddy have not 
taken this structural change into account. There have also been im-
portant changes in the labor market which affect the use of both local 
and migrant hired labor. These changes involve minimum wage rates, 
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workmen's compensation, social security, medicare, housing regulations, 
and, increasingly, unionization. The elimination of Public Law 78 
arrangements for importing Mexican Nationals has increased the real 
acquisition cost for migrant laborers 1 a development further accentuated 
by minimum wage rates and unionization. 
Labor saving technology and the historical ponderance of operator 
and family labor in the agricultural labor force mean that structural 
changes involving migrant labor are of little overall significance except 
for the unmechanized, stoop-labor crops which ·are dependent upon such 
laborers. The educational changes which have occurred have probably 
been important. 
Labor-saving technological advance has permitted capital to replace 
laborers so that the total supply of labor and labor substitutes in 
American agriculture has expanded rapidly over the years • The intro-
duction of capital substitutes for labor has made it possible for labor 
to be driven out of agriculture even in periods of low 1 off-farm salvage 
values for labor as witnessed by the introduction of the corn picker 
into the corn belt during the depression years and the 11 tractoring off 
of the Okies .. even when farm wage rates were at a very low level 
relative to other prices in the economy. 
Similarly, the development of land substitutes has greatly increased 
the total supply of land and land substitutes in the U.S. agricultural 
economy. As a result land prices have not advanced as rapidly as they 
would have in the absence of the creation and use of land substitutes. 
Such.technological changes should not be expected either to cause 
or stop the overcommitment of resources to agricultural production. 
Instead they are changes which imperfectly informed managers have to 
handle. In the handling, errors are made on the part of managers. The 
theory looked at earlier in this paper indicates that such errors, though 
randomly distributed initially with respect to over and undercommitment 1 
should be expected to lead eventually to overcommitment. 
When we look to the control institutions 1 we find that the structural 
changes which have occurred with respect to governmentally-operated 
price supports and production controls over the past 30 some odd years 
have not been of the type which have prevented managers from making 
mistakes • To the extent they have maintained the marginal value pro-
ductivity of resources 1 price supports have become the basis for further 
mistakes of farmers in capitalizing current income streams into the 
capital values for acreage allotments, land and durable items of capital 
such as breeding herds 1 orchards 1 irrigation systems and fences. This 
historical observation on the pricing of acreage allotments will be impor-
tant later in considering the impact of the international food gap on U.S. 
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agriculture. Further, these programs have been set up, by and large, 
to maintain and protect existing farmers and investments in agriculture 
rather than to (1) liquidate fixed overcommitments of resources to agri-
cultural production and (2) develop organizations for the purpose of 
controlling, on the bas is of improved knowledge, rates of entry of far-
mers and investments . 
In this same 30 year period, a greatly expanded program of govern-
mental sponsored economic research and extension has not been adequate 
to reduce the imperfections in knowledge faced by individual farm 
managers to such an extent that their errors of overcommitment have 
been reduced substantially. 
On the private side,W one can ask whether institutional changes 
involving contract farming and vertical integration from input suppliers 
such as fertilizer, feed and drug manufacturers are likely to stop the 
overcommitment of resources. A moment's reflection will indicate 
that such suppliers have very little real motive to reduce the overuse 
of the supplies they sell. One would expect overuse to be curtailed 
mainly by structural changes which would make contractors and vertical 
integrators financially responsible for the losses associated with over- ' 
use. If we look to the buyers of farm products -- the processors, dis-
tributors, wholesalers and retailers --we see the possibility that 
vertical integration, but not contracts, might reduce the overcommitment 
of resources. However, the general political situation is such that 
such agencies have to be careful about eliminating large numbers of in-
dividually operated family farms. So long as the production of the agri-
cultural products processed and distributed by these agencies remains 
in the hands of other entrepreneurs there appears to be little incentive 
for processors and distributors to gain by setting up control mechanisms. 
Such mechanisms would reduce the volume of business of such firms 
thereby making it necessary for the controlling agencies to perform the 
politically unpopular act of increasing prices to consumers while re-
ducing their own volume. 
The International Food Gap and Overcommitment 
We are now ready to look more analytically at the opportunities 
and problems likely to be created by the international food gap. 
Growth in demand is capable, theoretically, of offsetting the tendency 
toward overcommitment and over-pricing of inputs one expects in U.S. 
agriculture on the basis of both theory and history. 
w See Dale. Hathaway's paper, this conference, for similar views 
on the private side. 
-200-
The question is whether this expansion in demand is sufficient 
to do this in view of (1) the characteristics of U.S. agriculture listed 
in the next to last section and (2) the structural changes discussed in 
the last section. 
Though the world-wide population explosion is creating a great 
physical need for food there are serious questions about (1) "effective 
demand," (2) the ability of the U.S. government to finance foreign 
consumption of U • S. produced food at costs of production related to 
advancing U.S. wag~.r,.ates and (3} cheaper alternative ways of pro-
ducing food abroad.W 
Unless the expansion in effective demand is steady but almost 
unanticipated by farmers, the theoretical and historical examination 
of resource use in U.S. agriculture 1917 to date indicates that U.S. 
farmers should be expected to use too many resources, pay too much 
for land and overcommit too much operator and family labor. 
With so much of the effective demand determined by U.S. political 
activity, with Russia overhauling her agricultural production policies 
and with many undeveloped countries with underutilized productive 
capacity overhauling their agricultural expansion in foreign effective 
demand for U.S. farm products. Further, as I read the farm press and 
observe changes in land value, the expansion in demand is far from 
unanticipated -- in fact, I fear that it is over-anticipated and that 
farmers will pay so much for land, invest so much in capital and commit 
so many people to farming that effective demand will not cover acquisi-
tion costs simultaneously for all inputs in the future any better than 
in the past. This fear is only increased by observation of this rapid 
current rate of increase in U.S. non-farm wage rates. 
The Kinds of Structural Changes and Agricultural 
Economics Research Needed 
When one examines the history of U.S. agriculture and the impli-
cations of the theory discussed in this paper and in view of the chang-
ing characteristics of American agriculture, it appears that needed 
additional structural changes involve (1) a reduction of imperfect 
knowledge, (2) a reduction of differences between acquisition and 
salvage values, and (3) development of additional control mechanism 
on entry of men and resources, these controls to be operated by 
agricultural producers. 
W Conference on "Alternatives for balancing future world food production 
and needs," sponsored by Iowa State University, Center for Agricul-
tural and Economic Adjustment, Ames, Iowa, Nov. 8, 1966; partic-
ularly the paper by T. W. Schultz, U.S. Malinvestments in Food for 
the World. 
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It is my own judgment that the public service organizations for 
agriculture namely, the U.S. D. A. and the Land Grant colleges and 
universities have not done an adequate job of reducing the imperfec-
tions in knowledge faced by individual farmers. I simply think that we 
can do much better research on the implications for resource use in 
agriculture, of technological changes, changes in the human agent, 
income demand elasticities, foreign demand, etc. than we have done. 
Currently, for instance, we are doing little that is adequate on the 
implications of the so-called international food gap. Better specific 
research is needed as to the quantities of resources which can be 
committed to agriculture, in the aggregate, without producing so much 
product that it cannot be sold except at prices which will not cover 
acquisition costs. 
While researchers could do much better than they have done, they 
probably would not be able to do this job well enough to cure the long-
term tendency of agriculture to overcommit resources to agricultural 
production. Furthermore, even if researchers were able to produce the 
knowledge, it is questionable whether a greatly expanded and improved 
extension and information distribution system would be able to get it 
fully distributed to and used by farmers. A reason for pessimism here , 
involves the atomisic organization of agriculture for which knowledge 
of macro consequences is of little private personal importance. 
If the above conclusions with respect to public reduction of imper-
fect knowledge are correct, then the theory indicates that steps should 
be taken to more nearly equate acquisition costs and salvage values 
for agricultural inputs. However, these differences are due, in the 
final analysis, largely to the geographic dispersion of farms and trans-
portation costs. Except for expensive subsidies, differences between 
acquisition and salvage prices are hard to eliminate. This combines 
with the above conclusions about the difficulty of solving the problem 
through research and extension to indicate that agriculture needs to 
seek structural changes involving the creation of control mechanisms. 
Control mechanisms are needed to regulate the rate at which resources 
are committed to agricultural production. Historically, the government 
appears to be a poor agency for doing this. It has tended to protect 
the resources, farmers and farm firms already committed to production 
and has not concentrated on stopping new overcommitments. Private 
nonfarm input suppliers are unlikely to perform this function well as 
they simply do not have incentives to control the overcommitment unless 
they become owners of the agricultural producing firms. Similar con-
clusions are reached with respect to control mechanisms which would 
originate on the demand side with the processors and distributors. 
Though, I hasten to add, that it would not necessarily be wrong for 
private agricultural entrepreneurs to dis appear and become part of either 
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supplying or distributing firms and agencies, real political problems 
would be involved. For a long while, people in this country worried 
ab::mt the replacement of the family operated "Pop and Mom" grocery 
store by the chains. It did disappear, however, and Pop and Mom 
were replaced by supermarket laborers and managers. As I cannot see 
how the moral fiber or other aspects of American society were damaged 
by this transition, I cannot conclude, a priori, that American society 
would necessarily be damaged by a restructuring of our agricultural 
society to put agricultural production in the hands of input suppliers 
of processors and distributors. Actually, such a restructuring might 
mean that agricultural labor would receive returns commensurate with 
those received by laborers in the rest of the economy and that invest-
ments in agricultural production would earn returns comparable to those 
in the rest of the economy. If this came about, such a restructuring, 
like the abandonment of the Pop and Mom grocery store, might be a 
good thing. However, despite my relative lack of fear on this point, 
our thoughts on restructuring American agriculture should give consider-
able attention to the possibility of creating new control mechanisms 
owned and managed by agricultural producers. Mter researchers and 
extension workers have made their best efforts to product new knowledge 
and to educate the public and the individual farmers, this same informa-' 
tion could be used by organizations of producers in operating controls 
on (1) the entry of firms into agricultural production, (2) investments 
of new major pieces of capital equipment such as bulk tanks, power 
units etc., and (3) the commitment of youths to agriculture. 
When the American economy decided to grant similar powers of 
control to non-farm firms by permitting them to incorporate, sufficient 
attention was not given to governmental arrangements for maintaining 
public responsibility on the part of these new institutions. Similarly, 
when labor was granted the right to organize and bargain collectively, 
rather than individually, sufficient attention was not given to the 
regulatory role of government. In both cases, public control of these 
institutions was extended and further developed subsequent to the legal 
changes permitting them to be established. If we change our institu-
tional arrangements to permit a development of control structures for 
agricultural production, a change in the role of government will have 
to occur. There are reasons for believing that the legal changes pro-
viding for the creation of control institutions should simultaneously 
provide for government regulation of the resultant agricultural monopsonies 
and monopolies. This area needs much research by agricultural econo-
mists, particularly those in the field of policy. 
Another comment seems appropriate. Even if expanded and more 
effective research and extension were provided and even if institu-
tional arrangements to permit producers to develop control mechanisms 
were developed, it does not seem likely that organizations of producers 
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would be able to control a commodity so widely dispersed and so diverse, 
as, say, wheat or pork. Therefore, it seems that there is likely to 
continue to be a role for government to play in the field of direct 
price supports and direct production controls despite our rather un-
fortunate experiences with these institutions to date. Again, more 
agricultural policy research is indicated. 
As a final comment, there are reasons to believe that the solution 
of the problem of overcommitted resources might eliminate the U.S. 
family farm 1 s economic "raison d 1 etre. " Thus, if the structural 
changes suggested above should be adopted and prove effective, 
separate attention should be given to answering the question of whether 
or not we want to maintain family farms and if so how. As I explored 
this question in a paper presented at the Rome meeting of the Inter-
national Economics Association,W I merely refer you to that paper 
at this point as a guide to some relevant research which might be 
undertaken by farm management personnel. 
w Glenn L. Johnson, "The Modern Family Farm and Its Problems," 
to be published by the International Economics Association 
proceedings from Rome, 1965. 
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APPEND1X 
Theoretical Notes 
At the individual firm level, we are interested in the different 
consequences of two alternative sets of assumptionsW for the inputs 
xi 1 1 = 1 1 o o o o 1 n o 
(1) 
The first set of assumptions is 
00~ PAXi = Psxi = 0 
00= p > p = 0 
AXi sxi 
i=i, •••. ,d 
i=d+1, •... ,n 
PAXi = acquisition price of Xi and Psxi = salvage value of Xi. We assume 
a one to one correspondence between prices of stocks and service flows 
for the Xi. (See paper for a discussion of consequences). 
For set of assumptions (1), let G stand for gain (or loss, if negative) 
from reorganizing a given firm. 
m n 0 0 G = !, Py.(Y.-Yj) - ! Px (X.-X.). j= 1 J J i= 1 i 1 1 (2) 
Yj = products, j= 1, •.•• , m. Y~ stands for initial output of the product 
j while Y. stands for the reorganized output of Y by the reorganized firm. 
J 
Similarly I x? and xi stand for the initial and reorganized input of xi I 
i= I, .••. , n. 
The problem of the manager of a firm is envisioned to be that of 
reorganizing an initial organization to maximize G subject to 
(a) 
m 
b. = ! X. j for i = d + 1 , •••• , n 
1 ' 1 1 J= 
(b) X .. ~ 0, for i = 1, .•.. , n 
1J 
l§/ This presentation draws heavily on Clark Edwards, "Resource Fixity, 
Credit Availability and Agricultural Organization," Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, Michigan State University, Dept. of Agr. Econ., 1958. 
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where X .. is the amount of the ith input used in producing the jth product. 
1) 
(3) 
m d m 
G* = Z, Py.(Y.-Y?)- ~ Px .Z.1 (XiJ.)-Xi0J .• Pyj =price of jth product. 
'1 J J J '1 i J= I= J= 
Assuming the law of diminishing returns and independence among the 
j production functions, (3) can be maximized by methods developed 
by Kuhn and Tucker. 27/ When the Lagrangian function is formed as in 
(4) 
n 
L:G*+ i: 
i=d+1 
m 
0 
.(x. - ~ x .. ) 
1 1 L. lJ 
. j=1 
it can be maximized subject to (2) (a) and (b) above "if and only if there 
is a set of i (for i=d+ 1, ••.. , m) such that ( 4) is maximized with respect 
to the Xij and minimized with respect to the j." 
For each of the variable inputs (i= 1, •... , d) used in producing a 
product j 
(5) p 8Yj 
y ~X .. 
0 lJ 
(for i= 1 1 o • • 1 d; j= 1 1 • o o 1m) 
for the most profitable reorganization of the firm. For each of the "fixed 
inputs (i=d+ 1, •... , n)" used in producing a product j 
(6) Py.8Yi J8X .. 
lJ 
-A.. = o 
1 
i=d+ 1 1 o o o • 1 n; j= 1 1 o o o o 1m 
. can be interpreted as the "on-farm" opportunity cost of X.. Off-farm 
1 ' 1 
opportunity costs of Xi are assumed zero as Psx. = 0. Acquisition costs 
1 
for X. are assumed infinite. Hence, the x? for i=d+1, •... ,n are fixed 
1 1 . . 
regardless of Pyj and of subsequent Xij for 1=1, ..•. ,d and J=1, ••. ,m. 
The second set of assumptions is 
(7) 00> PAX. 
1 
for i= 1, ... , n. 
JJ.../Kuhn, H. W., andTucker, A. W., "Non-linear Programming," 
Second Berkeley Symposium on Mathematical Statistics and Probability, 
Neyman,· J., ed., University of California Press, Berkeley and Los 
Angeles, 1951, pp. 481-92. 
-206-
m n m 
(8) G = ~ Py.(Y.-Y?)- ~a. ( ~ X .. -X?) 
j = 1 J . J 1 . i = 1 1 j = 1 1J 1 
m 
if ~X .. >X? then a. =PAX j= 1 1J 1 1 i 
m 
0 if ~X .. < X. then a =P j= 1 1J 1 i sx1 
m 
if ~X .. = X. then PAX.> a. >Psx. 
. 1 1J 1 1 J= 1 1 
Let W. = amount of X. purchased and V. = amount of X sold. Hence 1 1 1 i 
m 
(9) 0 2,X .. =X - V. + W subject to the 
. 1 1J i 1 i J= 
n m 
restriction that x? - v ~ 
1 i ~ ~X .. i= 1 j= 1 1J 
Equation (8) can be rewritten as 
m n n 
(9) G* = ~ Py,(Y.-Y?) + ~ PSX V.- 2.PAX W. 
j= 1 J. J J . i= 1 i 1 i= 1 i 1 
where S = a = P and A = a = P 
i i sxi i i AXi 
When placed in the Lagrangian form, (9) appears as 
which is maximized with respect to X .. , V. and W and minimized with 
. lJ 1 i 
respect to Ai andf-1, following Kuhn and Tucker. For each product 
pOSSibly USing Xi 1 the S'OlUtiOn 'inVOlVeS for all i and j • 
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(11) OL 
8x .. 1J 
- Ai < 0, ..8k_ X .. = 0 and X .. > 0. 8x.. 1J 1J-1J 
Condition (11) indicates that the marginal val\le productivity of an 
input in producing a given product is less than or equal to opportunity 
cost if none of the input is used in producing that product.' 
The solution also involves 
(12) 8L =A. _A.< o; 8L w. = o; w. > o 
8Wi 1 1 - 0Wi 1 1 -
which indicates that purchase of X. involves an opportunity cost for 
1 
X. equal to its acquisition price at the optimum. 
1 
The solution also involves 
(13) 8 L = s. -II. -A. < 0; 8L v = 0; v. > 0 
8Vi 1 11 1 - 8Vi i 1 -
which indicates that sale of X~ involves an opportunity cost for Xi 
equal to its salvage value when less than x? is sold. W. is greater 
\ 1 0 1 
than or equal to zero when Si > 1\i and when all of Xi is sold. 
(14) 
The solution also involves 
0 
= X. - V. > 0; 
1 1 
a condition made necessary by the fact that more of X. cannot be sold 
. 0 1 0 than 1s on hand. ll .. > 0 when X. = V.. W. = 0 when X. > V .. 
r1 1 1 1 1 1 
Differences and consequences of the two sets of assumptions. The 
first set assumed acquisition and salvage values of inputs to be either 
equal_Q[ infinite and zero, respectively. The second set assumed 
acquisition and salvage prices to be unequal. 
I. Under the first set of assumptions: 
A. Inputs with zero salvage and infinite acquisition prices are priced 
internally at opportunity costs determined by product prices, initial 
quantities on these inputs on hand, the nature of the production function 
using them, and prices (including opportunity costs) of other inputs. 
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B. Some of the optimizing reorganizations of farmers are reversible. 
These reorganizations can result from changes in (1) product prices and 
{2) prices of other inputs. Reorganizations are irreversible which result 
from changes in initial quantities of inputs on hand with infinite acquisi-
tion costs or zero salvage values, as are those resulting from technolog-
ical change. 
C. B, above, implies reversible supply functions of individual 
firms for products and reversible demand functions of individual firms 
for inputs. 
D. If d = 2 and n = 3, the iso-value product and iso-cost map for 
the jth product would appear as follows: 
X1 
LL is a line of least cost combinations. HPP is the high profit point. 
The cost functions would appear as follows: 
$ 
ATC 
AVC p 
~------~---------- Yj 
y j 
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E. If imperfect knowledge is assumed, failures to organize at 
the HPP can be corrected at no cost by selling any of the X. which 
1 
are in excess and buying any of the Xi in deficit, i= 1, •.•• , d. Hence 1 
no capital losses need be incurred on X. for i=1, •... ,d. 
1 
F. Capital losses and gains can occur on the X. for i=d+ 1 1 •••• , n, 1 however. The capital value of any durable in this set of X. will be the 
present value of its expected A.'s and A. is a function of 1product 
prices, technology (nature of th1e productl.on function), Px. for i=1, •... 1 d1 
1 
changes in these determining variables can create capital gains and 
losses for the fixed resources. 
II. Under the second set of assumptions, i. e.QO> PAX > Psx > 0 
for i= 1, •••• , n. 1 1 
A. Inputs with P AXi > P SXi 
( 1) were priced internally at opportunity cost, Ai when PAX.> 
1 
Ai > Psxi and are fixed 
(2) are priced at PAX when A. > PAX. and are variable 
i 1 1 
(3) are priced at P which might be termed an external 
sxi 
opportunity cost when/\-:=; P SX. and are variable 
. 1 
(4) have A. 's (opportunity costs) determined by product prices 1 
1 
initial quantities o{the all Xi's on hand for which PAX.> Psx.' the 
1 1 
nature of the production functions using them and the prices (including 
opportunity costs) of other inputs. 
B. The optimizing reorganizations of farms which result from the 
changes listed in II A 4 are not reversible. 
C. B, above, implies irreversible supply functions of individual 
firms for products and irreversible demand functions of individual firms 
for inputs. Irreversibility is taken to mean responses to price decreases 
which are not the exact opposites of responses to increases. Generally, 
the theoretical output responses to product price increases should be 
expected to exceed the contractions associated with product price declines. 
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Similarly, expansions in use of inputs resulting from product price 
increases and input price decreases should be expected to be greater 
than the contractions resulting by comparable product price declines 
and input price increases. 
D. If n=3 00> PAX > Psx > 0 ,(X)> PAX> PSX > 0 and 00 
I I 2 2 
= PAX > Psx = 0, then the iso-value product map for the jth pro-
3 3 
duct will appear as follows: 
Expansion 
Path 
XI 
The line of least cost combination when XI and x 2 are priced at 
acquisition costs need not be the same as when they are priced at 
salvage values. Though the first can still be dubbed an "expansion 
path," the second is better called a "contraction path." At this point 
it becomes advantageous to introduce the concept of an iso-marginal 
value product line. Four such lines are of interest in the XIXz dimen-
sion of the production function under consideration, two for XI and two 
for x 2 • In each case we are interested in all combinations of XI and 
X for which MVPx. = PAX and for which MVPx. = Psx . An XIX 2 map 
2 1 i b bi b 
of such isomarginal value products for Y = aXI Ix2 / x 3 3 when 
3 L bi = I and I >bi>O appears as follows: 
i=I 
7 
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For the first set of assumptions, the iso-marginal value product 
lines for Psxi and PAX 1 would be identical. The same would be true 
for P SX and PAX • Thus areas 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 do not exist under the 
2 2 
first set of assumptions. Area 5 is a point in that case while areas 
2, 4, 6 and 8 are lines. While it is interesting to explore the values 
of Vi' Wi' Ai andfl-i for areas 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8, time can be saved and 
valuable simplicity can be gained by ignoring the iso-product lines 
which do not border area 5 and erecting perpendiculars and extending 
horizontals as follows: 
x1 
( 1) 
(3) 
t 
(4) ' (9) lc _ 
(8) 
~ (7) 
~----~----~------X2 
In addition, one iso-product line represents the HPP output 
for PAX and PAX has been added. This is, of course, a reproduc-
1 2 
tion of Figure 4 of the main text. Let Yj A be the output of j at point A, 
Yj 8 at point B, etc. For firms initially organized 
within area 1 P sx >A 1, PAX <A2, v 1 > 0, W 2 > o and 1 2 
G is max. at B, Yj 8 >YjA even for Yf<YjA' 
The capitalized value of \,1 after max. G 
is less than at X~ ,X~ and the capitalized 
value of \, 2 after max. G equals the stock 
f 0 0 acquisition price o x 2 • At both X1,x2 and 
B the capitalized value of \.1 is less than 
the stock acquisition price of X . 
1 
within area 2 
within area 3 
within area 4 
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If B = A, as it would under the first set 
of assumptions, YjB = YjA and the capitalized 
value A I and A 2 would equal P Tlv and P 
.1-\J\.I PJ{ 2 
for stocks, respectively. 
PPJ{ >AI, PSX for X~ along AB, A2 >PPJ{ , 
I I 2 
VI = WI = 0, W 2 > 0, G is 111ax. on AB at 
0 
XI and XI, and Y.Xo X > Y. even for 
J I I 2 JA 
Y~ < YjA. The capitalized value of A I after 
max. G is less than at X~,X~ and is less than 
the stock acquisition price of XI in both 
instances. The capitalized value of A after 
2 
max. G equals the stock acquisition price 
of x 2 • For B = A under first set of assump-
tions see last sentence for within area I. 
P PJ{ can be made<A.I, PX can be made4.,2, 
I 2 
V = v2 = 0 , W > 0, W > 0 G is max. at A I I 2 
and Y = Y 'A. Y~. Capitalized values of A j J J I 
and A 2 are equal to the stock acquisition 
prices for XI and x 2, respectively at YjA' 
For D = C = B = A nothing is changed. 
P8x <A , Psx< A < P TIV for x 2° along BC, I I 2 2 .t-\J\.2 
VI> 0, V 2 = W 2 = 0, G is max. at x 2 =X~ 
0 
on BC and YJ'A< Y'X xo<Y. . The capitalized 
. J I 2 J 
within area 5 
within area 6 
within area 7 
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\ 0 0 
value of future /\ 2 after max. G <at XI,X2> 
P SX and <P JlX for stock x 2 • The capitalized 
2 2 
value of AI after max. G equals P SX < P JlX 
1 I 
for stock XI. For C = B =A see last sentence 
for within area I • 
; 0 0 0 
v2 = w2 = 0, GIS max. at XI,x2 and yj = yj > 
YjA. The capitalized values of A1 andA2 at 
X~,X~ are less than PM{ and PM{ for stocks, 
I 2 
respectively. For A= B = C = D, see last 
sentence for within area I. 
PM{> AI' Psx< A2< PM{ for x2 along AD, 
I 2 2 
' 0 
w I> 0 I v 2 = w 2 = 0 I G IS max. at x2 = x2 
on AD and YjA< Yj> Yf even when Yj< YjA. 
The capitalized value ofA2 after max. G >at 
0 0 
XI ,x2 I >Psx2' <PPJ(2 for stock x2. The 
capitalized value ofA1 after max. G equals 
P JlX for stock at XIX~. For C = A under first 
I 
set of assumptions see last sentence for 
within area I. 
0 
at D and Y.D>Y.A even for Y. <: Y.A. The J J J J 
within area 8 
within area 9 
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capitalized value of AI after max. G at D is 
equal to PAX while the capitalized value of 
I 
A2 = P SX < PAX for stocks. For D = A under 
2 2 
first set of assumptions, see last sentence 
for within area I. 
P > AI > P for X along DC, P > A , 
AXI sxi I . sx2 x 2 
V 2 > 01 VI = WI = 0 1 G is max. at XI 0 X2 on DC 
andY?> YjX 0 ,x > Y.A • PAX capitalized 
J I 2 J I 
value of AI after max. Gat XI 0 1X2 P for 
sxi 
stock and the capitalized value of A = P8 2 XI 
for stock. For C = D = A see last sentence 
for within area 1. 
psx >AI' psx >AI' V2>01 W2> 0, G is max. 
I 2 
at C and YjA< YjC< Yj. After max. G at C, 
Psx = capitalized value ofAI and Psx = 
I 2 
capitalized value of AI for stocks. For C = 
D = A= B, see last sentence for within area I. 
The cost functions which go with the first iso-product diagram of this 
section are segmented and irreversible as implied in C. For example, 
output at successive points in time for the firm under consideration for 
Pyjt< Pyjt+ I> Pyjt+2 > Pyjt+3 < Pyjt+4 where t + i stands for successive 
production periods could be as follows: 
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$ 
Pyt+l 
PYt 
....... _________ y 
rather than as follows under the first set of assumptions (see I. D.). 
$ 
E. The consequences of imperfect knowledge are great. 
1. Under perfect knowledge, the firm would organize at A in 
the third diagram of II. D above. No overproduction, no capital 
losses, and no disappointed income expectations would follow 
and the differences between the two sets of assumptions would be 
slight. 
2 • Under imperfect know ledge, however, mistakes would be 
made and the firm would find itself in any of areas 1 to 9 of the 
third diagram II. D above. A check of what can happen in each of 
the areas (seeD above) supports the statements of the main test. 
These theoretical event-s correspond closely with what has happened 
in agriculture. This in turn focuses interest on: 
a. improving knowledge, 
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b. preventing mistakes in farm organization which would place 
farmers in areas 11 21 41 5, 61 71 8 and 9. Mistakes in area 3 
are easily and costlessly corrected. 
F. Capital losses incurred in areas 1, 2, and 4 through 9 are non-
Pareto better. Evaluation of circumstances leading to such losses requires, 
therefore, analytical procedures going beyond modern welfare economics 
forcing efforts such as made in Chapter 5. Under the first set of 
assumptions, areas 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8 would not exist and no non-Pareto 
better losses would occur in areas 1, 7 and 9 on x1 and x2 in the above 
example. Hence, modern welfare economics is sufficient under these 
the first set of assumptions for evaluation. Under both sets, capital 
losses can occur on X3. In theory, X3 is ordinarily treated as land. 
As both land rent and land values are implicitly regarded as unearned 
in theory and, hence, as subject to destruction without raising evalua-
tive questions, economists have worried little about non-Pareto better 
adjustments in rents and land values, however illogical (and unjustified) 
that may be. This book attempts to remedy this difficulty by not dis-
tinguishing between either rental and other incomes Qr between capital 
losses and gains on land and other assets. 
G. Growth in demand becomes more important for the second than 
for the first set of assumptions. 
1. Under the first, unequal rates of growth in demand and 
supply have the consequences traced out by T. W. Schultz in 
Agriculture in an Unstable Economy. 
2. Under the second 
a. if the growth in demand exceeds supply, many errors of 
organizing in areas 1, 2 and 4 through 9 (see second diagram in 
II. D above) are converted in errors of organizing in area 3 where 
correction is easy and costles s. (Though growth in demand is 
rapid in the nonfarm industry, agriculture's low income demand 
elasticity product producers appear to experience only small 
growth relative to the number and magnitude of their errors in 
organizing farms.) 
b. when growth in demand lags behind growth in output 
(partly as a consequence of errors of overproduction) errors of 
organizing in areas 1, 2 and 4 through 9 are correctable only 
slowly (less rapidly 1 perhaps, than new errors are made) and 
at great cost. 
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III. Under both sets of assumptions 
A. Serious problems exist about the optimum number of units of 
service to extract from a given durable in a given time period. For 
instance, in buying tractors 500 hours of use per year might be the 
optimum rate of usage when buying a tractor, while some other number 
becomes optimum in successive time periods after it becomes fixed as 
a result of sequential errors made in organizing and reorganizing the 
business through time. 
B. The aggregation problem going from firm supply and demand func-
tions to industry supply and economy demand functions is obviously 
greater for the second than for the first set of assumptions. This pro-
blem has not been attacked for the second set and involves substantial 
difficulties for the first set. Some analysts have suggested that 
aggregate supply and responses would be similar under the two sets 
of assumptions. The following thoughts are offered: 
1. In reality, macro agricultural supply responses are more 
responsive to increases than to decreases in prices. 
2. Net prices received by sellers are not equal to gross prices 
paid by buyers after transaction and transportation costs are figured. 
3. Causes of imperfect knowledge are repetitive and never 
ending. 
4. (2) implies that acquisition and salvage prices never become 
equal in the long run. (3) implies that errors of production are 
repeatable in the long run. 
FARM FIRMS -A DISCUSSION 
by Dale 0. Anderson* 
The timing of this Conference is quite appropriate. Throughout 
the agricultural sector of the American economy, the dissatisfaction 
among farm groups over low product prices and rising input prices is 
exposed in several ways. For example, dairymen are conducting a 
milk witholding program in an effort to force processors to sign con-
tracts for milk at a price level felt necessary by the dairyman, other 
groups are concentrating on the input side by advocating a boycott 
of machinery dealers, drought in much of the winter wheat producing 
areas is casting doubt on whether the 19 67 wheat production will 
meet the domestic and foreign demands, and small groups are organ-
izing to encourage farmers in the spring wheat producing areas to fore-
go the planting of the expanded wheat allotment for 1967. These are 
all signs which have strong implications for future research in the 
producing and marketing of agricultural products and the structure 
which the producing units and factor and product marketing firms will 
take. 
The three papers contained in this section do an excellent job 
of pointing out future direction of research in the production and 
marketing areas of agricultural economics. The purpose of this 
paper is to highlight some of the key points of the three papers in 
this section which are particularly important to the development of 
future research plans . 
The paper by Neil Harl considers the organization and structure 
of the farm firm of the future. Harl sees this firm as being vastly 
different from its present form. There will be a trend toward multi-
member firms, more bargaining power, and more contract buying and 
selling. He further asserts that the family farm concept should be 
redefined in terms of the goals that can be accomplished by retaining 
a system of family farm, particularly as it applies to the future struc-
ture of farm firms. The researcher is presented with the challenge to 
*Associate Professor of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State 
University. 
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identify the essential characteristics of the family farm as a con-
cept, and to evaluate and relate the importance of these characteris-
tics to emerging problems of firm organization. To this end, Harl 
challenges the social science researcher to meet the dynamic future 
by including the law as a variable in analyzing the broad objectives 
of society. That is, the law as a variable should be one of the 
important model specifications as the researcher develops his pro-
gram. 
Much of the previous research regarding firm analysis has been 
a static appraisal assuming profit maximization. More recently there 
has been a shift toward the development of a dynamic analysis of the 
farm firm. This research has considered the survival and growth of 
the farm firm. Particular attention was directed to this. area of re-
search at the 1966 annual meeting of the American Farm Economic 
Association held at the University of Maryland.Y In addition, at 
least one regional research project, GP-2, has oriented its major 
research undertaking to an analysis of firm survival and growth .Y 
The collection and development of the types of data necessary 
to successfully develop much of our research is not available. It 
is our obligation as researchers to make known the types of data 
that are needed to test hypotheses concerning various economic 
problems. These requests should be directed to the appropriate 
agency personnel as a guide to useful revision of enumeration pro-
cedures and data. 
Harl feels that the corporate farm or some derivative of it will 
be the most rapidly growing form of farm firm organization in the 
next several decades. He does not mention other structures that 
wpl likely grow and develop. I think that farm partnerships, in par-
ticular, have considerable potential as the predominant farm firm 
structure of the future. However, I do agree that the farm firm of 
the future will be multi-membered. However, the farm partnership 
Ysee "Growth of the Farm Firm", Journal of Farm Economics, December 
1966, pp. 1503-1532. 
YGP-2 Regional Technical Committee, "Economics of Establishment, 
Survival, and Growth of Dryland Farms in the Great Plains Environ-
ment". 
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appears to have the same necessary prerequisites for growth and 
development as the corporation farm possesses. It seems that the 
major factor favoring the corporation form of ownership is the 
intergeneration transfer of ownership. 
Research analyzing the corporate structure in agriculture is very 
limited. In particular, research is needed to determine the net 
effect of the corporate form of organization upon the decision maker's 
planning horizon. This information, along with research results 
analyzing the effects of other farm firm organizational structures, will 
make it possible to make evaluations and recommendations about 
specific organizational structure consistent with goals and planning 
horizons of the decision maker of the future. 
The growth and survival of a viable farm unit is dependent upon 
a reliable and adequate source of credit to finance the unit. Harl 
concludes that the corporation appears to have many elements in 
\. 
its favor concerning the ability to obtain credit. However, he feels 
that external capital rationing may be increased due to incorporation, 
particularly in the case of a shareholder's limited liability. Research 
is clearly needed to analyze the limited liability problem of share-
holders in reducing credit availability, and to develop an equitable 
and workable policy regarding external capital rationing due to limited 
liability of one or more shareholders. 
Harl indicates that conceptual work is needed to develop research 
models which will adequately analyze various forms of organizational 
structure of farm firms. He suggests three models which provide 
adequate models for analyzing different types of problems. The three 
are: (1} recursive programming, (2} simulation, and {3} behavioral 
simulation. 
Earl 0. Heady and Gordon Ball discuss research implications 
which are app9rent in response to wage rate changes and increased 
demands. The authors indicate that there will be a distinct change 
in the resource structure of the farm firm brought about by technology, 
increased investment in the human resource through formal education 
and vocational training, and the present age distribution of farmers. 
The extent and types of agricultural policies needed for the future will 
depend upon the organizational structure of farm firms. In like manner, 
the size and number will explain rural America and the resulting 
"Main Street" business complex which serves it. 
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How many farms will there be in the United States in 1980 or 
2000, or at what level of farm numbers will stability tend to exist? 
This question formulated in one way or another is of prime concern 
among agricultural leaders and all people associated with agriculture 
in the United States today. Some projections have predicted that 
farm numbers will eventually drop to 50, 000. Others have indicated 
that farm numbers in the United States will stabilize at 1. 5 to 2. 0 
million farms. Whatever the eventual number becomes, substantial 
adjustments are forthcoming in the farm and nonfarm communities 
of rural America. In other words, fewer farms support fewer towns, 
schools, and services of county government. This means further 
consolidation of farms, services of local businesses and services 
of city and county government, including secondary education. 
The increased farm size and decreased farm numbers, increased 
investment in the human resource, greater occupational mobility 
and minimum wage laws will continue to force the future price of 
labor and other resources upward. Heady and Ball expect a continued 
substitution of capital for labor, and as a result feel that additional 
research is needed to more accurately analyze this substitution process. 
They cite two reasons for such a need: (1) to guide individual farmers 
on profitable substitutions that are profitable on their farms, and (2) 
to determine the rate at which social and economic problems will 
face rural communities . 
Heady and Ball indicate that the number of farms in the United 
States in the future is dependent solely upon the nature of cost or 
scale economies of the farm firm. In short, research results are 
not available in the following areas: 
1. Nature of short run and long run cost functions in technologies 
related to highly machanized and large volume feeding or dairy-
ing operations, or environmentally controlled livestock produc-
tion. 
2. There are no data or research results available to indicate 
whether important cost economies relating to prospective and 
upcoming technology are more prevalent in the farm producing 
firm or the input supply firm. 
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Heady and Ball argue that area 2 above is particularly important 
concerning future structure of the farm firm as well as the input 
supply firm. They conclude that ( 1) if the largest cost economies 
are present at the farm producing level, then the present structure 
of farm machinery ownership will prevail, however (2) if the major 
cost economies are located within the input supply firm rather than 
the farm producing firm, the authors visualize a shift in machine 
ownership whereby the supply firms will furnish the machinery on 
a custom bas is and the farmer will become a sophisticated .landlord. 
Thus, the researcher should be challenged to determine the extent 
to which cost economies that favor larger farm units unfold from 
advantageous price position or the resulting production functions. 
This area of research could include: (1) a measurement of the cost 
functions for farms employing alternative complements of fixed 
resources, and (2) a measurement of cost economies for farms that 
represent factor input and output producing units under the same 
management. In addition, additional knowledge is needed to accu-
rately assess the importance of alternative institutional arrangements 
of land ownership on the resulting cost economies as firms grow. 
Another important element contributing to increased output from 
land is the capital-land substitution. In general, capital substitutes 
reduce the per acre requirement to produce a unit of product as opposed 
to the capital-labor substitution. Capital replacing land to produce 
the same level of output implies that land must be taken out of 
production. Research is therefore needed which analyzes the process 
of capital substitution for land and pinpoints the regions in the United 
States in which major adjustments in land use for individual firms 
must take place. The result of this research proposal carries strong 
implications for public policy development in this area. 
Firm growth and capital accumulation would occur at a very rapid 
rate and in extremely large quantities if the 50,000-100,000 projec-
tion of farm numbers ever became reality. Heretofore research efforts 
in the area of firm growth have been extremely limited. Mention was 
made earlier in this paper of the firm growth emphasis at the 1966 AFEA 
meeting and the GP-2 regional project directed toward firm growth. 
Heady and Ball feel that research in this general area should be directed 
at an exploration of relationships on farms between current income, 
consumption, investments and net worth. In addition, they feel the 
following questions also deserve attention: (1) how farmers contend 
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with estate taxes, (2) what are the prospects of obtaining capital 
by selling shares to the public, and (3) the possibility of obtaining 
long term loans at prime rates. 
The growing farm firm will pose problems concerning risk and 
uncertainty which previously did not exist. Heady and Ball suggest 
that strategies required of the farm firm of the future might very 
likely be developed from many of the strategies employed by some 
of the large industrial firms which are a part of our present day 
economy. In this regard, research must be initiated which further 
develops the analysis of problems regarding uncertainty. For example, 
the authors c.ite: ( 1) what are the outcomes resulting from existing 
game and other decision models, (2) further adaptation, development, 
and extension of subjective models, and {3) further development and 
application of simulation. 
It is very likely that management will be the most limiting factor 
-t-o the maximum size of farm firms. Harl suggests that future farm 
firms are likely to be multi-member units. As such there will be a 
separation of management and supervisors. The training and experi-
ence of these individuals will be extremely crucial to a growing -
viable farm unit. Research must be directed at a specific analysis 
of the management function in agriculture. What factors contribute 
to a successful manager? What management qualities are needed to 
successfully coordinate four or five supervisors? In this regard, 
Heady and Ball suggest that various operations research models must 
be researched more deeply to determine their relevance to investments 
and managerial decisions of large scale specialized farms. The North 
Central Region previously conducted research on vegional basis 
to .identify the managerial function in agriculture. However, a 
recent revision of the research project for continued work in this area 
was not approved. However, individual states should continue to 
support this research endeavor. 
Glenn Johnson considers the overcommitment of resources as 
applied to the production of agricultural products. Johnson first 
traces the history of resource commitment in the production of farm 
products. The historical analysis is stratified into six periods, 
YNC-59 Regional Technical Committee, "The Management Resource 
in Farming". 
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beginning with World War I and concluding with the so-called 
International Food Gap. During the first five periods, concluding 
at the end of the Korean Conflict, Johnson argues that we have 
turned to some "whipping boy" without asking the fundamental 
question of whether inherent characteristics of American agriculture 
were responsible for the overcommitment of resources regardless 
of the existence of World War I, The Great Depression, World 
War II, or Government commodity programs. The sixth period 
includes the period of time from the Korean War to the International 
Food Gap and takes us from large surplus stock of agricultural 
products to the end of excessive government stocks for every-
thing except cotton. Johnson concludes that it appears we no 
longer have culprits to blame. Many contend that we have reached 
a new era in which we are through overcommitting resources. 
A brief analysis of the inputs employed in the production process 
provides additional insights irtto the overcommitment of resources. 
Johnson contends that labor has been continually overcommitted to 
the production of agricultural products. In addition, future projec-
tions i.ndicate that this trend will continue. 
According to Johnson • s analysis, there have been few periods 
in which new forms of capital which substitute for labor and land 
have not been profitable. In fact, about the only classes of cap-
ital in which overcommitment has occurred and losses have been 
incurred are specialized farm or nonfarm produced durable capital 
and storable expenditures. In general, Johnson feels that there 
has been very little overcommitment of capital of all other forms 
employed in agriculture. 
Johnson argues that land is a resource having a high acquisition 
price and a very low salvage value. He feels that the characteristics 
of land make it easier to pay too much for it rather than to over-use 
it physically. · There continues to be a strong demand for land, 
particularly to minimize losses from overcommitment of labor and 
then large machinery to minimize losses on labor. 
Johnson concludes from the historical summary that (1) World 
War I and II, the Korean War, the Great Depression, and govern-
ment programs tended to aggravate the overcommitment of resources 
to the agriculture sector of the U. S. economy, and (2) that this 
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overcommitment existed because of a fundamental characteristic 
of American agriculture, independent and not explainable by such 
variables as changing technology, improvements in human agent, 
inflation, or risk and uncertainty. 
The second section of Johnson•s paper considers some refine-
ments and developments in theory which are necessary to a complete 
explanation for agriculture to possess a tendecny to overcommit 
resources to the production of agricultural products. The theoretical 
developments made by Johnson are based on two explicit assumptions: 
(1) concerned with imperfectly informed managers capable of learning I 
and (2) acquisition prices less than or equal to infinity but greater 
than or equal to salvage prices which are in turn greater than or equal 
to zero. Although this modified theory leads to an overcommitment 
of resources through time, the following conclusions are derived: 
(1) no mistake of overcommitting an input whose acquistion cost 
exceeds its salvage value is completely correctable, (2) some mistakes 
of overcommitment of resources can be partially corrected by loss, and 
(3) some mistakes of undercommitment of production can be completely 
corrected by moving to the optimum level of resource use. 
Johnson considers the characteristics of American agriculture and 
identifies those components which make it unique from other automis-
tically organized firms. These factors include (1) an excess supply 
of labor, (2) U. 8. farmers a part of an economy where real per capita 
incomes and wage rates are increasing rapidly, (3) occupy a large 
geographical area, (4) managers are not particularly well informed 
about macro consequences of individual decisions, and (5) they operate 
in a continually changing environment with imperfect know ledge of 
changes forthcoming. Thus 1 Johnson concludes that the combination 
of theory and fact implies that the tendency to overcommit resources 
has been inherent in the agricultural economy of the United States. 
Johnson dicusses some of the structural changes which are 
occurring in American agriculture to reduce the problem of overcommit-
ment of resources to the production of agricultural products. These 
changes include (1) better trained managers I supervisors, and labor, 
(2) creation and innovation of new technologies, and (3) changes in 
public and private institutions which control resource use. In addition, 
the author feels that possibly vertical integration, but no contracts 
might help to reduce the overcommitment of resources. 
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Johnson goes on to suggest the kinds of structural changes which 
o.re needed in order to more completely control the overcommitment 
of resources in a sector of the economy which is characteristically 
destined to do so. The main structural change would include a 
reduction of imperfect know ledge. That is, more research must be 
directed toward the development of decision making strategies which 
would help to reduce the imperfect knowledge problem of resource 
allocation. This research would include such variables as technolog-
ical changes, human resource, income elasticity, foreign demand, 
and the International Food Gap. 
Johnson further challenges researchers in agricultural economics 
with the following areas which need further research. These areas 
include (1) the determination of the quantities of resources which 
can profitably be committed to agriculture without causing an over-
commitment problem, (2) can the present information programs of 
disseminating research results and implications impress the need 
for necessary adjustments in resource use and be fully distributed to 
all farmers, (3) considerable attention must be directed toward the 
possibility of creating new control mechanisms owned and manged 
by agricultural prod·:.1cers. 
Summary 
The three stimulating papers in this section have outlined many 
areas of future research needs. They should provide an excellent 
set of guideposts from which Jmportant research projects will be 
formulated to provide answers to the question forthcoming in the 
years ahead. 
T~ere are several questions to which all the papers have alluded 
somewhere in their discussions. For example, it appears that research 
must be continued to search out more explicitly the cost economies 
that are present in agriculture by type of farm and method of operation. 
There was considerable emphasis placed •:>n the need for research to 
dev~lop t:1odels of firm growth and associated problems. Research 
results must be forthcoming analyzing the managerial resource in 
farming including 1 3 reduction Of imperfect ki10Wledg~ Which COntinually 
faces decision makers. More of our resedrch shou Li b·~ d•:·.r,:; bp~)J 
vvith institutional factors as a variabl:; component. This is particularly 
true for considerations of the corporate form of resour::es ownership an:i. 
i mplicatio:>ns f:x firm growth, development, o.nd i :1::ergene:ation trans fer 
of ownership. 

IMPLICATIONS FOR CHANGES IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT MARKETS 
FOR FARM MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING RESEARCH 
by Lowell D. Hill* 
The marketing system for agricultural products is large, complex, 
and highly dynamic. Despite continuous efforts of universities, re-
search consultants, and market analysts, the marketing system has 
never quite reached a state of equilibrium with its environment. The 
pursuit of an equilibrium price by the forces of supply and demand is 
rather like the pursuit of a rabbit by a beagle. The position of the 
rabbit at any moment is the equilibrium position of the dog. By the 
time our beagle reaches the rabbit's original position, the rabbit is 
no longer there and the dog moves off in a new direction toward a new 
equilibrium position. If we were to watch only the dog, his movements 
would seem very erratic and unpredictable. If we gain sufficient per-
spective to see both the dog and the rabbit, the causality behind their 
actions becomes obvious and we discover the motivation that keeps 
them going. Our task as researchers is to study the behavior of this 
"rabbit" and plan strategies which will help our "economic beagle" to 
come Closer to being in the right place at the right time. One of the 
problems is that the researchers are often far behind in this race. Not 
only have they lost sight of the rabbit, they can't even see the dog. 
They have on occasion devoted too many resources to the finding of an 
equilibrium position which even the dog has long since passed--solving 
problems already resolved by industry. I interpret the task of this 
activity to be the examination of some of the changes that are occurring 
and that might occur, and to suggest research areas that could provide 
answers to the problems of real concern to individuals, firms, industry 
groups, and society. 
The scope and magnitude of recent changes in the product markets 
could be illustrated in many ways. One could look, for example, at the 
number of new products coming on the market. General Foods introduced 
over 50 new food items in a single year. Campbell Soup marketed only 
44 items in 1955 but over 300 in 1965. Of the 72 new products which 
Borden & Co. placed on the market during a recent two-year period, 83 
percent were considered successful and thus influenced the distribution 
of the consumer's dollar.l/ Many of these developments result in a 
*Assistant Professor of Agricultural Marketing, University of lllinois, 
Urbana • 
..!/Oscar M. Adkins, "New Products to Food Companies," Food Tech-
nology, (October, 1965), pp. 50-54. 
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different allocation of resources for producers of raw materials and a 
different organization of the market, as well as a different pattern of 
consumer expenditures. 
Alternatively one could identify the changes, and implications of 
changes, in the concentration ratios and other structural variables of 
the various industries processing and marketing food. In 1937, the 
four largest firms accounted for 24 percent of total shipments of canned 
peas. By 1958, this share had increased to 53 percent of the total. 
The 40 largest chain stores accounted for 24.7 percent of total sales 
in 1948,.1 By 1963, this share had increased to 36.1 percent of total 
sales .b · 
A third alternative would be to examine the changes in buying 
practices and pricing policies of various firms in the market channels 
for food products. Under this heading one could examine integration 
in the livestock industry, or the use of private label products in food 
retailing, or recent anti-trust action against agricultural firms including 25 
suits against the dairy industry and 12 against fruit and vegetable pro-
cessors in the last 15 years. Without developing these examples in detail, 
I would like to start by describing change under four general headings, 
discuss some important examples of each category, and finally discuss 
the implications of these changes for researchers in farm management 
and marketing. The four classes of changes are: 
1. Changes in buyer-seller relationships 
2. Changes in consumer tastes and income 
3. Changes in governmental policy 
4. Changes in technology of production and processing 
Changes in Buyer-Seller Relationships 
During the past 100 years the development of mass distribution 
techniques and greater specialization have moved the final consumer 
farther and farther from the point of production in terms of time, form, 
and space. More recently, the increased size of producing units and 
horizontal growth of food marketing firms has made it more economical 
to purchase direct from producers or at least from the point of first 
assembly. All national, most regional, and many local chain store 
organizations today operate on an integrated warehousing and distribu-
tion system. Each retail store is serviced by thewholesale plant of the 
Y National Commission on Food Marketing, Organization and Competi-
tion in Food Retailing, Technical Study No. 7, June, 1966, p. 7 I. 
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parent firm. There has been a subsequent decline in the need for whole-
salers in the industry and an increase in direct purchases. With increas-
ing horizontal mergers, direct purchase is also increasing among restaurants 
and cafeterias. Associated with this change in the market channel has been 
an increase in specification purcha,ses or the so-called prescription buying, 
where variety, grade, size, and pack of a commodity are specified in the 
purchase order prior to loading. In many instances the product is graded, 
packaged, and crated before it ever leaves the producer. 
Contracting of many of the specialty crops is another approach to 
specification buying in which the processor or marketing agency is able 
to control the quality characteristics of the product. Tomatoes are a 
good example. Many processors obtain all their raw product under pro-
ducer contracts which specify variety, size, maturity, and quality. Since 
acid content is important in catsup and juice, these processors control 
acidity of their product in different geographical areas through their con-
tracts by specification of the variety to be grown. 
Buyer-seller relationships also include changes in the power structure 
between processors, distributors, and retailers. Changes in size and 
specialization of these firms have altered the marketing channel and the 
relative bargaining position of processor and retailer. The milk industry 
provides an excellent example of this change._ Jn 1931, only 14 percent 
of all ice cream was sold :t}J.rough food stores;Y by 1965, 54 percent was 
sold through food stores .Y A similar change has occurred in fluid milk. 
In 1930, 94 percent of the fluid milk was delivered direct from plant to 
the consumer; by 1944, this had dropped to 36 percent .21 and in 1965, 
only 28 percent was home-delivered._ ):'he other 72 percent was delivered 
wholesale--primarily to food stores • ..§! This change has provided food 
chain stores with increased power in the market. Most national chain 
stores obtain dairy products for a large number of their retail stores from 
a single supplier. The threat of losing a sale of this magnitude exerts a 
significant influence upon the practices and policies of the supplier. 
Smaller dairies are either unable to provide sufficient volume, do not 
carry a full line of dairy products, or are reluctant to commit their entire 
11 Robert E. Jacobson, Roland W. Bartlett, The Ice Cream and Frozen 
Dessert Industry--Changes and Challenges, University of Illinois 
Agriculture Experiment Station, No. 694, p. 19. 
1/Ice Cream Field and Trade Journal, March, 1966, p. s-s . 
.§/Roland Bartlett, "Chicago People are Drinking More Milk, " Illinois 
Farm Economics, CXCIV (July, 1951), p. 1192, Table 2 • 
.§/U.S. Department of Agriculture, Packaged Fluid Milk Sales in Federal 
Milk Order Markets, C & MS - 11, November, 1965. 
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supply to a single customer, A shift from one dairy processing plant to 
another for the regional needs of A & P could have a serious effect not 
only upon the processing firm but on the producers supplying milk for the 
plant. This power relationship in ice cream has encouraged many small 
processors to open retail ice cream stores as they seek a stable outlet 
for their product which will not jeopardize their economic position 
through dependence upon a single customer, 
Vertical integration and contract production will be discussed in 
several of the other papers in this series, so I shall describe only one 
such change that has particular significance for product markets, This 
is the introduction of live cattle futures contracts in November 1964 
and the live hog contracts in February of 1966. Both of these represent 
an innovation in marketing and pricing distinct from the traditional futures 
trading in products such as grain or pork bellies. Futures trading in 
livestock is a new concept in the sense that its function is the shifting 
of price risks on goods in the process of production rather than on a 
given inventory of storable goods, When used by producers, the live cattle 
futures contract is a system of forward contracting stabilizing the selling 
price to the producer prior to putting the cattle on feed. This futures 
market is not a means of allocating a given inventory over time but a 
means of reducing uncertainty for individual producers in the allocation 
of resources among various production alternatives. Unlike the traditional 
futures contract, a production futures contract is written for a commodity 
which cannot be stored. These contracts have gained acceptance and 
apparently will be a factor in future production and marketing. The volume 
of trading during the first full month of operation of the live cattle futures 
was 1,386 (December 1964); oneyearlater, Decembervolumewas 14,086 
and in December 1966, total volume traded was 17,082. Open interest 
reached a high of 665 in the first contract (April 1965 delivery) and a 
high of 5,173 in the April 1967 contract. Hog futures are operating on 
a much smaller volume and have not yet shown any strong upward trend. 
No information is available on the users of these contracts--whether 
producers, packers, or speculators. There is some indication that pro-
ducers are in the minority. This may be partly explained by the number 
of cattle feeders (especially smaller ones) who cannot justify the time 
required to learn to use the futures market successfully, This suggests 
a need for a program in which the futures market can be translated into 
a simple, guaranteed, cash price at a given point in time. A national 
meat packer has introduced such a contract under which the cattle or 
hog feeder is quoted a specific price for livestock delivered to the 
plant at an agreed-upon future date. The packer then hedges this sale 
in the option month corresponding most closely to the time of expected 
delivery. The palatability of the contract to producers is increased by 
an advance of $25 per head of cattle and $5 per head for hogs at the 
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time the contract is signed. The primary objective of the packer is 
to guarantee and stabilize his supply of slaughter stock. While the 
offer has been accepted by relatively few feeders at this time, interest 
is increasing and the goal is to have 20 percent of the total kill delivered 
on contract. The advantages and disadvantages of such a contract to 
producing and processing firms, and the ultimate effect upon the market 
system, is an important area of concern. 
Changes in Consumer Tastes and Income 
Let me define consumer tastes and income broadly enough to include 
the export market as well as the domestic market. For many commodities 
the changes in foreign demand far exceed the significance of changes 
in the domestic market. As the volume and value of exports have increased, 
the tone of foreign trade has changed. Formerly, foreign markets were 
the residual claimant for excess production of any commodity, grade, or 
quality that was found to be surplus. Present emphasis is shifting to 
production specifically undertaken to meet foreign requirements . Changes 
in quantity and quality demanded for export have been passed directly 
back to the producer and are influencing production decisions. One and 
one-fourth million bushels of an edible soybean called Kanrich were 
exported through Mitsui Grain Company to Japanese markets in 1966. 
These were purchased from producers, through local and sub-terminal 
elevators in central Illinois under a contract guaranteeing a 20¢ per 
bushel premium over the market price for soybeans. This market has 
developed in only the last three years to meet the increased demand and 
declining supply of edible beans used for production of miso in Japan. 
A similar market exists for Hawkeye soybeans for producing tofu 
for sale in Japanese stores. A premium of 5¢ per bushel is paid for 
soybeans of this variety meeting quality and purity standards. Most 
of these beans are assembled, inspected, and cleaned on an in-transit 
rail rate to New Orleans or Baltimore. Barge transportation is not 
used· since it would involve additional handling and subsequent breakage. 
This market is not a residual claimant for soybeans but is a demanding 
market which commands a resource allocation completely different from 
the domestic demand. More and more of the foreign markets are being 
based upon such requirements and are thus influencing production and 
marketing. 
Even the increased volume of exports is a change of importance for 
research. Total agricultural exports which were only $2.9 billion in 
fiscal year 1953-54 reached $6.7 billion in fiscal 1965-66. One-fourth 
of the nation's harvested acreage produced for the export market in 
1965-66 compared with 9 percent in 1953-54. The increase includes 
considerable shift in relative importance of various products. Soybean 
exports have increased from 57.3 million bushels to 25 2 million bushels 
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during the last 12 years, mostly to Japanese markets. Fruit and vegetable 
exports are increasing rapidly due in part to the feasibility of air shipments 
to northern Europe. Exports of meat have risen by 84 percent accompanied 
by an increase of 71 percent in numbers of breeding cattle since 1959. 
The trend for most products has been toward development of foreign 
markets at competitive price levels. Much of this has been a result of 
private company promotion abroad. Some 45 U.S. trade and farm groups 
operating in 70 different countries are actively cultivating the consumers 
of U.S. products in other nations. In-store promotional activities are 
having a significant effect upon consumer attitudes in western European 
countries. One hundred twenty-nine firms exhibiting at trade fairs in 
Belgium and G~rgtany reported over $4 million in actual and expected 
sales in 19 65 }.1 Another factor explaining changes in volume and 
kinds of exports has been the rapidly rising levels of living in the 
land-scarce, high-income countries of western Europe and Japan. Higher 
per capita incomes enable these people. to increase their purchases of 
meats, feed grains, fruits, and vegetable oils. More and More U.S. 
production is allocated toward satisfying the desires of foreign con-
sumers. As the export market increases relative to the domestic, it 
will have even greater impact upon varieties and cultural practices 
of producers, and upon merchandising, packaging, transportation, 
processing, and pricing practices of the marketing firms. 
Without taking time to develop them in detail, I would like to 
mention two other areas of change whose importance warrants more 
space than I shall devote to them. The increased leisure time of 
rural and urban residents has resulted in a rapid growth in the demand 
for recreation facilities. Current expenditures for leisure are esti-
mated as high as $35 billion and are expected to more than triple within 
15 years. The kind and quantity of this demand cannot be adequately 
met by the National Park System. Private lands must assume an impor-
tant role in providing facilities for camping, fishing, hunting, etc. 
The. land best suited for such uses is in the hands of farmers. 
Changes in the food consumption patterns in the United States 
have also exerted an influence upon marketing channels and the alloca-
tion of production resources. Shifts among products as indicated by 
per capita food consumption are indications of changes in tastes and 
preferences as well as responses to changes in prices and consumer 
income. The effects upon various products and product forms have 
varied widely. Per capita consumption of frozen vegetables increased 
by 43 percent in the last 10 years, while fresh vegetable consumption 
declined by 6 percent. Per capita consumption of broilers increased 
Z/"USDA 4133 - 65," United States Department of Agriculture, 
December 29, 19 65, pp. 1-5. 
-234-
by 70 percent in the last 10 years while consumption of eggs has de-
clined by 16 percent.Y 
With domestic consumption becoming less a function of 11 needs .. 
and more a function of 11Wants, 11 and given the impact which merchan-
dising and promotion exerts upon consumer desires, the future changes 
in consumption patterns may be even greater. 
Changes in Governmental Policy 
I shall mention only briefly the changes in governmental policies 
and programs. To cover the numerous changes and their bro·ad implica-
tions would require all three days of the conference. I also anticipate 
that other papers in this series will discuss some of the changes in 
government action and policy and their implication. I will suggest 
only two examples to illustrate the importance of policy to agricultural 
product markets. 
Government policies of the United States and other countries 
largely determine the 11 rules of the game 11 under which agricultural 
products are exchanged in the domestic and foreign markets. As 
these rules are changed, adjustments are required of the firms in the 
industry. Most of these adjustments are non-Pareto better. When 
CCC stocks were drastically reduced in 1964 and 1965 the income 
for grain storage firms reached such low levels that many firms were 
forced out of business. Adjustments in storage rates and capacities 
are still in a state of flux as a result of the distortion of storage 
charges under the government storage program. 
Many changes have occurred in trade barriers within and between 
countries which have altered the available markets for agricultural 
products. The European Common Market activities and negotiations, 
Public Law 480, bi-lateral trade agreements, and export subsidies 
on wheat are a few examples of these changes. T_hey have had an 
impact upon all phases of the marketing and production of agricultural 
products. 
Changes in Technology of Production and Marketing 
The impact of technology has been a problem of economic importance 
throughout most of the history of economic thought. With technology 
increasing at an increasing rate it becomes ever more difficult to evaluate 
Yu .s. Department of Agriculture, Handbook of Agriculture Charts, 1965, 
(October, 1965), pp. 108; 59. 
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requirements of future adjustments. It is difficult to separate tech-
nological changes from the institutional and structural counterparts 
required to utilize the technology. Therefore, the examples discussed 
under this heading could logically be called changes in market organiza-
tion or put under any of several other appropriate subtitles. Professor 
Dahl has already referred to one of these changes which is revolu-
tionizing the grain industry. Field shelling of corn has created a 
serious imbalance between the marketing resources for drying, handling, 
and storing grain on the one hand and the demand for services on the 
other. The p"lrcent of corn field shelled in Illinois rose from 6 percent 
in 19 60 to 57 percent in 19 6 6. The resulting changes in the marketing 
channel and in the services required have had diverse effects upon 
the returns to resources. Changes in returns to scale, 1ocational 
advantage, and transportation rates, have left many elevators with 
excess resources receiving low or negative marginal returns while 
similar resources of other firms are receiving short-run economic rents. 
Some facilities are expanding rapidly while other elevators in the same 
geographical area are closing due to low returns to labor and capital. 
Yet the chaos in the grain trade is not entirely attributable to field 
shelling of corn. The trend toward increased off-farm marketings was 
under way before field shelling, and greater demands were already 
being placed upon elevator and transportation facilities. The rapid 
increase in grain exports would have created handling, storing, and 
transportation problems even if there had been no field shelling. 
These changes have placed tremendous pressures upon a marketing 
system unable to adopt new technology rapidly enough to accommodate 
demands of producers on the one hand and the demands of the domestic 
and foreign markets on the other hand. 
Technological changes in processing and marketing have also had 
an impact upon agriculture. Freeze-drying, instant foods, and new 
products by the thousands are all part of the technological changes 
which have occurred in agriculture and agricultural industries. I 
would like to select only one of these changes for detailed discussion. 
It has already been mentioned, but I would like to carry its implica-
tion a little further. The development of spun protein fibers from 
soybeans has opened new vistas for edible products from grains. 
Although originally introduced on the market with the characteristics 
of meat, the form, shape, texture, and flavor of many other foods 
can be. duplicated. With proper additives it may become pecans or 
walnuts, apples or oranges,. beef or bacon •. Adequate supplies of 
synthetic amino acids, vitamins, etc. are available to permit dupli-
cation of the nutritive value on nearly any food. While soybeans 
are deficient in the sulphur-containing amino acids, the addition of 
albumin and some synthetic products gives Bontrae (one of General 
Mills • new spun soy products) a protein efficiency ratio nearly 
equivalent to that of casein. Although current prices of many of these 
------------------------
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products are relatively high, the economics of production are such 
that the cooked, ready-to-eat product could be delivered in quantity 
to manufacturers of pot pies, T.V. dinners, etc. at a cost of 35¢ to 
SO¢ per pound compared to cooked, boneless chicken at a cost of 
85 cents to $1.05 per pound. The efficiency with which animals 
convert vegetable protein to meat protein is estimated at about 15 
perceRt/ The protein yield of the spun soy process is about 85 per-
cent.~ Stated another way, one acre used to produce meat will 
provide protein requirements for one man for less than 250 days. 
One acre of land in soybeans will provide protein for one man for 
2200 days. The limiting factor is not cost nor nutritive value but 
consumer acceptance. 
Another technological change is the development of high lysine 
corn. The discovery in 1963 that a mutant gene increased the lysine 
content of corn, opened the door to the development of genetic 
strains with protein levels and a balance of amino acids tailored to 
particular species of livestock. Preliminary feeding trials indicate 
that high lysine corn is equivalent to a corn-soybean meal ration 
for hogs • Another mutant gene produces a different balance of amino 
acids more nearly meeting the requirements of poultry. In field tests 
at Illinois in 1966, in 17 paired comparisons the high lysine plots 
produced an average of 85 percent of the yield of normal corn. A 
few hybrids reached 90 percent of the yield of normal corn. Agronomists 
anticipate pilot production on farms in the early 1970's. Some seed 
corn companies are on a crash program to obtain stabilized strai.ns 
of high-yielding, high-lysine corn to meet the anticipated demand. 
The impact on the corn, soybean, and livestock industries may be felt 
within a very few years and pressure is already building for research 
to help improve the adjustments. Technologically, we have barely 
scratched the surface of nature's secrets and have a very limited con-
cept of their implications for the future. 
Implications for Research 
The examples that I have discussed include only a very small 
segment of the total picture of change in the market for agricultural 
products. However, these examples will serve to illustrate the kinds 
of research needed to facilitate adjustment to this changing economic 
environment. I shall not attempt to specify projects but only to 
describe some general problem areas suggested by the various kinds 
of changes. 
Y Bontrae--A New Meat Like Ingredient for Convenience Foods," 
Food Technology, February, 1967, p. 64-67. 
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Implications of Changes in Buyer-Seller Relationships 
The increase in prescription buying and forward contracting by 
chain stores and restaurants has altered the traditional market channel 
and provides an opportunity for decreased marketing costs as physical 
movement and handling of the product is decreased. The magnitude of 
potential cost reductions and the effect upon over-all efficiency of 
marketing has little empirical substantiation. The contribution of 
additional market performance studies in this area would be enhanced 
by relating the changes in efficiency and costs to the distribution of 
income and the level of consumer prices. Producers need additional 
information on the relative costs and returns from such an organization 
of the market and on the implications for the location of decision making 
in the integrated production-marketing structure. 
While retail firms have been integrating back through wholesale and 
processor stages of marketing, many processors have integrated forward 
into retail distribution. The effect upon both costs and efficiency 
and the research needs are similar in both cases. However, the impact 
upon consumer prices, the changes in income distribution, and the 
effect of market regulation may be quite different. In 1964, a study 
of 131 milk markets scattered over the United States showed gross 
margins varying from 5. 1 cents to 14.9 cents per quart. Many of 
these differences were attributed to the introduction of small, low-
cost, cash-and-carry dairy stores. The growth of these high-volume, 
low-margin stores is restricted to markets where retail prices are not 
regulated by state marketing orders . Where state law establishes 
minimum retail prices, there is no opportunity for such market innova-
tion. Research is needed not only to determine the optimum "rules of 
the game" under which innovation and efficiency are encouraged, but 
to determine tl'e effects upon producers and consumers of alternative 
organization of the market. 
· One of the most intriguing areas for research of recent years is 
the development of the futures market for live cattle and hogs. Until 
1964, it was generally accepted that one criterion for a successful 
futures contract was that the commodity be storable. The relatively 
stable return to storage derived from hedging grain in the futures 
market helped establish order in these markets. Now a contract has 
been written for a non-storable commodity enabling hedging of a 
product not yet produced. The purpose or function of the contract 
for live cattle is very different from that of the contract for grain. 
What will be the effect of this market innovation on the livestock 
industries? Research needs to begin with a serious gap in our factual 
information. There is no data on who uses the.cattle and hog contracts, 
who are the longs and shorts, what is the volume of trading by producers, 
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processors, and speculators, or how the gains and losses from this 
zero sum game will be distributed. These additional data are necessary 
for adequate performance of the speculative function. Once some data 
are available, the research potential is unlimited. At the producer 
level: What is the effect upon optimum size of enterprise? How can 
the futures market be used to maximize producer returns? Does this 
alter the relative profitability among grades of cattle? Should the 
contracts cover a longer period of time to carry the price back to a 
basic production decision period? How will calf producers be affected? 
Similar questions are relevant for packers. 
Looking at the market at an aggregate level, there are questions of 
effects upon price stability, seasonal and cyclical fluctuations in pro-
duction, and the determination of daily prices. Price stability in live-
stock marketing may be achieved by government regulation, by vertical 
integration where a few firms may dominate production and sale, or by 
forward contracts formalized into a futures market. Policy research is 
needed to help agriculture evaluate these alternatives. 
A starting point for such research would be a survey in cooperation 
with the board of trade, of the users of the live cattle futures. This 
would identify hedgers and speculators, the positions they have taken 
in the market, the size of their open interest, their profession, and the 
profit or losses associated with their use of the futures market. Risk 
models have often been discussed in the literature but have seldom 
been employed in empirical studies. A supply response estimate based 
upon risk differences when cattle production is hedged could be tested 
by following the cattle production records of hedgers and non-hedgers 
over time. 
The use of the futures market as a means of contracting between 
packers and feeders raises additional questions. There is already 
some evidence that this will affect lending practices and limits • 
The· cash advance will certainly affect the capital position of the 
producer. There is a need to identify the characteristics of pro-
ducers using the futures markets directly, relative to the characteris-
tics of producers selling on contract to a third party who then uses 
the futures market to hedge his advance purchase. How will these 
alternatives affect the individual producer and his production and 
marketing decisions? How will the rate of technological adoption 
be affected? What is the new equilibrium size of producing units? 
Meat packers using contracts based upon the futures market for 
live .cattle and hogs could provide the data necessary to estimate the 
effect of this market change upon their total supply of livestock, upon 
the variability of their daily slaughter, and upon the costs and returns 
fc::>r marketing and processing. 
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The development of direct buying: contract production, and vertical 
integration increases the difficulty in obtaining price and quantity infor-
mation for the product market. A smaller volume moving in regular 
market channels results in less reliance upon market forces to establish 
prices. The usefulness of statistical records of market transactions 
is diminished since they may cover a small proportion of total sales. 
The ability to evaluate price and quantity movements is hampered by 
a lack of data on transactions that take place internally within a 
single firm. Additional research is needed to determine better ways 
of obtaining data for these products and of evaluating the market 
forces which establish prices on products moving through an integrated 
market channel. 
Implications of Changes in Consumer Tastes and Income 
A change in consumer tastes is another way of saying a shift in 
the demand curve for a given product or product group. This shift 
in the demand curve in the export market is the result of many factors. 
Most of them have been rather poor~y1 identified and seldom quantified. 
A few studies have been initiated ~ but many more are needed in 
the area of price and income elasticities as well as potential supply 
response. There has been some research by commercial firms on 
developing advertising and merch'andising techniques oriented spec-
ifically toward foreign markets but there are many unanswered ques-
tions. There is even opportunity for some analysis of governmental 
policies and actions which alter the effective demand of various 
countries and for an analysis of the results of such actions upon the 
demand curve of different products·. 
Many spatial equilibrium models have taken export as a fixed 
quantity since it has been such a small proportion of the total. When 
volume of trading increases as it has in soybeans, for example, the 
solution to these models cannot be realistic unless the foreign demand 
is included as one of the trans-shipment points. At the micro level, 
the increasing demand for a specific quality and quantity for export 
markets--particularly where price premiums are offered--will result 
in a different optimum combination of enterprises. Continued research 
on new products may identify additional opportunities for exporting 
U.S. agricultural resources. Orientation of production toward specific 
export markets means a shift in resource allocation with implications 
for producers and consumers • 
Shifts in the demand curves of U.S. consumers have also had an 
impact upon prices and quantities of many products. Conceptually, 
!Q/ For example see, Nixar Osman, W. R. Morrison, and L. D. Bender, 
Factors Affecting the Estimated Future Foreign Demand for Soybeans, 
Agriculture Experiment Station, No. 712, University of Arkansas, 
May, 1966. 
----------- ---------------------------------
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the problem is to differentiate empirically betweelJ {_pO)lement along 
the demand curve and a shift of the curve. Blaich !J:J has used a 
strength-of-demand concept to estimate the direction and magnitude 
of the shifts in demand curves for 120 different food commodities. 
This is a comparison between two points in time. There is a need 
for additional refinements to identify some trends in these shifts 
and also to identify the changes in price elasticity over time for 
certain cetagories of foods. Spatial equilibrium and production 
feasibility studies are in general suffering from a lack of information 
on elasticities and trends in elasticities in their estimates of optimum 
resource allocation and trade among regions. 
The increased leisure time of society provides a booming recrea-
tion market with a very hazy set of demands. Farmers have little 
experience in selling this vague service to a fickle public and most 
agricultural technicians are no better prepared than the farmers to 
deal with these problems. There are very serious management 
deficiencies and little research available as guides. An ERS study 
indicated that only 60 percent of the recreation enterprises surveyed 
received any returns to management and family labor if a 5 percent 
return on capital was assumed. Most farm record systems now in use 
are inadequate for evaluating the returns from the recreation enterprises. 
M. the aggregate level, research is also needed to project the impact 
of increased farm recreation upon the demand for land resources. 
Implications of Changes in Governmental Policy 
Export markets for our products are a function of our domestic 
agriculture and trade policies, policies of importing nations, and the 
policies of exporting countries competing with the U.S. It is impera-
tive that researchers in the area of foreign trade be familiar with the 
past, present, and future of price support programs, tariff barriers 
and nontariff barriers of all countries involved in the export and 
import of any given commodity. Additional research is needed to 
analyze the implications of these policies with respect to the U.S. 
markets abroad. The research should be a two-way street--looking, 
on one hand, at the effects of various policies upon U.S. agricultural 
trade, and on the other hand at the implication of our trade for 
changes in our domestic and foreign policies • Some good work has 
been done on tariff barriers and there is adequate economic theory 
available with which to study various tariff models. Of equal impor-
tance however is the field of nontariff barriers such as marketing 
monopolies, quotas, restricted importing periods, bilateral agree-
ments, health regulations, compulsory mixing of domestic with 
imported products, and special import taxes. 
!11 0. P. Blaich, Strength-of-Demand for 120 Market Categories of 
Food, 1957-61, University of California Agricultural Extension Service. 
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A good illustration of policies affecting exports may be found in 
the U.S. Maritime regulations. Public Law 664 requires that 50 per-
cent of the goods sold by U.S. for export must be carried on American 
ships. As a result, the price of American wheat delivered to the 
Black Sea ports in 1963-64 was increased an estimated $3.00 per ton. 
We have not sold any significant volume of wheat to Russia since. 
This shipping policy has certainly affected the markets for our 
agricultural products. 
Institutional or nontariff barriers of the trading nations must be 
considered in any evaluation of change in product markets. Although 
consumer demand and income levels in other countries may suggest 
a market for U.S. products this demand is severely restrained by 
institutional restrictions such as the requirement by the West German 
government that margarine manufacturers buy rapeseed oil equivalent 
to 5 percent of the total oil used. Similar mix requirements are 
found for tobacco in Australia (40-43% of the leaf must be domestic), 
New Zealand, and West Germany. In Belgium, imported wheat is re-
stricted to 30 percent of the total wheat used in the milling industries. 
Health regulations have been effective in controlling European imports 
of live poultry and breeding stock from the United States. The effects 
of these and similar regulations on exports, imports 1 and income of 
trading countries can be readily hypothesized with the available economic 
models. However, the empirical work has been very inadequate for 
testing these models. Marketing and policy research must be coordinated 
for the goals are interdependent. Neither governmental policy nor 
allocation of products among markets can be taken as given in any 
realistic evaluation of future trade among countries. 
Implications of Technological Changes 
Technology and innovation are continually shifting the balance of 
power among firms and redistributing incomes and market shares. These 
wheels of change grind one firm out of existence while carrying another 
to new heights of power and profit. Innovation and incidence of tech-
nological change is therefore an area of considerable importance in 
the research efforts of land grant universities as they seek to improve 
adjustment in various industries. 
Production, harvesting and transportation technology in the grain 
industry in the past ten years have resulted in a rather drastic re-
allocation of resources. The adjustments are still a long way from 
equilibrium as evidenced by the high rate of expansion of facilities 
and the mortality rate of firms. High priority research areas include 
the optimum distribution of drying and storage facilities among farms 1 
country elevators, terminal elevators, and processors. Related to 
this, and perhaps drawing upon these results 1 are studies which will 
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answer the question of the optimum number, size, and location of 
grain facilities. For the individual elevator firm there is a need for 
information on costs, returns to scale, and market opportunities. In 
many cases an integrated approach by farm management and marketing 
would greatly enhance the value of the results. 
In the area of trans port at ion there is only limited information of 
fixed and variable costs, alternative modes of transport, optimum 
combinations of truck, rail, and water, services desired, and competi-
tive rate structure. Box cars have given way to open hopper cars, 
Big John hoppers and even a Whopper Hopper. Data and research on 
these changes and their costs are basic to a study of grains· and most 
other agricultural commodities involving transportation. 
New products are difficult to research for we cannot foresee 
clearly the future events, and the data are very limited on recently 
introduced products. Research can be initiated on consumer accept-
ance, range of substitutability, price and income elasticity and 
cross elasticity of demand for new products introduced on the market. 
At the producer level there is a need for an inter-industry study of 
the effects of new products such as the spun soy protein on resource 
allocation, prices, volume of production, supply response, and 
alternative resource use. 
While U.S. consumers are adverse to diets based upon nutrient 
requirements, there may be some opportunity for looking at the demand 
for food in terms of nutrients, subject to certain minimum restrictions 
on diet, tastes, and availability. For example, a linear programming 
model is already in use at the Sara Mayo Hospital in New Orleans 
which takes into account nutritional requirements, popularity of 
indiv~~u9l items, frequency of their request, and total cost of the 
diet. !.£I This model could be expanded to include intermediate pro-
ducts and competing industrial demand for agricultural production. 
Bas"ic resource requirements within the model would include land, 
labor, and associated factors of production such as fertilizer, live-
stock feeds, chemicals, and equipment. Nutrients would be obtain-
able from high lysine corn, spun soy proteins, and other developing 
products. Data are available for many of the coefficients of this 
model although resource requirements and nutritional contribution of 
some new products may require additional research. The primary 
limitation is the size of such a model although recent expansion and 
changes in computers and programs could handle the data. Appropriate 
restrictions would include consumer preferences, demand elasticities, 
and rate of new product development and acceptance. The information 
lYwendell A. Clithero, "Nutrient Economics" Proceedings of the 
Ninth Agricultural Industries Forum, Equipment, Feed and Chemical 
Industries, Dept. of Ag. Econ., University of Illinois, 1967. 
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obtained from shadow prices and opportunity costs would probably have 
more direct application than the resource allocation of any particular 
solution to the model. 
One change of importance to researchers has been implicit through-
out all the examples I have used. We can no longer be satisfied with 
restricted pieces of research pursued independent of the rest of the 
industry or economy. The various segments of our marketing and 
production systems have become so interdependent that any meaning-
ful economic research must be done in the context of the total environ-
ment. Improved tools and techniques facilitate a systems approach 
and we must accept this challenge. 
The research needs which I have discussed have been given no 
priority. Their relative importance depends in part upon the research-
er's frame of reference. Rather 1 I have tried to indicate the magnitude 
and diversity of the problems that do exist--real problems 1 whose 
solutions are anxiously awaited by industry; specific problems, whose 
solutions can be directly applied; methodological problems, whose 
solutions will provide tools with which to tackle more difficult pro-
blems in the future. 
In closing I would like to refer back to the analogy with which I 
introduced the search for equilibrium. Some economists in their 
zealous attempt to help the beagle, are quite willing to shoot the 
rabbit. This may be effective in reaching equilibrium but it will also 
end the chase. The fallacy of such an approach to problems of adjust-
ment is that economic growth depends upon the chasing, not upon the 
catching. A dead rabbit is also a stagnant economy. 
IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGES IN INPUT MARKETS FOR CREDIT AND 
FINANCE ON FARM MANAGEMENT AND MARKETING RESEARCH 
by John C. Redman* and Robert W. Rudd* 
The structural and market changes which have been occurring and 
appear likely to occur in the credit and finance markets serving agri-
culture have a common thread which runs through most such modifica-
tions. This thread consists of at least two major strands. These 
changes are either made (1) in response to changes in the structure 
and organization of agriculture which confronts the credit and financial 
institutions as markets for the service provided by credit and financial 
institutions or (2) in response to shifts in the relative profitability 
of providing services to agriculture compared to nonfarm uses of these 
services. Failures to respond to changes point to the likelihood of 
shifts in patronage among agencies providing credit or the development 
of new institutions or strategies in credit acquisition. 
Introduction and Current Situation 
From the multiplicity of credit-related changes which have been 
occurring and are projected to occur, we have chosen to comment on 
several and to try to infer from these developments some of the areas 
of needed research. Before beginning this task, however, a perspec-
tive is needed on the current status and trends in providing credit for 
agriculture. In looking backward to establish directions of change, we 
will use 1950 as a convenient benchmark in most cases. Agricultural 
indebtedness has tripled in size since 1950 (to 1965). The share 
repr.esented by farm real estate debt has risen modestly--from 45 
per cent to about 51 per cent of indebtedness. Debt-asset ratios 
have climbed in both real estate and nonreal-estate farm debt, with 
real estate debt up from 7 per cent to 12 per cent of the value of real 
estate assets and nonreal-estate debt rising from 12 per cent to 24 
per cent of the value of nonreal-estate assets. 
Agricultural patronage of credit sources has shown remarkable 
stability among the statistically identified credit sources. Life 
insurance companies remain the largest separately identified source 
of mortgage credit with 21.0 per cent of the outstanding loans in 
*Professors of Agricultural Economics, University of Kentucky, 
Lexington, Kentucky. 
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1950 and 22.7 per cent in 1966 • ..!/ Federal land banks have increased 
their share of farm mortgage credit from 16. 2 per cent to 20. 0 per cent 
in 19 6 6 while operating banks declined from 16. 8 to 13. 8 per cent. 
The share of the largest category of farm mortgage lenders, individuals 
and other nonreporting lenders declined slightly, from 42.5 per cent 
to 40.5 per cent. Loans by the Farmers Home Administration, with a 
limited clientele, declined slightly, from 3. 5 per cent to 3. 0 per cent. 
Nonreporting creditors, also the largest category for nonreal-
estate credit, declined as a source from 45 per cent to 41.5 per cent 
in 1966. The largest gains in share were made by the Production 
Credit Associations, with a gain from 7. 5 per cent to 13. 6 per cent, 
while Farmers Home Administration declined as a nonreal-estate 
source from 6. 7 per cent to 3. 8 per cent. Operating banks gained 
slightly in share, from 39. 8 per cent to 40.4 per cent. Federal 
Intermediate Credit Banks serving agriculture through livestock 
loan companies and the agricultural credit corporations declined from 
1. 0 per cent to 0. 7 per cent of nonreal-estate loans. 
There is convincing evidence that change has been occurring in 
the kind of farm borrower served by credit agencies. Ray Doll has 
recently made some preliminary estimates of changes in the last 
decade w~h show that the average age of farm borrowers from banks 
is rising. The proportion of farm borrowers 45 years of age and over 
is up from 49 per cent in 1956 to about 58 per cent in 1966. The 
average loan per borrower is almost triple the size of a decade ago. 
Net worth of farm borrowers is rising too. In 1956 less than 20 per 
cent of the outstanding farm loans of banks were made to borrowers 
with $100,000 or more in net worth. In 1966 the share was over 36 
per cent. Dr. Doll has also noted the shifts in purpose of bank loans 
made to farm borrowers. There have been significant increases in 
the share of bank loan funds for purchasing feeder and other livestock, 
modest declines in loan fund shares for use in farm real estate pur-
chases and purchases of machinery, trucks and other equipment, with 
more significant relative declines in shares for other debt consolida-
tion or payoff and land and building improvement • 
..!/Percentages in this and following paragraph computed from Agricultural 
Credit and Related Data 1966, Agricultural Committee, American 
Bankers Association. 
Jl From tables presented by Dr. Raymond J. Doll, Vice-President and 
Senior Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City at the meet-
ing of the Agriculture Committee, American Bankers Association, 
Sarasota, Florida, on February 10, 1967. 
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One significant shift has occurred relating to the trend of farm 
assets to realized net income of farms. In 1950 the average value of 
assets required to generate $1.00 of realized net farm income was 
about $7.65. By 19 66, $13. 13 in assets were committed for each 
dollar of realized net income. Essentially all this increase was in 
real estate assets and reflects the sharp and steady rise in farm land 
values. By contrast the $2.42 of nonreal-estate assets needed for 
generating $1.00 of realized net farm income in 1950 had climbed to 
only $2.84 by 1966.11 
Some hints at the future directions of need for agricultural credit 
are found in Rex Daly's base paper. He estimates that agriculture 
will be using significantly larger amounts of several of the purchased 
input categories by 1980, although the total input mix will increase 
only 7 per cent from 19 65 levels. Input gains range from a modest 
20 per cent in power and machinery to an increase of about 90 per 
cent in fertilizer and lime. While we may infer at least a modest 
increase in the price of input, Daly provides no specifics on this 
point for the longer range outlook. 
John Brake of Michigan State has made some rough estimates of 
future agricultural credit needs .Y He projects agricultural credit 
needs of $100 billion in outstanding debt by 1980, compared to $87.5 
billions in 1965. His estimates suggest that real estate farm debt 
will reach $59 billions in 1980 compared to $18.9 billion in 19 65. 
Nonfarm real-estate debt of $41 billion is projected, compared to 
$18.6 billion in 19 65. Average indebtedness per farm, reflecting 
the combination of larger farms, rising land values and increased 
ratios of debt to assets, is estimated by Brake at $48,000 for an 
asset value of about $170,000 per farm. It is apparent that if Brake's 
estimates were restricted to commercial farms, both debt and capital-
ization would be much higher. It is also likely that the larger commer-
cial farms will have an even lower net worth per dollar of as sets. 
l/ Computed from data appearing in Agricultural Credit and Related 
Data 1966, Agricultural Committee, American Bankers Association, 
and various issues of The Farm Income Situation, Economic Re-
search Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
y 
John R. Brake, "Impacts of Structural Changes on Capital and 
Credit Needs," Journal of Farm Economics, December 1966, 
pp. 1534-42. 
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Changes in Agriculture Bearing on Responses of Credit 
and Finance Markets Serving Agriculture 
What are the continuing changes which have been taking place 
in the technology, structure and organization of agriculture which 
bear upon the responses which credit and finance markets serving 
agriculture are called upon to make--and hence, which bear upon the 
adequacy of present institutions providing agricultural credit? 
Previous papers have provided a wealth of leads on such changes and 
the purpose here will be to briefly summarize those which pertain 
particularly to credit and financial needs of agriculture. 
Growth in Size of Firm in Agriculture 
The conclusion of continued growth in size of farm firm is 
reached repeatedly in previous papers. Lester Kellogg states, 
"The trend in the average size of U.S. farms has been continuously 
upward. In the years ahead, it will continue its upward course, and 
where it will stop nobody knows." Daly projects with a continuance 
of present trends, about 2-1/2 million farms by 1970 and possibly 
fewer than a million commercial farms by 1980. Allen, while viewing 
the question of a radical increase in size of Midwest feedlot opera-
tions as somewhat conjectural, appears to lean toward the affirma-
tive, citing scale advantages in reducing price risks, more efficient 
feed use and prospects for effective environment control for cattle-
feeding operations • 
The implications of growth in size of firm for credit use range 
from the need for dramatically larger amounts of capital per farm, in 
an increasing number of cases greater than reasonable lifetime goals 
of capital accumulation can accommodate, to the kinds of strategies 
which can be employed to meet these needs. The concept of permanent 
or perpetual debt or leasing the land resource or devices like the land 
pun;::hase contract becomes increasingly important as size of farm 
increases. Incorporation of farming units as a device for dealing 
with the problem of inheritance may also assume increasing importance 
in avoiding the cycle of recapitalization. Eventual gains in farm 
size may bring a broader consideration of the example which Kellogg 
cites of a corporate farm structure with significant nonfarm investment 
representation which utilizes farm skills of management in a large and 
specialized operation. 
The Continuing Substitution of Capital for Labor in the Form of Power 
Equipment and Other Nonland Inputs 
The prospective decline in the labor used in agriculture occupies 
major space in Schuh•s base paper, while Kellogg and Allen comment, 
respectively, on the prospects for increase of specialized power 
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machinery and processed feed and fertilizer inputs in farming. 
Statistically, the value of assets per farm worker stand at about 
$36,000, more than doubling in a decade.Y Combined with farm 
size increase, the pressure for rapid adoption of new and specialized 
capital equipment in farming has several implications for credit 
needs in agriculture. First, the substitution of capital for labor has, 
to a predominant extent, meant the substitution of purchased inputs 
for nonpurchased inputs, since inost inputs with increasing shares 
of use in agriculture in recent years are purchased off farms. 
Along with the increase in mechanized equipment has come greater 
specialization of equipment and rising obsolescence as increasing 
risk hazards for purchasers as well as extenders of credit. This 
development has focused attention on the prospects of leasing rather 
than purchasing capital equipment, particularly on farms with limited 
capital and limited or uncertain need for annual use of the equipment. 
The trends in development of specialized machine equipment also 
point to higher cost of individual equipment items and a growing con-
cern for full utilization when purchase is made, leading to custom 
hire practices to the mutual advantages of owner and nonowner within 
the limits of seasonal accommodation. 
The trend in power and machinery used in substitution for labor 
has been only modestly upward in recent years, with a gain of 2 per 
cent as a share (1950-65); while, collectively, feed, seed and live-
stock, fertilizer and lime, and other nonland inpu1s1 have increased 
as a share by 17 per cent during the same period . .§r Not all the 
latter group of input categories is purchased, however, and machine 
power items have been increasing in price more rapidly than such 
items as feed and fertilizer. 
Greater Specialization by Individual Firms in Agriculture 
Several of the papers have commented upon the increased trend 
toward specialization by enterprise. The trend toward single enter-
prise operations has often been motivated by the access to lower 
costs per unit of production including the necessity to more efficient-
ly use machine equipment which is more narrowly specialized. 
Similarly, specialization of nonmachine inputs also has contributed 
significantly to lower costs. Reynold Dahl points to the marked 
decline since the 1930's in the per cent of feed grains fed to live-
stock on the farms where the grain was produced. Kellogg cites an 
example of an enterprise (in this instance, hatcheries) which have 
.§/The Balance Sheet of Agriculture 1966, Agricultural Information Bulletin 
No. 314, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
p. 17. 
_§/Handbook of Agriculture Charts 1966, Agricultural Handbook No. 325, 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, p. 23. 
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not only become specialized but in the process have moved from rural 
to urban areas • 
One consequence on increased specialization by enterprise is 
the increase in price risk in many instances. For large growers, 
this increase in price risk has led to substantially greater interest 
in the practice of hedging to reduce price risk. 
Aging of Farm Operators 
As part of the background for his paper, Schuh has cited the 
rising average age of farm operators. By 1980 the proportion of 
farm operators 55 years and older will have risen to over 50 per 
cent, compared with 39 per cent in 1960. The credit service for 
older borrowers of necessity must be different as well as the interest 
of the borrower in farm firm growth and collateral. The immediacy 
of problems of inheritance for such borrowers and the need to gear 
credit use to plans for transfer rather than firm growth are evident. 
Improvement of the Management Input in Farming 
There seems little doubt that the demands of modern farming call 
for continuing improvement in the level of skills of farm operators. 
Schuh observes in his base paper that the nature of technical change 
in agriculture is such that an increase in skills is necessary to farm. 
Dahl comments that marketing dec is ions have become more complex 
for farmers in today's environment. Kellogg emphasizes the need for 
quality management for successful farm operation. This need is 
echoed in the expanded role which tomorrow's farm operator must 
play. His is a larger task in acquiring enough capital for farm opera-
tion, and his is a larger task in controlling the capital assets of 
modern farming. In recognition of the risks and the crucial importance 
of quality of management in the successful use of credit, most lending 
agencies today rank management ability--whether it is called earning 
capacity, financial management ability or farm management ability--
as the most important factor in lending decisions, well ahead of such 
old standbys as net worth, working capital and character. 7_j 
Continuing Dependence upon Government Programs for a Significant 
Share of Farm Net Income 
The involvement of agriculture with government programs has at 
least two elements of interest from the standpoint of credit. Dahl 
comments on one of these in his base paper when he cites the current 
1/ Trends in Agricultural Banking, Report of Midyear 1965, Agricultural 
Credit Situation Survey, Agricultural Committee, American Bankers 
Association. 
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shift away from price supports by loan and storage at sought-for 
levels and toward market-clearing prices with a system of direct 
payments. He points out that this change has brought greater price 
uncertainty to grain producers with a wider market price fluctuation 
which is now possible. Such price risks are also now part of the 
market experience of cotton and wool among supported commodities. 
A second element of concern from the viewpoint of agencies lending 
to agriculture accompanies the present trend in government farm pro-
grams • This concern is the extent to which net income to agriculture 
is dependent upon government payments. Preliminary estimates for 
19 66 indicate that government payments made up 20 per cent of the 
realized net farm income. For individual states, this net income JV 
dependency ran substantially higher--as high as about 50 per cent. 
Clearly this degree of dependency gives lenders cause for concern 
about repayment ability when a large share of repayment ability is 
government generated and dependent on Congressional appropriations. 
Contractual Arrangements--Vertical Integration 
Two of the base papers have pointed to the possible development 
or renewed importance of contractual arrangements--Allen in the case 
of factory--mixed complete feeds on long-term contracts and Pherson 
in a somewhat cryptic" • • • more long-term arrangements between 
livestock producers and packers that will help eliminate supply 
fluctuations and uncertainty. " Daniel Padberg, commenting recently 
on trends in integrated agriculture, indicates that, except for broilers, 
there is only minor ig.~olvement of nonfarm firms in contractual opera-
tions in agriculture.~ 
The credit relevance of contractual or integrated operations in 
farming is that these represent alternative devices for moving nonfarm 
capital into agriculture, tending to supplant partially at least the 
usual sources of agricultural credit. 
Changes in Credit and Financial Markets and Innovations 
in Meeting the Credit Needs of Agriculture 
What changes have taken place in the credit and financial markets 
which serve agriculture--and what innovations and/or strategies have 
been developed to serve the credit needs of a changing agriculture? 
JV Computed from Farm Income Situation, FIS-205, February 1967, 
Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
~D. I. Padberg, "Efficiency and Welfare Considerations in Integrated 
Agriculture, "Journal of Farm Economics, December 1966, pp. 1,393-4. 
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Broadened Alternative Opportunities for Capital Lending by Credit Agencies 
Sales finance companies, often product manufacturer subsidaries, 
provide a convenient source of financing of producer and consumer 
durables and yet receive a respectable return on the loan, usually 
around 18 per cent. This return often exceeds the profit on the item. 
Often a combined sale and financing offer provides opportunity to 
acquire an asset cheaper than if each operation were performed 
separately. A farm supply dealer will usually sell an item of capital 
equipment cheaper if he can extend the financing. In other situations, 
dealers have contracts with finance companies to provide financing 
for their credit-worthy customers. 
Commercial banks have discovered a broadened range of oppor-
tunities for credit placement outside of agriculture. Financing of 
consumers has become much more attractive and the institution of 
bank credit cards has been developing rapidly. Many larger banks 
have found more attractive credit placements with industry where the 
size of loan and term length provides more flexibility and makes more 
efficient use of bank credit by reducing service costs per dollar of 
credit extended. 
Another factor which has reduced the available credit to agricul-
ture in some areas has been the growing tendency of farm operators 
to utilize investment sources other than banks to absorb idle balances. 
Low interest rates offered by country banks on time deposits, until 
recently, have contributed to this tendency along with an increased 
awareness by farmers of other investment opportunities. 
Growing Problems of Liquidity Facing Country Banks 
Dr. Charles N. Shephardson of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System in a recent discussion, described the country 
bank liquidity situation this way, "For many years, farm credit demands 
have been expanding much faster than have the resources of rural 
banks. Though this has been a comfortable situation for the banks 
involved, these banks have nevertheless been able to increase farm 
loans faster than their own deposit growth by employing a cushion of 
liquidity built up during the years of the Second World War. In this 
way, the banking system has held the decline in its share of farm 
financing to a fairly slow erosion." Shephardson continues, "Now, 
however, many banks have exhausted the wartime cushion of liquidity. 
The problem of obtaining funds to meet rising farm credit demands is 
thus reaching a critical point at more and more rural banks . In some 
Western States, in fact, a majority of rural banks can probably rank 
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this among their more urgent farm finance problems ... l.Q/ 
The liquidity problem of country banks has been enhanced by 
several factors, notable among which is the simple fact of expansion 
of credit use about three to four times as rapidly as gross and net 
income to agriculture, since the increases in productivity brought 
by more intensive use of capital have increased output and depressed 
farm prices. Also involved is the native conservatism of some country 
banks. Governor Shephardson points to the fact that in many banks 
in rural areas loan-deposit ratios in the 30 to 40 per cent range are 
found in communities which also have other banks with high ratios. 
The legal lending limit constitutes a principal restriction faced 
by the smaller agricultural banks in serving large commercial farmers. 
Although the limits continue to increase, approximately 27 per cent 
of all banks in 19 66 had limits under $50,000 per individual as com-
pared to 43 per cent in 1962. The most striking changes occurred in 
the Corn Belt and Plains where in 1962 nearly one half of the banks 
could not make loans in excess of $50,000. By mid-1966 the number 
had decreased to 25 per cent and 35 per cent respectively.!.!/ 
The Broadened Base for Risk Transfer Through Hedging Operations 
For a significant share of the basic crops, the prospect of 
hedging to protect for price risk has been an available service for a 
long time. Further, for several of these same communities, the need 
to hedge to protect a lender or the borrower was small, due to the 
significant protection offered by price support guarantees. With the 
shift to market clearing supports and direct payments, as Dahl has 
pointed out, the element of risk--price risk-- is enhanced. Hence 
the use of futures markets in the staple crops for which the technique 
of price support has changed is increasing. The more recent advent 
of futures trade in live cattle and hogs has served to further reduce 
price risk on production loans to feeders in an area where government 
price protection has been largely absent. Everette Harris of the 
Chicago Merchantile Exchange indicates that a significant share of 
the live cattle futures contract trades are made by cattle merit .ll/ 
.!!V Charles N. Shephardson, "Banking and Farm Finance: The Present 
Challenge." Speech delivered at the 22nd Annual Virginia Bankers 
Farm Credit Conference, Natural Bridge Virginia, March 8, 1967 • 
.!!/American Bankers Association, Trends in Agricultural Banking, 
Report of Midyear 1966 . 
.w Everette B. Harris, "Remarks," Proceedings, 15th National 
Agricultural Credit Conference, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 
November 15, 1966. 
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Credit agencies making livestock loans have expressed an increased 
interest and a growing number insist upon hedged contracts by borrowers 
to protect their livestock loans. 
Development of the Line of Credit Concept by Production Credit Associations 
Production Credit Associations by their very nature are primarily 
responsive to the needs of farmers. Prompt service is needed by most 
farmers and the PCA's have responded by making loans immediately 
available. Same-day service is available to members who have an 
established record. This practice of extending a line of credit has 
placed the PCA's in a more competitive position, service-wise, with 
the commercial bank. 
Addition of Specialists in Agriculture to Staffs of Country Banks 
The need for knowledgeable personnel to deal with the agricultural-
lending operations of rural banks is being increasmgly recognized as 
agriculture becomes more commercial and more complex. In 1965, 
an estimated 49 per cent of the agricultural banks had an agricultural 
specialist. There is also an increasing trend toward devoting the 
full time of a specialist to agricultural-lending operations in rural 
banks • This greater attention to agricultural loans has been paralleled 
by the growth of such separate features as special forms for agricultural 
lending; and a few rural banks have installed computer customer 
services oriented to agricultural needs, with others now considering 
adding such services. 
Modifications in Operating Bank Techniques to Meet the Needs of 
Agriculture 
The primary changes which have been made in operating banks 
to meet agriculture's changing needs include at least three develop-
ments with varying rates of adoption. These include the use of 
corres pendent banks for over lines, branch banking and the establish-
ing of agricultural credit corporations. 
The use of correspondent banks to share overlines arises from 
necessity for rural banks to service agricultural loans which exceed 
the loan limits prescribed by the National Banking Act (10 per cent 
of net unimpaired capital and surplus, with a limit extended to 25 
per cent if the loan is secured by livestock) or limits prescribed by 
state banking statutes. The use by rural banks of larger city 
banks to take the overline in agricultural loans has been growing 
significantly. A decade ago there were about 800 banks with $80 
million in farm loans on which another 400 banks had participated 
by taking $43 million in overlines. Last year the number of rural 
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banks using correspondents had grown to 2,500, with $574 million 
in agricultural loans on which 1, 100 banks were participating to 
the extent of $300 million. In spite of this impressive rate of growth, 
the extent of use of correspondent banks for loans is quite small--
less than 3 per cent of farm loans extended by banks. 
Branch banking which permits the use of the loan limits of the 
parent institution (a city bank) in rural branches has been advocated 
and widely used in those areas where branch banking is legal--
notably in the western part of the United States. Rapid growth of 
branch banking in those parts of the country where permitted indicates 
the potential of this means of accommodating the larger sized agri-
cultural loans. 
In a limited number of instances, rural banks, faced with a 
shortage of loanable funds, have established agricultural credit 
corporations . Such corporations provide a means for the parent bank 
to discount its agricultural paper with the Federal Intermediate Credit 
Corporation in a similar method to that used by the Production Credit 
Associations. There has been a reluctance by rural banks to use this 
method extensively and the number of agricultural credit corporations 
remains small. 
Strategies or Devices Adopted by Farm Firms in Meeting Credit Needs 
of a Changing Agriculture 
Several strategies have been developed by farm operators to meet 
the problems in credit and capital acquisition faced by modern agri-
culture. Their adoption has not been widespread as yet. As the 
pressures of rising capital requirements for modern agriculture continue 
to grow, at least three of these will receive greater attention. These 
are incorporation, the leasing of capital and the concept of perpetual 
or l?ermanent debt. 
Incorporation of the farming business has not been employed 
significantly thus far. Some studies suggest that the use of the 
corporate form of organization for farms has not provided any signif-
icant improvements in capital access. !1./ Others, such as Hesser and 
Castle, see the increase of incorporation as a form of farm organiza-
tion but mainly for the reason of tax and estate management. !!/ 
lll D. W. Hubbard, "Does the Farm-Ranch Corporation Solve or 
Circumvent problems? " Journal of Farm Economics, December 
1961, pp. 1216-18 . 
.!i/Leon Hesser and Emery Castle, "Finance and Capital Markets," 
Structural Changes in Commercial Agriculture, CAED Report 24, 
Iowa State University, 1965, p. 182. 
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As farm size grows, the ease of transfer of the going farm concern 
from generation to generation--as well as ease of entry--will weigh 
larger in favor of incorporation. Still other observers see promise in 
the device of incorporation as a means of solving problems in the 
growth of farm size . .lV Examples such as Kellogg cites in his 
paper may b_e the forerunner of a broadened use of incorporation. 
Prime barriers still lie in the establishment of the image for corporate 
farms which has been so successful in attracting investor capital 
in nonfarm business where risks are at least equally great. 
The acceptance of the idea of permanent farm debt appears to 
become broader as farm size increases and inheritance tends to be 
the major route to debt-free ownership on a growing number of larger 
farms. Hesser and Castle regard the problems and interest-rate 
change risks for the creditor to make the notion of pay-down to say 
half the value of the farm with interest maintenance after that point 
for a loan length of 30-40 years unattractive to lenders. They 
suggest, rather, incorporation with the sale of preferred stock in 
lieu of a loan with partial pay-down. The effect, they point out, 
is similar to permanent debt but would allow for change in real interest 
rates .l.V 
The leasing of capital has already begun to find abroad use to 
meet growing capital shortages in agriculture. During the formative 
phases of the leasing market for farm capital, there will be a period 
of experimentation and discovery of equitable rates and discovery of 
areas and items of major leasing adaptability. The use of leased 
capital will continue to be a choice, just as it has been in nonfarm 
capital such as automobiles, and will be res pensive to particular 
kinds of needs and shortages of liquid capital rather than supplanting 
farm capital ownership. 
Research Implications of Changes in Input Markets 
for Credit and Finance 
Suggestions for needed research in the area of credit and finance 
are not in genuine scarcity. In fact, the iterative character of such 
suggestions in the literature tends only to confirm common diagnoses 
of problems faced in this area. George Tolley and others discussing 
the topic at the symposium on "Capital and Credit Problems in a 
!.§./ 
Walter R. Butcher and Norman K. Whittlesey, "Trends and Problems 
in Growth of Farm Size, "Journal of Farm Economics, December 
1966, p. 1 • 
.!§/HesserandCastle, op. cit., p. 184. 
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Changing Agriculture" advanced a number of useful ideas for research.lZI 
More recently several other writers have advanced research ideas 
in the area of this paper. A partial list would include Leon Hesser, 
Edward Schuh, M. E. Wirth, C. B. Baker, J. M. Holcomb, Emery 
Castle, John Brake and Lester Kellogg. The contributory role of ideas 
garnered from these writings is gratefully acknowledged.W 
From the standpoint of efficiency, credit should play a neutral 
role in the entrepreneur's production decisions. Plans for adjustments 
should be based upon the expected returns over costs for a particular 
activity. Returns to the equity capital should be comparable to what 
is paid for borrowed capital. Ideally, whether or not to borrow the 
capital should be a matter of indifference. Actually, many decisions 
hinge on whether or not credit is to be used. Often, farmers are 
prevented from making and carrying out plans because capital is 
rationed by the lending agency or by the farmer himself. 
Both lenders and borrowers ration the use of capital because of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty arises from a variety of reasons but all have 
psychological foundations which we as economists are ill-equipped 
to handle. The values and attitudes toward credit need a more thorough 
examination with the view of determining how they are changed and 
in what direction will the changes likely occur. Estimates of credit 
needs made on the basis of productivity, considering the element of 
risk, can vary widely. The crucial question is how the need for 
credit is to be estimated. Can research develop objective lending 
criteria which are really more reliable than those commonly used by 
lenders? 
lZI George Tolley, "Needed Research on Capital and Credit," in Capital 
and Credit Needs in a Changing Agriculture, Baum, Diesslin, and 
Heady (eds .) (Ames: The Iowa State University Press, 1961), 
·pp. 389-400. -
W Leon Hesser and G. Edward Schuh, "Factors Mfecting the Supply of 
Farm Mortgage Credit," Journal of Farm Economics, November 1963, 
pp. 839-40. M. E. Wirth, "Lifetime Changes in Financial Problems 
of Farmers," Journal of Farm Economics, December 1964, pp. 1191-
97. C. B. Baker and J. M. Holcomb, "The Emerging Financial 
Problems in a Changing Agriculture," Journal of Farm Economics, 
December 1964, pp. 1200-1206. Leon Hesser and Emery Castle, 
"Finance and Capital Markets," in Structural Changes in Commercial 
Agriculture, CAED Report No. 24, Iowa State University, 1965, 
pp. 181-95. John R. Brake, "Impact of Structural Changes on 
Capital and Credit Needs, " Journal of Farm Economics, December 
1966, pp. 1536-1545. Lester Kellogg, "Discussion: Impact of 
Structural Changes on Capital and Credit -Needs," Journal of Farm 
Economics, December 1966, pp. 1546-49. 
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Capital and ways of acquiring its use become immediately the 
central problem in such questions as the optimum-size farm unit in 
any given area. Although the economic-sized unit will change over 
time as technology and other factors change, research should pro-
vide us with some idea of what is an optimum-sized unit for various 
types of farming. An estimate can then be made of the capital 
needed to reorganize an undersized unit into a more reasonable 
economic and competitive unit. 
Research in agricultural price analysis leaves much to be desired 
as results are largely historical and not projective. Indeed, our 
level of confidence in price projections tends to be significantly lower 
than the assurance with which physical output or utilization is esti-
mated. Prices affect costs of inputs as well as the value of output, 
and the difference of the two affect the repayment schedule of loans. 
Do we really know what forces and what effect they (input and pro-
duct prices) have on farm real estate values over time? Obviously, 
agricultural productivity is only a minor force in determining land 
values in many cases. General economic activity can only be an 
insignificant factor also in many areas. Is land valuation a subjec-
tive appraisal which is largely psychological in nature? Can the 
farm management people tell us more precisely how the use of more 
machinery and less labor with accompanying substitution and scale 
effects change the cost of output? To what extent should the 
repayment schedule on loans formally take into account the varying 
firm profit expectation over time? 
The problem of acquisition or control of resources in sufficient 
quantity and quality becomes increasingly important as agriculture 
becomes more highly commercialized. A major problem still exists 
in our society as to how a farm may be transferred to succeeding 
generations without going through the cycle of improvement and 
depletion. Partnerships, corporations, perpetual debt and perhaps 
others have been suggested to cope partially with this problem, but 
the real question is have we exhausted the possibilities which might 
make it easier to obtain and/or transfer the resources as needed in 
order to compete effectively? 
The managerial ability of a farmer constitutes probably the single, 
most important determinant in acquiring and controlling capital re-
sources. The criteria used by lenders in evaluating the financial 
ability of a farmer are vague and inadequate. Most lenders will 
agree that poor financial management is by far the main cause of 
delinquency in repayment. With less than adequate criteria for 
determining the ability of a farmer to manage his resources, some 
lenders continue to look first at equity and collateral to secure the 
loan although the importance of management ability is recognized. 
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As yet, there has been no general breakthrough which will help 
lenders select those farmers who can repay their obligations as planned. 
Most of the past research has dealt with the financial practices 
followed by lenders but very little has been concerned with how 
lenders may operate more efficiently and in providing new and more 
innovative services to farmers. The commercial banks have been very 
aggressive on the consumer level but many farm lending agencies 
have followed many of the same general procedures for decades. The 
fact that individuals and miscellaneous lenders hold nearly twice 
the amount of farm mortgage loans held by the next most important 
organized lending agency (insurance companies) indicates that the 
formal agencies for whatever reasons are not fully meeting farm 
mortgage credit needs. The amount of merchant credit extended also 
indicates that perhaps the short-term and intermediate credit avail-
able from the conventional lenders does not fill agriculture's require-
ments completely. 
Much can be said about the adequacy and inadequacy of the 
various theories needed in examining the current and future credit 
problems. Much of the micro- and macroeconomic theory is useful 
in approaching credit problems, but considerable advances have been 
made in our sister disciplines-psychology, philosophy, mathematics 
and the hybrid, operations analysis-which may contribute toward 
the improvement and applicability of our concepts. More significant 
advances in managerial theory would lead to a better understanding 
of loan applications and improve the ability of the farmer to utilize 
a larger capital base. 
The rapid changes which are taking place in the organization and 
adoption of technology suggest that we should search for an adequate 
theory of technological evolution which will help to indicate an 
optimal organization with appropriate technology which can be expected 
ove·r the next several decades. This would help in making predictions 
regarding the financial needs of farmers and in providing for an 
adequate supply of capital. Closely related to this suggestion is the 
need for a more applicable theory of institutional and cultural change 
which would permit the credit market to operate more efficiently with-
in the known constraints. 
An improvement in the rate of capital accumulation is a generally 
accepted goal. How much do we know about how farmers accumulate 
capital over their life span? What can we say about the savings and 
investment function of farmers under varying conditions? Further, 
what do we know about the time preference system of farmers in pro-
duction and consumption activities under varying degrees of asset 
control? In spite of a fairly appropriate set of models currently avail-
able, how much data and information have our production economists 
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given us regarding time production possibilities of farms under varying 
situations? Not unrelated to this need for knowledge of how capital 
is accumulated is the need to know more about the value systems of 
farmers and how their attitudes toward capital and credit are developed. 
To what extent and by what methods value systems and attitudes 
should be influenced is a debatable problem, but nevertheless extremely 
important, in achieving social and economic goals. 
As the managerial level of farmers improves, the capital needed 
will also increase; but can we speak intelligently about the capital 
requirements and the necessary ability to utilize it efficiently, 
particularly as the farmer emerges more from the noncommercial to 
the commercial sector of agriculture? The appropriate role of the 
public lending agencies could well be one of providing joint technical 
assistance and credit to emerging commercial farmers who due to 
lack of experience and knowledge of the commercial farm business 
appear as high risk borrowers. Some avenue of "escape" should be 
provided for the individual from the noncommercial sector who has 
the potential to enter the commercial farming business to prevent 
him from being "locked iJ:l" by the culture and the economy in which 
he resides. 
The conference found time for questions from the audience. Here a participant 
listens to an answer to one of his questions. 
Besides formal discussion periods, participants had a chance to discuss 
the papers and viewpoints informally. 
Presenting a paper on the farm labor market was Bob Jones of Purdue 
University. On the left is Peter Heimberger, chairman of the session. 
Awaiting his turn to comment on several of the papers is A. Allan Schmid. 
After listening to Bob Jones and Allan Schmid, the audience responded with 
comments and questions, As chairman, Peter Heimberger directed the 
question-answer period. 
INPUT MARKETS FOR LABOR AND LABOR SUBSTITUTES 
by B. F. Jones* 
If in the next 15 years the farm population were to decrease by 
the same absolute amount as in the past 15 years, there would be no 
farm population by about 1980. A similar statement can be made 
about changes in the number of man-hours required in farm produc-
tion. These have been astounding changes and are indicative of the 
rapid changes in American agriculture which have occurred since 
about 1950. 
Within the general framework of this activity, the objective of 
this paper is to focus on the input markets for labor and labor substi-
tutes. The assignment here is to discuss the implications of changes 
in those markets for research in farm management and marketing. 
The paper is organized into four main parts. The first part dis-
cusses the extent of capital-labor substitution in agricultural produc-
tion and presents a classification of production based on the present 
status of mechanization and types of labor required. The second part 
of the paper considers some of the research implications of economic 
changes and relationships. The third part emphasizes research impli-
cations of recent legislative developments. The last part contains 
some concluding comments about our traditional backward-looking 
approach. 
The Extent of Capital-Labor Substitution 
A common policy prescription for increasing per capita farm 
income has been to encourage farm-employed labor to seek alterna-
tive nonfarm employment. Persistent low relative income has been 
one of the symptoms back of this proposed remedy. Also, studies 
of the agricultural adjustment process have indicated a need for 
continued downward adjustment in labor use in agriculture. And 
projections of farm employment based on productivity trends have 
indicated that continued reduction in farm employment is likely. 
Although these relationships appear consistent at the aggregate 
level, they have not been consistent with farmers' pleas of a labor 
shortage and government policy which permitted importation of for-
eign labor until January 19 65. 
*Assistant Professor, Purdue University. Helpful comments on an 
earlier draft of this paper were received from Paul Farris and Arlo Minden. 
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It is helpful in gaining perspective on the farm labor markets to 
divide farm crop production into two broad classes. Grain production 
and, more recently, cotton production represent a type of farm pro-
duction with rather distinct labor requirement characteristics. Fruits, 
vegetables, and specialty crops represent a separate class of pro-
ducts with different labor requirements. Distinctions between the 
two groups is developed in the followil'lJ section. This classifica-
tion will be maintained throughout the remainder of the paper. 
Mter listening to papers that have been presented, I believe this 
distinction is important. We have been discussing aggregate problems 
and I believe we tend to think of U.S. agriculture with a Midwest 
perspective. But there are some important regional differences and 
some important differences in capital-labor substitution situations 
based on type of production or kind of product. 
Consider now the first class of products represented by grain 
production. In this class technology is now available which permits 
most, if not all, functions to be done by machine. Future capital-
labor substitution possibilities consist of substituting larger machines 
for smaller ones or for substituting chemical or biological forms of 
inputs for mechanical forms of capital. Questions arise about the 
rate of discard of smaller machines and the rate at which it is econom-
ically feasible to adopt the newer labor-saving methods. The adjust-
ment process involves recombination of farms into larger production 
units, with release of labor one consequence. With the exception 
of cotton farms, production units have typically been organized 
around the labor available from the farm family with hired labor of 
only minor importance. 
Continuing with this generalization, it has been the food grains, 
feed grains and cotton which have been in over-supply and thus 
"to~ much" labor has been devoted to production of those commodities. 
Tobacco production, also in over-supply, is a labor-intensive crop 
and presumably at present does not have the same capital-labor sub-
stitution possibilities exhibited by grain and cotton production. 
The second type of production includes fruits, vegetables, nuts 
and other specialty crops. A principal difference in labor require-
ments between this kind of production and grain production consists 
of the level of mechanization available and the amount of labor required 
per unit of production. Planting and cultivating are largely mechanized, 
but the extent of additional mechanization varies among crops, and is 
much further developed in some lines of production than others. Harvest-
ing methods vary from use of a high proportion of hand labor to use of 
highly sophisticated machines. At present levels of technology, capital-
labor substitution consists of substituting machine methods for hand 
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methods rather than larger, more efficient machines being substituted 
for smaller machines. For some job operations mechanization possi-
bilities are limited because machines have not yet been invented or 
their performance is unsatisfactory because of plant characteristics 
which make them unsuitable for mechanization. Further mechanization 
depends upon development of suitable machines and development of 
varieties which are adapted to machine operations • 
Typically, production of fruits, vegetables and specialty crops 
has been organized into economic units which require more labor 
during peak seasons than is available from the farm operator family. 
Thus, seasonal hired labor is required during peak seasons.· 
Over-production of fruits, vegetables and specialty crops has 
been less a problem than for grains and cotton. Labor has been 
more a "shortage" problem than a "surplus" problem. 
When this classification scheme is extended to livestock pro-
duction, it appears that most, if not all, livestock production comes 
under the s arne heading as grain production. Technology in the form 
of materials-handling equipment and housing is available or is becom-
ing available which permits substitution of capital for labor. The 
extent to which substitution has occurred has depended upon fixety 
of resources in production, relative costs of capital and labor, and 
size of production units • 
Studies of farm labor markets have been highly aggregate-type 
studies which have considered national or regional markets for labor. 
Classification by type of farm labor, i.e., family and hired labor, 
on a national or regional basis has comprised the extent of dis-
aggregation attempted in econometric studies of labor. These studies 
have provided useful estimates of the parameters of the demand and 
supply functions for agricultural labor. However, a lower level of 
aggregation is required to analyze the relationships implied in the 
classification presented above. 
Sources of Supply of Labor 
The farm family has been the traditional source of supply for the 
bulk of labor requirements on most grain and livestock farms • On 
these farms both the operator and hired labor supply have come largely 
from the farm community and farm families • Relative wage rates, 
individual preferences for kinds of work, and employment opportuni-
ties in the farm and nonfarm sectors have been the relevant factors 
determining the number of persons seeking employment in the farm 
sector. It is clear that the level of aggregate demand and the level 
of unemployment in the nonfarm sector are important factors determining 
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the rate of out-migration from agriculture and hence are factors 
determining the quantity of labor supplied to agriculture. 
In general, farms which produce specialty crops have relied less 
on family !abo~ and more on hired labor than have grain and livestock 
farms. Historically, claims have been made that domestic labor 
supplies have been inadequate to meet the demands of specialty 
crop production. Manpower policies instigated during World War II 
are evidence of this purported shortage. Until 19 65, legislation 
(P. L. 7 8) permitted recruitment and importation of foreign nationals 
where need could be demonstrated. Refusal to extend P. L. 7 8 beyond 
19 64 does not represent a decrease in the claimed shortage; but a 
decline in the power of agricultural interests to secure the legislation 
which it favors. 
Although farm wage rates have been low relative to nonfarm 
wages, it is not clear that higher wages would bring forth the 
"desired" supplies. Also, it is not clear that workers, on the 
average, have been paid less than the value of their marginal pro-
duct, given that skill levels are low and that functions to be per-
formed are relatively simple. Because of the low status attached to 
this type work by our society, the value placed on leisure, avail-
ability of welfare payments and nonfarm employment opportunities, 
labor seeking this type of employment represents a residual supply. 
Thus it remains employed in agriculture only so long as nothing 
"better" is available. 
It can be argued that labor engaged in grain and livestock pro-
duction as contrasted to labor engaged in specialty crop production 
represents non-competing groups. Surplus operator labor in grain 
production is not likely to be seeking employment as hired labor in 
specialty crop production. Earnings may be comparable (although 
at low levels), but the low status attached to hired labor, particularly 
of the type done by migrant labor, precludes movement of operators 
to fill available hired worker positions except under severe economic 
pressures. 
The labor surplus-shortage situation in U.S. agriculture can be 
summed up as follows. Low relative incomes indicate an excess 
supply of labor in agriculture. Disaggregation suggests a large pro-
portion of the surplus labor is in grain, cotton and livestock produc-
tion. Technology imbedded in various forms of capital is available 
which would permit continued release of labor from farm production. 
The rate of release of labor is dependent upon the ability of operators 
to modernize agriculture through acquisition of capital. The adjust-
ment process requires recombination of fanns into larger units, and 
temporary shortages of labor develop in this sector as operators are 
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slow to acquire labor-saving technology and are slow to respond to 
rising wage rates. 
The labor situation has different aspects in specialty crop produc-
tion. Machine technology is available only to a limited (but growing) 
extent, and thus opportunities for substituting capital for labor are 
limited. I do not wish to minimize the present extent of mechaniza-
tion available or efforts being made to develop machines. But many 
functions which require hand labor have been difficult to mechanize. 
Relatively simple tasks remain to be done which require only limited 
skills. These tasks have undesirable work characteristics and jobs 
are taken only by workers who are unable to find employment else-
where. High levels of economic activity which enable workers to 
find nonfarm employment result in hired-labor supply schedules 
shifting upward and to the right with the wage rate tending to equal 
or exceed the marginal value product of the labor in agriculture. 
Research Implications of Economic Changes 
Given the classification scheme presented here and the structural 
changes developed in the base papers, what research areas are im-
plied? The following list is not intended to be all-inclusive; the 
intention is to present major areas where additional work would 
appear to be fruitful. 
Projected Labor Requirements 
Assuming Various Capital Situations 
A combination of factors which includes the long-time trend of 
farm wage rates rising relative to the cost of substitute inputs, labor 
11 surplus 11 in some areas of production and 11 shortages 11 in others 
indicates a need for additional research attention to labor questions 
_pm:, ~· This need will become greater as additional slack is removed 
from the agricultural labor force. Furthermore, the slack is likely to 
become less over the next decade, if one assumes economic growth 
rates comparable to those attained in the 1960's which have permitted 
unprecedented removal of labor from agriculture. 
Research should be undertaken which would project future demand 
for agricultural labor under various conceivable capital situations and 
economic organizations of agriculture. The approach should be suf-
ficiently disaggregated that numbers of workers could be estimated 
together with the skills required for the various capital situations. 
Analysis of the kind being suggested here would provide informa-
tion for policy dec is ions when recruitment of workers into agriculture 
is required. Also, it is not clear that present agricultural training 
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provides the type and amount of training for workers using modern 
equipment and methods. A projection of skill needs would provide 
information useful in setting up training programs for persons pre-
sently in the agricultural labor force and whose best opportunities 
probably remain in the agricultural labor force because of age or 
other reasons. 
Cohort analysis indicates an age structure of farm operators 
heavily weighted with the age groups past 50 years. Due to their 
relative immobility, it is important to know what upgrading of skill 
requirements will be required of them. It is conceivable that capital 
suppliers could provide part of the needed training if they had better 
information about what skills are required. 
Capital-Labor Substitution 
The substitution of capital services for labor has been a major 
factor in the release of labor from farm employment. As labor costs 
continue to rise, opportunities for substituting additional capital for 
labor will be sought. For example, technology is currently available 
which permits one man to double or triple pork production without 
increasing the labor input, but it is not in use on many farms. These 
facilities require relatively large sums of money, are highly specialized 
and have expected life of 10 to 20 years. Because of the tendency 
of farmers to over-invest in fixed facilities, it is important to have 
good estimates of capital-labor substitution rates. However, economic 
analysis of alternative building and equipment systems is hindered 
by lack of good technical information on the capital-labor substitu-
tion process • 
Farm management manuals prepared for use in teaching farm 
planning and organization of farms contain labor coefficients for the 
various enterprises. However, these are usually average coefficients 
for a given size of enterprise and often are not accompanied by suf-
ficient detail about what specific capital is included. Limitations 
of these data are probably a reflection of the lack of research data 
on capital-labor substitution relationships at a sufficiently disaggre-
gated level. What is needed is analysis of systems of production 
with sufficient information available to identify size of operation and 
other relevant facts. In order to secure these data for analysis, it 
may be necessary to engage in interdepartmental cooperation between 
economists and the physical scientists in laying out experiments 
emenable to economic analysis. 
Since farm operators are interested in new equipment as it comes 
on the market, they are interested in economic evaluation before it 
is available from traditional sources. Capital suppliers have become 
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increasingly involved in research and development, but they are more 
concerned with design, marketability, and consumer acceptance than 
in analysis which permits comparison with other systems. Also, 
objective analysis without vested interest is a consideration. 
New approaches which permit more rapid evaluation of new labor-
saving technology need to be tried. One approach would be for 
university researchers to work directly with firms supplying equipment. 
An example would be for an interdepartmental university group to 
serve as consultants to a firm in the building and equipment supply 
industry for feeding experiments set up to evaluate controlled-
environment feeding of cattle. Problems would arise with respect 
to release of experimental results, "apparent" university endorse-
ment, and objectivity of the analysis, but they do not appear to be 
insurmountable problems. 
Location of Production 
One response to rising labor costs which an industry can make 
is to move to a new location where labor costs are lower. A movement 
of production may involve gains in employment opportunities for one 
region at the expense of losses in other regions. Other reasons for 
a region to gain or lose in competitive position consist of new pro-
duction or business organization techniques which facilitate produc-
tion in a new location, e.g., movement of broiler production to the 
South. 
Assuming that underemployed agricultural labor is spatially 
relatively immobile, what opportunities exist for shifts in location 
of production to reduce underemployment and for making more effi-
cient use of labor resources? . What role has regional differences 
in labor costs had in shifting locations of production and in the 
development of geographic specialization? 
Other locational questions arise over the possibility of shifts 
in location of production to areas outs ide the U • S. , where labor 
costs are lower. For example, what is the likelihood of labor-
intensive vegetable production shifting to Mexico, where workers 
are willing to engage in hand labor? This shift is quite likely as 
the movement is already underway ,11 but what is known of its 
extent? What are the impacts for the U.S. and Mexico of such 
international specialization? 
11 . John G. Knapp, "Takmg the Crop to the Bracero," The Farm Quar-
terly, Vol. 22, No. 2, Spring 1967, pp. 90-95. 
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Use of Available Supplies of Labor 
Agricultural production has become increasingly specialized by 
geographic region and on farms within regions. This development has 
been contrary to the trend of horizontal integration in nonfarm business 
organizations. This specialization has lead to loss of some of the 
traditional complementary relations between enterprises. Questions 
of how to organize to make efficient use of available labor arise. 
One alternative is to make greater use of seasonal labor. What are 
the possibilities, particularly on Midwest crop farms, of making 
greater use of part-time help during peak work periods? Would this 
take hourly wage rates two or three times greater than present farm 
wage rates? If so, is this a lower-cost and more-efficient alterna-
tive than use of full-time labor which is kept employed in only a 
modestly efficient livestock operation for the remainder of the year? 
Regular part-time labor may be a real possibility near industrial 
areas where workers have farm backgrounds, have had experience 
with machinery, and may want to earn additional income. How could 
an organization be set up to utilize this source of supply of labor 
to farms? What form would it take? Might this be a cooperative 
venture organized by employers rather than as an employment agency? 
How would industrial unions react to organized, planned multipie-
job holding? 
An alternative solution to the "tight" labor situation is to purchase 
labor along with other commercially supplied inputs. New forms of 
fertilizer have reduced the amount of labor required in their applica-
tion. Also, bulk spreading of fertilizer by the farm supplier results 
in less on-farm labor required. Custom application of pesticides, 
insecticides, off-farm processing of feeds, and commercial seed 
production all represent purchase of labor services with the product 
and all permit greater output with a fixed on-farm supply of labor. 
These inputs represent the trend toward use on farms of a larger pro-
portion of purchased inputs. It follows that crop and livestock pro-
duction is becoming less a primary production process and more a 
transformation process using purchased inputs and thus is moving 
closer to industrial-type production. 
Growing use of purchased inputs leads to questions about optimum 
combinations of purchased and nonpurchased inputs. Which services 
should be performed on the farm? For example, where is the optimum 
location of grain-drying facilities? On farms? Or in commercial 
elevators? What are the economics of grain-drying facilities? 
Also, how does access or lack of access to these facilities affect 
the prices received by producers for grain? 
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Personnel managers in industrial firms have recognized the 
importance of selection, training and supervision of workers in 
increasing the productivity of labor. Traditional attitudes of most 
farm operators toward hired labor and the relatively small labor 
force on mbst farms have not contributed to good personnel manage-
ment on farms which hire labor. What kind of personnel management 
training programs should be provided to farm operators? Who should 
train the workers for tomorrow? How should they be recruited? What 
kind of training should they receive? Surely the day of hiring the 
first person that comes down the road is about over in agriculture. 
Aging of Farm Operators 
The changing age structure of farm operators is the major change in 
demographic characteristics of the farm labor force. The increasing 
average age of farm operators is a reflection of the fact that the reduc-
tion in numbers of farm operators has been accomplished through reduced 
entry rates and relatively low exit rates with aging farmers remaining 
in agriculture. The net entry and exit rates as determined by cohort 
analysis do not reveal the extent of movement in and out of the agri-
cultural labor force. Perkins and Hathaway found that gross exit 
rates of persons in the agricultural work force were relatively high .l..../ 
But because they were not able to maintain permanent employment 
in the nonfarm sector, they shifted back to farm employment; hence, 
net annual off-farm migration rates were relatively small. 
Kanel found that younger farmers tended to make greater adjust-
ments in size of farm and in volume of products sold than did older 
farmers .Y Despite this competition, older workers have chosen 
to remain in agriculture voluntarily or because of lack of alternative 
opportunities. Thus, both off-farm alternatives and on-farm oppor-
tunities have been more limited for older workers than for younger 
workers. 
On the other hand, older workers do not make particularly good 
candidates for retraining because of the relatively short period of 
time for recovering training costs. Since their limited contribution 
may be greatest in agriculture, it is important that they have access 
to resources and that they be provided with technical and managerial 
YBrian Perkins and Dale Hathaway, "Movement of Labor between 
Farm and Nonfarm Jobs," Agricultural Experiment Station Research 
Bulletin 13, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1966. 
Y Don Kane!, "Farm Adjustments by Age Groups, North Central States, 
1950-1959," Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 45, February 1963, 
pp. 47-60. 
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training. What are their needs and how can they be met? 
Legislative Developments and Research Opportunities 
A conspicuous aspect of federal labor legislation has been its 
exceptions for agricultural labor. Social Security coverage was not 
extended to agricultural labor until 1950. And then only a small 
segment of the labor force was provided with coverage. Social 
Security coverage for self-employed farm operators was not available 
until passage of enabling legislation in 195 6. Minimum wage legis-
lation exempted farm labor until February 11 19 67. Manpower pro-
grams initiated during World War II evolved into legislation ·pro-
viding for the importation of foreign nationals for farm work in the 
U.S. This enabling legislation was extended periodically until 
January 1, 1965, when the program was allowed to expire despite 
much protest from agricultural interests. 
Expiration of P. L. 7 8 appears to be the turning point for excep-
tions for agricultural labor. Since that time agricultural labor appears 
to be gradually entering the mainstream of labor legislation. 
Unionization 
It is not clear how rapidly or to what extent agricultural labor 
will become unionized. But recent successes at organization suggest 
that it will be only a matter of time before unionized agricultural 
labor becomes a viable force in agriculture. As farms become larger 1 
unionization will become more feasible. However, it is important 
to maintain perspective on the size of the future labor force on farms. 
Daly estimates there will be fewer than one million commercial farms 
by 1980. He also estimates they will be using around three and one-
half million workers by that date. i/ This would indicate an average 
of only three and one-half to four workers per farm, including operator 
labor. Thus, the average labor force on farms will not be large by 
industrial standards. However, because of wide variation between 
farms in organization and size, there is likely to be wide variation 
in the number of workers per farm. 
Schuh has argued that the growth of unionization and the impact 
which it has on wage levels, employment practices and working con-
ditions will depend upon the form which it takes. If it is assumed 
that unionization is accomplished, what services will the unions 
y 
Rex F. Daly, "Agriculture in the Next Decade: Some Projected 
Alternatives," December 1966. 
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perform for their members and for the employers? Will they facilitate 
hiring practices and be useful in assuring a source of supply of labor 
through a hiring hall? 
Will employers be able to bargain effectively with the union on 
an individual basis, or will a producer bargaining organization be 
required? If the monopoly union emerges, it would appear that a 
form of producer organization or board would be required for conduct-
ing negotiations on a counterveiling-power basis. How will this 
transfer of power to a bargaining association affect firm decision-
making? How will the public interest be represented in these 
negotiations? What lessons in dealing with organized labor· can 
be learned from industry experience? 
The federal government has looked with favor on efforts at 
unionization of agricultural labor. Probably activities of unions will 
come under increased scrutiny as they grow in power, particularly 
if the flow of food supplies is seriously threatened. 
The Traditional Approach--The Backward Look 
As an appendage to this paper, I wish to briefly consider our 
traditional approach and the possibility of its being biased by our 
values and attitudes toward farm organization. I suspect we are 
biased even though we make a strong plea for objectivity. I suspect 
a large proportion of us are 11 displaced" farmers and have been in-
fluenced by the traditional values. If this is true, have we as 
agricultural economists been so closely tied to the values held by 
the agricultural establishment that we have failed to consider relevant 
economic organizations for agriculture? Although Kellogg has not 
been the first to raise this issue, he has again called it to our atten-
tion. We are all familiar to some extent with all the arguments put 
forth in justification of the family farm. How relevant are these 
arguments today? Are they really just rationalizations of what has 
been? 
Suppose, for the sake of discussion, we consider input suppliers 
as they drive toward dealing more directly with farm operating units 
as becoming more oligopolistic in character and conduct. Further, 
suppose product markets do become more oligopsonistic in character. 
Then presume that between these two groups there exists only 
100,000 to 150,000 farms producing the bulk of farm commodities and 
that agricultural labor does become unionized with monopoly charac-
teristics and has power in dealing with employers. Given this situa-
tion, what kind of commodity or producer organizations will be re-
quired to deal with input suppliers and purchasers of products? Or 
will the farms become merely an extension of the marketing agencies? 
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These speculations may pertain to conditions so far in error or 
so many years in advance that they are not worthy of our considera-
tion here. Yet, our adherence to traditional value positions may be 
keeping us from examining some of the relevant issues of the day. 
DISCUSSION: NON-FARM AGRICULTURAL FIRMS, AGRICULTURAL 
ASSOCIATIONS AND GOVERNMENT 
by A. Allan Schmid* 
I should like to begin with a theme used by J. K. Galbraith in 
his Reith BBC lectures last year .1/ He notes that when Henry Ford 
created his first automobile it was manufactured from parts that were 
readily available in stock or could be machined in general purpose 
shops. The steel, gears, wheels, etc. were those which were widely 
available and in general use. The machine tools needed were those 
available in many shops making bicycles and various other items. 
If these materials and tools were not used for one thing they could be 
used for another. When the idea for a new combination of these came 
to the creative mind of old Henry, the market could respond readily. 
Let's contrast this with the latest model, the Mustang. The develop-
ment and design period stretched over many years • It contains 
materials specially made for it alone. For example, its planning 
involves making sure that metals of certain characteristics are avail-
able when a certain key part is to be made. No longer can a creative 
genius call up the local materials warehouse or bicycle shop and 
hope to find the appropriate components. Materials manufacturers 
no longer just toss out their product to see if anyone wants it nor 
do consumer goods manufacturers expect to find what they need in 
such materials heaps. 
What has all this to do with agriculture and the subject at hand? 
Lester Kellogg tells us that it takes John Deere 5 to 7 years to develop, 
test and put into production a major new machine. If they do not 
correctly estimate the needs and demands years in advance they are 
in big trouble. Or conversely since they are a large supplier and other 
suppliers can make the same error, agriculture will just have to put 
up with the available machines and wait for the manufacturers to 
retool. I wonder if the cost of mistakes here are as significant as 
any errors that farm firms might make in resource combinations or even 
in buying one too many machines that Glenn Johnson talks about. 
*Associate Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan 
State University. 
1/J. K. Galbraith, "The New Industrial State," The Reith Lectures, 
The Listener, November 17, 1966. 
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The new technological processes demand a degree of predict-
ability and coordination which differ from the good old days. Some 
of the speakers have well pointed this out. George Allen notes that 
more fertilizer manufacturers are moving to company owned retail 
outlets. He also speaks of the broiler industry needing more rigorous 
control over nutritional balance in feeds and that this may require 
large scale mixing plants. The case of tomato canners who must bal-
ance acid content of their products illustrates that the simple product 
markets of the past are going the way of the dodo bird. Lowell Hill 
has another example of a meat packer offering contracts for future 
delivery at a specific price and time to achieve an orderly supply. 
A processor can't sit there with an expensive single purpose plant 
and hope that his publication of a periodic price list or making bids 
at an auction will call forth the correct products at the right time. 
The richness and detail of the communication needed seems to over-
tax generalized market transactions. The expansion of administra-
tive transactions to link different stages of production within the 
corporation and new devices for linking separately owned firms have 
made planners of us all and the only possible reversal is a denial of 
the technological process itself. 
The speakers have dqne a good job in pointing out the impact of 
technological developments on profitable input and enterprise com-
binations, location of production, market concentration, and the like. 
I would like to extend this to consider how technology affects the 
market as an institution. Depending on the system of market rules 
and property rights, changes in technology produce effects which 
have feedbacks on the technological process itself. Let me try to 
explain. The beauty of the atomistic competitive market is that one 
man with a cost saving innovation can force others to follow. The 
innovator has great power to propagate change without considering 
what costs it might be creating for his fellows. This feature is some-
times forgotten in the much more praised characteristic that no one 
producer can affect price. Yet, one of the important economic growth 
features of competitive markets in the past is this ability of a few 
innovators to move others. When technological change was more 
modest this created few problems that couldn't be solved by the normal 
outmigration of the death rate. The few hardship cases could be 
treated by local charity. Now, when change is nonmarginal and the 
asset values and savings of large groups are wiped out in the process, 
the distribution of these losses can have an important impact on the 
process of technological creation and adoption and thus the future 
performance of the economy. Here, the old insistence in economic 
theory dogma of separating income distribution and resource alloca-
tion analysis falls flat. Let me illustrate further with some examples 
from Lowell Hill. He points to the dramatic increase in field shelling 
of corn. So a few small business men with truck mounted shellers 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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lose their shirts. So a few shellers are bombed, who cares? This 
changes things like enterprise locations and costs and returns but 
there is little impact in terms of future technological adoption or 
creation. 
But, I wonder if the next generation of equipment will go so 
quietly. Hill mentions the big hopper cars being developed for trans-
port of grain. I can•t help but wonder if the "Whopper Hopper" will 
go as gracefully as will the truck mounted shellers. I wonder if 
their owners won•t do something to protect the asset values of these 
costly and increasingly specialized pieces of equipment and plant. 
And, I wonder if this something might not be the slowing of the 
process of technological adoption itself. My research hypothesis 
is this: Unless we develop positive policies through our market rules 
and organization to systematically plan for and share the costs of 
these big technological changes we invite the application of much 
creative effort to the slowing down of innovation. We need to search 
for institutional alternatives here. The experience of Sweden might 
be useful.Y They give much aid to displaced workers so that they 
do not fear change. This aid includes retraining and housing help 
in their new location. Our own agricultural price support programs 
have surely put a firm bas,e under the adjustment process and make it 
more palatable. It provides capital for further investment and the 
move out. Yet, it does not distinguish sufficiently between the needs 
of those staying and those leaving and does not provide enough tailor 
made help and incentive. But, the answers, if indeed there is a 
problem here, need not lie in direct governmental activity. The 
conglomerate firm has interesting implications . They may be better 
able to roll with the punches of technological change in one of their 
product lines since it has other enterprises to carry it over the adjust-
ment period and pick up the overhead. An example is the diversifi-
cation of the tobacco industry. Of course, the conglomerate firm 
is troublesome for its ability to use this s arne power to enter a pro-
duct line by undercutting competitor•s prices because of their flex-
ibility in allocating costs • 
To summarize a bit at this point, I see various rigidities being 
built into our whole economy as each individual group tries to pro-
tect themselves from change. Agriculture has done less of this than 
some other industries to the benefit of the country and hardship of 
many farmers. But, agriculture may be trying to catch up. Agri-
cultural economists could perform a valuable service and provide a 
good example for the rest of the economy if they could solve this 
y 
See Andrew Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1965, p. 210. 
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basic problem of a society with rapid technological change. 
Before turning to some of the specific markets I would like to 
make one more general point on technological impact on market 
institutions. New innovations are the source of the great gains and 
profits in our economy. The power to allocate these gains will be 
the battleground for much future debate. Hill talks about the develop-
ment of manufactured spun vegetable protein which can duplicate the 
texture of a wide range of products including meat. For another 
example, just allow your mind to contemplate the havoc that the develop-
ment of a synthetic coffee flavor will have on Brazilian agriculture. 
I don •t know enough about these to know whether anything on the 
horizon could have this kind of impact in American agriculture. But 
whether it is tomorrow or the next, I have a feeling that the past 
revolution in agricultural technology focused on farm practices 
(hybrids, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) will be paled to second order 
by the changes to take place on the manufactured food side. The 
subsequent adjustments while they can•t again affect such large 
numbers of people may be equally dramatic and costly. 
But, let's leave the question of compensation and adjustment 
aid aside and ask a question about allocation of the net gravy. To 
dramatize my concern let me use another non-agricultural example. 
There is now a new communications satellite system which was 
developed in large part by public funds and immersed in the whole 
social enterprise of education and research where allocation of costs 
to individual developments is often impossible. Comsat, a private-
public corporation, was capitalized in 1962 for $200 million to use 
the new technology primarily for international communication .Y 
By 19 65, the technology had advanced so much that the firm was 
over-capitalized for its original mission. Now it appears that 
it is practical to use it for domestic TV transmission at half the pre-
sent cost. Who is going to get this new windfall? 
A. T. & T. says it would, through its corporate wisdom and 
according to sound business practices (whatever they are), spread 
the gain over it's entire telephone rate base and make all phones a 
bit cheaper. The Ford Foundation suggests that the gains from 
domestic TV transmission sales be used to finance educational TV 
production instead of depending on tax revenues . 
Y See Charles E. Silverman, "The Little Bird That Casts A Big Shadow," 
Fortune, February, 1967, p. 108. 
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This is an example of the great power that private and public 
groups have at their disposal as a result of our success in creating 
new know ledge. I don't know if there is anything as dramatic as 
Comsat in the agricultural industries, but I would guess that there 
may be numerous opportunities to allocate various costs and pro-
ductivity gains among various product lines. To conclude here, I 
would suggest that the power to decide which prices to lower may 
be worth investigation along with the more traditional market power 
to raise prices. 
May I summarize what I think I have said so far: 
1 • The problems of investment coordination and timing are more 
important with the new technologies. This is nothing new, but the 
process continues. We will need to search for new marketing insti-
tutions that can carry the richness and detail of communication that 
will be needed to avoid inefficient linkage of production processes 
and missed opportunities for new gains. The days when we could 
toss products on the market to see if anyone wanted them and adjust 
production in the next period accordingly are fleeting away. 
2. If we fail to coordinate agricultural investments and plan 
for and share the costs of adjustments created by new technologies 
we may be inviting a costly reaction which will slow future tech-
nological advance. We need to know the macroeconomics of tossing 
out a new machine or food product. These past bombs, so disastrous 
to some farmers and so great for consumers up till now, may have a 
feedback which will slow future innovation, particularly on the 
industrial side of agriculture. To share in the costs of adjustment 
may be a good investment in future productivity gains. 
3. Finally, the new technologies create gains to be distributed 
by the chosen ones. This could have a tremendous impact on the 
content of our growing G. N. P. Can research lay out some of the 
broad alternatives and choices here? 
Now, I would like to address a few points organized by the 
topics of the 4 papers I am to discuss. 
Product Markets 
The lack of attention to consumer problems in the papers and 
the whole conference is notable. It's great to have efficient produc-
tion and distribution, but .•.• I know that research on consumer 
difficulties with various package sizes and labels will not generate 
the political approval of a new study of feeding rations or farm supply 
inventory procedures. Still, every time I try to get the last ounce 
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out of a narrow-necked catsup bottle, I wonder if I am swearing 
alone. The fact that the price of catsup has been kept down or even 
lowered a few pennies doesn't impress. "When are the home economists 
going to publish the results of their product tests? How can people 
decide how to allocate research resources for greater efficiency in 
production when they can't get good information on the products them-
selves? Enough sermonizing. 
I applaud Hill's mention of some of the non-food and fiber out-
puts of rural land. How about developing a good management record 
book for farm recreation enterprises and some cost and return studies? 
Rural land produces water, landscape views, and air purification as 
well as food. How about some good production economics studies of 
these? 
As various authors have pointed out we are likely to see labor 
laws developed in industry increasingly applied to agriculture. I 
do not have wide experience in agricultural labor but perhaps I can 
indicate the kind of problem that concerns me by another example. 
D. Gale Johnson tells the story of his secretary who likes to eat 
her lunch in the office while she handles her own correspondence 
and types for outside hire. "While she is there, an occasional tele-
phone call comes in which she is perfectly willing to take. This was 
fine in the good old days. Now under the fair labor practices law, 
answering the phone during noon break will have to be compensated as 
over-time and there is no way for the secretary to agree otherwise. 
The result is that Dean Johnson may be forced to prohibit her to stay 
in the office and use the typewriter at noon. The employer and 
employee and the whole society are the losers. Yet, the law probably 
has a good purpose to protect employees from being taken advantage of. 
I suspect that agriculture with it's demands for flexibility, tim-
liness, and multi-skilled work patterns may not fit some of the rules 
that made sense in industry. Bob Jones mentions the potential for 
part-time workers in agriculture but this may be restricted by the 
paper work and labor rules not appropriate for their employment. ke 
we going to be creative enough to figure out ways to protect workers 
rights and still retain flexibility? Here is another chance for agri-
cultural economists to make a contribution to a problem that plagues 
the whole economy. 
Jones also points out the prospect for unionization of agricultural 
workers. Food is one place where work stoppages could be very cost-
ly for the whole society. Again, I wonder if we can be creative 
enough to somehow separate the wage bargain from the work process. 
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In a less interdependent economy one group could withhold it's labor 
to gain higher returns and the rest of us could ignore it. Not so now. 
We need ways to keep production going while people argue over their 
relative shares. 
The classical doctrine of diminishing returns to land has been 
defeated in the United States. Acres of cropland cropped in agri-
culture have decreased while output has increased. The major sub-
stitutes for space are well known and elaborated in the conference 
papers. While fertilizer, better seeds, and pesticides make it 
possible to get more out of the same space it is also true that there 
have been considerable investments which are closely associated 
with land as space--namely, drainage, conservation practices, 
flood protection, and irrigation. However, these latter items have 
not received much attention. 
Perhaps this is due in part to the persuasive work of T. W. 
Schultz which makes a great deal of the declining relative supply 
price of land during 1910-14 and 195 6. He concludes from this that 
land improvements are low return investments .Y 
It just happens, of course, that the symmetry of this conclusion 
is disturbed a bit by the fact that fertilizer has also declined in 
relative price. This latter, however, is viewed as a great boon 
and the research, innovations and investments in fertilizer production 
that kept prices down are applauded and along with things like hybrids 
are given most of the credit for keeping land prices down. All of 
this leaves me uncomfortable. At a common sense level I just wonder 
if Griliches' Y discovery of a 700% return to hybrid corn research 
would have been so great if the Dust Bowl conditions of the 30's and 
soil erosion had been allowed to continue. The space used in agri-
culture today is not the same as that used in 1900 and the difference 
is not alone that of fertilizer and hybrids incorporated in it. 
Whatever an adequate historical analysis might show, we may 
well have done the job and further land development investments 
may have low marginal returns. If this is correct we might take the 
~Dale Dahl's paper was not available when this was written. 
Y T. W. Schultz "Land in Economic Growth," in Modern Land Policy, 
University of Illinois Press, 1960. 
Y Zvi Griliches, "Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and 
Related Innovations," Journal of Political Economy, Oct. 195 8, 
pp. 419-31. 
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SCS and ACP budgets and use them to help move and retrain farmers 
no longer needed in agriculture. All recent Presidents whether 
Republican or Democrat have recommended cuts in the ACP budget. 
What does our research have to contribute to this decision? 
Whether tied to land or not it seems to me that production and 
marketing researchers have not given enough attention to publicly 
provided agricultural inputs. We know relatively little about the 
return to rural electrification, education, health, roads, mails, and 
extension activities. The production people seem too concerned with 
private firms and marketing people with the market as such. Schultz 
has, of course, taken his stand on the side of education. He ques-
tions "allocation of more resources to government for housing, urban 
development, river basin development, land and water conservation, 
hospital and other health facilities, highways, parks, and other 
recreational facilities. 11 He asks "where is the evidence to create 
even a plausible case that the enlargement of the role of the public 
sector in these directions will increase the rate of economic growth 
substantially? 11 And again, he asks "Will these particular public 
measures, other things remaining the same, increase substantially 
the rate of economic growth?" His answer was, "There is no evi-
dence at hand, to my knowledge, that would make an affirmative 
answer plausible. "I/ Of course, lack of evidence to the affirmative 
does not prove the negative. The hard fact is that we know very 
little about the returns to public investments in agriculture. 
I suspect this gap in our knowledge is especially important 
when public investments might be used as key leverage points in 
farm adjustments. When we are trying to get a new enterprise started 
and a production region pointed in a new direction, the problem of 
coordination and timing of investments may be critical. 
Perhaps I can illustrate my point with a proposal often suggested 
as the answer for the economic doldrums of northern Michigan. The 
animal husbandry people think the beef cow-calf herd is the salvation 
of the area. Farm management research indicates that it has~ promise 
as a supplementary enterprise combined with off-farm work • .§! Full 
time enterprises also have some promise but are limited by the problem 
of putting together large acreages. Public agencies are doing little 
to facilitate this land market problem. Also, this type of budgeting 
study takes the existing costs and returns mostly as given. There 
11 . Schultz, op.c1t., pp. 33-4. 
Y Maish & Hoglund, The Economics of Beef Cow Herds in Michigan, 
Michigan Agr. Expt. Station Research Report 58, 1966. 
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are often external economies which mean that the first producers 
have high costs, but if scale can be built up, costs can be lowered. 
When the FHA makes credit available on a cafeteria basis for various 
enterprises and at the same rate to everyone regardless of purpose, 
it is difficult to overcome the initial high cost stage of production. 
The FHA takes great pride in keeping its loss record low. Yet, it 
might make sense as part of a planned adjustment to make some risky 
loans initially for a new enterprise whose expansion could really change 
future costs, rather than scatter a few safe loans which will never 
have great expansion potential and leave cost and return levels as 
before, Now, the credit program need not operate in a vacuum. The 
loan may be safer if tied to pasture improvement aided by ACP and SCS 
and training programs and marketing cooperatives organized by the 
Extension Service. Here again these agencies are providing assistance 
on a cafeteria basis. Cost sharing for conservation practices are 
scattered and the cost share rates not structured to concentrate on 
key enterprises. 
We need to give much more attention to the macro-economics of 
agricultural adjustments and the coordination of public programs • It 
is interesting to make a side observation on an ideological issue that 
this presents. I have made the point earlier that market coorination 
may not be sufficient. There is no guarantee that assigning the 
responsibility to public agencies will do the job as is evidenced by 
the agricultural programs. There has to be some positive way for 
the agencies representing the various inputs to relate to each other. 
The way the public agencies keep records is of no help. We 
know how many miles of terraces were constructed, farm plans drawn, 
loans made and defaulted. But, no place do we relate these programs 
to a development objective appropriate for an area and consistent 
with the national context. 
Land Substitutes and Demand in an Urban Economy 
Great emphasis has been placed by people in this conference 
on the productivity impact of things like pesticides. Little has been 
asked about the net benefits. Pesticides create losses for some 
natural resource users, but l}Ot enough attention has been given to 
the macro-economic impact .Y 
WAn outstanding exception is J. C. Headley and J. N. Lewis, The 
Pesticide Problem: An Economic Approach to Public Policy, 
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. 
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Agriculture is being immersed in the urban economy. The noise 
of the irrigation motor at a cottage lined lake or the smell of a live-
stock feeding yard or a mushroom operation in a built up area are 
troublesome indeed. Land space has served as an insulator for these 
and while it is probably not limiting on Kansas wheat or Iowa corn 
farms, land is scarce in certain specialty crop areas and where close-
in transport is important. I include this lest we think the land space 
problem is completely a thing of the past. 
The Land Market 
I want to examine some additional issues related to the land 
market itself. The structure and organization of this market is not 
a popular subject for marketing research. I wonder why? Perhaps it 
is because it has none of the obvious market faults and tendencies 
toward concentration. Yet, it is a peculiar sort of market. There are 
a very limited number of sales per unit of time. It is a local market 
flavored with personal contact and influenced perhaps more by the 
particular characteristics of the owner. Yet, we use the data from 
these few marginal sales to indicate average labor returns in farm 
management studies and compare these with non-farm incomes and 
draw policy conclusions. 
An important puzzle in the land market now is why buyers insist 
on bidding most of the gains from support prices into land values. 
One expects that net income will be capitalized into the fixed factor 
controlling access to that income and if this did not occur we would 
certainly need to ask why. Yet, why do buyers over do it. Why do 
they over-capitalize. Apparently there are still a lot of people with 
even poorer alternatives. This is an area which needs more research 
and is rich with policy implications. 
Along this line, I wonder how long we will retain our historical 
leg·al unconcern about the characteristics of the owners of farm land. 
In some of the Scandinavian countries you must be a bona-fide 
practicing farmer and small acreages cannot be sold except to people 
who can combine them into larger units • Our problems are not as 
severe in this respect of consolidation but still questions are use-
fully raised. Recently the Justice Department raised a question 
about the acquisition of the American Broadcasting Company by I. T. T. 
In part this is concerned with the usual market power questions, 
but part of it is the fact that I. T. T. is partly owned by foreign govern-
ments. The question of income distribution in agriculture is attracting 
more attention and the question of who gets the agricultural income 
will probably generate more interest in the future. We are lately see-
ing various non-farm corporations buying or expressing an interest in 
farm land. Some are agriculturally based and some are not. Is this 
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just an expression of entrepreneurial curiosity or is this a trend based 
on something they see and we do not? 
Capital 
Redman and Rudd note that credit service for older borrowers 
must be different from the young. They argue that the older farmers 
need to gear credit to plans for transfer rather than firm growth. If 
this is true it creates real costs to society. Maybe this is one of 
the advantages to large outside corporations. Could avoidance of 
the slowdown in growth between generations be an important· efficiency 
factor? It seems hard to imagine that industrial firms can find the 
kind of investment returns in agriculture that they have been used to. 
Yet, maybe we have not been looking at a long enough time period 
where maintenance of growth might be an important source of profit 
that we don •t see in our shorter run studies. Redman and Rudd also 
note that large banks prefer to loan in large chunks thereby reducing 
service costs per dollar of credit extended. Do some of these things 
add up to significant advantages of large scale investment by outside 
corporations in farms? I must leave this as a question and turn to a 
quite different capital and credit consideration. 
Our subject is the input markets for agriculture. I wonder if it 
would be fair game to raise a question about the markets for inputs 
into firms which in turn provide inputs for farms or for inputs into 
food processing firms. With reference to farms, Redman and Rudd 
speak of the lender•s problem of selecting those farmers who can repay 
their obligation. This is a classical banking problem at all levels 
but I wonder if its complexion changes a bit when applied to non-farm 
firm loans. I am impressed by Adolf Berle•s emphasis on the role 
played by retained earnings in the whole economy especially for risk 
ventures. The data are hard to come by, but his analysis indicates 
that of the gross capital formation from 1919 to 1947 about 34 percent 
came from business savings .lQ/ He further cites Department of 
Commerce figures that from 1947 to 1957, three-fifths of all capital 
funds used by corporate business had been derived from internal 
sources. An additional one-fifth came from long-term markets 
(mostly debt issues) and the remainder from short term debt (including 
bank debt). The point is that industry is less reliant on outside 
financing than once was the case. Redman and Rudd state that from 
the standpoint of efficiency, credit should play a neutral role in the 
entrepreneur•s decisions. This may be true with reference to a given 
lQ/ 
Adolf Berle, Power Without Property, New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Harvest Book edition, 1959, Ch. 1. 
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goal, but the source of funds has important implications for the firm's 
policies and use of market power. More and more the successful 
"borrowers" select themselves. What are the implications of this 
for performance in the agricultural input industries? 
New Marketing Institutions 
I have the uneasy feeling that we have become locked in on cer-
tain institutions and that we are desperately in need of some new 
ones. For example, I wonder if we have ridden the price support, 
input subsidies, acreage restriction and maybe even group bargain-
ing into the ground. Let me illustrate first with an example I stole 
from Jim Shaffer. He observes the tendency toward overproduction 
in the Michigan tart cherry industry and notes that total production 
varies considerably. This is caused in part by the fact that there 
are marginal lands planted to cherries which only bear when weather 
is favorable and the normal crop areas also are having bumper yields • 
In simpler days we could just say that if people located in the wrong 
place it was their tough luck and others should let them alone. But 
in this case the over-planting on marginal lands is not merely 
disastrous for the marginal producers but for the normal producers 
as well through no particular fault of their own. Shaffer suggests 
a type of land use zoning as a possible solution. This is widely 
accepted in the Northern Lake States to prevent isolated agricultural 
location in forested areas where they would create the need for costly 
public services. Why not for cherries? 
A more homely illustration of the need for institutional innovation 
is the case of weeds. I have vivid recollection as a child of cutting 
thistles out of our pasture accompanied by a hopeless pit in my 
stomach as I looked over the fence and saw our neighbor's weeds 
going unhindered to seed. I wonder if we have studied opportunities 
to reduce individual farm costs through group action. Nebraska now 
has a weed district law, but it doesn't work. Why? 
Off in another direction, I wonder if farmers ought to place less 
reliance on price supports and payments and try for a 27-1/2 percent 
depletion allowance like the oil business. Supposedly the oil pro-
vision is to encourage investment and exploration. Just as good a 
rationale could be developed for agriculture in the face of rapid 
technological change that I discussed earlier. Agriculture needs to 
get its returns some way that do not show up as a Treasury expendi-
ture. However, one of the problems with tax provisions is that they 
are not generally designed to be selective. Take, for example, in-
vestment tax credits for agriculture. Instead of broad tax incentives 
we should consider stimulus to certain key investments identified 
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by research appropriate for enterprise reorientation and growth of 
agriculture by areas. 
To conclude, I don't know how one does research where the wanted 
output is a new institution. Most of these have come in the past 
through practical men and a process of trial and error. The speed of 
change in technical knowledge throws men into new social relation-
ships where the luxury of long term incremental experimentation may 
be costly indeed. If social scientists can not provide a good share 
of workable new ideas for future marketing rules we will fall further 
and further behind our world's potential. 

CHANGE AND COMMUNITY ADTUSTMENT: THE METAMORPHOSIS OF 
RURAL AMERICA 
by Karl A. Fox* 
The first part of this paper is organized around a number of maps 
and figures which will help us to visualize the changes which have 
taken place in the structure of rural society in the United States dur-
ing the past 50 to 60 years. The second part of the paper will relate 
these changes in rural society more directly to the purposes of this 
conference. 
The maps and figures are organized into three clusters. The first 
cluster shows the small geographical scale on which rural communities, 
rural labor markets and retail trade areas were organized about 1911-13 
in a horse and buggy society. 
The second cluster portrays the nature of the transformation of 
rural society under the impact of the passenger automobile. The 
effects include a tremendous expansion in the sizes of labor market 
and retail trade areas; the emergence of a hierarchy of central places 
or trade centers as the automobile gave relatively free rein to econ-
omies of size in store, schools and other establishments; and the 
de facto organization of the residents of these trade centers, together 
with the surrounding farm population, into relatively large functional 
economic areas or low density cities, each representing a synthesis 
of rural and urban society in an area as large as several typical 
counties. 
The third cluster of maps presents a view of the United States 
economy as a set of functional economic areas (PEA's) which both 
absorbs and extends the present system of Standard Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (SMSA's) and supersedes the traditional dichotomy 
between urban and rural society. 
The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community, 1911-1913 
In 1915, C. J. Galpin, a University of Wisconsin sociologist, 
published an Agricultural Experiment Station bulletin which immediately 
*Professor and Head, Department of Economics, Iowa State University. 
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became a classic)/ Galpin made his field survey during 1911-1913. 
His study covered a single 16-township county (Walworth) in southern 
Wisconsin. Figures 16.1, 16.2, and 16.3 are reproduced from Galpin•s 
1915 bulletin. 
Rural society as of ·1915 was organized on a very small geographic 
scale o Figure 16 o 1 indicates that there were about 100 school districts 
in Walworth County, each covering on the average an area of five or 
six square miles. These school districts were no doubt organized when 
an eighth grade education was the norm and it was believed that the 
subjects essential to farm boys and girls could be taught in one-room 
school houses. 
Figure 16.2 shows that Walworth County was served by 12 trade 
centers, towns ranging from about 500 to 2, 500 in population. The 
average trade area covered about 50 square miles. The farm popula-
tion of each trade area was about as large as the population of the 
trade center. Galpin also commented that the farm people patronized 
the same stores and obtained the same range of services from the 
trade center as did the residents of the center its elf. 
Galpin also delineated 11 banking zones, 7 local news paper 
zones, 12 village milk zones, 12 village church zones, 9 high school 
zones and 4 village library zones. In general, these various types of 
areas tended to reinforce one another. Galpin summarized his find-
ings with respect to 11 the actual but unofficial community .. in the 
following words: 
11 Eight of the twelve civic centers of Walworth County are incor-
porated; four as cities and four as villages. Officially, that is, 
legally, the incorporated centers are treated as communities, each 
by and for itself. The foregoing analysis of the use of the leading 
institutions of each center by the farm population discloses the fact, 
however, that these institutions are agencies of social service over a 
comparatively determinable and fixed area of land surrounding each 
center; that this social service is precisely the same in character 
as is rendered to those people--whether artisans, employees, or 
professional persons--who happen to live within the corporate limits 
of the city or village; moreover, the plain inference is that the 
inhabitants of the center are more vitally concerned in reality with 
the development and upkeep of their particular farm land basis than 
with any other equal area of land in the state. 
1/ Galpin, Co J. 1 The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community 1 
Wisconsin Agr. Expo Sta. Res. Bul. No. 34, May 1915. 34 pp. 
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Figure 16. I. A map of the school districts of Walworth County. 
The small zigzag areas on this map show the scale of 
the prevailing type of organized rural social life in 
Wisconsin. The village and city centers 1 however 1 
suggest a changing scale commensurate with the 
coming economic rural order. Source: C. J. Galpin, 
.2.l2.· cit. 
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Figure 16.2. Trade Communities. Twelve villages and small cities 
situated in the county serve as trade centers for the 
farm homes precisely as for the village and city homes 
and all the homes trading at the same center form a 
trade community. Township lines six miles apart in-
dicate the distance. Source: C. J. Galpin, ..QP. cit. 
---- ----------------------
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"It is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid the conclusion that 
the trade zone about one of these rather complete agricultural civic 
centers forms the boundary of an actual, if not legal, community, 
within which the apparent entanglement of human life is resolved into 
a fairly unitary system of interrelatedness. The fundamental community 
is a composite of many expanding and contracting feature communities 
possessing the characteristic pulsating instability of all real life." 
Galpin then proceeded to summarize the essence of his findings 
by means of Figure 16. 3 which he called "a conventionalized community 
form": 
"It is possible to conventionalize the form and relationship of 
these 12 agricultural communities in the following way. Suppose the 
civic centers to be equal in size and population, equally complete 
institutionally, and equally distant from each other; suppose all farm 
homes to be connected with the centers by equally good roads at 
all seasons of the year, and also equally direct. Then apparently 
each community would be a circle, with the agricultural city as its 
center, having a radius somewhat longer than half the distance between 
any two centers. In order to include all the farm territory within some 
circle, and to have the least possible common area, we must impose 
the further condition that the centers be arranged so that only six 2 
centers are equally distant from any one center, as shown in Figure 16. 3 • ,y 
Galpin used the phrases "agricultural community, " "fundamental 
community," and "urban community" interchangeably to describe what 
he saw. 
Figure 16.4 (by Karl Fox) is in keeping with the small scale of 
the communities Galpin found. However, it incorporates a constraint 
upon the form of such a community which is imposed by a rectangular 
grid of section roads. Such road grids cover much of the Midwest. 
(This was not strictly true of Walworth County, but we wish to illus-
trate a fairly widespread phenomenon.} 
Consider the square centered on East Troy. Given a complete 
grid of east-west and north-south section roads, each corner of the 
square is five miles by road from the trade center. However, if we 
wish to reach certain points on the northeast boundary of the square 
we must travel one mile east and four miles north, two miles east 
and three miles north, three miles east and two miles north, or four 
miles east and one mile north. In each case, we must travel five 
miles by road (the order of operations is immaterial} to reach the 
Y Galpin, .2£• cit., pp. 16-19. 
-293-
~ 0LLAGE OR CITY CeNTER 
II rAR/1 H0/'1lJ l/SE JttSTITVTI0/1S OF Tfl£ ClhT£R 
JI./ST AS !JO Re~I!JE/1TS Or THE CE/YT£R 
~ rAR/1 HOf1£J IJSe JttSTITVTIOIYS OF /'10Re THAfl 
OIYE CEffTER 
Figure 16. 3. The theoretical form of an agricultural community. If 
all the conditions relating to farm homes and neighbor-
ing trade centers were conceived to be equal, then 
apparently the agricultural community would be in the 
form of a circle whose outer edge it would share more 
or less with neighboring communities. Source: C .J. 
Galpin, .2.2• cit. 
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® 
ITEWATER "~d 
(/' eMILLA 
Figure 16. 4. Schematic map of county studied by C. J. Galpin 
(1915}, assuming a rectangular road grid and 
travel (pedestrian or horse and wagon} at 5 miles 
per hour. 
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boundary of the square. If we assume that people in 1915 could travel 
on foot or by horse and wagon at an average speed of five miles an 
hour, the boundary of the East Troy trade area is essentially a circle 
with a radius of 60 minutes. Under our assumptions, the rectangular 
road grid transforms this 60-minute circle into a square measuring 
five miles from center to corner--and also from the center to any point 
on the sides of the square. 
The Impact of the Automobile 
Figure 16.5 visualizes some of the changes wrought or facilitated 
by the passenger automobile. In 1915, the horse and wagon was still 
the dominant mode of local transportation; the village grocery store 
and the one-room school were dominant or at least typical institutions 
of the rural community. 
Rural roads improved only gradually, and their quality at any 
given time imposed a limit on practicable automobile speeds. As 
of 1930, the automobile was already the dominant mode of transporta-
tion; grocery stores were beginning to accommodate themselves 
to a motorized clientele; and most rural parents were encouraging 
their children to attend high school. 
By 1966, most residents of rural areas in the Midwest owned 
automobiles which could cruise at 70 miles an hour on good roads. 
They did much of their food shopping at supermarkets and they were 
encouraging their children to take some education or training beyond 
high school. 
Figure 16.6 like Figure 16.4 assumes a rectangular road grid. 
However, reflecting improved roads and fast automobiles, the squares 
measure 50 miles from the central city to each corner. If we wish to 
reach the midpoint of the northeast side of a square, we must travel 
25 miles east and 25 miles north (in any order we like). We assume 
that motorists can drive 50 miles in 60 minutes. Therefore, each 
square represents the projection of a 60-minute circle upon a rec-
tangular road grid which transforms it into a square of the size shown. 
The linear dimensions of the squares in Figure 16.6 are ten times 
as large as those in Figure 16.4; the areas of the squares in Figure 16.6 
are 5, 000 square miles, as against 50 square miles for those in 
Figure 16 • 4 • 
Walworth County, with an area of 576 square miles, contained 12 
trade areas. As of 1967, Iowa, with an area of 56,000 square miles, 
contains about 12 of the expanded trade areas • 
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Iowa has 99 counties. Each trade area shown in Figure 16.6 
is equal in size to 8 or 10 counties. However, as the county bound-
aries in most cases run east-west and north-south, the boundaries of 
the 50-mile squares in Figure 6 are oriented at a 45 degree angle to 
the county lines. Perhaps we should not make too much of this 
"rotation of rural society, " as variations in topography, road quality, 
and natural barriers (such as rivers with a limited number of bridges) 
tend to disrupt the perfect symmetry implied by the 50-mile squares. 
More important is the change in regional scale, which means that a 
trade area of the kind shown in Figure 16 ~ 6 includes a number of whole 
counties and parts of several more. Even if we approximate these 
trade areas in terms of clusters of whole counties, the indiv-idual 
counties are too small to cope with problems of area-wide significance. 
To some extent, we have assumed what we have not yet proved--
namely, that areas of the size shown in Figure 16. 6 are the modern 
counterparts of Galpin's "fundamental communities" of 1911-13. We 
shall adduce additional evidence shortly concerning the character of 
the present day functional economic areas of Figure 16. 6. 
Figure 16.7 suggests the effects of the passenger automobile on 
intervillage competition. 
We assume ten retail trade areas, each surrounding a village and 
each with a fixed boundary, the group as a whole forming a compact 
cluster covering a contiguous geographical area. We assume that 
the number of consumers resident in each of the trade areas remains 
constant, as do their incomes. 
The spatial-equilibrium model underlying Figure 16.7 determines 
the number of units of (say} groceries purchased by the residents of 
each of the ten areas, the equilibrium price in each area, the number 
of units "exported" from or "imported" into each of the areas, given 
a stipulated 10 by 10 matrix of customer travel costs (per unit of 
groceries purchased) between all possible pairs of areas. The matrices 
of per unit travel costs between areas are not reproduced, but for 
the highest level of such costs, T 6, the range is from $0. 84 to $3. 60. 
When travel costs are reduced by 16 2/3 percent to level T 5, the range 
is from $0.70 to $3.00 per unit. Finally, when travel costs are re-
duced to one-sixth of their original (T 6) level, that is, to level T 1, 
the range becomes only $0. 14 to $0.60 per unit. 
When customer travel costs are at the high (T 6) level, only 
Village 2 makes sales to residents of other trade areas. Grocers 
in Villages 1 and 7 compete directly with the grocer in Village 2 
and hence indirectly with each other. The residents of areas 
3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 shop only in their respective villages; the 
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Figure 16.7. Spatial equilibrium among ten production-and-consumption 
locations: Inter-location trading arrangements at three 
levels of transportation costs~ 
{A) 
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Percent Below T 6) 
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y Dollar figure by each arrow is transportation cost per unit (say, a 
standard "market basket" of groceries); figure in parentheses is 
number of units bought at location from which arrow leads by resi-
dents of the location at point of arrow. 
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grocer in each village has a true monopoly within a "reasonable" 
price range delimited by the cost of customer travel to the nearest 
alternative village. 
A reduction of one-sixth in travel costs brings the grocer in 
Village 5 into direct competition with the grocer in Village 2 and 
indirect competition with those in Villages 1 and 7. Also, the 
grocer in Village 10 finds himself in direct competition with those in 
Villages 4 and 9, and the grocers in Villages 4 and 9 are in indirect 
competition with each other. Grocers in Villages 3, 6 and 8 retain 
their positions of (limited) monopoly in their respective trade areas. 
A reduction of five-sixths in the cost of customer travel brings 
the grocers in all 10 villages into competition with one another, 
directly or indirectly. The grocer in Village 2 draws some patrons 
from areas 1, 5, 6 and 7, but some residents of his own trade area 
shop in Village 4. The grocer in Village 4 also draws some customers 
from areas 8 and 10. Grocers in Villages 9 and 3 are in direct com-
petition with those in Villages 10 and 1. 
The assumed reductions in travel costs may be interpreted as 
reductions in time required for customer travel; thus, if T 6 reflects 
customer travel at five miles per hour, T 1 reflects customer travel 
at 30 miles an hour. 
Figure 16. 7, then, suggests the revolutionary impact of the 
passenger automobile in breaking down former village monopolies of 
all kinds. The first storekeeper who shifts from a village grocery 
operation to a modern supermarket will drastically change the 
interarea trading pattern and the opportunities left for other village 
grocers. But we will not labor this example further. 
The speed of the passenger automobile has permitted larger 
establishments to emerge in the larger towns. These larger estab-
lishments include larger numbers of employees and involve hierarchies 
of several stages. The higher level positions in these job hierarchies 
usually require more education and/ or drive and/ or ability than the 
top jobs in the small establishments found in villages and small 
towns. Figure 16. 8 gives schematic representation to this fact. 
A good deal of so-called "migration" across county lines may 
occur within the same trade area, as additional education, training 
or experience qualifies young people in the more rural counties for 
better paying jobs which necessarily involve working in larger towns 
or cities than any found in their previous counties of residence. For 
example, the 1960 Census of Population indicated that 80 percent of 
the residents of Fort Dodge and Mason City (central cities of two of 
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Figure 16. 8. Job hierarchies in towns of different sizes. 
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the trade areas in Figure 16. 6) had been born in Iowa. A large percentage 
of these had very likely been born and raised within 50 miles or so of 
these two cities. 
Figure 16. 9 is reproduced from a study by Borchert and Adams )/ 
Borchert and Adams classified the hundreds of small towns and cities 
in the Upper Midwest (Minnesota and several states and parts of 
states to the north and west of Minnesota) into several categories or 
hierarchical steps on the basis of the retailing and wholesaling 
functions they performed. For example, a minimum convenience 
center would contain a gasoline service station, a grocery, a drug-
store, a hardware store, a bank, an eating place and any two of four 
other specified kinds of r~tail stores. These requirements might be 
met by the small town of 1, 000 people. 
The Borchert and Adams categories seem to fit the Iowa situation 
rather well, and probably apply roughly to most nonmetropolitan areas 
in the United States. Small towns such as those Galpin studied in 
Walworth County would in most cases be convenience centers today. 
County seat towns of 2, 50 0 to 5, 000 people would typically serve as 
partial shopping centers, while towns of 5, 000 to 25, 000 population 
would serve as complete shopping centers. 
In Iowa, the central cities of the trade areas shown in Figure 16.6 
range from 30,000 to more than 100,000 in population.Y Borchert and 
Adams would characterize these cities according to their wholesaling 
functions, although I am not convinced that wholesaling is their most 
important attribute. With one exception, the centers of trade areas in 
Figure 16. 6 would meet the Borchert and Adams criteria for either 
secondary or primary wholesale-retail centers. 
Figure 16.10 shows the distribution of town population sizes in 
one of the trade areas of Figure 16. 6--the area centered on Webster 
County just north and west of the center of the state. Fort Dodge 
(population 30,000 in 1960) is the economic, social and administrative 
center of the area shown. It contains the largest and most complex 
private and public establishments in the area, including a department 
store and a community college. Several towns in Figure 16. 10 would 
qualify as complete or partial retail shopping centers. Some of the 
smaller towns shown are convenience centers according to the 
Y Borchert, John R. and Russel B. Adams, Trade Centers and Trade 
Areas of the Upper Midwest, Upper Midwest Economics Study, 
Urban Report No. 3, September 1963, page 4. 
Y Excluding Spencer--if the area centered on Clay County in northwest 
Iowa is classified as an FEA. 
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RETAIL RETAIL SELECTED BUSINESS FUNCTIONS 
TRADE CENTER TYPE 
AUTOMOTIVE SUPPLIES 
BULK OIL 
CHEMICALS, PAINT 
DRY GOODS, APPAREL 
ELECTRICAL GOODS WHOLESALE 
GROCERIES 
HARDWARE 
INDUSTRIAL, FARM MACHINERY 
PLUMBING, HEAnNG, AIR CON-
DITIONING 
PROFESSIONAL, SERVICE EQUIPM 
PAPER 
TOBACCO, BEER 
DRUGS 
WMBER OONS1RUCTION MATERIAL 
ANTIQUES 
CAMERA STORE 
CHILDRENS' WEAR 
FLORIST 
MUSIC STORE 
PHOTO STUDIO 
PAINT, GLASS, WALLMPER 
PWMBING, HEATING SUPPLIES 
RADIO, TV STORE 
SPORTING GOODS SPECIALTY 
STATIONERY 
TIRES, BATTERIES, ACCESSORIES 
WOMEN'S ACCESSORES 
FAMILY SHOE STORE 
FARM-GARDEN SUPPLIES 
LUMBER, BUILDING MATERIALS 
HOTEL-MOTEL 
MORTUARY 
APPLIANCES OR FURNrrURE 
JEWELRY 
MEN S OR BOY S OR WOMEN'S 
CLOTHING 
LAUNDRY, DRY CLEANING 
GARAGE, AUTO, IMPLEMENTDULER 
VARIETY STORE 
ME.r, FISH, FRUIT 
GENERAL MERCHANDISE 
GASOLINE SERVICE STATION 
GROCERY 
DRUG S'TORE ... -CONVENIENCE 
HARDWARE STORE 
BANK 
EATING PLACES 
Trade center types defined by business functions. Graphic summary 
of characteristics of six levels in the Trade Center hierarchy. Type. 
of center is indicated· at base of each bar. Types of business are 
listed in right-hand column. Businesses which were required and 
•)ptional in defining each type of Trade Center are indicated by mark-
mgs on each bar. Width of bar is proportional to dollar volume as 
indicated for Partial Shopping Centers and above. Source: Borchert 
and Adams, Q.Q. cit. 
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Figure 16.10. Distribution of town population sizes in the Fort Dodge area. 
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Borchert and Adams criteria. In addition, the area within the square 
includes 50 or 60 smaller towns, each with retail sales of less than 
2. 5 million dollars in the year ending June 30, 1964. Few of these 
towns would qualify as full convenience centers; most of them would 
be in the minimum convenience center category or lower in terms of 
services available. 
Figure 16. 11 is the map of a midwestern city of about 50,000 
people in the late 1950's. The central business district contains the 
department store or stores such as are found in Fort Dodge. The 
black oblongs are supermarket locations; these identify shopping 
facilities comparable to the complete and partial shopping centers 
found in towns of 5,000 to 12,000 population in the Fort Dodge area. 
Not shown in Figure 16. 11 are the neighborhood stores, service stations 
and other small establishments analogous to those found in the con-
venience and minimum convenience centers in the Fort Dodge area. 
If we measure distances in terms of minutes, including time spent 
waiting for traffic lights and looking for parking places in the con-
gested city, it appears that the area in Figure 16.10 may be regarded 
as a projective transformation of a central business district, medium 
and large-sized shopping centers, and neighborhood stores such as 
those found in Center City. The economic base of Center City con-
sists primarily of 10,000 or more factory workers whose homes and 
work places occupy only three or four square miles of land. The 
economic base of the Fort Dodge area consists primarily of 10,000 
or more farmers and farm workers occupying nearly 5, 000 square 
miles of farm land. The range of consumer-oriented services found 
in the Fort Dodge area is quite similar to that found in Center City. 
Unpublished data from the 1960 Census showing the townships 
of residents and counties of employment for a sample of the employed 
labor force support the view that areas such as that around Fort Dodge 
are ·relatively self-contained commuting and labor market areas in 
the short run. Very few people living within the boundary of the 
square in Figure 16.10 work outside that boundary. Conversely, 
relatively few persons living outside the boundary commute toward 
Fort Dodge. The labor market and trade area aspects of Figure 16. 10 
(and Figure 16. 6) tend to reinforce each other in defining a modern 
"fundamental community" comparable to those Galpin identified in 
1911-13. 
Figure 16.12 indicates that the populations of Iowa counties 
containing the central cities of trade areas in nearly all cases grew 
more rapidly from 1950 to 1960 than did the outlying counties. Some 
apparent exceptions can be readily explained. From 1900 to 19 60, 
:population growth in the 12 Iowa cities (with their suburbs) which 
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Figure 16.11. 
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are centers of functional economic areas amounted to about 5 40, 000, 
slightly larger than the total population increase for the state. Many 
of the rural counties showed absolute decreases in population, and 
most towns which had populations of 1,500 or more at the turn of the 
century showed considerable population growth. The process under-
lying Figure 16.12 might be called "creeping urbanization," the popu-
lation of each area has been gradually moving inward toward the 
central city, and the population density gradient from the perimeter 
toward the center of each square has become steeper. 
The Spatial Organization of United States Society, 1967 
Most economists are familiar with the system of Standard Metro-
politan Statistical Areas (SMSA's) which figure prominently in the 
U • S. Census Bureau's publications of economic and demographic data. 
There are about 213 SMSA's in the United States. Each SMSA con-
sists of a county or a cluster of contiguous counties at the center of 
which is a city or urbanized area with a population of at least 50, 000. 
As of 1960, Iowa contained seven SMSA's, each consisting (within 
Iowa) of a single county; two of these SMSA's also included one or 
two counties in adjoining states. The central city of each SMSA in 
Figure 16. 13 is also the central city of a functional economic area 
with its labor market and trade area aspects. Nearly all of the 213 
SMSA's in the United States also serve as the centers of labor market 
and trade areas which are more extensive than the SMSA's as such. 
Figure 16. 14 shows similar 50-mile squares or 60-minute commuting 
perimeters around several Iowa cities of less than 50,000 population. 
Obviously, the 50,000 minimum population for an SMSA central city 
represents an arbitrary truncation of the frequency distribution of 
city sizes. The central cities of four of the Iowa functional economic 
areas shown in Figure 16. 14 had populations of 30,000 to 35,000 in 
19 60. It is worth noting that the total population of each of these four 
areas is approximately 150,000, or three times as large as the minimum 
population for an SMSA! 
The dashed outline around Clay County in northwestern Iowa may 
be regarded as containing a potential rather than an actual functional 
economic area. The central city of this area is Spencer, a town of 
about 10,000 people, but with large retail sales for its size; its 
population and retail sales are expanding quite rapidly. 
Figure 16. 15 is identical with Figure 16. 6; it is obtained by 
superimposing Figure 16. 14 upon Figure 16. 13. About 80 percent 
of the area and 90 percent of the population of Iowa are within these 
50-mile squares. The completion of new interstate highways (and 
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50-mile commuting distances from the central business 
districts of Iowa PEA central cities with less than 50,000 
population. 
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other improved highways) is having the effect of packing adjacent 
functional economic areas more tightly together and filling or reducing 
some of the gaps in Figure 16. 15 (if we choose a one-hour commuting 
radius, rather than 50 highway miles, as our most basic concept). 
It would evidently be possible to partition Iowa into about 12 areas 
which would include the entire territory of the state. If desired for 
political or statistical reasons, these areas could consist of clusters 
of whole counties • 
Areas such as that centered on Taylor County in southwest Iowa 
could be allocated between adjacent functional areas on the basis of 
major shopping criteria. Taylor County is nearly 100 miles from either· 
Des Moines or Omaha, so daily commuting is not a good alternative. 
Between 1950 and 1960, the number of males aged 25 to 34 in Taylor 
County decreased 41 percent, indicating that a great many young men 
had migrated from the area. 
Figure 16. 16 suggests that an exhaustive set of functional economic 
areas could be delineated for the entire United States. East of the 
Missouri River, the vast majority of the population lives within 50 
miles of towns of 25, 000 or larger. In the Mountain states, it appears 
that towns with populations of 10,000 to 15,000 provide essentially 
the same range of goods and services as is found in towns of 30,000 
to 50,000 population in the Midwest. In sparsely-populated areas, 
highway speeds are faster than in the congested areas; also, the 
residents may be willing to spend longer times on their individual 
shopping and recreational trips • (Whether they will tolerate longer 
daily commuting time is another question.) It appears that a number 
of functional economic areas in the Mountain states would include 
less than 40,000 or 50,000 people within reasonable commuting times 
of their central cities • 
It is evident that a functional economic area of PEA system could 
abs.orb the existing SMSA system without difficulty. East of the 
Missouri River, most PEA's would include total populations of 150,000 
or more. If the residents of such an area recognized their community 
of interest, they should be able to support school systems and medical 
services of as high quality as a city of 150,000 people. Such an. 
area should contain a substantial and diversified pool of professional 
and lay talent and present a wide range of problems and challenges 
for potential leaders • 
It is not clear that an area with a population of only 40, 000 can 
provide as full a range of services and leadership as can the more 
populous areas east of the Missouri River. Conceivably, several 
contiguous areas in the Mountain states might need to cooperate in 
providing a sufficient population and tax base for high quality 
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educational, professional and cultural services. 
We have shown how the passenger automobile, operating for 
more than half a century, has transformed the rural community of 
Galpin's time into an expanded community of perhaps 100 times the 
area. The automobile has permitted the realization of economies of 
size and specialization in many kinds of private and public estab-
lishments and has encouraged a new synthesis of rural and urban 
society. 
It appears that the United States can be viewed as a se.t of 400 
or so relatively self-contained labor market or commuting areas. 
It seems likely that the automobile will continue to be the dominant 
mode of personal transportation during the next decade or two. 
Improvements in this mode of transportation will tend to pack the 
existing functional economic areas more closely together, but are 
not likely to change the basic "granular" structure of the United 
States economy. 
These areas provide a logical basis for regionalizing the national 
data system and for formulating and implementing economic and social 
policies relating to employment, education, retraining and other 
people-oriented objectives. These areas could also be used as basic 
units for estimating the effectiveness of government programs in a 
more tangible way than that of working directly with national aggregates. 
Implications of the Present Structure of the United States 
Economyfor Farm Management and Marketing Research 
The picture of the United States economy and society we have 
dra~n has certain implications for the consumer end of the food 
marketing system and also for adjustments in the ratios of labor to 
capital in agriculture within each labor market area. 
Nature of the Consumer Market for Farm Food Products 
Each functional economic area appears to be a relatively self-
contained labor market, shopping and consumer service area. Each 
one has its export base activities, including agriculture and/ or manu-
facturing in most cases. The residentiary sectors of different func-
tional economic areas are characterized more by similarities than by 
differences. National chains of department stores, hotels, motels 
and other establishments recognize these similarities and also rein-
force them. 
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Hence, we may view the United States as a set of 400 or so 
"macrohouseholds," each with a consumer demand matrix and a 
consumer-income constraint analogous to George Brandow's national 
model of the demand for food .Y 
In the nonmetropolitan functional economic areas (as in Figure 
16 .10), it may be helpful to classify goods and services into those 
which are available only in the central city; those which are avail-
able in the central city and also in complete shopping centers of 
perhaps 5, 000 to 25,000 people; and those which are also available 
in towns of less than 5, 00 0 population. (Borchert and Adams de-
scribed several hierarchical levels of trade centers; however, it 
may be that no more than three levels of retail trade centers are 
economical in the sense of justifying new construction at the pre-
sent time.) 
If the trade centers in an PEA are classified into (say} three 
hierarchical levels, equilibrium for each household in the area 
involves maximizing the utility of goods and services that can be 
purchased and brought home within the family's income constraint. 
An optimal solution to this problem involves spatial equilibrium con-
siderations in addition to the family budget constraint. 
The same model can evidently be extended into metropolitan 
areas so far as consumer purchases are concerned. The article on 
Shopping Centers in the 1965 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
speaks of three kinds of shopping centers or plazas in metropolitan 
areas. The largest of these is the so-called "regional shopping 
center" serving as many as 500,000 people, the chief tenant of the 
center being a suburban branch of a large downtown department 
store. The next smaller kind is the "district center" and serves from 
60,000 to 120,000 people; the chief tenant of such a center is 
usually a department store (though smaller and less distinctive than 
the· dominant type found in a regional center). The smallest kind of 
shopping center recognized in the article is the "neighborhood center" 
which serves from 15,000 to 30,000 people; the chief tenant is usu-
ally a food supermarket. 
Around smaller cities, the labor market and shopping areas tend 
to be coextensive. In the largest cities, the connection between 
retail trade areas and commuting areas is loosened by the existance 
of alternative modes of trans port. But, the consideration of this 
problem within metropolitan areas is not germane to the purposes of 
.§/See Brandow, George E. , Interrelations Among Demands for Farm 
Products and Implications for Control of Market Supply, Penn. Agr. 
Exp. Sta. Bul. 680, University Park, Pennsylvania, August 1961, p. 17. 
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this conference. 
In nonmetropolitan areas, the central cities of FEA' s are the con-
centration points for wholesaling and warehousing activities. For 
example, the warehouses in Fort Dodge, Iowa, a city of 30,000, are 
much too large for Fort Dodge as such. Their size is determined and 
justified by the total population of the trade area, which is approxi-
mately 150, 000. 
In considering the prospects for economies of scale, it appears 
that the opportunities available to food wholesalers, dairies and 
bakeries might well be visualized in terms of discrete numbers of 
functional economic areas, perhaps including in that definition the 
"regional shopping center" trade areas in the larger cities. 
Nature of Resource Adjustments Within PEA's Regarded as Labor 
Market Areas 
We have indicated that each functional economic area is a 
relatively self-contained labor market in the short run. We might 
conceptualize the process of agricultural adjustment as an iterative 
logical procedure along the following lines: (1) 'Starting with the 
existing labor force and stock of capital in an Ft:A, we might re-
allocate these resources within the area (a) to equalize the marginal 
value products of labor of any given quality among sectors and 
(b) to equalize the marginal value products of capital among sectors, 
agricultural and nonagricultural. We may subdivide both agriculture 
and nonagriculture into as many sectors as may be required to 
recognize significant differences in production functions or processes. 
If this initial reallocation were done on the assumption that the 
FEA is a "point economy," we might next let in real space and allow 
for the possibility that the marginal value product of labor of a given 
quality performed at a distance of 50 miles from the central city might 
be smaller than the marginal value product of that labor applied in 
the central city itself. In other words, within the FEA we would ex-
pect to find wage and opportunity cost surfaces for each distinctive 
kind of labor. These surfaces would have their highest points at the 
central city and would slope downward with increasing distance from 
the central city. 
The next logical step would be to compare the marginal value 
products of labor of given qualities among PEA's and also the marginal 
value products of similar kinds of capital. Then, using spatial 
equilibrium concepts, we might calculate a pattern for equalizing 
marginal value products among areas which would minimize the social 
and economic costs of migration and capital relocation among PEA's. 
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Next, we might consider an optimal pattern of organization in each 
PEA under 1967 technology and make retraining of the local labor 
force an alternative to migration. Once again we would equate 
marginal value products across sectors within each PEA and (globally) 
among PEA's • 
It must be stressed that an PEA is a labor market area, urban and 
rural, agricultural and nonagricultural. If the United States should 
adopt an active labor market policy like that of Sweden, it would be 
logical to try to maintain full employment in each PEA. Any worker 
who could not be employed in a "good" job in the PEA at a given time 
would be paid while engaged in additional training or retraining. 
Wages for agricultural workers under such a policy would have to 
be fully competitive with wages in other sectors of the area's economy 
at all times • 
If the federal and state governments cooperated to maintain 
essentially full employment (including persons engaged in sponsored 
training programs) in each PEA, one result would be a steady economic 
pressure to reallocate persons with managerial talent as between 
farming and other activities. 
In the nonagricultural sectors, there is a strong income gradient 
favoring moves up the managerial hierarchies of both consumer-
oriented and export-oriented enterprises. With continuous full employ-
ment in an PEA, it appears that agriculture would also tend to move 
toward sizes of operating units in which managerial, bookkeeping, 
technical and "blue collar" functions would be performed by distinct 
individuals. If different functions received very different salaries 
or wages, a man who could perform the highest salaried function 
should ordinarily spend full time on it. Producers' and/or marketing 
coops could (and in some cases do) accomplish some of this special-
ization; so do integrators in the broiler industry. 
One other possibility should be considered as we look ahead. 
We hear much talk about air pollution, water pollution and traffic 
congestion in our major metropolitan areas. We also hear arguments 
in favor of the establishment of "new towns" as an alternative to 
continuing expansion and increasing congestion in our largest cities. 
If it became federal policy to encourage the growth of trade area 
centers which now have 20,000 to 50,000 people until they reached 
75,000 or 100,000 people, there would be construction booms in many 
rural areas. This policy might also be viewed as a major instru-
ment for stimulating the development of lagging regions, by using 
"growth centers" as the leading sectors in regional economic develop-
ment. 
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Several of the smaller European countries appear to have achieved 
unemployment rates of less than 2 percent or even (in some cases) 
less than 1 percent. If the United States should strive for similar 
standards area by area, agriculture would be under constant pressure 
to pay fully competitive wages to hired workers and to provide fully 
competitive incomes for farm operators and for farm boys who were 
considering careers in agriculture. 
My view of the present and future framework within which 
marketing and farm management research must operate may be summa-
rized as follows: 
In the United States the traditional dichotomy between urban and 
rural has largely dis appeared. The image of the traditional dichotomy 
lingers in the minds of many people, rural and urban alike, and con-
tributes to much confusion concerning appropriate solutions for the 
economic and educational problems of "rural" people. The greatest 
problem of rural society in the United States is the belief that a 
rural society still exists and can be manipulated successfully apart 
from the society as a whole. 
For better or for worse, the city as an economic and cultural 
entity has surrounded the country. Farmers and agricultural econ-
omists must now deal with an essentially urban market for labor, for 
capital and, increasingly, even for land. 

ON ORIENTING FARM COMMODITY RESEARCH TO STRUCTURAL 
AND MARKET CHANGE 
by George D. Irwin* 
Commodity orientation has fallen from style in farm policy dis-
cussion. We now talk of a people orientation • .!/ So what is the 
place of a discussion on commodities, and what is the relevance of 
commodity research? I intend to use this question as a vehicle for 
proposing a general theme. I will then expand on the theme in 
selected areas where changes have particular impact on research 
priorities. 
Rationale of Commodity Orientation 
I propose that studies related to farm commodities remain vital, 
even though the general policy focu-5' }s in terms of people. We have 
merely added a dimension to policy_bt which may actually increase 
the significance of commodity problems and permit a clearer look at 
them. It may be useful to review six reasons why this is true: 
1. Since people orientation has freed commodity price from a 
general agricultural welfare function, price is likely to become a 
more important corner post of the welfare of commercial farmers. 
2. Commodity analyses and policies have an additional special 
significance for rural welfare arising from the aging of the farm popu-
lation and its immobility. The effect is two way. The aging phenomenon, 
and people policies related to retirement and consequent recombina-
tion Of freed reSOUrCeS 1 impOSe an important dimension in SUpply 
response work. And on the other hand, results in the commodity 
market help determine the extent to which aging creates a continuing 
welfare problem in the commercial agriculture industry. 
*Agricultural Economist, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department 
of Agriculture, stationed at Purdue University. P. L. Farris, G. E. 
Schuh, R. C. Haidacher, J. Havlicek, and J. H. Berry suggested 
several improvements made from an earlier draft • 
.!/ Paarlberg, Don. Emerging Farm Policies. Presented at 17th Annual 
Institute of Animal Agriculture, Purdue University. April 2-4, 1967. 
Y Ruttan, V. W. Agricultural Policy in an Mfluent Society. J. Farm 
Econ., Dec. 1966. 
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3. Commodity is related to general welfare programs through the 
cost of food and its availability, 
4. Structure and functioning of commodity markets have important 
overall policy implications in terms of long run income distribution 
between consumers and owners of factors of production. 
5. Commodity price is still the primary means of getting consumer 
preferences reflected back to raw materials. Increasing loss of identity 
through processing will continue to offer more difficult imputation 
problems and may reinforce pressure for more specification buying. 
This could serve to increase the number of commodities and·to increase 
clarity of the price signals, besides its less clearly positive struc-
tural implications for efficiency in the food marketing chain. 
6. Commodity is, some observers suggest, the focus about 
which farmers may organize in the future to concentrate their 
influence, and thus, is likely to continue as an important policy 
concern. 
A General Theme 
Many of the pressures for change in recent years have come from 
the farm input markets. Thus the general theme I wish to convey is 
that we cannot any longer take input and other product prices as 
given in commodity research related to farm policy. Nor is it possible 
to automatically assume structure as given, That is the import of 
the ch~qges discussed in the background papers. It is the message of 
RuttarJ/, as he described the five sets of market relationships through 
which interactions between farm and nonfarm economies are restructur-
ing agriculture. It is also a major lesson dramatized by the regional 
adjustment studies which swept the country during the past decade. 
For lack of homage to this new dictum, we often found the terrain 
rocky in trying to relate individual economic units to aggregates in 
our regional supply studies. This partial failure was to some extent 
understandable, for until recently, the product market was the primary 
link to the nonfarm economy. We built models without interdependence 
on the input side, and were surprised when the models traced through 
to yield the general theme I have asserted. This serendipitous result, 
which. was reinforced by other separate analyses arriving at the same 
conclusion, is perhaps the most significant outcome of the regional 
studies. It brought home to a great many researchers the need to widen 
their horizons in response to the changing real world. At the same time, 
it spoke well that the general economic models were able to trace 
through to an unanticipated result. 
Y Ruttan. .212· cit. 
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Research Orientations 
What can we learn from this which will help us in future research? 
Is the only lesson that we may expect our future efforts to falter on 
the rocks of erroneous assumption? Perhaps. Certainly the danger 
is real, but I find it significant and hopeful that many of us are now 
aware of the changed research environment we must encompass to be 
relevant to policy needs. 
It is my feeling that most commodity research has policy implica-
tions, but that it is certainly appropriate and feasible to look at 
priorities. Juers ,Y from the viewpoint of a policy adviser,· noted 
that making research useful for decisions implies an understanding of 
at least three features of the policy process: 
1. The analysis must be timely. Preferably, this means the 
research must be completed before the issue becomes "hot" in the 
political arena. This, in the public eye, correlates with objectivity. 
2. Results need to be presented in a decision making framework. 
We must provide a general research understanding. Then comes the 
all-important, often neglected step. Someone must spend the time 
to interpret it in terms of current issues. Specialization has hit in 
this area, too, and we tend to be either researcher or policy analyst.Y 
We as researchers are often prone to assume that a research report 
on the general results will be enough, and that anyone can frame it 
for decision making. This step, whether you call it adaptive research, 
extension, or policy analysis, has become more difficult as our research 
models become more complex, powerful, and difficult to comprehend. 
My point is that we need to reconsider the question of who is to 
put results into the decision framework. Perhaps the researcher has 
a contributory role, and probably he stands to gain from this experience 
a new sense of relevance in his future efforts. 
3. Political and administrative considerations, as well as 
economic, enter the policy analysis. And the weight given economics 
depends on the economic analysis available. 
From this standpoint, I find it useful to think of farm commodity-
related research in this rapidly changing economy in a dichotomous 
framework. On one hand, we need to study and describe the leading 
edge of developments in order to get inductive insights into the 
Y Juers, Linley E. Adequacy of Current Research and Education as 
Viewed by a Farm Program Analyst. J. Farm Econ., Dec. 1962. 
Y The parallel between research and extension in farm management on 
one hand, and policy research and analysis on the other is significant. 
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relevant external and internal forces, and the direction they are taking 
us o These areas are not very amenable to our supply-demand models, 
but they furnish invaluable fuel for propelling their development into 
useful channels o On the other hand, for reasons I shall expand upon 
later, we also need studies encompassing the whole of a commodity-
or the aggregate and its components. Where is it going as a result 
of these forces, and where are its lagging components in terms of 
income and welfare? These are the areas where formal research 
models can best be adapted. Looked at in another way, the dichot-
omy contrasts the basic difference in emphasis between short run 
possibilities with existing structure and equilibrium models, on one 
hand, and the longer run, necessarily less formal procedures designed 
to isolate potential sources of breakdown in our analyses which assume 
fixed parameters. One approach streetlights an entire scene, the 
other spotlights its moving border. 
At the Leading Edge 
Where are the moving borders, the issues we need to work on in 
commodities? I will concentrate on five conventionally defined areas 
which seem particularly relevant. For them, specific detailed atten-
tion seems warranted. The areas also provide an important component 
of variability which must be accounted for in the aggregate analyses I 
will get into later. 
Demand Forces 
Some analysts would contend that the major unstable elements 
have been on the supply side in recent years. Demand forces are 
destined to take a less passive role. 
The most prominent reflection is in the expanding world market, 
which already has shown both spectacular increase and great year 
to year variability. For example, recent work on feed grains.21 
indicates an export market for about 1/5 of the production by 1972, 
against less than 1/7 in 19 64. Instability was demonstrated by the 
dramatic jump in 1965-66, and the equally significant fallback in 
the 1966-67 figures due to better world production conditions. Our 
grain stocks in reserve insulated the United States market from much 
of this impact. The next time, our stocks might not be so adequate. 
y 
Haynie, Roscoe G., Wilson & Co. Remarks on Price and Grade 
Determinations in Red Meat Products. Discussion presented at 
17th Annual National Institute of Animal Agriculture. Purdue 
University, April 2-4, 1967 o 
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The point is that these markets furnish important components of, and 
important instabilities to United States production requirements. 
Several nations have high income elasticities of demand for commercial 
exports of feed grains derived from their domestic demand for meat. 
But projection has some different twists from that done for the United 
States where population and per capita income (and in a few cases 
changing tastes) are the significant demand shifters. The world 
market portion of United States commercial demand also depends on 
the situation of competitive suppliers and on such policy aspects 
as national balance of payments .V Of course, the noncommercial 
exports of food aid are a direct resultant of United States foreign 
policy. The fact that these forces are less than completely· economic 
in their outcome does not lessen the importance they carry in future 
United States commodity demand. As self interest, we need to place 
a high priority on exploring and understanding them as far as possible. 
A second demand force is found in what amounts to a proliferation 
of commodities in the United States market, which make the relation-
ship to a broadly classified raw commodity increasingly tenuous. A 
result is the tendency toward specification buying by processors. 
Another is in contracting and integration. One aspect of this prolifera-
tion is a consequence of s_up-s pecification of consumer tastes. 
Langemeier and ThompsonY recently completed a study which showed 
United States consumers now differentiate between fed and nonfed 
beef. A similar development, though originating on the technology 
side, is the coming breakdown of corn into several commodities. We 
already have sweet corn. High lysine {protein) corn promises great 
improvement in human, swine, and poultry nutrition, and has potential 
impacts on the oilseed proteins which are poorly understood. We may 
expect ~~rtain industries to develop high-starch corns to meet their 
needs.~ And improved grain hybrids, bred for short stalks, are 
increasingly unsuited to high silage yields. The point I make is 
that our domestic demand studies cannot be satisfied with traditional 
commodity categorization if they are to meet these changing needs. 
Another aspect of proliferation arises in better recognition of the 
divergence between raw product and consumer product. One dairy 
representative recently noted that the loss of butterfat sales in the 
Vschertz, L. P. Review of Coppock, J. 0. Atlantic Agricultural Unity: 
Is It Possible? J. Farm Econ., Feb. 1967, p. 233. 
JV Langemeier, Larry and R. G. Thompson. Demand, Supply, and Price 
Relationships for the Beef Sector I Post World War II Period. r. Farm 
Econ., Feb. 1967. y . 
Thomas, Alan T. Evaluation of Opaque-2 Maize for Fermentations with 
Sacchoromycetes cerevisiae. In Proceedings of High Lysine Corn Con-
ference. Purdue University, June 21-22, 1966. Publ. by Corn Indus-
tries Research Foundation, pp. 128-134. 
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switch to low fat milk by consumers was just about offset by the 
increase through sour cream .lQ/ A meatpacker noted that the so-
called meat-type hog provides larger hams and loins, which are dis-
counted because those sizes have been associated with lower priced 
sow pork, and because they are too large for the average consumer. !l./ 
New products are obviously called for if the desired gain in hogs 
prices from the meat-type animal are to become fact. Each of these 
examples points to increasing distance between initial and final 
product, and for the need to recognize and identify these products in 
studies of demand. A further aspect of proliferation arises in the 
large proportion of housewives in the labor market. They require 
convenience foods in more processed forms. 
A thread winding through the discussion of proliferation leads to 
a third demand force - the increasing difficulty of relating farm level 
to consumer demand. We need to look at these imputation problems 
in terms of the market structure and power possessed by buyer and 
seller at the various levels. The simple notion of a marketing margin 
is likely to become less and less satisfying as a summarization of 
the set of relationships between the raw product producer and the 
retailer. Tracing these impacts in a form useful for decision making 
will frequently require us to make short~r~ t~rm demand analyses, and 
to recognize interrelations with supply .lli' 
Supply 
Some important "leading edge" implications for supply emphasis 
grow out of two developments: (1) the shift of agriculture from being 
heavily land and labor based to being capital based, and (2) the 
average aging of the labor force, with the prospect that this will 
continue to be with us for several decades. 
The switch to capital based production imposes some vital changes 
in the nature of product supply curves and of production response. They 
are reflected particularly in reversibility, vulnerability, and uncertainty. 
Capital basing, as has been pointed out, involves higher cash costs 
as a percentage of gross income, and thus increases vulnerability. 
A smaller percentage of the resources are the traditional residual 
lQ/ Corbett, Willard, Dean Foods Co. Remarks on Quality Controls 
for Grade and Price Determination in Dairy Products. Discussion 
presented at 17th Annual National Institute of Animal Agriculture. 
Purdue University, April 2-4, 1967. 
1.1/ Haynie. ..Q:Q.. cit • 
11/J. Havlicek, L. H. Myers and Anthony Prato at Purdue have demon-
strated the importance of including supply variables in quarterly 
demand estimation for beef and pork. 
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claimants, family labor and capital, which can take deferred compen-
sation as a reaction to unfavorable situations. This cushion is 
withering. Capital has been imbedded generally in larger enterprise 
size and increased specialization. Once the investment decision 
has been made, it is largely irreversible and organizational adjust-
ments are less flexible. Because of the relative ease of entry into 
agriculture, the biological time lags between decisions and produc-
tion and the high capital requirements, we have an almost classic 
opportunity for investment cycles resembling those of industry, and 
particularly in livestock breeding. Thus, as Kottkell/ has pointed 
out, we need to examine firm supply functions with respect to iden-
tifying where they are reversible. Specialization also raise·s questions 
about efficacy of allocation models, which we will explore later. 
The increased dependence on purchased inputs emphasizes the need 
to make supply and demand analyses for these inputs in order to 
consider these variables in estimating commodity supply. 
A parallel influence is the aging of the labor force described by 
Schuh in his paper. Aging generally means reduction in the number of 
alternatives to farming. It therefore may reduce supply flexibility 
and raise questions of income adequacy, particularly since adequacy 
of business size appears to be inversely related to age. In most 
research we have not considered age or stage in_ t.h~ family life cycle 
as classification variables for supply analysis.!!! We need some 
work to test the hypothesized relationship between age and response. 
Regional Advantage and Location 
An easily overlooked effect of the capital revolution is that it 
reduces the extent to which regional advantage is land based. Shift-
ing location of consumption centers and the recent drastic alterations 
in transportation rate structures come to play a more dominant role. 
These effects, combined with the specialization and large enterprise 
trend in beef feeding, have been well demonstrated by the growth of 
western feedlots. I think we need some work to determine the causes 
of this rapid location shift of recent years. I might hypothesize that 
the growth rate curve would flatten out in western locations as the 
fed beef supply catches up with population in that area. All this is 
apart from the question of increasing size of feedlot, although we 
also need to know whether there is some causal interrelation between 
size and location. It would be useful to test the hypothesis that 
_!11 Kottke, Marvin. The Anatomy of a Step Supply Function. J. Farm 
Econ., Feb. 1967. 
WAn exception was Ph.D. work done at Michigan State by Orlan 
Buller on fruit farms • 
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regional differences in size are due solely to slower adjustment to 
economies of size in older feeding areas, due to unrecovered invest-
ments in smaller-scale fixed assets. 
Another series of questions in location arise in the commodities 
where per capita demand curves are shifting right and being amplified 
by a growing population. We see this particularly for beef. Rumors 
are that the western range is nearing its capacity as a source of feed 
for the beef cow herd, one of the enterprises that has remained 
strongly land based. Is this true? If so, is the mid-South the region 
of next advantage? How would an expansion in this area affect the 
location of feedlots? Comparative costs of shipping grain,. feeder 
animals, fat animals, and meat are changing, and are bringing into 
question our traditional answers to these important questions. 
Comparative Structures and Pricing 
HeflebowerW has pointed out that the fruits of technical 
progress tend to be distributed as wages and profits under oligopoly, 
but as lower consumer prices in a competitive situation. In commodity 
areas with different kinds of structure among buyers and sellers, 
questions of bargaining power arise. 
Pressures are felt for coordination through contracting or inte-
gration. The pricing mechanism is put to a severe test as an allo-
cator and distributor. It has been suggested that the pricing mechanism 
works most efficiently when fixed costs are low (marginal costs are 
allocable), a rapidly disappearing situation in both farming and the 
processing industries. The rising fixities are embodied in special-
ization in large enterprises. The switch to capital-based agriculture, 
plus the specialization foster what we have come to recognize as 
the cost-price squeeze. The traditional answer economists have 
given to farmers is volume. Today, we find many who are saying 
"no -the answer is bargaining." This strikes me as an extremely 
significant change in the psychological environment of agriculture. 
It opens for us as researchers a number of new research doors. 
We have questions of equity in contracting arising from unequal market 
power, and of direction of enterprise control which may lead to further 
vertical integration • 
.!.§./ 
Heflebower, R. B. Market Power: Its Sources, Distribution, and 
Consequences in Farmers in a Market Economy. Iowa State Univ. 
Press. 1964. 
-------------------~------------------
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Information serves as a key to success of a pricing mechanism, 
along with power. An increas ingll significant mechanism for focusing 
information is the futures market .1&./ The possibility for hedging in 
fat and feeder livestock suggests the possibility that the commercial 
farm may become a producing operation, with the risk bearing portion 
of the entrepreneurial duties shifted to investors. In addition to 
needing to study this as an alternative to direct forms of contracting 
and vertical coordination, we need a great deal of analysis on the 
information focusing success of the futures market. From the view-
point of farming, we also need to study it in the context of its func-
tioning in the farm operation. From society's point of view, exchange 
through a competitive futures market may be an attractive alternative 
to bilateral bargaining arrangements as a pricing mechanism for 
specification buying. 
Instability of Farm Prices 
Almost all of the forces discussed so far lead one to conclude that 
we may expect greater problems with instability of farm prices. World 
markets are growing and are annually unstable. The durable equipment 
associated with specialized enterprises and ease of entry suggest the 
possibility of widening inventory and price cycles. The uneven advance 
of technology promotes uncertainty, uneven adjustment in supply, and 
periodic readjustments. The effect of these instabilities on incomes is 
accentuated by the extreme stability in prices of purchased inputs. 
Three decades ago such a price-cost situation led to efforts to 
stabilize commodity prices. In recent years, supports have lowered 
in order to get in equilibrium with world markets, and some have 
implied that they should be eliminated. Yet it seems reasonable to 
argue that today's high capital agriculture is less able to withstand 
variability. I am suggesting that we have a potential need for some 
stabilizing policy recognizing the world market, and that information 
in this area may be a fruitful goal for some commodity research work. 
Stabilizing at an equilibrium price level, rather than at a level de-
signed to provide income transfers to agriculture, amounts to a form 
of forward pricing and absolutely requires keen commodity analysis 
work. 
On the Aggregate Picture 
In addition to studying the leading edge to identify the long range 
developments, we also have obvious needs for knowing about the mass, 
the aggregate, and its components. In this area, the general theme I 
!.§.../For an excellent presentation of this conclusion see T. A. Hieronymus 
"A New Emphasis in Futures Trading." Illinois Business Review, 
24:3:6-8, March 1967. University of Illinois Bureau of Economic 
and Business Research. 
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stated at the beginning has its greatest impact. Integrative analyses 
are called for, involving product demand, input supply, the transpor-
tation system, and the production processes. They need at times to 
be dis aggregated regionally, by type of farm, and by age of operator 
for welfare and other distributional analyses. 
The integrated and disaggregated approach has been developing 
methodologically for some time. One example, combining the success-
ful features of much earlier work, has been the ERS-Farm Production 
Economics Division national model. It recurses between a demand 
model and a group of area production models, with the recursing built 
in a cobweb way on the fact that production decisions are made well 
in advance of harvesting output. The model has potential for adding 
a transportation network and more regional demand relations, at the 
expense of computational size. So far, only limited attention has 
been given input supply relations. It seems to me that a good con-
ceptual framework for handling the growing complexity of these inte-
grative models may be the Leontif type of model, but expanded in 
the farm production row and column. Alternatively, we could think 
of adding a less detailed "activity" to present models to handle the 
related input and product relationships. The integrative model focuses 
on a growing need to understand appropriate time lags in responses. 
In the area of supply analysis, the structure and market changes 
have at least two important implications for our models • In commer-
cial farming, the various forces leading to specialization have pro-
gressively reduced the enterprise choices. Increasingly, we have a 
clearly dominant profit situation for a particular enterprise. Decisions 
are more clear cut. The capital revolution, on the other hand, means 
an increased possibility of variation in level of inputs on any one 
enterprise. Thus the implications for our research models are: (1) a 
need for more attention to multiperiod-investment decision models, !1./ 
and for less of the traditional static enterprise choice models. This 
puts our analysis more nearly in a firm growth context, where we 
need to take a close look at the appropriateness of models assuming 
the growth path follows a sequence of static equilibria. (2) A need 
to expand the allocative models by making more activities available 
in the direction of variation of input levels. We may 1 for example, 
need to allow several fertilization levels to choose among in studying 
a corn farmers' response to a new feed grain program. 
11/ Dale Hathaway noted this point over 5 years ago in terms of helping 
farmers. The point is equally applicable to more aggregative anal-
yses. Hathaway 1 D. E. The Implications of Changes in the Economy 
for Work in Agricultural Economics. r. Farm Econ. I Dec. 1962. 
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We need to look a long way ahead, and this is particularly 
difficult in a rapidly changing environment. Results from extra-
polating our econometric models based on time series break down after 
a shorter time in this kind of situation, but I feel they will remain 
extremely valuable for verifying the changes that take place. They 
are indispensable for short range policy work, and provide some 
help in the difficult problem of providing a standard for checking our 
more anticipatory normative models • 
Concluding Comment 
In summary, reports of the imminent death of farm commodity 
research are, to use the well known phrase, very much exaggerated. 
Reports that we may expect a significant mutation, on the other hand, 
are accurate. The commodity creature, which was formerly isolated 
from all except product markets, is fast being exposed to the entire 
economic environment. Adaptive processes must be forthcoming, and 
the underlying stresses may be expected to alter its personality and 
behavior. Some priority research problems lie in developing research 
models to analyze policy alternatives and their effects over time; 
but we must avoid the pitfall of getting so involved with the models 
that we fail to provide the leading edge explorations which nourish 
these models and also have significance on their own. Both kinds of 
problems thirst for data, and imply a high priority to isolating the 
kinds of data needed and to collecting it. Of particular significance 
in each priority category, it seems to me, are (1) renewed attention 
to differential aspects of the demand situation by income level, 
country, and product differentiation, {2) examination of the combined 
effects of age distribution and capital-inflexible, high cash cost 
specialization on supply response and on the recombination of land 
units over time, and finally (3) exploration of the structure of input 
markets, both to provide supply and demand data for research models 
and to assess the questions of market power, exchange equity, the 
external forces for changing structure of farm firms which do not fit 
our usual formal models • 

IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS OF MARKETING 
RESEARCH TO RESEARCH IN AGRICULTURAL POLICY 
by R. L. Kohls* 
As I understand my mission, it is to stimulate discussion concerning 
what relation recent developments and research findings in marketing 
have to say to those concerned with research and other related activities 
in agricultural policy. This is a wise exercise for our profe·ssion. The 
policy research and extension efforts have been one of the stronger 
phases of our professional efforts in the past. However, if the iden-
tified policy problems of the past are merely projected into the future, 
our work will be refining the answers of the wrong set of questions. 
As I understand the past, our policy research efforts for several 
years right after the World War II floundered as we attempted to iden-
tify the pertinent policy problems. Then after many seminars and dis-
cussions, agreement pretty well jelled that "the" farm problem was 
best described as one of inadequate farm incomes. Mter this decision 
was made, alternative solutions were proposed and explored such as 
curtailing production, increasing demand, and reducing marketing 
costs. Consensus gradually was r~ached that the route of curtailing 
production was most fruitful and research efforts focused in on how 
to best accomplish that job. I, for one, believe that this research 
was generally meaningful and valuable. It not only generated needed 
data and relationships but it also produced proposals and plans. 
The extension service helped the body politic in making its action 
decisions. Action was taken. This combined effort and activity 
certainly was one of the profession's "finest hours" (I say one 
because I believe the decade of the thirties would also qualify) for 
it turned its energies toward what social scientists are supposed to 
be concerned with--the aiding of men to manipulate their business 
and economic resources toward desired ends. It was involved in the 
role of invention of new concepts and rules rather than in the static 
role of scolds . 
The major point that I wish to make in this discussion is that the 
formulization of "the" farm problem as one of inadequate farm incomes 
will not adequately define the policy problem areas of needed action 
of the future. First, I do not believe that issues relating to the farm 
can any longer safely be segmented out from the business context of 
*Professor of Economics, Purdue University. 
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the total system in which the farm operates. I suggest that the 
pertinent arena is food and fiber policy for the nation - not narrowly 
defined farm policy. Secondly, I do not believe the "levels of incomes 
of farmers" any longer adequately describes the concerns and pro-
blems of this food and fiber industry either from the viewpoint of the 
members of the industry, including farmers, or from the viewpoint of 
society as a whole. Several developments occurring within the market-
ing segments of our total food and fiber industry are contributing to 
these emerging issues. It is to these I will now turn. 
The Collapse of the Neutrality Assumption 
I think it can be safely said that in much of our farm production 
oriented research it has been assumed that the marketing system was 
essentially a neutral ingredient. Farm level demand was derived from 
consumer demands with the costs of the marketing process intervening. 
The source of change in demand was largely attributable to changes in 
the numbers and incomes of consumers. (Preferences of consumers 
were considered - but the source of these preference changes were 
either largely ignored, assigned to such stable factors as religion or 
race, or tied into income.) These demand changes were then dutifully 
transmitted by the marketing system to the farm level. 
Several conclusions are now emerging from research point to the 
proposition that the marketing segments is far from a neutral transmitter 
of consumer demands. These might be summarized as follows: 
1. Numerous studies are concluding that consumer income effects 
on expenditures for food are largely for more marketing services and 
processing. The residual income elasticity of demand at the farm 
level may be very low. And, furthermore, whatever effect incomes 
have on aggregative farm level demand probably comes largely from a 
change from low-resource-using to higher-resource-using products 
in the desired raw product mix. 
2. The marketing system is not neutral or ineffective in its 
efforts to shift consumer level demands for the product mix. The 
development of new processed products, merchandising techniques 
and advertising expenditures can and do shift consumer expenditure 
patterns among product lines at least within the total food budget. 
Research results in this important area are confusing and muddy, but 
they certainly are not conforming the hypothesis of no effect. There 
has been a low-margin merchandising of broilers. Probably more 
students of the problem than not, conclude that such policies have 
tended to enhance the demand for the rapidly expanding broiler pro-
duction. Milk is another product for which there has developed a 
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rather universal approach for low margin merchandising on the part of 
major retail establishments. There has been a rather sudden interest 
of the potato industry in new product technology. There is evidence 
that this development has influenced the demand for potatoes. There 
has developed a similar interest in the turkey industry concerning 
processed turkey products. It is not at all clear whether this develop-
ment which is increasing year around turkey use will simply reduce 
expenditures for other meats - or increase the total meat area expendi-
ture. Such examples could be greatly expanded. 
3. A related point to the preceding is that such marketing 
activities may be highly selective in their product orientation. Such 
activities may be either consumer demand increasing, marketing cost 
increasing (or decreasing} or both. In addition, the incidence of 
cost or benefit from such development may be shared in various ways 
among consumers, marketing agencies and farmers. This fact is at 
least a partial source of the recent unrest among both consumers and 
farmers. The feeling of these particular groups is that they have been 
required to bear the burden of changes in the marketing area over which 
they exercise no control. 
The Problem of the Appropriate Unit of Focus 
Much of policy analysis has treated the farmer and farm production 
as an aggregated whole. The aggregate demand and supply of farm 
products has been the vehicle of analysis and the impact on aggregate 
farm income the goal. 
There is rapid tendency toward enterprise specialization in the 
farm firm and some tendency toward more regional specialization of 
production patterns. And at least within the assembly level of market-
ing there is growing enterprise specialization. We have already noted 
that marketing activity and costs changes may vary widely among 
product groups. Integration activities have not taken place between 
marketing and agriculture in general but have developed very unevenly 
among specialized marketing agencies and a particular farm enterprise. 
These developments all point to the enterprise or product as the 
appropriate unit of policy concern and research analysis. 
There are other developments which confuse the issue, however. 
The production units of processing seem to be increasingly special-
ized. For example, separate hog, cattle, broiler, and turkey slaughter-
ing facilities are tending to replace the multiple purpose slaughter 
facilities. In the critical issue of managerial control of business units, 
however, the issue is not so clear. The development of the conglomer-
ate manufacturing unit of many product lines, both combining products 
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within the food complex and also combining food and nonfood products 
seems to be on the increase. The retail unit itself has trended away 
from product line specialization toward complex aggregation of many 
product families. Specific product line orientation of management has 
given way to viewing all the products as something to be manipulated 
as part of the whole. Pricing the product mix is common terminology. 
Where does this lead us as we seek the appropriate units of pro-
blem identification and analysis? It seems clear a general agricultural 
production focus is less appropriate at the initial production level. 
If we increasingly have specialized producers of pork, cattle, and 
chickens, the possibility that an effective broiler advertising cam-
paign may be largely at the expense of pork is of little concern to 
the cattle group. Integration activities in turkeys is of only passing 
interest to specialists in dairying. On the other hand, the retailer 
pricing his mix to maximize his retailing returns couldn •t care less 
that his use of near-loss operations on one product and loaded margins 
on another may have very special implications to one group of producers 
compared to another. Defining policy problems, proposing alternative 
solutions and analyzing impacts must increasingly take these divergent 
developments into consideration if such work is to be effective and 
helpful in guiding dec is ions and actions. 
The Decline of the Validity of the Community 
of Interest Assumption 
Both of the above developments 1 the growing inappropriateness 
of the assumption of neutrality of the marketing system and the in-
creasing difficulty of identifying the appropriate unit of focus 1 are 
very closely related to another assumption that has been carefully 
cultivated over time - even though many of the cultivators may have 
done so with tongue-in-cheek. This is the idea that the farm communi-
ty and the marketing community are interdependent and have one big 
community of interest. Interdependent they certainly are 1 but this 
does not make them one big happy family in which actions benefiting 
or hurting one member automatically have similar results on other 
members. 
This is only another way of stating that different segments of the 
food industry are developing differing capabilities of exercising market 
power. One trend almost all marketing research agrees upon is that 
firms are increasing in absolute size. Whether this development is 
leading toward increasing concentration of power in all relevant markets 
is a question not so clearly answered. Certainly there is developing 
market concentration in selected areas of the food industry. 
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What kind of market behavior results from these trends is not at 
all clear. Our research has been over-occupied with measuring concen-
tration ratios. There is a considerable shortage, however, in work 
that assesses and evaluates what these varying levels of concentration 
mean to market performance and the nature of competitive behavior. 
The need is critical for devising realistic and acceptable criteria for 
answering the question of how effective is the existing level of competi-
tion. Unfortunately we often appear as if we were divided into two 
opposing camps: one group holding firm to the model of perfect com-
petition and decrying any departure from the model as bad; the other 
group holding firm to the view that existing competition is keen and 
vigorous and that any obviously unacceptable behavior or performance 
is temporary and will be automatically corrected in the long run. 
Neither of these extremes is very useful as a philosophic base for 
policy analysis. But the middle ground lacks definition and content. 
The Deterioration of the Exchange System 
It is concerning the exchange system and the mechanics of price 
discovery that the findings of much current market research are probably 
saying the most to researchers in policy. Three specific developments 
here can be mentioned: 
1. There is a proliferation of price discovery points at the raw 
product levels and the reduction of such points at the processor-
wholesaler-retailer levels. 
Part of our conventional wisdom as agriculturalists stems from 
the time, now many years ago, when products moved from the farms 
into the hands of processor, wholesale and retail buyers located in 
large urban centers and organized around various kinds of market 
facilities and 11 market streets 11 • Here prices were discovered under 
conditions assumed to approximate the model of perfect competition. 
There were weaknesses, to be sure - especially in the areas of 
communication and product identification. But these could be largely 
over-come by governmental policy which fostered the free assembly 
and dissemination of market information and promoted the increased use 
of uniform standards and grades. Prices were discovered by individual 
buyers and sellers exercising their classic propensity to haggle in 
the market place. The one thing which is clear is that these organized 
terminal markets are no longer a major vehicle for the exchange process. 
Buyers have moved out into the production area to acquire their 
needs through direct negotiations with individual farmers either at 
their farms or at many local buying points. At the other end of the 
marketing system with the increasing size and manufacturing activity 
of processors and the increasing size of retail organizations, the 
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exchange process is increasingly taking place through individual 
isolated agreements between two interested parties. Though the 
actual physical use of the old system has declined, evidence points 
to the fact that the use of the pricing results of the vestigial activity 
has not. 
Whenever title exchange takes place, dec is ion must be made as 
to the value of the particular product at that particular time and place. 
Increasingly the food system is using a system of formula relation-
ships tied to specific quotations of the old terminal system to arrive 
proposed exchange price levels. This is occurring at the very time 
that the validity of such price levels in increasingly under question. 
2. The number of open pricing point levels in the marketing 
channel is being reduced. No matter how one evaluates the situation 
the conclusion is unescapable that integration through either owner-
ship or contract both between initial producers and other parts of 
the marketing system and between the other levels of the marketing 
system is increasing. The drive or desire to establish more effective 
control over the market channel exists strongly in important marketing 
dec is ion centers • 
Some have argued that integration is simply a new arrangement 
of the traditional open-market exchange system. Others have suggested 
that integration and contractual arrangements constitutes a replace-
ment of this system. Regardless of conceptualization, the results 
of this development is a shrinking of the amount of open and uncom-
mitted trading which takes place. Though for a different reason, the 
results of this are similar to the decentralization process discussed 
earlier. Less products are available for any type of centralized trad-
ing. Here, also, many groups and firms making contractual arrange-
ments and struggling for some base to tie to, are using formula rela-
tionships tied to the price result of the marketing process that it is 
tearing down. 
3. There is a decreasing use of uniform product standardization 
and an increasing use of service and differentiation in the product 
package in the pricing system at all levels of the food industry. 
More and more processing and service is being added to the raw product 
_of the farm as it passes through the marketing channels. This in-
creases the importance of technology in the marketing process. It 
permits the increased manipulation of the design and differentiation 
of the final consumer product. Added to this is the impact of multi-
unit retailing and self-service merchandising. With this are greater 
expenditures to influence consumer acceptance and loyalty to a store 
or group of stores and/ or a particular product or product line. As the 
Food Commission concluded: the food industry is becoming more and more 
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"sales oriented"; increasing emphasis is on manipulated consumers and 
less on simply producing a good product for less. In the farm produc-
tion operation itself technology and knowledge have increased the 
possible control over the variation in the farm product production. 
All of these changes add up to an increased concern over the 
variation of the product throughout the system. At the farm end 
this has resulted in increased integration referred to previously and 
an increase in so-called specification buying. Such buying is really 
extra standardization being enforced over very narrow ranges of a 
product line. Traditional "uniform" grades and standards of products 
and their packaging are often used as a basis upon which extra require-
ments are added by both the buyer and seller. Such relatively minor 
technical differences in products are of great importance to the effec-
tive operation of highly mechanized and standardized marketing firms. 
To this then are added an increasing bundle of services and intangible 
factors which are used to additionally direct and control the flow of 
products through the system. This may take the extreme form of 
complete contractual arrangements specifying production, product and 
packaging activities or the less complete forms of the furnishing of 
advice, technology and materials to the participants • Prices generated 
upon goods using broad and widely used standards are often not con-
sidered to be adequate signals for organizing the flow of goods. 
All of these add up to the proposition that traditional efforts to 
increase the use of uniform standardization and to generate improved 
market intelligence may no longer be an adequate approach. We may 
be the period of transition to a basically different system of organizing 
and controlling the production and flow of food and fiber products • 
The Policy Implications 
If the above adequately describes the developments in the market-
ing ·system, then there are many implications to research and activities 
in policy. I believe that in many ways, as professionals concerned 
with agriculture policy, we have lost touch with what farmers and 
others consider their problems in the real world. The unrest is there, 
but the action agencies in the field are not hammering on our office 
doors for our advice, counsel and research. 
We should again turn our talents to that area where we should 
have some unique talents - in helping to sort out and identify the 
relevant problems of the food and fiber industry and then devising and 
evaluating alternative solutions. I say problems because I believe 
that policy issues of tomorrow will not simplify themselves into a 
single category such as that of inadequate incomes. I say food and 
fiber industry because isolating out farms and farmers will not be realistic. 
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I would suggest that society in the years ahead will be in the 
process of devising new rules under which the production and market-
ing of food and fiber will function. In the past when this has occurred 
it has taken the form of many individual pieces of legislation put to-
gether to establish new institutions and develop the ground rules for 
different acceptable behavior. The Sherman Act and the following 
legislation over the years helped shape the form of competition. 
Laws were passed creating the cooperative, the Federal Land Bank, 
the market order system. 
Should we restrict the freedom of firms to differentiate products 
and influence consumers? Should we regulate the freedom of a retailer 
to manipulate prices as he pleases? Should there be some boundaries 
placed on integration activity? Are the present statutues adequate 
in defining the dimensions of a cooperative; the rights and behavior 
of bargaining groups? Should Farm Boards, or pricing-by-committee, 
or the organized bargaining table be instigated as an alternative to 
the deteriorating pricing system? Society will answer such questions 
as these with or without our help. I believe it would find more effec-
tive long-run solutions if the talent of our profession participated. 
IMPROVING AGGREGATION VALIDITY 
by John E. Lee, Jr.* 
In recent years, increasing concern has been expressed in the 
literature of our profession over the problems of aggregation in 1l 
models of agricultural demand and supply ( 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12) • 1 
Most frequently the concern has been with the validity of aggregated 
supply estimates when micro supply situations are simulated in 
linear programming models • 
The aggregation problem stems from the fact that while most 
economic activity originates with individual firms and households, 
economists, with increasing frequency, want to say something about 
the behavior, in the aggregate, of all or a group of such units. One 
obvious approach is to build up to the aggregate, firm by firm. This 
is not feasible in an atomistic economy such as agriculture. A 
second approach is to ignore the individual units by working with 
observed or postulated relationships among economic aggregates. A 
third alternative, especially for an atomistic or purely competitive 
economy, is to approach the aggregate through "representative" units 
or through the analysis of subaggregates. 
The latter approach has been particularly popular in agricultural 
supply research. The so-called Regional Adjustment Studies (NC-54, 
S-42, etc.) have used linear programming models of representative 
farms to derive regional estimates of supply schedules for the major 
commodities. The basic units of analysis for a model of national 
agricultural production developed by the Economic Research Service 
are representative resource situation subaggregates. Linear programming 
models of these units are used to estimate aggregate supply response 
to economic stimuli. These are but two examples of the micro-oriented 
approach to estimation of aggregate behavior--an approach that has 
almost become conventional in farm management and production economics 
research. 
*Agricultural Economics, Production Adjustments Branch, Economic 
Research Service. This version of the paper has benefited greatly 
from the suggestions of Lee M. Day. The author also appreciates 
the comments of Fred Abel, Glen T. Barton, and W. Neill Schaller. 
The views expressed are the author's and do not necessarily reflect 
the views of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
11 Numbers in parentheses refer to Literature Cited at end of paper. 
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The concern for the validity of aggregate estimates of supply 
derived from the approach typified in these models is justified. 
There are at least three sources of invalidity in that approach: 
1. The failure to be consistent with respect to time in the 
formulation and specification of supply models; 
2. The failure to recognize that constraints on economic activity 
at higher levels of aggregation may be different than at micro levels; 
and 
3. The failure to systematically group farms and construct units 
of analysis so as to recognize the interfarm variation in forces that 
shape economic behavior. 
These failures are interrelated; thus, the distinctions between 
them are somewhat arbitrary. But the breakdown provides some 
"handles" on the aggregation problem and an organization framework 
for the discussion which follows. I will work from conceptual and 
theoretical benchmarks, but the emphasis in this paper will be on 
practical guidelines for improving aggregation validity in models of 
agricultural supply. 
It seems appropriate to begin with a look at the aspect of the 
aggregation problem which has been discussed most frequently. 
The problem is that of exact aggregation; or simply, the problem of 
grouping farms so that analyses of aggregate behavior will be free 
from bias or error attributable to the grouping process itself. 
Grouping Microunits for Aggregation Validity 
Recent Conceptual Developments 
Richard H. Day (3) has shown that conditions sufficient for exact 
aggregation are proportional variations of resources and behavioral 
"bounds," proportional variation of net return expectations among all 
farms in the aggregate, and finally, common technical coefficients 
which appear in the constraints on the farm's dec is ions • Tom Miller (7) , 
searching for less restrictive conditions for exact aggregation, has 
shown conceptually that the responses of different farms to a given 
set of relative product prices will be proportional if the farms have 
homogeneous activity vectors and if the s arne activities appear in the 
linear programming solution vector for each farm. In other words, 
farms that have the same enterprises in the optimum enterprise mix 
can be grouped without bias or error. While Miller's conditions are 
less restrictive than Day's (groupings of farms under Day's conditions 
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would be subsets of groupings under Miller's conditions), they are 
of limited practical value because they are defined as requirements 
of the solutions to the individual farm problems, rather than as observable 
characteristics of the farms themselves. 
In another recent paper, Sheehy and McAlexander {13) hypothesized 
that if farms could be sorted into groups having the same absolute re-
striction (limiting resource) on output, benchmark farms based on the 
averaging of resource levels within each group would give unbiased 
aggregate results. They proceeded to apply these grouping criteria 
only to single-product firms and not to the more general multiple-
product, multiple-resource case where variations in relative· prices 
must be recognized. 
Thus, several writers have advanced sufficient conditions for 
exact aggregation. However, these have been rather restrictive con-
ditions or have applied only to special cases. None of these efforts 
answered Lee Day's (1) call for research to determine the necessary 
conditions for exact aggregation and to determine the magnitude and 
direction of error at various prices associated with different levels 
of variance in the proportionality of resources. We turn to that task 
now. 
The Necessary Conditions for Exact Aggregation 
In an extension of Miller's analysis, this writer (6) showed how 
the "qualitatively homogeneous solution vector" conditions could be 
translated into observable characteristics of the farms themselves. 
This was done by solving the dual to Miller's primal problem. In so 
doing it was revealed that the shadow prices (marginal value products) 
of the resources were the same for all farms which Miller showed 
could be grouped without aggregation error. Further, these shadow 
prices were constant over the range of resource ratios represented by 
the ·aggregated farms. The task remaining was the practical one of 
determining the exact ranges of resource ratios over which the marginal 
value product was constant. 
In the article to which I just referred, simple graphics were used 
to demonstrate that, in effect, the activity vectors in a linear programming 
situation represent marginal value product "borders." All farms with 
combinations of resources bounded by the same marginal value product 
•• borders" or activity vectors have the s arne shadow prices in the dual, 
have the same activities in the primal solution vector, and can be 
aggregated without error. The number of cells or bounded areas 
represents the maximum number of groups of farms needed for exact 
aggregation. 
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Working with the dual counterpart to Miller's theorem rather than 
with the primal was a matter of convenience rather than necessity. 
All farms whose resource coordinates lie between the same two feasible 
activity vectors will maximize revenue with some combination of those 
same vectors, thus meeting the "qualitatively homogeneous solution 
vector" conditions of Miller's primal theorem. 
From this exercise it was apparent that the key to determination 
of the resource ratios relevant to error-free grouping of farms is the 
relationship between the ratios in which resources are required by 
alternative activities and the ratios in which resources are available 
to farms. This observation has been used to develop an exact aggre-
gation algorithm for multiple-product farms in a completely general 
price situation. 
The difficulty with multiple-product farms is that the resources 
available to a given commodity (activity) are subject to change as 
prices (and thus the relative profitability of the activities) change. 
The answer to that difficulty, of course, is to recognize all possible 
orderings of the relative profitableness of activities (that is, to 
recognize all the possible orders in which activities could come into 
the linear programming solution) . This can be done in the following 
way. First, all the relevant combinations of two resources are deter-
mined. For example, if one or more activities use all three of resources 
A, B, and C, the relevant combinations of two resources would be AB, 
BC, and AC. Then the critical ratios of each of these combinations of 
two resources are determined from the technical coefficients of the 
activity vectors . In other words, the boundaries to the critical 
ranges of each resource ratio are the ratios in which the various 
activities use these resources. Then farms are grouped according to 
the critical resource ratio range in which each combination of two 
resources falls. Sequential sorting on the basis of all possible 
relevant combinations of two resources (assuming that prices of all 
outputs could vary from zero to infinity) produces a number of groups 
of farms free of aggregation error. 
Since the same conditions must be met for each relevant resource 
ratio by the farms in each group, the order of the sequential sorting 
process will not affect the composition of the final groups of farms. 
Because for each farm in each group the output of each commodity 
will be limited by the same restraint at any given price, the shadow 
prices for the resources of each firm are identical and the conditions 
for zero errors are met. 
In fact, this "critical resource ratios" grouping algorithm provides 
the minimum sufficient conditions (and therefore the necessary conditions) 
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for exact aggregation in a completely general model. If any farm in 
any one of the groups derived meets anything less than these condi-
tions (that is, if any of its resource ratios fall outside the critical 
ranges which delineate that group) there will be aggregation error at 
some combination of prices. 
The exact aggregation process can be made general with respect 
to technology and time as well as to prices. This can be done by 
expressing technological capacity as restraints, and variations in 
operating technology (crop and livestock practices) as alternative 
activities. In the case of multi-period models, all known technologies 
which are possible alternatives over the whole sequence of time 
periods can be included as vectors in the original grouping procedure. 
The Concept of Error 11 Trade-off" 
It should be obvious that in a problem of any size, the number of 
aggregation-error-free groups delineated by the critical-resource-ratios 
method just outlined will be very large. The natural question then is, 
11What effects on costs and quality of information would result from 
combining some of the exact aggregation groups? .. 
Previously, this qtiestion of a "trade-off" between analytical 
costs and aggregation error has been thought of in terms of representing 
a heterogenous population with a single representative farm and then 
proceeding to increase the number of representative farms one by one, 
noting while doing so the marginal rate of substitution between 
increased costs and reduced aggregation errors. However, now that 
a procedure is available for exact aggregation of firms, it seems 
logical to move in the opposite direction, that is, to gradually reduce 
the number of aggregates to be programmed by successive combining 
of the basic groups which are free of aggregation error. 
As a part of research recently completed, this approach was 
developed in three stages. First, a measure of aggregation error in 
multiple-product, price-general models was developed. That measure 
was based on the value of the productive capacity of resources mis-
allocated as a result of combining the original error-free groups of 
farms. Then an algorithm was developed for successively combining 
the two groups which minimized the maximum marginal aggregation 
error. The final stage or result was the plotting of a schedule of 
accumulated maximum aggregation error for successively smaller 
numbers of groups of farms (from the original number of error-free 
groups to one). Conceptually, a cost schedule could be superimposed 
on the accumulated error schedule to develop a decision framework for 
an acceptable "balance" between the amount of aggregation error one 
is willing to live with and the costs one is willing to incur to further 
reduce error. 
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The point I want to make with this discussion is that the necessary 
conditions for exact aggregation are known. These conditions imply 
burdensome numbers of groups of farms. Offsetting this, proposals 
are being offered for efficient "trade-offs" between numbers of groups 
of farms for analysis and the potential aggregation error. 
Recent Empirical Developments 
Very few empirical analyses have explicitly addressed the problem 
of aggregation error. Two articles (4, 13) in a recent issue of the 
Journal of Farm Economics reported applications of Sheehy's and 
McAlexander's "homogeneous restriction method" for grouping farms. 
In both cases, use of this method resulted in less aggregation error 
than the more conventional grouping methods • However, the sample 
populations in both cases were farms on which dairying was the single 
dominant activity. Tom Miller has worked with samples of multiple-
product farms at Iowa State, searching for practical guidelines for 
reducing aggregation error. The results of that work have not yet 
been published. 
To evaluate the "critical resource ratios" method for exact aggre-
gation and the associated error "trade-off" concept which were dis-
cussed in the previous section of this paper, a sample of 100 farms 
in southwest Georgia was selected. These were multiple-product 
farms; most of them produced some combination of cotton, peanuts, 
wheat, corn, oats, soybeans, beef cattle, and hogs. Survey data 
for each of the farms were used to construct separate linear programming 
models. The model for each farm was solved and the solutions to 
all farm models were added to derive the "true" aggregate supply 
schedule for each commodity. 
In the models, the actual variations in activity coefficients for 
each commodity, as revealed by the survey data, were retained to 
provide maximum realism. In addition, there were as many as 18 
potentially limiting resource restraints. For the population of 100 
farms 1 exact aggregation required 100 groups. Each group obviously 
contained a single farm. 
These results were not at all surprising. Exact aggregation is 
a demanding requirement. For the population of farms included in the 
experiment and considering the restraints included in the models 1 it 
is possible that a slightly larger sample would have produced some 
groups with more than one farm per group. That is 1 at a certain size 
of sample the ratio of number of error-free groups to farms in the 
sample would have dropped below one to one, and beyond that the 
ratio would have fallen at an increasing rate as the size of sample 
increased. 
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The error "trade-off" concept was tested with a subs ample of 2I 
farms, for which exact aggregation required 2I groups. A completely 
general price situation was assumed. The 2I groups were sequentially 
reaggregated; first to 20 groups; then to I9 groups; and so on until 
finally all farms were back together in a single group. Each step 
consisted of combining two groups of farms so that the potential 
aggregation error was minimized. The resulting "trade-off" curve is 
shown in Figure 20 .1. That curve shows the relationship between the 
number of groups of farms and the maximum relative aggregation 
error from mis allocating the productive capacity of the resources 
involved. 
The magnitude of the possible error depicted in Figure 20.1 is 
at first distressing. But it must be remembered that the situation 
in which all prices can vary from zero to infinity is an extreme case. 
Usually we are concerned with the magnitude of error for more modest 
price variations. 
The same farm models were resolved with the prices of all commodi-
ties except cotton held constant at I962 prices. The price of cotton was 
varied from $0 .I6 per pound of lint (including a return for cotton seed) 
to $0.40 a pound. The resulting error for alternative numbers of groups 
of farms is shown in Table 20 .1. Data from Table 20.1 were used to 
construct the "maximum actual error" and the "average actual error" 
curves in Figure 20 .1. 
The models for the groups of farms shown in Table 20.1 were solved 
with all the activities of the original farms included. For the three-
group and one-group models, "modal" activities were estimated and 
the models rerun. The results are compared in the first four columns 
of Table 20. 2. The use of modal activities reduced the aggregation 
error considerably. In fact, constructing modal activities for the 
single aggregate farm reduced error more than breaking the aggregate 
into three groups, each of which retained the original activities. 
For comparison of the minimum-error-grouping procedure with 
more conventional procedures, the same farms were grouped according 
to size. The size categories were those used for the same region for 
the S-42 Regional Adjustment Study: Under ISO acres of open land; 
ISO through 249 acres of open land; and 2SO acres and more open land. 
The results are shown in the two right-hand columns of Table 20. 2. 
The absolute results of this simple experiment must be used 
judiciously and may not hold for other regions or farming situations. 
Certainly the complexity of the aggregation problem and the magnitudes 
of error involved in the "trade-off" process will be smaller in regions 
where the production of one major commodity, such as wheat in parts 
of the Great Plains, dominates alternatives over a wide range of prices. 
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Table 19.1. Aggregation error as a percentage of "true" aggregate 
value of production for specified numbers of groups of 
farms and at selected prices of cotton 
Error for alternative number of groups of farms 
Cotton price 
($/lb.) 15 10 5 3 1 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
0.16----------- 11 21 35 41 56 
0.20----------- 11 20 35 41 56 
0.22----------- 11 22 35 41 56 
0.24----------- 11 22 37 43 67 
0.26----------- 12 21 48 44 67 
0.28----------- 12 22 36 49 61 
0.30----------- 11 23 46 48 59 
0.32----------- 8 23 40 42 44 
0.34----------- 9 16 36 39 47 
0.36----------- 5 16 30 39 44 
0.38----------- 11 18 24 36 44 
0. 4.0----------- 10 17 24 35 44 
Weighted average 
error----------- 10 20 35 41 54 
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Table 19. 2. Aggregation error as a percentage of "true" aggregate 
value of production for specified groups of farms and 
at selected prices of cotton 
Error for alternative farm groupings 
Cotton price One One Three Three Three Three 
($/lb.) group, group, groups, groups, sizes, sizes, 
inclusive modal inclusive modal inclusive modal 
activities activities activities activities activities activities 
Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent Percent 
0.16-------- 56 36 41 16 64 24 
0.20-------- 56 36 41 16 65 24 
0.22-------- 56 36 41 16 66 24 
0.24-------- 67 36 43 19 66 26 
0.26-------- 67 37 44 20 68 25 
0.28-------- 61 38 49 22 84 31 
0.30-------- 59 34 48 23 82 27 
0.32-------- 44 32 42 15 66 20 
0.34-------- 47 38 39 12 60 20 
0.36-------- 44 49 39 14 52 18 
0.38-------- 44 36 36 15 46 19 
0.40-------- 44 35 35 14 44 19 
Weighted average 
error-------- 54 37 41 17 62 23 
--------------------------
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However, these empirical experiments do serve to illustrate concepts 
which in turn may provide practical guidelines for improving aggregation 
validity. 
Implications for Constructing the Basic Units of Analysis 
Despite the theoretical developments reported in this paper, it 
is a practical reality that, for the time being, programming models of 
regional and national agricultural production as well as models of 
resource use and interregional competition must contain a relatively 
small number of basic analytical units (each representing a .group of 
farms). That being the case, the greatest returns in terms of reduced 
aggregation error may come from doing a better job of constructing 
these units of analysis. 
Weighted Average Activities 
The empirical experiment with the sample of Georgia farms demon-
strated that the use of "modal" activities resulted in less error than 
including all the activities of each farm in models of groups of farms. 
Theoretically, at least, error from variations in coefficients for a 
given activity can be totally eliminated by using coefficients that 
are weighted averages of the coefficients for that activity for all 
farms in a group. Using weighted averages is necessary because 
different farms furnish different proportions of the total potentially 
limiting resources and the influence of the technical coefficients 
of each farm is proportional to that farm's share of the total output. 
Weighted average activities may be obtained by weighting the 
reciprocal of the technical coefficient of each farm (for a given 
activity) by the proportion of the potentially limiting resource con-
tributed to the aggregate by that farm and then obtaining the reciprocal 
of the result. In other words, the output of given commodities for 
individual farms of a group of j farms could be expressed as 
where i represents the commodity or activity (I .•• M), j is the farm 
(1. •• n), and a, b, and care the technical coefficients for resources 
XI, X2, and x3, respectively. The total output of each commodity 
for the group of farms could be expressed as 
T (2) Qi =~xi+ Bi x2 + ci x3 
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n 
where A.= 
1 ~ [ { ! " . e)] -1 I and where9 is the proportion of X 1 j=1 lJ 
contributed by the jth farm. The weighted average coefficients in 
equation (2) would constitute the activity vectors in models of farm 
aggregates. 
Perhaps a small sample of the farms represented by a model would 
be sufficient to establish both the variations in coefficients for a given 
activity and the weights for each of those variants. The only difference 
in the data required to estimate weighted average coefficients and that 
required to estimate "modal" coefficients is that the former -requires 
resource quantities data for each farm. 
Improved Restraints 
Even when good aggregate restraint data are available, we get 
error in models of production because of the variation in the relative 
scarcity of specific restraints from one farm to the next. It is common, 
for example, in some regions that some farms must hire additional 
labor while others have idle labor. In most cases the idle labor on 
one farm is not available to farms with labor shortages. In addition, 
some restraints (and their coefficients) are somewhat elastic and the 
restraint quantities are hard to define. In critical periods, farmers 
may work harder, faster, and more hours per day. In a crisis, other 
family members, not normally a part of the farm labor force, may pitch 
in and help. Machine capacity may be expanded by using machinery 
more hours a day. 
Two suggestions may be appropriate for improving estimates of 
restraints for models of farm aggregates. Both should help reduce 
aggregation error. The first is the use of the "inclusive" method 
for estimating restraints. For example, in short-run supply models, 
it fs not uncommon to use census of agriculture estimates of total 
land available in a region. Sometimes this estimate is adjusted by 
subtracting out land used by enterprises and types of farms not 
included in the model. But this process is often not taken far enough. 
It may be better to start by estimating the land used by activities 
specifically included as model alternatives. From that benchmark, 
estimates could be made of (1) additional quantities of land that could 
be available to the included activities, and (2) the economic condi-
tions which might make those quantities available. 
The second suggestion is a variation of the inclusive approach 
and may be particularly useful for shorter-run predictive models. It 
may be called the engineering method of estimating restraints. Weighted 
average coefficients for, say, labor in period t-1 could be multiplied 
--------------
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by actual activity levels in period t-1. The product is a first approxi-
mation of the labor restraint in period t. This estimate could be ad-
justed if there are reasons and data for doing so. Then the model 
could be run to see what pressure points develop with respect to labor. 
These points could then be examined and the reasonableness of the 
restraints further evaluated. This approach helps to reduce the problem 
of attributing positive productive capacity in the aggregate to resources 
which on individual farms may in fact be in surplus. Again, the use-
fulness of this suggestion depends on the research objectives. 
Formulating Models to Improve Aggregation Validity 
Recent attempts to evaluate some of the regional studies of 
agricultural production and adjustments prompt me to say something 
about the relation of assumptions about time, resource mobility, 
and research objectives to the validity and usefulness of the results 
of supply models • 
Model Realism and Aggregation Error 
The original assignment to write this paper called for emphasis 
on realism in aggregation. But the realism of the aggregation pro-
blem is a function of the realism of our models, which are themselves 
abstractions to the extent that they do not perfectly simulate the real 
world. I have not been able to understand the surprise and dismay of 
researchers who, when they conduct optimizing analyses with highly 
unrestrained models, built on assumptions of advanced technology, 
and weight these results to aggregate levels, get supply-price relation-
ships highly unlike those they observe in the real world. It would be 
grossly inaccurate to attribute all the differences between the model 
results and the real world to aggregation error. If we want results to 
compare with the real world we have to build models of the real world--
including all the relationships, uncertainties, and subjective and 
objective goals and restraints of the real world. 
The nature of the aggregation problem varies with the "realism" of 
our economic models • In highly abstract models in which all resources 
are assumed variable, knowledge is assumed perfect, and all farmers 
are assumed to have perfectly adjusted to a common "best" technology, 
the problem of aggregation bias or error from grouping farms with unlike 
resource ratios, technical coefficients or expectations does not exist. 
If, however, any of the real world's asset fixity and imperfect know-
ledge are permitted, the possibility of aggregation error in the results 
of a given model must be recognized. In general, the intra-model 
aggregation problem becomes more complicated as the realism of the 
models increase; that is, as we move from static to dynamic assumptions 
and from more "normative" to more "predictive" assumptions. 
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Potential aggregation error may be suppressed in more predictive 
models where so-called 11 behavioral 11 or .. flexibility .. restraints are 
included. These restraints, which generally take the form of upper 
and lower bounds on the solution levels of specified enterprises, 
indirectly account for the many forces that cause lags in adjustment or 
temper profit-maximizing behavior in the real world .Y Thus, this 
particular method of adding realism to supply models may reduce 
aggregation error as a by-product. 
Assumptions about Time 
Too often the validity of the supply schedules generated by models 
is impaired by inconsistent assumptions about time. This may be calJEJd 
an aggregation-over-time problem. For example, in one major study:.1-
(1) The time period used for yields was assumed to be of sufficient 
length for the full effect of improved practices on crop yields to 
materialize; (2) the time period used for restraints was assumed to be 
long enough for intermediate-term capital investments in buildings, 
farm machinery, equipment, livestock, and pasture improvements to 
be considered as variable costs (yet operator labor and management 
were considered fixed); (3) farm numbers were those projected for 
1975; and (4) the price and cost projections represented ..... the level 
of prices that may be expected to prevail over an extended period of 
years under assumptions of relatively high employment, a trend toward 
peace, continued population and economic growth, and a stable general 
price level. .. One wonders whether the time periods of (1), (2), (3), and 
(4) were consistent. Failure to ensure that all the assumptions about 
time are consistent could result in mongrel supply schedules that have 
meaning for no time period. 
As researchers, we have some license to play around with any 
assumptions we like. It may be useful to know the nature of "equilibrium .. 
under alternative assumptions even though we imply ceteris paribus 
assumptions about the rest of the world and ignore the number of 
iterations of our model needed to reach equilibrium. But we get into 
trouble if we try to ascribe realism to our model results when we have 
failed to trans late economic time into calendar time. Imagine trying 
to explain to a policymaker how he should interpret the "long-run" 
supply schedules I described a moment ago. Some economists tend 
to hold the policymaker's lack of appreciation of long-run research 
in contempt. But economists who have had occasion to work closely 
Jj For an excellent discussion of the meaning and estimation of "proxy .. 
restraints, see Schaller (9). For examples of their use, see (2) and 
(II). 
Y See pp. 8-10, (14). 
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with policy problems share the policymaker's disappointment at the 
failure of supply models to provide results to which he can attach 
specific dates under real world conditions. 
I do not mean to imply that 11 long-run 11 research is not useful. 
But we should be as rigorous and consistent in our long-run models as 
we have to be in short-run predictive models. 
Assumptions about Resource Mobility 
There is an inter-model as well as an intra-model dimension to 
the aggregation problem. This is the question of the validity of deriving 
aggregate supply schedules by horizontal summation of representative 
farm supply schedules. Sharples, Miller, and Day (12) have recognized 
this problem in their evaluation of the NC-54 study. But the process of 
horizontal summation of supply schedules, per se, is valid. The in-
validity lies in the failure to account for the aggregate limitations on 
availability of resources that are assumed to be variable or unlimited 
at the representative farm level. This failure has been particularly 
serious in the Regional Adjustment Studies because of the longer-run 
assumptions about the variability of resources. It is less serious in 
the shorter-run predictive models wherein most resources are fixed. 
Individual farms or representative farms may buy land, but the 
aggregate supply of land is fixed. Labor or capital may be assumed 
unlimited for representative farms, but the aggregate quantities of the 
resources are certainly limited. When these aggregate limitations are 
not included as constraints on model results it is no wonder that the 
representative farm supply schedules and thus the summed schedules 
are biased upwards. 
One possibility for reducing the distortion of supply estimates 
resulting from assumption of unlimited resources for representative 
farins is to include the matrices for a number of such farms as diagonal 
blocks within a regional matrix. Thus, some resources could be 
unlimited for individual representative farms but fixed for the aggregate 
of all such farms. The final solutions for each representative farm or 
resource situation subaggregate would reflect the competition for the 
fixed amount of resources available at the regional level. The validity 
of the supply schedules so derived would depend on the extent to 
which resources were mobile among regions represented by separate 
matrices. For example, the supply of land may be fixed for a region 
but labor and capital may flow among regions • 
For year-to-year predictive models the failure to consider the 
aggregate effects of the dec is ions of individual producers on input 
and output prices may not be particularly serious. For many agricultural 
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enterprises, the nature of production is such that resources are committed 
to production in a planning period and the aggregate consequences of 
individual behavior are not relevant until the next planning period. This 
lagged response to the interaction of aggregate supply and demand means 
that individual regions and representative situations can be analyzed 
independently of others within a given production period without the 
kind of simultaneity considerations which would be necessary in the 
analysis of an oligopolistic industry. However, the aggregate price 
implications must be considered in models of multi-period enterprises 
such as livestock or in longer-run models in which the passage of time 
is implicit. 
Some Additional Aspects of the Aggregation Problem 
Aggregation Validity and the Representative Farm Concept 
The "representative farm" is a useful tool for budgeting and farm 
management purposes. But the conventional representative farm may 
not be the appropriate unit of analysis for aggregate supply studies. 
There is a tendency to construct such units on the basis of "look alike" 
criteria such as acres of land, size of labor force, or current enterprise 
combinations. These criteria may not be those which minimize aggre-
gation error in estimates of aggregate supply. 
The representative farm concept as it has evolved has chained 
researchers to thinking in terms of "typical" identifiable entities which 
are instantly recognizable (small farms, part-time farms, peanut-cotton 
farms, etc.). The purposes of aggregate supply analysis may be best 
served if the researcher is not constrained by the idea that he has to 
be able to typify the characteristics of the farms in a group within 
the context of a single "representative" farm. It may well be that 
when farms are grouped in a way which minimizes aggregation error, 
the farms in a given group may not "look alike" in the standard sense. 
For ·example, when the Georgia farms in the sample described earlier 
were grouped according to criteria which minimized aggregation error, 
the intra-group variance in size (acres of land) was greater than the 
differences in the mean sizes of the groups. 
It may be useful to think in terms of treating whole groups of farms 
as single decision-making entities (while ensuring that the decision 
"rules" are appropriate for the individual farms involved) . This is the 
aggregate representative resource situation approach. There is no 
apparent need for researchers who take this approach to "scale down" 
the aggregate to the average or representative farm to see how that 
micro unit looks. 
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If it is really necessary to interpret the results of aggregate 
supply analysis for identifiable situations, it may be necessary to 
group farms into those situations first. Each group could then be 
subdivided for the explicit purpose of minimizing aggregation error. 
The Need for "Open-Structured" Data Y 
In practice, the approach to aggregation may be dictated more by 
the nature of the data available than by the beauty of the relevant 
theory. To deal with the aggregation problem, more "open-structured" 
as opposed to "pre-structured" data are needed. Much of the survey 
and census data available are already processed and "canned" before 
the user gets them. Perhaps for general descriptive uses this form of 
presentation must be retained. But aggregates and averages for 
counties, states, and other units cover up the micro variations that 
are the very source of the aggregation problem. With today's modern 
data processing facilities it is becoming more feasible to preserve, 
on tapes, cards, and discs original sample data for micro units. 
With proper programs this data could be retrieved in unstructured form 
or restructured to meet the needs of users. The same data that would 
permit grouping of farms to minimize aggregation error would also be 
the best data for estimating the parameters of the analytical models 
of those groups. 
Until such data are available, builders of models of aggregate 
supply can use sample surveys designed for their own needs or try 
to utilize data from surveys conducted for other purposes . There 
are always likely to be data gaps from the latter approach and these 
may be critical. 
A Look to the Future 
· The changes in the structure of agricultural production and market-
ing which have been discussed in these papers will affect the problem 
of aggregation validity. On the marketing side there is likely to be 
less price uncertainty as more commodities are produced under con-
tracts or on a custom basis for large buyers. This reduces the varia-
tion in net return expectations. The same marketing forces will call 
for increased specification of product qualities, grades, sizes, and 
dates of delivery. Contractors may even specify certain types of 
pesticides, levels of fertilization and harvesting methods. The result 
will be greater uniformity of products and ways of producing them. 
Y See (10) for a more elaborate discussion of data needs for aggregate 
supply models. 
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There will still be variations in weather and soil qualities, but even 
these may be more subject to control through cloud seeding, irrigation, 
and more scientific feeding of nutrients to the soil. 
Changes in both marketing and production will continue to provide 
incentives for further specialization. This may tend to reduce the 
number of enterprises on individual farms and increase the specializa-
tion of machinery, labor, and the overall bundle of resources. There 
will thus be increased validity in grouping farms on the basis of their 
specialization because of the increased fixity of specialized resources 
and because farms within these groups will have increasingly similar 
resource ratios and technical coefficients . 
Even management may become more homogeneous. As Professor 
Leontief once remarked to a Harvard class: "Every year more managers 
think like economists say the economic man should think because every 
year more managers have been trained by economists to think like the 
economic man. " 
It is likely that some of the emerging structural changes will 
complicate the aggregation problem. But on the whole, the kinds of 
changes I have described will simplify the aggregation problem and 
improve aggregation validity. This, in turn, will increase both the 
accuracy and the relevance of the more predictive models of economic 
behavior. 
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EFFECT OF CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURE ON OWNERSHIP 
PATTERNS OF WEALTH AND ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF 
INCOMES, RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES 
by Thomas T. Stout 
There was once a Professor of Economics in our College of 
Commerce at Ohio State University who's examination questions 
caused me to sit and meditate during the first hour of a two...;hour 
examination period. I did this in order to be more assured that 
during the remaining hour I could write in response to what I thought 
were the central issues of his questions. The title of this paper 
which defines my responsibilities here reminds me of one of the good 
professor's examination questions, and I assure you it has caused me 
to meditate, and to worry, while other things persistently encroached 
upon what otherwise would have been time spent in preparation for 
my presence before you now. 
But I have been consoled by three thoughts: (1) My preparatory 
chore does not prove really to be a matter of exploratory research to 
substantiate my comments; presumably I may take as given the essen-
tial reliability of evidence presented by the Bureau of the Census, 
the Department of Agriculture, and the previous papers. (2) Second, 
when I tried to refuse to participate in this program on grounds that 
other duties would prevent diligent preparation, Gordon Ball assured 
me that "something speculative" was desired. So I felt less obliged 
to present 90 percent proof and 10 percent conclusions, which seems 
to be the standard proportion for presentations to an audience of this 
kind. (3) Finally, it occurred to me that, since I would be the last 
man on the program, then perhaps with a little luck there would be no 
one. left to hear my comments anyway. 
Those who have preceded me on this program have said what needs 
to be said to provide opportunity for me to conclude with some of the 
things I think it all means. Moreover, some of what it all means 
has already been said with clarity, with eloquence, and with scholarly 
precision and insight by others on this program, and on other occasions 
by persons like Bonnen, Hathaway, Paarlberg, and Breimyer. And by 
*Professor of Economics, The Ohio State University. The author is 
indebted toM. F. McDonald, L. L. Jones, and M. H. Hawkins, 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociology, The Ohio 
State University, for assistance in the preparation of this paper. 
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inference, it has been said by people like Francis Parkman, Bernard 
DeVoto, Irving Stone, David Lavender, Bruce Catton and Mari Sandoz, 
and by others still, who include Hamlin Garland, 0. E. Rolvaag, 
Willa Cather, Edith Wharton, Conrad Richter and Harvey Allen -- and 
Remington -- and Russell -- and Harvey Dunn. 
You recognize of course that I am confessing to a certain bias 
which causes me to respond rather willingly and perhaps enthusiasti-
cally to artist-historians, journalist-historians, and contemporary 
agricultural economists who are intrigued with main themes and 
central tendencies. I am less concerned on subjects that we have 
attended to in these sessions, with whatever the quantitative pro-
portions of their distributions may be proved to be by those who are 
devoted to their measurement. Perhaps this is so because what I 
have to say doesn't require confidence limits beyond about the 75 
percent level and my judgment tells me that my remarks could achieve 
those limits. 
For much of the post-war period, most of us believed that nothing 
really very spectacular was occurring in agriculture, or at least that 
whatever startling rates of change we did encounter either would not 
amount to much or could not be maintained. We were too close to 
the information. Even information has diminishing marginal utility, 
and when you sit at the communications crossroads the next little 
tidbit doesn't excite you too much and gets easily discounted. But 
the tidbits have been piling up, and while the standard classroom 
word to cadaver-eyed scholars has been "little opportunity in agri-
culture", something akin to Tablets from Sinai has been accumulating 
at the crossroads. I believe that one of the reasons we have gathered 
here this week is to try, with some trepidation, to discover what the 
Tablets say. About all we have been able to make out on our own is 
an exciting word here or an ominous word there -- like OPPORTUNITY 
and DANGER. Like explorers in an ancient tomb, we find the surround-
ings somehow threatening, we are curious, even anxious for the next 
discovery, but a little frightened by what we may find. 
In the past, nearly every published prognostication about change 
in agriculture has proven to have been grossly conservative. For 
example, in June, 1955, at a time when there were 5. 2 million farms 
in the United States, Fortune Magazine published a major article 
which assessed the agriculture of 1980. The article speculated that 
by that date, 25 years later, there would be only 4. 2 million farms 
in the country. But by the time 10 of those 25 years had elapsed, 
the number of farms already was reduced to 3. 2 million. Of course 
a change in census definition occurred in the interim, but it is true 
nevertheless that the article forecast an 18 percent reduction in farms 
on the basis of the old definition. What occurred, based on the 
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current definition, was a 33 percent reduction in 10 years, with the 
expected 18 percent reduction occurring in the first five of those twenty-
five years. 
What else happened during the past ten-year census period? As 
I recite a few of the developments, recall the reasons why they hap-
pened, if you will; your memory-span need by only about three days 
long. And consider whether it is perhaps legitimate to project the 
rate of change another ten years, even though the trends of the past 
five years have moderated the ten-year influence. 
The value of all farm products sold has increased 43 percent. 
The value of products sold per farm has risen 118 percent. The 
value of land and buildings per farm is up 186 percent; value per 
acre has climbed 74 percent. Cash grain farms have decreased 25 
percent, dairy farms are down 33 percent, poultry farms down 47 
percent, and cotton farms down 69 percent. Average farm size has 
increased 45 percent, and the only farms that increased in number were 
those of 500 acres or more --up ten percent. Farms of lesser size 
decreased between six percent (260-499 acres) and 44 percent (under 
100 acres). Farms selling $40,000 or more in products increased 39 
percent in the past .!!Y§ years, and those realizing sales of $20-39,999 
rose 23 percent. All others decreased drastically. 
Generally, these trends have been more moderate for the Central 
Corn Belt states of Indiana, Illinois and Iowa, with two striking 
· exceptions. Whereas the national increase in farms with sales of 
$40,000 or more was up 39 percent, this three-state area increased 
59 percent. While national averages registered a ten percent increase 
in farms over 500 acres, these Corn Belt states experienced a 51 per-
cent increase. 
Where does this really put modern agriculture today? Well, for 
one thing, it could be argued that already we have more severe con-
centration ratios in agriculture today than in most industries with which 
we enjoy playing concentration-ratio games. Yes, the top four food 
retailing firms had 20 percent of the retail grocery sales in 1964, 
and those sales occurred in only 3. 6 percent of total retail grocery 
stores. But also in 1964, the top 3.4 percent of U.S. farms ($60,000 
or more in sales) realized what appears to be about 29 percent of 
total sales. The four largest meat packers did not do as well in 
1964, nor did the four largest firms in fluid milk, prepared animal 
feeds, or bread and related products. Perhaps you feel compelled to 
remind me that our concerns for concentration stem principally from 
central decision-making and control, which is conducive to structural 
power, and that such centralization is absent in agriculture. I think 
my position would be that technology and pure competition already 
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have produced the willing maiden of agricultural concentration, and 
needing only an introduction to a series of skillful! suitors she could 
be quite a prostitute. Moreover, I would submit that in the past ten 
years the suitors have noted her succulence and have started to call. 
I believe we are on the threshold of revolutionary change in 
agriculture. I mean revolutionary in the literal sense that revolutions 
leave earlier forms unrecognizable and cause persistence in customary 
patterns of thought and action to be untenable. I think we are entering 
upon a period of fundamental re-appraisal for. agriculture, a period 
in which difficult and unprecedented questions will be as ked about 
the proper economic and social role of agriculture, and a period 
in which changing attitudes, values and social requirements will 
require the development of radically altered programs to properly 
realign a mutated agriculture in. a mutated social setting. 
Another ten years like the last would bring us by 1975 to this: 
Farm sales will be a 50 billion dollar industry. The average farm 
w111 generate $25,000 to $35,000 in sales annually, and this from a 
farm quite large by present standards. We .will have 2. 1 million farms, 
and perhaps as few as one million really commercial farms. Average 
per acre value of land and buildings will approximate $250, but in 
the central Corn Belt it will more closely approach $5 50. Average 
farm real estate investment in the U.S. will be about $130,000 per 
farm, but in the central Corn Belt it should be more like $280,000. 
We could be left with something like 300, 000 cash grain farms and as 
few as 50,000 cotton farms, with possibly no more than 50,000 farms 
that each produce more than $40,000 in annual sales. To facilitate 
the rate of change these figures suggest would require nearly 450 
farm title transfers every business day of every year during the entire 
10-year period. 
By 197 5 the growth of "large farms" will permit farms of 500 acres 
or more to account for nearly 20 percent of all farms. But the startling 
thing is that such farms will be only average in size; projecting present 
census trends leads to an average size of 510 acres by 1975. 
What kind of a distribution in farm size are we moving toward when 
only 15 to 20 percent of the farms are larger than average and 80 to 85 
percent are smaller than average? What kind of investment in agri-
culture are we contemplating for large farms when average investment 
in land and buildings will approach $130,000 and average Corn Belt 
investors will need between a quarter and a third of a million dollars? 
What kind of investors do we have in mind for that end of the distribu-
tion that lies above the average; what kind of entrepreneurial talent? 
-------------------
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Really, we already know, don't we? They little resemble the 
noble son of the soil when they retain Arthur D. Little to tell them they 
may anticipate an 18 percent after-tax return on equity capital. Or 
when they employ Battelle Memorial Research Institute to recommend 
that they begin now in investing $35 million dollars in integrated 
livestock production in 26 states. Or when Humbel Oil acquires 
6, 000 acres of citrus land in Florida; or when Campbells completely 
integrates production for Bounty canned foods and Swanson frozen 
foods; or when Kearn County Land Company controls J. I. Case; or 
when Norris Grain expands integration and ownership in Great Plains 
grain and livestock production. Why should not substantial corpora-
tions with investable funds, forced by anti-trust laws toward conglo- · 
merate merger, consider investments in an area where opportunities 
assume growth-industry proportions? (The recent Supreme Court 
decision on the Proctor and Gamble-Clorox merger could have tremen-
dous implications for future growth patterns in agriculture.) 
The conventional wisdom of astute observers in the post-war 
period has been consistently to pontificate that opportunity for cor-
porate endeavor in agriculture was minimal - this for a variety of 
"well-founded" reasons, but principal among them was low return on 
investment. This just is not true, and the fiction certainly is not a 
restraint to alert management with investable funds at its disposal. 
Low average return figures in agriculture are misleading for at least 
two reasons: (1) Such extreme variation surrounds the average that 
the average reflects no meaningful central tendency, and (2) equity 
positions appear ridiculously high (83. 2 percent of assets in the 
1967 Balance Sheet of Agriculture) to the potential entrant who seri-
ously intends to maximize return on equity capital. Those of you 
here from the Great Plains are familiar with the 40 percent equity 
perpetual loan arrangements under which business is conducted on 
aggressive farms and ranches in your states. Yet even this by no 
means develops the full opportunities that are feasible for maxi-
mizing returns to equity. 
This kind of activity in the top end of the spectrum is not a 
final result, but only a next step in a continuing process of acquisi-
tion, combination and concentration that agriculture has been under-
going at an accelerating rate ever since social actions were taken to 
. facilitate it, beginning in the last century. I think it can be argued 
convincingly that solicitous social attitudes toward agriculture have 
facilitated this development handsomely. 
Consider the conventional equilibrium models against which we 
measure and judge economic performance. Out of our concern for 
equity arises the social model for perfection in economic equity which 
we call perfect competition. Of course we do not expect it to exist, 
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but we find it a handy navigational device, and against it we compare 
all forms of economic activity that do exist, and we label them all 
imperfect competition. Imperfect competition ranges from benign, 
harmless forms which equate with pure competition, onward to most 
malignant forms considered monopolies, which either are drummed out 
of the corps or reduced to docile public utilities through legal tech-
niques for economic emasculation. 
Still, one must be careful about these social judgments, for we 
have discovered that perfect equity and great wealth and productivity 
are incompatible. Perfect equity would prohibit pure profit, yet the 
search for pure profit is the essential lure that draws capital and 
management on to great accomplishments. 
So in our need for compromise, we restrict our judgment to care-
fully defined categories of right and wrong concerning how pure profit 
may be acquired. Certainly, pure profit is realized only by achieving 
non-tangency between average revenue and total cost curves, and, 
true, our measures of competitive imperfection hinge upon how much 
control the firm or industry appears to exercise over one or both of 
these curves. But how may this be done? 
One technique of pure profit acquisition that is particularly 
distressing is the exploitation of inferior skill, knowledge or power 
in the market place. We judge this to occur when purely compe~jtive 
industries are confronted in the market by more powerful counterparts 
which prove to be oligopsonistic in their purchases. When the 
oligopsonist exercises superior skill, knowledge or power to arti-
fically depress his cost curve, he is depressing the revenue curve 
of the supplier. 
"This must not be permitted to happen to agriculture 1 ! " Let us 
stabilize the price or average revenue curve with buttresses from the 
social model of perfect competition. We can increase product homo-
geniety with a proper system of grades and standards. We can im-
prove the level and distribution of knowledge among all parties by a 
functional system of market news and marketing information. We 
can increase factor mobility by socially subsidized education and 
financing. We also can facilitate freedom of entry and exit with 
proper financing, and with Homestead Act rationales and re-training 
programs. Oh, there seems to be no end to the devices that can be 
employed, and we may point with pride to our accomplishment when 
in classrooms we recite the instances wherein agriculture displays 
the characteristics of pure competition. It is now much safer for 
farmers to sell their hogs to local markets than it is for them to 
sell their automobiles to used car dealers. 
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But what has this done to agriculture, or more specifically to 
the entrepreneur in agriculture, who responds to the lure of pure 
profit just as readily as does any entrepreneur anywhere? While 
we have afforded him protection by stabilizing his average revenue 
curve in a competitive market we also have, by fixing the price line 
to both individual buyers and sellers, denied him opportunity to 
achieve price-cost non-tangency by trying his skill with the price 
line o No doubt it is true that farmers have lacked the skill and 
power to do much but lose ground had they been permitted to try, but 
is it not interesting to note how they no longer cry out vigorously for 
protection, but for the opportunity to try? While free-for-all with-
holdings may still not have much more likelihood of success than 
before, astute groups are attempting more surgical approaches with 
specialty crops; and licensing ideas and similar plans receive the 
serious attention of sophisticated planners o 
But what is important to the argument here and now is that the 
opportunity for pure profit to farmers has, over the past half-century 
been carefully identified by a series of public programs to be a 
matter of mastering cost curves. 
And the best-prepared farmers have taken the most obvious route; 
that is by acquisition of land to achieve economies of scale. 
Not only does continuing inflation assist in following this route, 
but it is simpler, easier, than working longer and harder, reading 
industriously to build a stockpile of technological understanding, 
or thinking hard enough to become the county's leading innovator. 
Certainly all these desirable entrepreneurial attributes have developed 
too, but my position is that economies of scale have provided the 
most obvious route to cost-cutting, and the public programs of the 
past half-century have helped to point the way. 
We have tended generally to regard agricultural people as a 
group of information-receivers needing only the Gospel of What-and-
How to lead them to better lives. Perhaps this has been true, and 
certainly the evangelical programs that have arisen to help farm 
people receive the message have been workable, generous and 
charitable o But I do not believe we ever concerned ourselves too 
. much with the implications of there being outright information-hungers 
sprinkled among the information-receivers and interested by-standers. 
No matter whom the information is intended to assist, it is the infor-
mation-hunters who get it most and use it best. For example, a two 
percent sample of the mailing list for our monthly extension publica-
tion, Economic Information for Ohio Agriculture, discloses that the 
percentage of farmers who receive it has declined to 40 percent o The 
other 60 percent is made up of bankers, brokers, investment counselors, 
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farm equipment dealers, fertilizer companies, manufacturers and pro-
cessors, county PCA's and SCS offices, and here and there a teacher. 
We have set a pack of hounds in motion with our information~ 
and now they go baying down the hot trails in the damp, still night. 
Some are away in the lead while others cry over lost trails far be-
hind; trails they never found, and never will. Certainly, the system 
of public information for agriculture can take as much credit for 
creating misery among the losers as it can for blessings dispensed 
among the winners. Now with gathering momentum, and joined by 
hounds from other kennels, the leaders rush down a trail that leads 
to more concentration, more potentially undesirable characteristics 
of imperfect competition, and in far more uncomfortable proportions 
than is true of most industries today. 
All that is needed to bring us to the point of re-appraising our 
mutated agriculture is effective product differentiation, effective 
restrictions to entry, and some central decision-making authority. 
Agriculture will have arrived, but its identity will have been lost. 
Capital requirements, technology, and management demand already 
are posing substantial barriers to entry. The advent of direct market-
ing, corporate ownership, integration, contracting, and the brand 
names of the integrators can provide the central decision-making 
authority and the product differentiation. It can also erase the 
familiar identity of agriculture and replace it with the image of a 
Weyerhauser tree farm. 
I do not wish to register with you simply a concern for the mere 
presence, per se, of corporations in agriculture. What is worth 
exploring is the implications to the total system of the injection of 
massive amounts of investable funds and superior management skills 
into the upper end of the agricultural production spectrum. It is 
only incidental, though not innocent of portent, that astute corpor-
ations happen to possess large quantities of both of these inputs. 
What is not incidental, and certainly not innocent, is the nature 
of problems that potentially emerge in terms of the holy-trinity, if 
you will, of structure, performance and conduct. The problems 
emerge into a technological society that has other problems also to 
consider and is more than ever capable itself of central decision-
making. It is also a society that has other demanding uses for land, 
and has a growing tendency to become impatient with a misperforming 
and militant sector that holds little policy-making authority but 
controls too much of a basic factor of production to be trusted with 
it. I think it would be interesting to present for your consideration 
sometime an argument which might be entitled: "The Circumstantial 
Evidence Supporting the Feasibility of Socializing Agricultural Land." 
It is not a possibility that I like to contemplate, but it is one we had 
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better explore, if for no other reason than that we would wish to 
devise a better possibility, in order that public control does not 
pick up the marbles by default. 
However justified they may feel their attitude to be, I believe 
farmers take a very inexpedient tack when they voice militant demands 
concerning their rights and privileges. However much we may 
sympathize with their complaints, nor no matter how much their out-
cries reflect a broader-based unrest and turmoil, what they are asking 
is dangerous it seems to me. No economic sector has inherent rights; 
only those that society chooses to give. What they are asking when 
they plead, for example, for permissive legislation to bargain, license 
or withhold, is for public recognition that the social model of perfect 
competition is unwanted and should no longer be employed in their 
behalf. They ask that legislation make public the record of official 
denouncement of the model that has been the bas is for public attitudes 
toward agriculture over the past century. One cannot ask this without 
expecting a certain consistency of action to go with the requested 
new public attitude. One cannot ask that monopolistic competition, 
with oligopoly opportunity, be the order of the day without also 
expecting confrontations with regulatory forces heretofore largely 
held at bay. One cannot expect continued dis proportionate receipt 
of facilitating programs once one has been granted the opportunities 
of a structural form capable of taking care of itself. 
These considerations provide room for interesting conjecture about 
the future role of certain facilitating services close to our hearts. 
Namely, what is the role of the agricultural college, the agricultural 
experiment station, the agricultural extension service, the Department 
of Agriculture--if the agriculture it serves wishes to be known as 
a big boy; independent, capable, self-reliant? It is not satisfactory 
to say that the same old demands for information will remain. That 
may be. But the same old excuse for providing it will not remain. 
It is probably not unreasonable to speculate that perhaps the modal 
group of agricultural economists who expect to complete careers as 
agricultural economists in domestic public service has already been 
trained. 
I do not believe this is true, however, of rural sociologists, 
whose presence in our departments over the years often has done little 
more for agricultural economists than to constitute occasional assurance 
that, in the pecking-order of the professional heirarchy ~ agricultural 
economists could be worse off. Everett Rogers once referred to agri-
cultural economists and rural sociologists 11 as close bedfellows with-
out much academic intercourse. 11 I suspect that, not only has the 
modal occurrance of rural sociologists yet to appear, but that in the 
f1..1ture some academic intercourse must occur if we expect our research 
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offspring to provide meaningful solutions to many of the real problems 
we are about to encounter with the agricultural economy and its chang-
ing social setting. 
I would re-emphasize in closing that the changing structure of 
agriculture and the implications to resource requirements, interregional 
and international competition, market performance, and investment 
opportunities or the lack thereof, are not separately identifiable or 
even the central problems we are about to confront. I believe that 
in the coming decade we will be participating in social self-examina-
tion and appraisal of the multiple bases on which, over the years, we 
have judged the equity of apportionment of wealth, income, Tights and 
privileges. We are finding many of our precedents less than completely 
satisfactory. We are entering upon a period when we may regard 
none of them above scrutiny and re-evaluation. I confess that this 
frightens me: I am already a programmed social animal somewhat like 
the Londoner who preferred not to read the New York Times because 
it got him 11 all mixed up. 11 
What are the implications for marketing and management research? 
They arise in the recognition that marketing and management research 
have tended to make their most substantial contributions in times of 
stable social attitudes about economic performance; times when policy 
alternatives were identified and defined with reasonable certainty 
that these were in fact the relevant alternatives. I expect the research 
of the coming decade, whether microscopic or magnificant in scope, 
to predominate in wcrk with strong sociological and policy overtones. 
I would encourage agricultural economists to recognize how, more 
and more, we have reduced our discipline to schools of technicians 
adept at assessing the performance of this bearing or that drive shaft 
in quite a spectacular piece of machinery, but often to the detriment 
of their ability to assess the performance of the total machine. As we 
enter upon a no-man's land of no rules and new rules in observing 
the interrelationship of society and economy, let us remember that 
economics is a discipline in perspective -- one of the very few 
disciplines in perspective that exists. 
When Winston Churchill assumed his duties as Prime Minister 
during World War II, he had occasion to say: "I have not become the 
King • s first minister in order to pres ide over the liquidation of the 
British Empire. 11 Some observers of the passing scene have remarked, 
however, that that is precisely what Sir Winston did nevertheless, and 
that perhaps the surgery of subsequent years might restore a view of 
realism and relevance to the leadership of the Empire. Perhaps we 
have performed a similar function these past three days. Perhaps we 
have been presiding over the liquidation of cherished traditions and 
useless illusions about a changing empire. For the sake of our effec-
tiveness in confronting the problems of the future, let us hope so. 
